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If the breadth of this work accomplished anything, it was because of the free-
dom afforded by its funding. Much research does not allow such unfettered
exploration. That is especially the case with environmental research. As of
the late 1990s, environmental research in the Netherlands was largely contract
research. Environmental research projects drew funding in the form of con-
tract research 50-70% of the time, while the average across Dutch universities
was 25-30%.1 The outcome was policy-oriented works aimed at immediate
application. Theoretical treatments on larger issues, including the interaction
of social, economic, and environmental spheres, which this work tackles as
environmental justice, saw little attention.
The research before you is some evidence that those times have changed.
Nevertheless, it bears noting that had the project and generous funding it
received been even moderately steered from the outset by a desire to create,
evaluate, and recommend a future-focused policy—Dutch or otherwise—the
path would have been tremendously different. This is certainly not to imply
that that outcome would have been in any way worse. It would be impossible
in any event to compare. If the outcome here, however, contributes both
to the environmental justice discussion and to the broader social and political
perspectives on environmental issues from which it draws, then future research
should make sure to make room for larger theoretical works within their policy-
minded funding.
There is an obligation that goes along with that too: to make sure to provide
sufficient training for researchers in all the fields that now so clearly come to
bear the “Green Discussion.” If there is one thing that studying environmental
justice has taught it is that no longer can researchers be only an environmental
lawyer, or an environmental economist, a student of social justice, or even
human rights advocate; one must now be all of those.
I doubt that the work at hand demonstrates that I personally have reached
that level of professional development in all those subject areas. If this is a
shortcoming of the work then it is one I admit with some pride. It was a
conscious decision taken early in the research not to “sharpen our gaze by
narrowing the focus.” With a mandate to examine the environmental justice
1Leroy, Pieter/Nelissen, Nico Social and Political Sciences of the Environment: Three
decades of research in the Netherlands. International Books, 1999, p. 21.
v
discourse in the U.S. and in Europe it became obvious during the course of
research that making tight comparisons would necessarily blind the reader to
the wider issues which were revealed when comparing the twin discourses more
broadly. Given that nearly all researchers come at environmental justice as
a side project, lead into the area by their main interests and predominant
academic discipline, there was both an opportunity and a need to start in the
middle for a change. In places, that may have necessitated a more cursorary
treatment of a topic than a specialist may have liked. Nevertheless, it is the
hope that this work identifies those areas clearly for such specialists who would
rather focus narrowly and do not have the ability in their current academic or
professional situation to read broadly.
At the expense of empirical conclusions or doctrinal recommendations this
work stands foremost as an introduction to environmental justice standing
abreast two very different continents. Similarities in living standards and
culture aside, the historical momenta of each have played tremendous roles in
shaping their legal landscapes and therethrough the picture of environmental
justice which they present. If environmental justice is indeed more than a
green-tint on social justice, or likewise the literal dirt left by the yet-unfinished
project against racial discrimination, then it needs to focus on and explain
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1 Prologue
Injustice, then, is simply
inequalities that are not to the
benefit of all. Of course, this
conception is extremely vague
and requires interpretation.
John Rawls
1.1 Motivating the Discussion
There have been twenty-two pieces of legislation proposed in the United States
Congress which attempted to codify environmental justice standards.1 All
have died in Committee negotiations. After two decades of discussing en-
vironmental justice—in the sense of the term that the pieces of legislation
utilize—no substantive U.S. federal law exists and none are on the horizon.
That is, there is no additional regulation on nor prohibition about clustering
environmental burdens, even when those clusters are centered around minori-
ties, or poor or at-risk.
The high-water mark for the environmental justice movement in the United
States as far as legislation was the procedurally-focused and much cited Ex-
ecutive Order 12898. The Executive Order is, however, a federal policy in
word alone, knighting environmental justice as a nobel cause but granting it
no sword or armour.2 This outcome has a visceral connection with the state of
1Including but not limited to: agreeing on a H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess (1993),
(The Environmental Justice Act of 1992); H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), (The
Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993); and S. 1841, 103d Cong., 2d Sess (1994), (the
Public Health Equity Act); cf. Lambert, Thomas/Boerner, Christopher Environmental
Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions. Yale Journal on Regulation, 14 1997 and
Jaffe, Seth D. The Market’s Response to Environmental Inequity: We have the solution;
what’s the problem? Virginia Environmental Law Journal , 14 1995.
2See Section 5.4.4. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), who oversees the
U.S.’s compliance with its environmental obligations and therefore has guidance over the
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the environmental movement in general; there are achievements in recognizing
much about the way modernity manages the environment but very limited
motion in changing the management. More specifically, efforts for environ-
mental justice to borrow existing policy weapons from both the environmental
movement proper and from the powerful civil rights movement brought demon-
strably little success,3 failing in a broad way to ignite the problems of clustered
pollution into a firestorm of legislative reforms the way that the more general
problems of pollution swept like a wildfire over the legal landscape. Among
the reasons for the failure is the stinging criticism that there is little hope in
crafting effective policy though when we have “little empirical verification of
the true extent of the problem.”4 The intervening decade has unfortunately
not reduced the truth of that statement or delivered new requisite empirical
data.5
And all of this in the country where the environmental justice movement got
its start. What should one conclude from the fact the the environmental justice
discussion failed equally to reach critical mass in Europe, although it did sprout
and leave new tangential roots? With such an ostensibly negative outlook,
why should one read—or write, for that matter—a(nother) book espousing
legal opinions and options toward addressing environmental justice? That is
to ask, why are we—economists, lawyers, sociologists, political scientists and
more—still talking about what it means to be environmentally just?
The simplest answer is that despite the external notes of pessimism the in-
ternal academic milieu remains quite comfortable. That comfort seemingly
derives from the multitude of paths toward environmental justice still to ex-
plore, paths that each academic field opened for discussants over the past
decades of trial-and-error on several continents. Identifying the problems has
been the easy part; many of these academic paths widen the definition of en-
vironmental justice, moving away from racial bias as the gravity in clustered
Executive Order, issued guidelines after the Order’s issuance specifically stating that the
order “does not change the prevailing legal thresholds and statutory interpretations under
[the National Environmental Policy Act] and existing case law.” See Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ) Environmental Justice Guidance under the National Environmental
Policy Act. Washington, D.C., 1997 – Technical report
3See Chapter 5. In general also Davy, Benjamin Essential Justice: When Legal Institu-
tions Cannot Resolve Environmental and Land Use Disputes. Springer, 1997
4Cutter, Susan L. Issues in Environmental Justice Research. Proceedings, Third National
Conference on GIS and Public Health, 3 1999, p. 525; See discussions of empirical problems
in Chapter 3.
5In fact, there is likely more that environmental justice research does not know now.
See Section 3.4.
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environmental burdens and rather connecting the outcomes the dynamics of
inequality in modernity. In doing so they greatly expand the scope of investi-
gation.6 Parts of the widened scope harken back toward the very early social
justice roots of environmental justice,7 while others stay closer to the advocacy
core, but dig deeper in bringing more objective tools to bear.8 And although
many more hurdles than practicable solutions have been identified the major-
ity of proposed paths have yet to be ruled dead ends. There is work here to
be done.
Given the many routes currently under investigation, how does one choose
to focus on one? More specifically, how can this work from the outset choose to
focus on a human rights approach? This work grounds its choice to come at the
problem from a certain direction in the underlying disfunction of environmen-
tal injustice–the disheartening expectations for a minority of the population
burdened with relatively more environmental problems. Even if their numbers
are not yet impacted by a specific environmental threat, the well-known abil-
ity of environmental burdens to move leaves them expecting to be in the path
of motion of burdens with their numerical disadvantage, along with any con-
comitant socio-economic disadvantages. That is, this research first explains
why environmental justice is a concern of human rights proportions before
searching for human rights answers.9 But for the broader community of legal
6Notably a special issue of Antipode (2009), discussing specifically the widening views
in sociology of the spaces of environmental justice, viewing more than just geographic dis-
tributions. See Holifield, Ryan/Porter, Michael/Walker, Gordon Introduction: Spaces of
Environmental Justice: Frameworks for Critical Engagement. Antipode, 41 2009, Nr. 4.
7Notably, Wenz, Peter S. Environmental Justice. SUNY Press, 1988. Also note early
German literature on pollution and unequal impact of effects: Jarre, Jan Umweltbelas-
tungen und ihre Verteilung auf soziale Schichten. Otto Schwarz & Co, 1975; Zimmer-
mann, Klaus Umweltpolitik und Verteilung: eine Analyse der Verteilungswirkungen des
öffentlichen Gutes Umwelt. E. Schmidt, 1985. Also from legal research see Gormley, W. Paul
Human Rights and Environment: The Need for International Co-operation. A.W. Sijthoff,
1976, and from economics Baumol, William J/Oates, Wallace E The Theory of Enviromental
Policy. Cambridge University Press, 1998 esp. p. 240-256.
8Inter alia, in the U.S. Bowen, William M/Atlas, Mark/Lee, Sugie Industrial Agglomera-
tion and the Regional Scientific Explanation of Perceived Environmental Injustice. Annals of
Regional Science, 43 December 2008, Nr. 4; Noonan, Douglas S. Evidence of Environmental
Justice: A Critical Perspective on the Practice of EJ Research and Lessons for Policy Design.
Social Science Quarterly, 89 2008; Cutter, Susan Hazards, Vulnerability, and Environmental
Justice. Earthscan, 2006;Bowen, William M Environmental Justice through research-based
decision making. Garland Publishing Taylor & Francis Group, 2001; in Europe, especially
the social health dynamic, Elvers, Horst-Dietrich/Gross, Matthias/Heinrichs, Harald The
Diversity of Environmental Justice: Towards a European Approach. European Societies,





scholars and environmentally-inclined researchers who take issue with human
rights approaches, this book still has something to offer by touching on and
summarizing a wealth of literature in and surrounding environmental justice
while making its case for a rights-based solution. This is a auxiliary outcome
stemming from the project’s mandate to investigate environmental justice from
the inside outward in both the U.S. and in Europe.
The parallel literature evaluation carries the main methodological goal as it
moves through the established environmental justice canon. By discussing at
length the shortcomings of the more established and more examined routes to-
wards environmental justice while keeping in mind the expectation of some de-
gree of relative political and legal weakness on the part of the groups concerned
about injustice, the research exposes that a rights-based approach is both more
comprehensive of the generating phenomena of injustices and a more coherent
tact for environmental justice realization, laying as it does within relatively
well-tested boundaries of law.10 Whether or not a researcher agrees fully with
this conclusion, this thesis still provides a taking off point for their own work.
To that end, extensive references toward priming a counter literature review
are provided.
Also important is that the multitude of paths toward environmental justice,
paths which travel over many scenarios which would decrease disproportion-
ate environmental burdens11 have come into view as researches have pulled
upward and outward from the tight zoom on the U.S.-centered environmental
justice movement. This work continues this trend by straddling the conver-
sation in Europe and the U.S. As researchers pull the focus back, however,
there is some natural sacrifice in resolution power as well as in directed aca-
demic momentum. That is not to say that the wide-angle has stopped case
studies and smaller scale, policy-focused investigations.12 Nevertheless, the
10See Chapter 4.
11Noting early the criticism that “disproportionate” needs a comparator group, something
that most environmental justice studies never state explicitly. Noonan.
12Recent dissertations provide an excellent example of this, including: Oemrawsingh,
Sangini Tilottama Human Rights and the Environment Interlocked: Dealing with Environ-
mental Problems in a Human Rights Setting. Ph.D thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam,
2008; Kruize, Hanneke On environmental equity: exploring the distribution of environ-
mental quality among socio-economic categories in the Netherlands. Ph.D thesis, Univer-
siteit Utrecht, 2007; Fraser, Leah Marie Participation and policy: A case study of envi-
ronmental justice government-social movement interaction. Ph.D thesis, University of Cal-
ifornia, Irvine, 2005; Ottigner, Gwen Ellen Grounds for action: Community and science
in environmental justice controversy. Ph.D thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2005;
O’Neil, Sandra George Environmental Justice in the superfund clean-up process. Ph.D the-
4
1.2 Hypothesis and Methodology
loss in general resolving power of a wide-angle view has largely stymied the
progression of academic musings toward general practicable applications. It is
therefore important that this work do more than summarize where environ-
mental justice has been and catalogue the various paths which are open to
forward motion; it concludes on a theoretically practicable application. The
be fair, however, the scope of the work falls short of a discussion on moving
toward that implementation. Agreement with the conclusions herein on the
desirability of a human-rights approach necessitates an immediate follow-up
discussion on the institutional ramifications of such a change, migrating as it
does pieces of current regulatory frameworks and environmental oversights to-
ward the human rights institutions. The practical component is left for future,
but immediate, work.
To summarize then the primary mission of the work is to defend to the reader
the application of fundamental rights—human, constitutional and civil—in an
environmental direction as a practical, established, and cohesive approach to
protecting against the realities of environmental injustice. The application is
based on a comparison of the outcomes of the different ways in which Europe
and America have utilized—and blocked—their existing rights-protections in
environmental directions and their ability to prevent the shifting of environ-
mental burdens toward a minority of society. Hopefully, the arguments here
will both serve as roadmap and pave a certain road toward future human rights
approaches to environmental justice protection.
1.2 Hypothesis and Methodology
This thesis tests the hypothesis that the problems fomenting themselves as
environmental injustices can more completely solved by operationalizing exist-
ing rights toward environmental ends. The concept of extending protections
from extant rights into green areas is known broadly as a derived environ-
mental human right (derived-EHR). To support the hypothesis, the research
takes the following methodology. First, the hypothesis itself is derived from a
wide reading of the literature revealing the democratic and economic dynam-
sis, Boston College, 2005;Schweitzer, Lisa Environmental Sacrifice Zones: Risk and Trans-
port in Southern California. Ph.D thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 2004. On
drawbacks to constant focus on policy-oriented environmental studies, see Leroy, Pieter/
Nelissen, Nico Social and Political Sciences of the Environment: Three decades of research
in the Netherlands. International Books, 1999.
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ics which foment the problem now known as environmental justice (Chapters
2,3). Simply positing a human right to solve a problem is an overuse of the
rights discourse; the problem must exist in the realm of problems traditionally
addressed by the liberal rights canons. The investigation of environmental
justice though shows that one should expect disproportionate distributions of
burdens, or at a minimum a degree of clustering, and that they are more likely
to affect a minority of the population, including the traditional areas focused
on by environmental justice research like lower income and racial minority
populations. That established, the injustice problem reaches to the level of a
human rights issue because the numerical and power insufficiencies of the af-
fected groups will necessarily make the situations difficult to address politically
and/or legally.
The ubiquity of the environmental injustice problem, both theoretically and
in practice, is illustrated here by the literature of the movement itself,13 serv-
ing both as a bridge to helpful economic theory which quantify the injustice
and as the background necessary for the comparisons between the U.S. and
European.14 The background also introduces the forms some attempts at ad-
dressing environmental justice have taken, all of which have had less success
than the ubiquity of the problem should garner. The European approach,
however, has done noticeably better in addressing the underlying mechanics
of the injustice problem by emphasizing existing individual rights. It is in
fact these established, protected areas which are impacted by the tilting of
environmental burdens toward smaller and less powerful groups.15 As it is the
ubiquity of the problem which raises environmental injustice to the level of
rights-based analysis there remains in the wake of the past experience little
reason to believe that non-rights-based methods could be a more ready solu-
tion or a more complete attack on the foundation of the problem.16 Therefore
the environmental justice problem is shown to be both an issue calling on and
impacting fundamental rights and only ineffectively and inefficiently soluble
by non-rights methods.
13Chapter 3.
14For the interested reader, the outcomes from this approach finds strong parallel support
in the extensive theoretical derivations of Davy. Davy, Benjamin Essential Justice: When
Legal Institutions Cannot Resolve Environmental and Land Use Disputes. Springer, 1997.
15Chapters 4 and 5.
16Such is only strengthened when viewed in full on top of the regulatory state. As this
research does not dig deeply into the interplay of individual state’s regulations it leaves the
hypothesis in its stronger form.
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This is supported by showing how many the benefits identified in the EHR
literature and illustrated by the actual jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) succeed in addressing environmental justice con-
cerns. Instead of predicating a new substantive right to the environment on
some objective measurement of quality, such as on an acceptable magnitude
of risk or exposure or on even more vague notions such as “satisfactory” envi-
ronment, the European derived-rights approach simply but actively recognizes
the myriad ways in which environmental quality impacts the established liberal
canon of rights. This is only the lower bound; the jurisprudence bringing envi-
ronmental concerns into a nexus with more positive, second-generation, rights
pushes protections closer to realization of an EHR and by extension does more
to protect the disempowered individual from environmental injustices.17 Even
without further elaboration, however, the derived-rights so far illustrated en-
compass more of the generating problems of environmental justice than any
other approach. This statement finds much support in a comparison to a sim-
ilar U.S. approach, from which the concept of environmental justice emerged,
but which focuses narrowly on anti-discrimination protection instead of the
multi-axial rights overseen by the ECtHR.
Notably, as this is a first attempt at working the mechanics of derived EHR
rights into protecting against environmental injustice this work does not at-
tempt to hold the conclusion up as the best solution, nor will one find an
attempted proof that this is the solution to the myriad problems and cir-
cumstances identified in decades of environmental justice literature. In fact,
derived-EHR protections clearly do not go as far as environmental rights ad-
vocates would like, otherwise there would be no discussion on taking the next
step from derived to codified environmental rights. By extension, derived-EHR
protections then also do not provide as much armour as some environmental
justice proponents would desire. It nevertheless addresses the democratic and
economic problems underlying individual instances in a way which regulation
and policy cannot, thus making the fundamental rights approach both more
complete and more operational.
In summary, the thesis capitalizes on theory and evidence that the environ-
mental justice problem is larger than applied policy or faulty environmental
regulation and therefore moves research to question whether the beneficial
17The sociologist might recognize traces of intersectionality discourse here. It is not
addressed as such herein but merits noting the implicit parallels.
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outcomes in Europe with deriving environmental protections could aid in the
solution of environmental injustice problems in general.
1.3 Rationale
The investigation dictates that the research to proceed differently than other
environmental justice-centric works. At the level of analysis dictated by the
desire to have a broad comparison between very different regions one need
not establish the absolute magnitude of the problem, or the size of the envi-
ronmental injustice to see the potential for a problem for democratic society.
Thus, there is no empirical case study backbone here but rather a theoreti-
cal development. The first investigations (Chapter 2) establish the problem
that an environmental offense which falls on a minority of the populace will
be a problem for democratic participation and rights protection in general.
This chapter also addresses why engaging other aspects of established pro-
tection, like attachments to health impacts, will not be expected to supple-
ment a lack of environmental protection. The second investigation (Chapter
3) culls the economic literature to ground the first chapter’s illustrations on
well-established economic foundations which clearly illustrate the motions of
environmental distribution patterns. The failure of other existing attempts
to protect against injustices which form the corpus of environmental justice
literature within these two chapters accomplishes then the first research goal
of raising the environmental justice problem to the level of a failure to protect
basic rights.
With that in hand, common sense would steer policy makers toward estab-
lished levers of control not already deemed problematic or incomplete. When
dealing with a problem of this scope, control falls generally into two cate-
gories: control from above and control from below. The search starts here
with control from above, utilizing the environmental human rights literature
as an illustration of the “trump” card function. The search could just as easily
start from below but beginning here allows for an introduction and treatment
human rights-based environmental control in general (Chapter 4) and its func-
tion in Europe in particular. This construction seems more readable than a
journalistic catalogue of the various examples of regulation of environmental




The benefits of the broad human rights approach in Europe becomes clearer
when one picks up the experience in the US (Chapter 5). Thanks to over two
decades of experience in the United States, there is substantial material for a
comparison to be made and the lackluster results of attempts to utilize a single
fundamental right toward environmental protection stand in stark contrast to
the experience in Europe. While the experience is not particularly heartening
for an advocate of environmental justice in the U.S. it does serve an important
structural role in the development of an environmental justice-inclined rights
discourse. The revelation is that there is a surfeit of flexibility to extend
existing laws and protections into relevant areas.
The methods followed suggest at a minimum that one cannot expect a re-
newed or empowered version of environmental regulations or anti-discrimination
laws to eradicate the problems of environmental injustice. The problems sim-
ply run too deeply for any one method to fix. Flexibility and an individual
approach are both hallmarks of the European Court’s derived environmen-
tal protections and they come to the forefront in this analysis as well. They
function where other methods would be too rigid. This negative expecta-
tion for other methods finds background support both from the theory-based
democratic and economic discussion and from the evidence contained in the
experience in the United States. And while the analysis here is certainly not
conclusive that similar methods could not rectify injustices, it does present
major hurdles which would have to be individually surmounted.
Finally, while there are several works, jointly and severally, which catalog
the environmental justice literature, none do so with such an explicit focus
on operationalizing existing rights for environmental justice ends. Hopefully
the detail here will aid in the process of critiquing the hypothesis. Given the
flexible state of environmental justice research, criticisms either strengthening
the hypothesis or, perhaps, steering environmental rights research down a
separate path are both welcome. Conclusions thereto will naturally be the
discussion in the last chapter (Chapter 6).
In the final analysis, the efficacy of the derived protection is less impor-
tant at this juncture than the simple fact that analyzing it forces research
to first move upward and outward from the problem of environmental jus-
tice as it is currently tackled in any single field. The effort establishes a new
vantage point that is useful for later researchers and their own specific propos-
als (or counter-proposals) and is therefore of value in itself given the current
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state of environmental justice research. The specific conclusions in Chapter
6, while being first and foremost in the eyes of a specialist, take a backseat
to both the generalist and the newcomer to environmental justice research.
In pursuit of supporting its hypothesis the general discussion creates a useful
overview for new research and hopefully generates some momentum in those
directions. The conclusions move further away from the U.S.-centered model
and discrimination-centered perspectives and toward a broader view of the
fundamental rights which are impacted by the distribution of environmental
burdens. When that is the case, one can see that environmental justice is a





should not be identified with
freedom itself
Cass R. Sunstein
While the above sets out the motivation for pursuing this topic in general,
as well as the structure adopted to do so, it remains imperative at the outset to
set up a rationale as to why one could conceivably choose a human rights path
for environmental justice research. Given the emotional significance of any
justice issue, an emotion carried in even the briefest of introductions to the
environmental justice literature, one might worry that the choice to pursue
relief via rights aligns itself with a heavy moral significance. The reach for
rights has done so in the past and has at times capitalized on unwarranted a
priori acceptance.
A carte blanche search at a university library for “environmental justice”
immediately reveals legal, sociological, economic takes on the theme. Why not
attack—or continue attacking—the environmental justice problems via these
routes? This introductory chapter sets out the general rationale and moti-
vation on moving toward human rights.1 The environmental justice research
already accomplished, though lacking in many respects, reveals much about
the nature and prevalence of environmental justice-type issues. There is much
there to capitalize on and to re-position as a stepping stone towards the human
rights approach.
Most if not all of the current thinking on environmental injustice rests under
the social justice umbrella. Social justice is naturally a broad term though.
As no just society arguably exists, social justice research strives for a theory of
social activity which is coherently just. And as humans require resources from
1It does not, however, discuss the problems or costs of moving from the current systems
toward a rights-based system. It treats the two as already-existing structures. Research on
the transition though is quite necessary.
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and interact strongly with the natural environment a principle on how such
interaction can justly and equitably take place is a necessary part of the social
justice. That is all a large undertaking, requiring not only a definition of justice
but defining the coherence and dynamics of the system whose equilibrium
said justice even before one turns to the environmental interactions.2 The
idea of engineering a just society from the inside, via the hands which have
already been shaped by the social constructs in which they have evolved to
operate is a contentious issue however, pressed most coherently during the last
century from the liberal tradition and thinkers in the wake of Hayek.3 There,
protecting personal liberty, private property rights, and certain minimums of
enforcement becomes the best society can do for the human project; goals of
reforming interaction via projects of law are destined for lackluster results and,
when they are pressed for too long, abject failure.
This is the first and most general criticism of attempting an environmen-
tal justice project via tailored regulation and economic policy action. While
that literature itself is too large to serve as a starting point for this book it
serves to illustrate that the project of defining “justice” is not only large and
contentious but subject to foundational criticism as to the ability to reform.
As Gray4 notes, “[j]ustice does not speak with one voice.” Thus, this research
does not search for a theory of justice on which to hang environmental jus-
tice’s hat. In fact, any summary of the classical liberal tradition serves as
a forewarning to those who would engage environmental justice as a(nother)
means for defining a single set of values which, when properly enacted, are the
guiding principles for human flourishing.5 The human rights tradition however
sits at the crossroads of the two major philosophical branches of liberalism and
active social science. It could be viewed as part of the minimal legal structure
necessary for guaranteeing individual liberty or it could be part of the free-
doms given up to live in a coherent society. The details of the system of rights
2See Barry, Brian Why Social Justice Matters. Polity Press, 2005 for an introduction
before heading into specific theories of (politico-legal) justice, i.e. Rawls, John A Theory
of Justice (Original Edition). Belknap Press, 2005; Nozick, Robert Anarchy, State, and
Utopia. Basic Books, 1974, among many others in their wake. Also compare Gray, John
Two Faces of Liberalism. The New Press, 2000.
3See, especially Hayek, F.A. The Constitution of Liberty. University of Chicago Press,
1978. Also Gray, John Hayek on Liberty. Basil Blackwell, 1984, esp. p. 118.
4Idem Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 7.
5For an introduction to Gray’s political philosophy, see Ibid.; and constructive critiques
thereof in Horton, John/Newey, Glen, editors The Political Theory of John Gray. Routledge,
2007.
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naturally would determine which of the two branches it tends towards but
here at the outset merely allows for one way in which to justify the rapid move
toward examining human rights as a path in environmental justice directions
without grabbing tightly to any philosophical school.
Instead of wading into that larger discussion this work rather straddles the
debate to take as a starting point the idea that justice is the “enterprise of
pursuing terms of coexistence among different ways of life” and a “project of
reconciling the claims of conflicting values.”6 That is, after all, what environ-
mental justice is all about when striped of any historical and moral trappings:
finding a compromise between competing valuations of environmental usage
in a system that arguably tends to favour one side of the equation. Whether
the feeling of injustice is real of perceived,7 it has unarguably led to the long-
standing dissatisfaction with the system which choses how humans utilize and
protect the environment and therefore to continued attempts to reform the le-
gal character of the system, attempts which have met with no lasting success.
And so the umbrella of social justice remains currently where to locate the
sub-genre of thoughts on justice loosely referenced by environmental justice.8
The fact that so many disparate thoughts have been put forward under the
umbrella of environmental justice, coming from the larger set of ideas in social
justice, leaves some hesitation in dubbing the concept a field. There is as yet
no way to be sure that the different flavours of environmental justice might yet
break off from their loose association and be absorbed into separate fields.9
That indeed might be beneficial for the directions some would have the topic
go. The reader will have their chance to weigh in on that general debate at
6Gray Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 33.
7For an introduction and analysis of the components of injustice, real and perceived,
and the momentum that the current system seems to press into the conversation, see Davy,
Benjamin Essential Justice: When Legal Institutions Cannot Resolve Environmental and
Land Use Disputes. Springer, 1997, esp. Part II., also p. 238.
8For a very recent “re”-introduction to the competing genres of thought within envi-
ronmental justice, tackled via the broadening social justice route, see Antipode (2009), vol.
41, no.4 especially Holifield, Ryan/Porter, Michael/Walker, Gordon Introduction: Spaces
of Environmental Justice: Frameworks for Critical Engagement. Antipode, 41 2009, Nr. 4;
Walker, Gordon Beyond Distribution and Proximity: Exploring the Multiple Spatialities of
Environmental Justice. Antipode, 41 2009, Nr. 4
9For discussion see Sze, J/London, J K Environmental Justice at the Crossroads. Soci-
ology Compass, 2 2008; Benford, Robert; Pellow, David/Brulle, Robert, editors Chap. The
Half-Life of the environmental justice frame: Innovation, diffusion, and stagnation In Power,
Justice, and the Environment. Cambridge, 2005. Also, discussing dilution effects of “main-
streaming” environmental justice: McCarthy, D Environmental Justice grantmaking: Elites
and activists collaborate to transform philanthropy. Sociological Inquiry, 74 2004, Nr. 2
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the conclusion of this book.10
With that being said, it is permissible to take the next step toward justi-
fying a human-rights analysis of environmental injustice. It is a small step
from any point in the social justice narrative towards democratic problems
that contribute to the expectation of and continued presence of a perceived
disproportionateness of environmental burdens. When one is searching for the
means with which to assure a conception of social justice one must, in a demo-
cratic society, turn to democratic principles themselves. When a problem by
definition affects a minority of the people in that society then there is a large
potential for failure of a democracy to take those concerns into account.
2.1 Democratic Problems
Where social justice takes a big bite of the “justice” picture, environmental
justice should start with a comparative nibble. Social justice discusses the
allotment of goods and services throughout society; focusing on environmental
issues allows for a smaller and more defined inquiry. And that smaller piece
is strongly impacted by outcomes of modern politics, especially in the western
democracies with well-developed regulatory states which are scrutinized herein.
Problems perceived in the distribution then likely have as a component a failure
of the political process. That is indeed the case with environmental justice.
There are echoes here fromWenz’ early advice that “[b]ecause environmental
concerns are uniquely global. . . theories of distributive justice are tested most
thoroughly for their comprehensiveness when they are applied to environmen-
tal matters.”11 The ubiquity of environmental injustice, even in societies who
make extensive use of redistribution policies, points at a unique failure to
recognize and address this particular manifestation of a distribution problem.
In not having a solid theory of justice on which to hang their analysis and
to use as leverage for achieving outcomes, environmental justice must rely
on existing political structures for achieving their ends. The literature has
shown only lackluster results here. This is likely due to the incompatible and
subjective nature of environmental usage, which plays havoc with any attempts
10Other areas where environmental justice might fall include under the heading of interna-
tional justice, if the momentum continues to be lead by legal scholars. See Ebbesson, Jonas/
Okowa, Phoebe, editors Environmental Law and Justice in Context. Cambridge, 2009.
11Wenz, Peter S. Environmental Justice. SUNY Press, 1988, p. xii.
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to overlay environmental situations onto any rule-based system of distributive
justice. As Gray notes,
“[w]hen communities contend for power over scarce resources, they
are likely to seek to justify their rival interests by arguments of
fairness. Where interests are at odds and political power is at
stake, shared principles are likely to yield incompatible judgements
of what justice demands.”12
Where incompatible judgments exist, rule-based definitions of democratic so-
ciety falter.
Without extant rules competing interests will argue over potential rules,
utilizing existing legal and political avenues as a fulcrum, exactly what one
sees in the environmental justice arena. But what happens when one of those
parties is a minority of society, a grouping which is, at a minimum, numerically
inferior and has the distinct possibility of being unable or less-able to compete.
In that case, the distribution of environmental quality becomes problematic
because one can then expect political structures (Chapter 2) and economic
realities (Chapter 3)to disallow and/or disadvantage a minority in the societal
dialogue toward peaceful coexistence.
Minority here need not imply a racial or socio-economic group as it does in
most environmental justice work, although in practice it often does. Minority
in this sense simply means a numerical minority which in general impacts
influence and in particular impacts voting. The remainder of this chapter
explore why this numerical minority status is such a problem.
2.1.1 The Ability to Impact
Democracy, to cut to the quick, requires two parts to form a relevant gover-
nance structure and therethrough work toward any concept of justice: majority
rule and minority rights. While the first portion is generally less contentious,
owing to the relatively few ways in which decisions can be agglomerated,13
the latter has required more iterations in political reasoning. There was early
recognition that protections needed to be placed in common rule to stop the
12Gray Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 7; Note the similar sentiment in Davy, as well as
echoes of of Stiglerian public choice theory where rival groups will be locked in a zero-sum
game for capture of public goods; in this case, that is the assigned usage of the environment.
13Although there is a notable literature with the field of economics on the relations
between preference aggregation methods like voting and outcomes.
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exploitation of citizens by their own government.14 More recent attempts at
explaining and justifying democracy stem from the need to allow free individ-
uals to express their preferences and allow input into decision making.15 The
individual may lend their voice to a government, but the aggregate dynamic
from which the sovereign power rises needs to leave room for the individual
dynamic itself, for this is where the capabilities needed to build the sovereign
of tomorrow grow. It is this reasoning which has echoes in the kind of for-
mal legal consideration, and notably at the highest levels of human rights law,
which plays a central role in the coming chapters.16 Democratic participation
is necessary for authentic governance and situations where information held
by a minority in the participating populace cannot be heard or utilized do
damage to the democracy as a whole.17
Since the revolutions of the 18th century,18 human political progress has
moved toward functional majority rule and minority protections. The former
aspect, majority rule, has taken generally the same forms across the “Western”
world while the latter aspect of minority rights has tended to incorporate a
“universal” and “inalienable” character in its discourse, a search for a Platonic
form of human needs. A kinship with natural law and a search for the way the
world should be therefore unmistakeable. Indeed, the affinity of human rights,
constitutional rights, and civil rights begins here.19 But as legal scholars no
longer hold out the hope that there is a realm from which natural law descends
complete with instructions on how to protect minorities the question is not
to search for a revealed wisdom but how society makes decisions which may
place the interests of its citizens against one another.
It is quite clear that economic and financial logic does not free society from
14Dowding, Keith; Idem/Goodin, Robert E/Pateman, Carole, editors Chap. Are Democ-
ractic and Just Instutions the Same? In Justice & Democracy. Cambridge, 2004.
15Dowding, Keith/Goodin, Robert E/Pateman, Carole; Dowding, Keith/Goodin,
Robert E/Pateman, Carole, editors Chap. Introduction: between justice and democracy
In Justice & Democracy. Cambridge, 2004, p. 26.
16Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, 8 E.H.R.R. 103: discussing the function of free speech
in democratic society.
17inter alia Sen, Amartya Inequality Reexamined. Harvard University Press, 2004; Dowd-
ing; Barry
18With a brief hiatus in the 19th century as ideological movements undid much of the
individual focus, encouraging trading individual rights for group and social class, Osiatyński,
Wiktor Human Rights and Their Limits. Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 7, and to
some commentators into the welfare (police) states of the mid- to late-20th centuries.
19As William Blackstone discusses in his Commentaries,1 Commentaries 125 natural
rights are secured as private immunities, while the social contract that society “hath engaged
to provide” becomes secured in express in law and are therefore “civil privileges.”
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making decisions. The allowing of decisions to be made by economic forces
rather than democratic ones is what Robert Paehlke terms “economism.”20
Davy has similarly criticized the “doctrine of efficiency” for attempting to
make environmental decisions devoid of social content.21 While some of these
problems might fall away if government stepped away from regulation, in that
regulation is as often designed to fit a certain industries needs as much as it is
designed to protect the social good, and instead allowed for a more Coasian or
legal-based bargaining between collected individuals and a business-interest,
the current regulatory-state’s reliance on economism to justify decisions re-
mains distortionary. Most problematic is the impact that the distortion has
on the protected sphere of individual liberty in which democratic participation
grows.
Notably, the research at hand was conducted at a time while the world
descended into financial straits brought on by a storm of such “economism”
failures.22 A flood of investigative reporting in the wake of the ongoing lo-
calized wars and the tangle of exotic finances which now blanket the world’s
taxpayers in bailout debt help to illustrate ad infinitum how even arguably
well-functioning—deep markets with much information and many informed
participants— economic decision-making can spectacularly fail. Undeniably
that failure has landed on the shoulders of individuals, forcing them to deal
with fallout that they otherwise would not have.
In the current case, one might well argue that those affected in a global
financial crisis constitute a (vast) majority in the world, not a minority. But
the same is true of environmental justice. Again, environmental justice must
concern itself with the situation of “minorities” knowing full well that those
20Addressed in his book; Paehlke, Robert C. Democracy’s Dilemma: Environment, Social
Equity, and the Global Economy. MIT Press, 2004. The term and idea bear some similarity
to the views of the Physiocratic school of political economy, and in particular Françios
Quesnay, in which the economy moves according to natural (physical) laws removed from
democratic conversation. cf. Branco, Manuel Couret Economics Versus Human Rights.
New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 103. Also note Karl Polanyi’s use of the concept “market
society.” Polyani, Karl The Great Transformation. 2nd edition. Beacon Press, 2001
21Davy.
22Notably, popular books of the time, such as Naomi Klein’s “The Shock Doctrine: The
Rise of Disaster Capitalism ”, Klein, Naomi The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster
Capitalism. Picador, 2008; and Niall Ferguson’s “The Ascent of Money”, Ferguson, Niall
The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World. Penguin Two, 2008 among many
others showed some of the consequences of focusing tightly on what way “the economy”
would want to steer societies. Equally any attempt to use aggregate and average data on




affected are likely the majority of humankind.23 The meaning of minority here
therefore is a broad term invoking both racial and ethnic minorities within a
country but also groups whose socio-economic and financial means place them
in the power- and voting-minority.24
Justice research has established that there are certain “preconditions” that
must be met to enable a democracy to function on both majority rule and
minority protections,25 preconditions that can be hampered by reliance on
economic decisions. The need for personal discourse, as well as the benefits of
its abstract and often un-characterizable nature, plays a central roll in Nuss-
baum’s well-documented capabilities approach to justice, building justice amid
and amongst the temporal dimensions of citizens and their socio-legal-political
institutions.26 The European Court of Human Rights has also explicitly rec-
ognized the role of a protected sphere in which to form democratic decisions:
“Democracy requires that the people should be given a role.”27 That role must
be adequately protected from encroachment. Interference with the respect for
private life, where one develops democratic preferences, must be deemed nec-
essary.28 If such a sphere is necessary, and granting decision-making power to
economic forces reduces these spheres in which citizens grow in their citizen-
ship and make choices, then there must exist checks assure that those spheres
stay free.29
23See esp. Martinez-Alier, Joan The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecolog-
ical Conflicts and Valuation. Edward Elgar, 2002, p. 176
24By way of percentages, in the United States where environmental justice concerns
started, 1998 statistics found approximately 17% of poor households to be white, 34%
black, 30% hispanic. Hence, unless such number change dramatically, there will be some
significant overlap between poverty status and minority status relative to the environmental
justice discussion. See Bowen, William M Environmental Justice through research-based
decision making. Garland Publishing Taylor & Francis Group, 2001, p. 13. Simple numeri-
cal minorities follow easily from discussion of racial and socio-economic minorities, although
population alone does not determine significance, a theme repeated explicitly in geographical
economics, in Chapter 3, and Section 3.4.
25Hayward, Tim Constitutional Environmental Rights. Oxford University Press, 2005,
p. 146-148, and notes therein.
26Nussbaum, Martha Frontiers of Justice: disability, nationality, species membership.
Belknap Press, 2006, p. 78.
27from Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v. Turkey, judgement of 31 July 2001. 35 E.H.R.R.
3.
28“Necessary” is a high hurdle in the eyes of the ECHR: “. . . ‘necessary’ in this context
does not have the flexibility of such expressions as ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’, or ‘desirable’, but
implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’ for the interference in question. . . ” Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981, 4 E.H.R.R. 149, para 51. See also
Handyside v. United Kingdom; Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, 8 E.H.R.R. 103.
29For a recent and enlightening continuation on these themes, which unfortunately this re-
search can only touch on, see Holland, Breena Environment and Capability: A New Norma-
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It goes almost without saying that the rise of the environmentally regulatory
state confirms that environmental decisions are under “economism” pressures.
One can find ready support in environmental law literature, especially that
discussing the precautionary principle30 and cost/benefit analysis.31 So can
environmental problems have the same impact on the protected spheres as
these other problems? Research shows yes, definitely. Continued alignment of
environmental dis-amenities with certain groups of people certainly impacts
their capacity for growth and development, and may even impact their ability
to assess their potential needs. Kristin Schrader-Frechette notes, in deriving
duties for environmental justice from democratic needs, that “urgent, eco-
nomic survival, has provided [burdened groups] less time for the important
democratic citizenship.”32 It also is a central theme in Holland’s recent work,
illustrating that “. . . because certain environmental conditions are necessary
for producing and sustaining these material things, and indeed for making
all the human capabilities possible, I [. . . ] establish these environmental con-
ditions as an independent ‘meta-capability’. ”33 The intellectual tradition
for this line of argument takes off from the now-established work of Sen and
Nussbaum.34 Indeed, this sort of cognitive adaption to prevailing realities
might even be an explanatory factor in the relatively low interest in environ-
tive Framework for Environmental Policy Analysis. Ph.D thesis, The University of Chicago,
2005;Holland, Breena Justice and the Environment in Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach”:
Why sustainable ecological capacity is a meta-capability. Political Research Quarterly, 61
2008. Holland (p. 323, 2008) explains the sphere-reducing imagery in the larger context
of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as occurring “. . . because these systems do not deliver
these materials [basic capabilities] regardless of our impact on them, a just society must
protect their functional capacity to carry our such activities such as food production, waste
absorption, disease control, and maintaining the chemical composition of the atmosphere.”
Note also Richard Dworkin’s attention to how racism and prejudice can impact democratic
functioning: Dworkin, Richard Taking Rights Seriously. Harvard University Press, 1978
30Sunstein, Cass Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2004.
31Inter alia, and focusing on the environmental justice literature, Kruize, Hanneke/
Bouwman, Arno The Distribution of Benefits and Costs of Environmental Policies: A Case
Study on the Distribution of Environmental Impacts in the Rijnmond Region, the Nether-
lands. Utrecht, 2003 – Technical report; Kiel, Katherine/Zabel, Jeffrey Estimating the Eco-
nomic Benefits of Cleaning Up Superfund Sites: The Case of Woburn, Massachusetts. The
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 22 March-May 2001, Nr. 2-3; Foreman Jr.,
Christopher H. The promise and peril of environmental justice. Brookings Institution Press,
1998.
32Schrader-Frechette, Kristin Human Rights and Duties to Alleviate Environmental In-
justice: The Domestic Case. Journal of Human Rights, 6 2007, p. 121 (emphasis omitted).
33Holland Political Research Quarterly 61 [2008] , p. 320.
34Inter alia Sen; Nussbaum, Martha/Sen, Amartya The Quality of Life. Oxford University
Press, 1993; Holland, a student of Nussbaum, serves as the environmental synthesis: Holland
Political Research Quarterly 61 [2008] .
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mental protection shown by the poor.35 When one is struggling with more
pressing economic survival issues, what energy is left to create a wish-list for
environmental improvement? Moreover, what energy will be spent to make
democratic decisions on environmental policy? As discussed below in Section
2.2, the fact that environmental impacts reveal themselves most strongly in
the future and therefore incentivize current democratic choices only through
a certain discount factor, becomes another illustration of problems for capa-
bilities development. These results remind us that protecting citizens, and
perhaps more strongly, protecting those in a minority subjected to the (envi-
ronmental) decisions of the majority, serves a function in a democracy and is
therefore more than a “green” or moral imperative.
Assuming for the moment that there is not a problem with the system of
majority rule in place today, the myopia of both the market and the incentives
intrinsic to political structure which allowed it to come to fruition36 have the
distinct and demonstrable ability to operate against minority spheres. This
has been a concern at the highest level of justice literature and environmental
problems have been shown to impact the same spheres that generated the
concern for researchers of justice.37 Moreover, the problem is dynamic and
once in action continues to winch against the minority.38 Barring for the
35Sunstein, Cass R. Free Markets and Social Justice. Oxford University Press, 1997,
p. 257.
36Illustrated and explored by economists like Mancur Olson, e.g. Olson, Mancur The
Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities. New
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1982; idem Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Com-
munist and Capitalist Dictatorships. Basic Books, 2000; to George Stigler, e.g. Stigler,
George The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management
Science, 3 1971; and political scientists like John Gray, e.g. Gray, John False Dawn: The
Delusions of Global Capitalism. Granta Books, 2002, p. 199. Also note Revesz, Richard L.
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis. Harv. L. Rev. 115
2002.
37On the latter point, focusing on inequality’s effect on development, see Wilkinson,
Richard Mind the Gap: Hierarchies, Health, and Human Evolution. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2000; Wilkinson, Richard D. Unhealth Societies: The affliction of inequality.
Routledge, 1996.
38Methods of action have all been proposed from many different fields which land mi-
norities in this predicament. Steven Pinker, a psychologist, observed that society cannot
be simultaneously free [to make choices], fair [ruled by laws and fairly represented], and
equitable [guided by shared principles of fairness]. Pinker, Steven The Blank Slate: The
Modern Denial of Human Nature. Penguin, 2003 David Donnison, a sociologist, observed
in a report specifically on social justice to the British government, conveyed that the “in-
justice machine” has many different functional parts or dimensions, all interdependent on
each other and each spinning towards increased injustice if they are not stopped simulta-
neously. Donnison, David Act Local: Social Justice from the Bottom Up. Commission on
Social Justice, 1994 (13). – Discussion Paper; and cited in Barry, p. 14. Economists speak
of a “race to the bottom” i.e. Sheldon, Ian Trade and Environmental Policy: A Race to the
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moment an investigation on how to restructure majority rule to address the
problem and the many concomitant problems that would arrive with such a
ground-up revision of society, one can only turn to minority rights in order to
balance modern democratic society.
Recognition of the problem is not entirely predictive of solutions, however.
Barry39 reminds us that “the need for really hard choices between [democ-
racy and justice] arises only if ‘democracy’ and ‘justice’ become greatly at
odds with one another; and the distance between them will deepen the nearer
societies are to being truly ‘divided’ . . . ” The division here is exactly the
world which social justice research worries is the reality of our world.40 If the
ratchet of environmental injustice is not a single mechanism but a combina-
tion of many injustices, operating on a divided people then a society can tick
towards division faster than any single problem would move. This then neces-
sitates “really hard choices.” With social justice research already identifying
and discussing many different mechanisms,41 environmental justice becomes
important not only in itself, but in the roll it plays in enabling the host of
other social problems.
In general, environmental justice has not been seen in this light however.
Instead of being a part of the more encompassing justice literature, or impact-
ing majority rule and minority rights through its hinderance on the latter,
environmental justice has been couched as a failure of law and regulation.
While law and regulation should have done more to address the environment
Bottom? Journal of Agricultural Economics, 57 2006, Nr. 3; Singh, Ajit Labour Standards
and the ’Race to the Bottom’: Rethinking Globalization and Workers’ Rights from Devel-
opmental and Solidaristic Perspectives. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 20 Spring 2004,
Nr. 1, and the pollution haven hypothesis. i.e. Copeland, Brian R./Taylor, M. Scott Trade,
Growth, and the Environment. Journal of Economic Literature, 42 March 2004, Nr. 1. Other
disciplines have joined together under the heading of “political ecology.” Hornborg, Alf/
McNeill, J. R./Martinez-Alier, Joan, editors Rethinking Environmental History. AltaMira
Press, 2007, and citations therein. Even studies in historical societies have revealed how
social structure and economic activities dictate the environmental situations of the culture,
which in turn determine whether the culture grows or slowly divides or dies due to declining
stocks of resources. Hughes, J Donald; Hornborg, Alf/McNeill, J. R./Martinez-Alier, Joan,
editors Chap. Environmental Impacts of the Roman Economy and Social Structure: Au-
gustus to Diocletian In Rethinking Environmental History. AltaMira Press, 2007; discussing
the Roman civilization; also Myrdal, Janken; Hornborg, Alf/McNeill, John Robert/Alier,
Juan Martnez, editors Chap. Food, War, and Crisis: The Seventeenth-Century Swedish




41See, again, Holifield/Porter/Walker and notes therein, as well as Barry, Brian Why
Social Justice Matters. Polity Press, 2005.
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situation in particular, the fact that social justice is already concerned with so
many other areas of detrimental impact on minority spheres of development it
is highly unlikely that regulation would have been able to address all pertinent
areas. As one’s ability to grow democratically shrinks, one’s participation in
democratic affairs shrinks concomitantly. Any solution to environmental in-
justice must be cognizant of this dynamic and actively address it. And rights
have been specifically developed to protect the minority sphere against the
many ways which the majority might impact it. Rights have not however, as
of yet, developed specifically to protect against how the majority can direct
the environment itself against the minority.
2.1.2 More than Regulation
This is the current environmental injustice situation: there are environmen-
tal problems extending from many angles of modern life, ranging in detriment
from innocuous to unlivable, but combining to create a landscape of distributed
burdens and benefits. Where the distributions have been perceived as dispro-
portionate, they have been catalogued by the environmental justice movement.
Why though does this create a problem which will reach to the level of human
rights? The first part of the answer is that the burden impacts the spheres
necessary for adequate democratic participation by all citizens. These are the
spheres supposedly protected by liberal rights and when left unprotected do
damage to principles of democratic governance. One might not need to go to
human rights fixes though, except on moral or completeness grounds, if other
forms of oversight rectified the problems and could restore the sanctity and
completeness of personal liberty.
The second problem then is the failure of regulation and law to fully ad-
dress the environmental problems in a way that shores up the protections.
Although one might still desire an environmental right to complete pantheon
of rights protection the need would not exist at juncture if there was a reg-
ulatory “patch.” Unfortunately though the cry for regulators to fix the mal-
functioning environment-machine comes with less energy than it once did. A
half-century removed from the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring42
and a plethora of agencies dedicated to environmental regulation distributed
through western governments sit in awkward silence staring out the bureau-
42Carson, Rachel Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962 (2002).
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cratic window at continued environmental degradation. Davy notes that it is
the distribution of agencies in fact that causes some of the problem. A uni-
fied planning policy, in his view, might side-step some of the gaps left in the
proliferation of oversight agencies.43.
Most crusades for fixing environmental burdens have equally focused on soli-
tary problems or incidences. Even where those are successful the unaddressed
problems continue to act against success, keeping any justice-minded goals on
a proverbial treadmill. The existence of a burden can influence the likelihood
of another burden moving with some gravity toward it,44 and the continued
success of preventing environmental problems in one area naturally put pres-
sure on other areas, both near and far, to host the burdens which they do not
want. The existing model of regulation thus has its work cut out for itself
if it wants to function in the protective capacity necessitated by the need to
protect the minority of a population.
The fact that the environmental justice “movement” remains most concen-
trated and cogent in the United States, a country which has Environmental
Justice enshrined as a goal by its Environmental Protection Agency45, makes
it difficult to hold out hope that simple regulation will in short order succeed in
fixing all interconnected problems. The intervening years and energy expended
should have yielded some forward-looking protections by now. At best, pro-
tection has come ex post and in isolated fashion. Changing the environment
after all “walks on two legs: one economic . . . ; two, technological.”46 With-
out a common, coordinating, and dynamic program, reacting to false steps or
stumbles of either leg, regulation aimed at individual legs leaves regulation ca-
reening in the circles of crisis one sees when reading the environmental justice
literature.
It takes political will to create a new or modified regulatory framework. It
takes even more will to create a unified framework given the need to com-
promise and build coalition support. Such political will has yet to emerge.47
Indeed, the trend in recent years has been toward splintered, special interest
political entities rather than a growth of an ideology inside an existing polit-
43Davy.
44See Section 3.4.
45National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC). See
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/nejac/
46Martinez-Alier, p. 5.
47Though the climate change and sustainability paradigms offer a hope for the immediate
future of a unifying force.
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ical party.48 But the failure to unify policy is not merely driven by partisan
politics inside individual countries. The world is now globalized. There is an
overlapping power and influence in the modern world, shared to some extent
and fought over to another between expanding circles of influence which cor-
porations and the classical power and influence of sovereign states share.49
Internal political problems and the ability to codify political will into policy
momentum are now compounded by external influences. And while this notion
could generate much discussion, here it is sufficient to note that the overlap-
ping spheres of influence come from more than just the power of the state.
That reinforces the proposition that it is highly unlikely that a single policy
reform—legal, environmental, civil, or international—can fully encompass the
situation.50
Consider how the regulatory state already compartmentalizes risks. As
White51 explains, “specific events or incidents attract sanction, while wider
legislative frameworks may set parameters on, but nevertheless still allow,
other ecologically harmful practices to continue.” The end result is a pock-
marked landscape of regulated, tolerated, and unregulated risks with each
pocket attracting its own independent level of oversight and continued atten-
tion. To require policy makers to grasp more firmly the risk-lever in making
environmental choices, aiming at equitable distributions of risks, would require
an entire reworking and, in many cases, de novo measurement, of the risks in
society.52 And that assumes control over all of those levels, something that
globalization belies.
Certainly there is ground to be covered by increased regulation, especially
48As an anecdote in this direction, Niall Ferguson notes that, at the turn of the current
century, there are twenty times more people involved with voluntary or self help groups in
Britain than with political parties. The combined membership of the three largest political
parties does even outnumber the membership of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
See Ferguson, Niall The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000.
Basic Books, 2001, p. 256.
49An idea codified prominently by Susan Strange; Strange, Susan The Retreat of the
State. Cambridge University Press, 1996. But compare Ratner, Steven R. Corporations and
Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility. Yale L. J. 111 2001, p. 462, comparing
a corporation’s power over its own employees and a single government’s regulation of that
power to the power corporations now exert over non-home States.
50The sentiment that the world in which we hope to effectuate change is increasingly
polycentric is shared by Philip Alston, a prominent commentator on human rights and from
whose work this research also draws. See Alston, Philip; Idem, editor Chap. The ‘Not-a-Cat’
Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accomodate Non-State Actors? In
Non-State Actors and Human Rights. Oxford University Press, 2005.
51White, Rob Crimes Against Nature. Willan Publishing, 2008, p. 91.
52For an introduction to risk as a legal concept in this vein, see Davy, p. 78-87
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environmental regulations focused on effecting environmental justice. The
point here is not to imply that regulation is wholly without benefit.53 Consider,
for instance, an expanded tax on consumer goods which builds the price of
waste disposal into the up-front costs, a system already at work in European
countries such as Germany and the Netherlands. Besides forcing consumers
to pay for their waste the tax inspires producers to minimize or eliminate
gratuitous packaging and harmful processing chemicals as they all will inspire
increases in cost that must be passed on, at least in part, to consumers.54
The imposition of such a tax in the U.S., for example, would not be without
environmental consequences. Regulation is not impotent.
Such policy however only addresses one problem. American goods consumed
overseas, for example, would not be under the purview of US law, and con-
sumer demand abroad would hike pollution at the production site. And this
is only one stylized example. The literature has many more.55 Without a
coordinating goal, increased regulation or political will cannot be entrusted to
solve an overdetermined problem. And until there is a supra-national coordi-
nating environmental agency, some of those problems will remain impossible
to determine within individual boundaries.56
Placing more burdens on the regulatory state, already burdened and in no
way fast-acting when it comes to weighing the wishes of many environmental
stakeholders is then at least arguably less attractive than finding a way to
empower individuals. Much has been said of the power of individuals in the
environmental justice movement itself.57 There are problems with grassroots
53For all the ways in which regulation has been successfully applied to individual instances
of environmental injustice, see most prominently, Gerrard, Michael B./Foster, Sheila R.,
editors The Law of Environmental Justice. 2nd edition. American Bar Association, 2008
54Barry, p. 82.
55E.g. Pellow, David Naguib Resisting Global Toxics. The MIT Press, 2007; Serret, Yse/
Johnstone, Nick, editors The Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy. Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2006.
56If true change is the goal however we must recognize the warnings of Mancur Olson
that “[t]he accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of regulation ,
the role of government, and the complexity of understandings, and changes the direction of
social evolution.” Olson The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation
and Social Rigidities, p. 73, also p. 47. The failure of key global players to ascent to the
Kyoto Protocol, the continued dispute about carbon emission regulation, and the debate on
returns to banking restrictions mentioned earlier in this chapter highlight the warnings of
Professor Olson and illustrate the current power of distributional coalitions over the desires
of individuals on the world stage.
57For discussion of grassroots power, see inter alia Bullard, Robert D. Confronting Envi-
ronmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots. South End Press, 1993. Much is also made
of the grassroots crusade in Hill, Barry E. Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Prac-
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organization, of course, but taking power into individuals’ hands is nevertheless
valuable relative to the complexities of global and domestic environmental
regulation.
Commentators have noted that “[w]hile international environmental law has
adopted more stringent standards, norms, and techniques for implementation
it offers little recourse to individual victims of environmental harm.”58 The
same can be said in national law and is especially visible in the U.S., where
regulations promulgated by agencies are not necessarily enforceable by indi-
viduals.59 The majority may make decisions, but what recourse is there for the
negatively affected individual, who is by definition the minority if the decision
was rationally taken? If the decision complies with existing regulation, and
therefore garners the appropriate permit, there is likely little for the individual
to do.60 The individual used to be a deputy of environmental enforcement,
the common coordinating principle around which policy is measured. This
was the case before environmental regulation moved that burden upwards in
to bureaucratic controls and technology and scale so eclipsed the relationship
between individual and industry.61 This is the contemporary situation with
which modern regulation and regulatory agencies has grappled, the diminution
of the individual relative to the regulated.
The weakness of the individual unfortunately extends below the regulatory
level, where it might be expected, as well. The environmental justice story
in the United States62 shows quite plainly that even creative uses of law, es-
pecially utilizing non-environmental protections toward environmental ends,
do not enable or empower aggrieved individuals or minority groups. Vicki
Been, whose work played a pivotal role in the empirical definition of dispro-
tice. Environmental Law Institute Press, 2009; also Cole, Luke W. Environmental Justice
and Entrepreneurship: Pitfalls for the Unwary. Western New England Law Review , 31 2009
58Dommen, Caroline; Picolotti, Romina/Taillant, Jorge Daniel, editors Chap. How Hu-
man Rights Norms Can Contribute to Environmental Protection In Linking Human Rights
and the Environment. University of Arizona Press, 2003, p. 105.
59See Section 5.3.2.4.
60A large discussion of the affect of permit shielding occurs in Davy
61Commentaries by Bruce Yandle can be helpful in seeing the contrast between environ-
mental policy control mechanisms and the common law or individual centric control. As an
introduction, see Yandle, Bruce Common Sense and Common Law for the Environment.
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997; also Meiners, Roger/Yandle, Bruce Common
Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy. Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 7 1999;
Meiners, Roger E./Yandle, Bruce Common law environmentalism. Public Choice, 94 1998
and Rose-Ackerman, Susan Controlling Environmental Policy: The Limits of public law in




portionate environmental quality in the formative years of the environmental
justice discussion63 similarly supports the likely ineffectual nature of single
or simple government policies toward the multi-causal environmental injustice
situation.64 While one must be careful with such statements not to imply that
simply because aggrieved parties have not by in large succeeded in changing
the status quo that they are indeed harmed, the continued feelings of injus-
tice, joined with the inability to realistically challenge the status quo must give
pause to the democratic mindset.65 If the individual is right, and moreover if
that individual is, as Professor Been and the rest of the environmental justice
literature help to illustrate, a minority or disadvantaged member of society,
and furthermore if they do have a concern about their place in the common
environment relative to larger utilizers, could they achieve change without an
ability to challenge the status quo at international or domestic law?66
Again, none of the preceding is to say that regulation is not capable of
solving problems, but rather that combined with a long history and established
scholarship on the science of regulation67 and the arguable trend away from
individual ability to address problems, there appears to be a hole devoid of
power into which persons may fall. Once in that hole they run the risk of
decreasing their opportunities for democratic growth and realistic influence.
Where regulation will not reach and individual access to legal instruments
becomes non-existent the only thing remaining is for a movement among the
aggrieved party or parties to influence or become the majority. As we discuss in
Chapter 3, it is unlikely that the problems of environmental distributions will
become a problem of the majority. If it did, then there would be a democratic
method for rectifying the problem. Because of the burdensome factor intrinsic
to all pollution, once it affects a majority it will not be allowed. This statement
implies that a good strategy for allowing pollution is to modularize it, keeping
each individual pollutive element a separate issue so that an aggrieved majority
never coalesces. Instead, subgroups of minorities fight the atomized burdens.
63See Section 3.5.2
64Been, Vicki Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportion-
ate Siting or Market Dynamics? The Yale Law Journal , 103 1994, Nr. 6.
65Again, the recent “expansion” of the environmental justice dialogue is anecdotal evi-
dence in this direction as well. See Holifield/Porter/Walker.
66For a more detailed introduction to the problems of challenging existing political and
economic structures’ utilization of the environment, see Hancock, Jan Environmental Human
Rights: Power, ethics and law. Ashgate, 2003, Chapter 2
67Including Stigler, George The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics and Management Science, 3 1971.
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Therefore and unfortunately, the minority must routinely influence the ma-
jority to effect change, a burden above and beyond the environmental burdens
with which they are grappling. Such an outlay has been described as “waste-
ful” in squandering time, resources, and trust.68 Squandering of trust also
leads to entrenchment of each side along emotional grounds and thereafter a
cessation of learning by which each side might move toward a compromise.69
Forcing the system to recognize the blind-spot of the overall distribution of
burdens is the manifestation of the “waste.”70
The following example helps to illustrate at the outset why influencing the
majority is so problematic. Here we introduce a type of environmental “bad”
which was prevalent in the early environmental justice discourse. The goal
of this short discussion is two-pronged. First is the common and relatively
non-contentious observation that the bargaining power is unlikely to be on
the side of the minority, or here the environmentally burdened. Much more
damaging though is the common-sense objection of why society should burden
the minority, who is fighting against disproportionate burdening, with the
requirements of organizing to conduct the fight.
2.1.3 LULUs and the Organizational Problem
At the outset it is clear that environmental burdens have the potential to
impact the protected sphere of individual liberty and thereby reduce their
democratic growth. It is moreover a concern if those burdens impact less
than a majority of the population as it leaves the particular minority in a
numerical disadvantage to push politically for change. The majority votes to
utilize a space for a purpose which will bring benefits to many but apply the
costs to a spatially-localized few. The spatiality of environmental usage and
the miracle of the modern interconnected, global market virtually guarantees
that the benefits of utilizing the space will accumulate to a wider audience
than do the burdens. And while the example to follow relies on “space” as a
geographic area, the concept of disproportionate burdens easily extends to a




71Consider the higher exposure of the poor to auto emissions although they are the class
with the lowest ownership of, and therefore least benefit from, autos. Such was studied in




Let us consider the arguments around Locally Undesirable Land Uses (LU-
LUs) and the related “Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) mentality. The acronym
appears simultaneously as a rallying cry for communities fighting to keep bur-
dens away from their neighborhood and in a pejorative sense by developers
and town planning boards who struggle with the cost and benefit sides to the
social problem and convincing the burdened to accept that burden. Here the
term is merely used to fix ideas.72 This spatial problem figured prominently in
the early environmental justice literature in the U.S.73 The basic idea is that
there are some land uses which are beneficial to society as a whole but bad for
those in proximity to the use. More concretely, LULUs can improve the tax
base of a community and bring new jobs although they do contribute a set
of burdens.74 A better tax base can bring new roads, parks, and even lower
taxes, a dynamic benefit which can catalyze growth in the community.75
Consider the possibility of individuals assenting to poorer environments for
these job and economic improvements. Such a situation “is not only unjust,
quality. Environment and Planning A, 35 May 2003, Nr. 5
72Other acronyms, such as ‘PIMBY’: Put It In My Backyard or ‘YIMBY’: Yes In My
Backyard, appear as campaign slogans of neighborhoods vying to accept LULUs for eco-
nomic reasons. Even more colorful, and less kind, acronyms, such as ‘BANANA’: Build
Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything, and ‘CAVE People’: Citizens Against Virtu-
ally Everything, land on activist groups when exasperated planning boards cannot win over
an empowered citizenry with cost–benefit analysis. NIMBY, however, covers the general
phenomenon without the obvious biases of the other terms and hence is the keyword for the
concept in the literature. More recently, groups have coined the term NOPE (Not on Planet
Earth), in response to activities that, while potentially economically lucrative, are seen as
too dangerous for any location. There is also a related title, called “Drawbridge Mentality,”
which describes the tendency for people to create certain bonds with that locale and want to
“pull up the drawbridge” behind them so that others cannot change or even have access to
what they have set up. It is often applied to people who move to either remote, unspoiled,
or relatively exclusive locations, as opposed to urban or suburban developments, but the
mentality a dislike of changes runs along the same spectrum in both. See further discussion
in Davy.
73Inter alia, Andreen, William L. Defusing the “Not in My Back Yard” Syndrome: An
Approach to Federal Preemption of State and Local Impediments to the Siting of PCB
Disposal Facilities. North Carolina Law Review , 63 1985; Brion, Denis J. An Essay on LULU,
Nimby, and the Problem of Distributive Justice. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law
Review , 15 1988;Been, Vicki What’s Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice
and the Siting of Locally Undersirable Land Uses. Cornell Law Review , 78 September 1993,
Nr. 1001;Idem The Yale Law Journal 103 [1994]
74Idem Cornell Law Review 78 [1993] , p. 1025
75For discussions and examples on the benefits brought through compensation for allow-
ing LULU activities see Lambert, Thomas/Boerner, Christopher Environmental Inequity:
Economic Causes, Economic Solutions. Yale Journal on Regulation, 14 1997, p. 214-21,




but also undemocratic, since such people are under an effective material com-
pulsion to accept, and bear the brunt of, decisions in a way that others are
not.”76 Thanks to this, and other77 economic dynamics, people can become
“environmental mercenaries:” one being paid to put their own body in the
path of unseen projectiles.78 Within the current system then the only way
around this is for the people already touched by the system-imposed burdens
to do more work.
The fact that the problem of a LULU (or NIMBY) exists though is evidence
of a certain failure in planning and the ability of the burdened to affect planning
outcomes. As Davy summarizes,
LULUs and NIMBYs challenge the conventional wisdom of envi-
ronmental and land use policy and law. The incapacity to resolve
disputes over the siting of noxious facilities raises doubts about the
legitimacy of social order, regulatory government, and the admin-
istrative state. [. . . ] LULU blockage is not only about the local
opposition against a prison, a power plant, an airport, or a haz-
ardous waste facility. It is about the viability of the “orthodox”
[efficiency] approach to the distribution of environmental amenities
and degradation, or, more generally speaking, about the sharing of
benefits and burdens.79
Moreover the phenomenon is quite widespread because LULUs can cover
territory outside of polluting activities also.80 Prominent among non–polluting
LULU facilities are homeless shelters, substance abuse centers, AIDS clinics,
halfway houses.81 These uses fall into the same conceptualization as noxious
76Hayward, p. 155.
77Discussed in Chapter 3.
78In which case, society is adhering to the modified version of “Thous shalt not kill”
proposed by Arthur Hugh Clough in ‘The Latest Decalogue’; “Thou shalt not kill; but need
not strive officiously to keep alive.” cf. Barry, p. 133.
79Davy, p. 173.
80As Robert Bullard noted, environmental justice is more than “just [waste] facility sit-
ing.” Bullard, Robert D. Environmental Justice: It’s More Than Waste Facility Siting.
Social Science Quarterly, 77 1996, Nr. 3.
81The term halfway house can have several meanings, depending on location, all with
varying degrees of LULU status. Also known as bail hostels in the UK, such facilities are
often locations where criminals, often approaching parole or release dates, are relocated
to for short stays as a “halfway” step toward rejoining society. In this use, they are also
termed “transitional facilities”. The term can also though refer to locations of refuge where
victims of household or domestic abuse or a variety of other dangerous situations can come
to and escape the problems. The thought of having either criminals or people escaping from
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land uses like landfills because the dangers, whether in the form of health
damage from environmental problems or feelings of personal safety near certain
facilities, are focused spatially on a neighbouring group while the benefits are
spread widely, and therefore also diluted in the minds of the spatially-local
group. The benefits accrue to society at large and appeal to those looking
to aggregate the positives for a cost/benefit analysis and an, in some sense,
efficient political decision.
For example—and as the first concrete illustrations of type of studies referred
to environmentally unjust—New York City studied the siting of homeless pro-
grams in 1989 and found them noticeably less prevalent in the traditionally
more wealthy neighborhoods. The study found that central Harlem, a histor-
ically black area, had more than sixty programs spread over only two postal
codes. The wealthy areas of the Upper East Side, Murray Hill, Greenwich
Village, SoHo, and Tribeca each had less than five.82 The same LULU clus-
tering appears in studies of the siting of houses for the mentally disabled, and
halfway houses.83 These non-noxious patterns of burdens then sit next to a
set of pollution correlations, such as general air quality correlations and socio-
economic status, which are a current illustration of environmental injustice.84
These statistics are only solitary observations, however, and due to different
methodology studies from different locations and cities are difficult to compare
between. Even when the pattern exists inside of the same country and/or reg-
ulatory structure it is difficult to compare and aggregate. Nevertheless, they
are tangible pieces of the story that brought up the potential problems of
spatially clustering burdens relative to the diffusion of benefits.
If the cluster of people subject to the burden wished to change the situation,
what could they do? When everyone is given a vote and the opposing sides can
voice the pros and cons to all the majority voice speaks. The minority vote,
as usual, is left behind under the rationale that the best for the collective—
greater “pros” than “cons”—was accomplished. In the pollution context, when
dangerous situations living in close proximity to one’s own neighborhood is often unappealing
to citizens, and therefore such facilities often draw opposition. A classic U.S. reference to
halfway houses in the environmental justice context is found in Nicholson v. Connecticut
Half-Way House, 218 A.2d 383.
82Been Cornell Law Review 78 [1993] , p. 1013.
83Ibid., p. 1013-14, footnote 63, citing a Boston study where the poorer southern end
had one halfway house bed per 55 residents, while the entire rest of the city had one bed for
every 847 citizens.
84American Lung Association Urban Air Pollution and Health Inequalities. Environmen-
tal Health Perspectives, 109 2001.
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all the science, risk, and profit potentials are computed, the “efficient” outcome
becomes where the pros outweigh the cons within the bounds of safety for the
spatially burdened.85 The rationale stands strong only when the minority has
sufficient opportunity to become the majority, through campaigning, grassroots
organizing, and by voicing their minority concerns through legally protected
routes. That is, when the minority sphere of personal liberty is protected
enough to allow for both their own apprehension of the facts around risks and
burdens and therethrough to effect their preferred outcome. Otherwise there
is a tyranny of the majority.
The emphasis on campaigning and achieving a majority is necessary in sit-
uations of spatially concentrated burdens because, save for green altruism
or similar conservationist thoughts, it would be irrational for a non-effected,
spatially-distant person from voting against the facility which would likely gar-
ner them even minimal benefits with no burden. The greater the benefits to
the use of the environment, or, at a minimum, the greater the concentration
of burdens away from those in the voting class who might receive any ben-
efit, the less realistic the chance of persuading the majority against creating
(or expanding or not to renew a license) a LULU.86 To the extent that this
is quantifiable, the situation arises where “past injustice leads to an ongoing
injustice.”87
Here tension arrives if not outright conflict.88 In the market, individuals
vote with their resources; resources that are clearly—especially in cases rele-
vant to environmental justice—unequally endowed on the population. Their
democratic representation however is limited to one vote. Democratic society
gives everyone the same right to influence the allocation of resources within
the State.89 The dissatisfied attempt then to rectify the distribution using
their enfranchisement, while the satisfied utilize their combined political and
85This is Davy’s doctrine of efficient siting, Davy.
86To continue to link the point that democratic governance requires a realistic chance of
the minority becoming the majority, and therethrough necessitates sufficient freedoms for
the minority to develop their difference of opinion, note the sentiments developed by Hayek
in Hayek, F.A. Individualism and Economic Order. University of Chicago, 1948, inter alia,
p 29-30.
87Risse, Mathias How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor? Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 33 September 2005, Nr. 4, p. 354.
88Both tension and outright conflict can be seen, inter alia in the negotiations around the
Aarhus Convention, discussed infra in Section 4.2.4.2. Briefly, parties against the imposition
of stricter environmental regulations justified their position not by detracting from substance
of the regulation, but in building opposing economic arguments. cf. Hayward, p. 144.
89Przeworski, Adam The Neoliberal Fallacy. Journal of Democracy, 3 1992.
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resource voting power.90 Environmental justice writers specifically have noted
this problem,91 saying “. . .markets offer even fewer opportunities to the poor
to meaningfully participate.” This is an especially detrimental aspect of in-
equality
because it affects public policy, altering the distribution of edu-
cation, health care, environmental protection, and other material
resources. This is true in rich countries as well as poor ones, re-
gardless of the existence of elections and political parties.92
These are concrete illustrations of how the democratic system grants momentum—
tilts the landscape—toward the usages preferred by the majority without a
compensating protection or voice for the minority.93 Further, this is not a
new observation, but finds much earlier support in social justice now applied to
environmental questions.94 In general minorities become “persistent losers”95
who find it difficult, if not impossible to change their situation while gover-
90See, inter alia Grossman, Gene M/Helpman, Elnhanan Special Interest Politics. MIT
Press, 2001. In the U.S., 3/4 of presidential and congressional campaign contributions come
from families earning more than $200,000USD per year. cf. Barry, p. 180 Rousseau noted
similarly, and much earlier, that “[s]ocioeconomic inequality gives some in the community
disproportionate influence over lawmaking and divides the community into hostile groups
unwilling to submit their separate interests to the interest of all.” Similar sentiments were
stated by Armand de la Meuse in 1793, cf. Fleischacker, Samuel A Short History of Dis-
trubive Justice. Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 61,71. Similar dynamics underlie the
capture theory of regulation of George Stigler and public choice theory of Mancur Olson,
among many others. Also note Okun, Arthur M. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff.
The Brookings Institution, 1975.
91Cousins, Ken Smoke in the Skies, Bread on the Table. College Park, MD, 2001 –
Technical report, p. 5 (in address missing aspects of an early critique, Boerner/Lambert)
92Jencks, Christopher Does Inequality Matter? Daedalus, 131 2002, Nr. 1, p. 60; Also
noted in the specific context of racism on which later chapters of this book touch (Chapter
5) in that failure of adequate participation “irrationality prevents an optimal use of human
resources.” Lawrence III, Charles R. The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism. Stanford Law Review , 39 1987, p. 330.
93The work of Eric Krieg, for example, finds evidence that when a locale’s tax base
is made up in large portions of industrial or commercial taxes, then these influence local
government decisions and more likely to show externalized environmental hazards. Krieg,
Eric J. The Two Faces of Toxic Waste: Trens in the Spread of Environmental Hazards.
Sociological Forum, 13 1998; Krieg, Eric J A Socio-Historical Interpretation of Toxic Waste
Sites: The Case of Greater Boston. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 54 1995,
Nr. 1
94Above the previous mentions, momentum or extra-voting power of the upper class was
noted in Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure Class even in 1899: “...the wealthier
class comes to exert a retarding influence upon social development far in excess that which
the simple numerical strength of the class would assign it.” Veblen, Thorstein The Theory
of the Leisure Class. Modern Library Paperback Edition edition. Random House, 1899
(2001), p. 147
95Dahl, Robert A. A Preface to Democratic Theory. University of Chicago Press, 1956.
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nance cycles continue against them. Here,
“[t]he problem is not simply that some people do not get the gov-
ernment they want, but rather that minorities do not get what
they want on issues which are of importance to them but to which
the majority is relatively indifferent.”96
The injustice of clustered environmental burdens then fits both of the two
criteria which Downs97 noted as categorizing society’s most intractable public
policy problems: 1) they occur to a relative minority of a population, even
if that minority is numerically significant and 2) the problems are caused in
significant part by activities which provide substantial benefits to a majority
or powerful minority of the population. The reason they are so intractable is
because changing them requires painful losses at the most powerful levels of
society.
So the free market added to majority rule does not necessarily create an
equitable market; “[d]emocracy and the free market are rivals, not allies.”98
Rather, it further impacts the ability of the minority to impact the outcome,
further reducing their ability to grow in democratically. Regulation could
address this, however, by directing markets through the rule of law. The
law can affect the “way the system operates to the advantage of some and
the disadvantage of others, and to give greater priority to some social values
over others.”99 But we have already noted the difficulties of a numerical
minority getting the majority to move toward different social values.100 The
LULU “problem” thus reveals more intrinsic problems than simply difficulties
in getting people to agree on were to sit undesirable facilities.
96Dowding, p. 36.
97Downs; cf. Beauchamp, Dan E.; Hofrichter, Richard, editor Chap. Public Health as
Social Justice In Health and Social Justice. John Wiley and Sons, 2003.
98Gray False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism, p. 17; also Dowding/Goodin/
Pateman, p. 19.
99Strange, p. 23.
100Even the statistics society chooses to collect are a reflection of the value judgements
of those in charge, and not always a reflection of democratic deliberation. Sunstein Free
Markets and Social Justice, p. 124.
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2.1.4 Grassroots and Politics
Some environmental justice commentators are very positive about grassroots
environmental justice and the ability to effect a change in majority opinion;101
by pointing out the shortcomings of the system the majority will realize the
irrationality and internalize their externalities. Others are less enthused.102
Still others hope that should this grassroots campaign fail to convince then
there are legal routes that could be engaged by a coordinated minority. If
that is the case then there is somehow sufficient protection for the democratic
concerns.
Indeed, there have been successes along these routes.103 The research here
does not focus on grassroots campaigns toward environmental justice for sev-
eral reasons however. First and foremost, extensive comments thereto already
exist, at least on the US front.104 Unfortunately, the grassroots phenomenon
is predominantly limited to the US, insofar as it functions under the banner
of environmental justice. Most importantly though the potential for location-
specific success does not inform the larger discussion of environmental justice;
does the problem go away with a successful grassroots campaign achieves ma-
jority influence or finds a way to put a legal hold on siting, or does it shift
to a “weaker” locale?105 The “hyperspatiality” of risk “dictates that environ-
101inter alia and most recently Hill Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice;
Cole Western New England Law Review 31 [2009] .
102Notably, the outcome of Davy’s treatise. Davy.
103Cole Western New England Law Review 31 [2009]
104Esp. Bullard Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots; also
Idem The Quest for Environmental Justice. Sierra Club Books, 2005; Hill Environmental
Justice: Legal Theory and Practice, and notes therein. Also for examples and overview
of many movements: Schlosberg, David Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Move-
ments, and Nature. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Outside of the U.S. lit-
erature note Dunion, Kevin Troublemakers. The Struggle for Environmental Justice in
Scotland. Edinburg Universitz Press, 2003; McDonald, David A. Environmental Justice in
South Africa. Ohio University Press, 2002.
105This is the “hyperspatiality” argument of David Pellow. See Pellow. See also Strohm,
L. A. Pollution Havens and the Transfer of Environmental Risk. Global Environmental Pol-
itics, 2 2002. Also note Faber, discussing how “ecoliberalism” has been known to solve
one environmental problem by transferring it to another group. Faber, Daniel; Faber, D.,
editor Chap. The Political Ecology of American Capitalism: New Challenges for the envi-
ronmental justice movement In The Struggle for Ecological Democracy: The Environmental
Justice Movement in the United States. Guildford, 1998, p. 29,38 Pellow uses the example
of the Khian Sea saga in the 1980s to illustrate the chained effects, and often exceedingly
long time frames involved. The Khian Sea saga saw incinerator ash from Philadelphia,
the United States, criss-cross global ports, become partially dumped on Haitian beaches,
buried in Haiti, and eventually returned to the US, and deposited in a landfill just outside
of Philadelphia, 16 years later. See Pellow, p. 107-123. Another example of hyperspatial-
ity with no actual reliance on long distances is the decision to install sulphur scrubbers on
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mental harm will follow the path of least resistance from one location to the
next [. . . ].”106 This take on the well known race-to-the-bottom means that
environmental injustice can disappear at one spatial scale but reappear at an-
other, a concept noted as far back as the early days of environmental justice
research107 but now emerging with substantial force in the globalized economy
with its inability to coordinate environmental outcomes.
Of course, this is not to denigrate the abilities of grassroots campaigns nor
their successes. Rather it points to a mechanism which will potentially undo
those successes. Moreover, it is the same mechanism which tends to bring the
environmental burdens to their door in the first place. The mechanics here
and the evidence therefor are discussed in Chapter 3. Here it is sufficient to
note that the mechanism exists.
These distributional dilemmas seem to pop up in even the best meaning
projects. The World Bank itself has noted problems of equity stemming from
its benevolent loans. This has been the case in relation to large-scale irrigation
projects which, in the process of bringing farmland into being, can create
significant changes in local economics, producing a new and more inequitable
distribution of wealth.108 Thus, even apparent success is not always lasting
success, especially in the larger lens of social justice.
Above these reasons though it is unclear why the solution to the general
problem of majority over-representation in deciding environmental distribu-
tion should be an emphasis on increased minority work and advocacy, espe-
cially when there is a non-zero cost to that advocacy. Consider the theoreti-
cal situation which exists if the circumstances surrounding LULU siting were
coal-fired power plants as part of the 1977 Clean Air Act (CAA). While the sulphur did
indeed stay out of the air, the scrubbers then left tons of sulphur sludge which has to be
disposed of on land. The situation—sulphur pollution—was not solved but slid into another
problematic category. cf. Bowen Environmental Justice through research-based decision
making, p. 224 Above circular transfers, singular success does not preclude the potential
for economic and political reversals. Stories of grassroots success in bringing minorities into
economic power can end in defeat when minorities inherit a political arena mired in debt
and decay as a “legacy from the old order.” Davis, Mike Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles
and the Imagination of Disaster. Vintage, 1999, p. 405; discussing Los Angeles. See also
Martinez-Alier, J Scale, environmental justice, and unsustainable cities. Capitalism, Nature,
Socialism, 14 2003, Nr. 1; Gandy, M Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New York
City. Cambridge, 2002.
106Pellow, p. 236.
107inter alia Taliman, V Toxic Waste dumping in the Third World. Race and Class, 30
1989
108McCorquodale, Robert/Fairbrother, Richard Globalization and Human Rights. Human
Rights Quarterly, 21 1999, p. 743.
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approximated by Coasian conditions, including low costs to organizing and
bargaining as well as well-defined property rights.109 In the Coasian world,
local residents would band together to bargain with the a facility or LULU
to reduce or even eliminate environmental problems, assuming the facility al-
ready has the rights to pollute. The qualitatively identical outcomes of either
accepting compensation for an efficient level of harm or paying—bribing—to
appropriate the property rights from the facility are the classic dynamics in
such a situation. If this were the case, firms would take potential bargaining
and political action into consideration as they decided on location, knowing
that the bargaining can extract income from the facility.110 In any event,
the outcome would be economically efficient in the sense of optimal non-zero
burdens regardless of who started with the property rights.
In the real world, however, the potential for political action can depend on
characteristics of the town or city where the LULU is headed, critically per-
haps on the makeup of the people. It is no secret that money plays a part in a
person’s ability to start a collective aimed at bargaining. That money can be
real expenditure or more simply the ability to forgo income and spend time
working on a (non-paid) project like community action. To the extent that
environmental clustering tends toward lower income or lower socio-economic
brackets, as much of the environmental justice canon supports to one extent
or another, these will be the groups who have the largest costs to organizing.
It is true however that sometimes the lower status can be an asset. An inter-
esting anecdote, supplied by Brion111 illustrating a strategic play by justice
advocates involves the strategic nomination of a wealthy community as a ge-
ographically superior, but politically infeasible alternative to a middle-income
community site, in order to force the legislature to compromise on what func-
tion the middle-income LULU sites would eventually serve. Here, recycling
was preferred over the originally desired solid waste disposal. While this is
not bargaining in the Coasian sense, it does bend toward empowerment, or
utilizing the particulars of the legal and political landscape in one’s favour.112
Nevertheless, Brion notes that the reality of the situation more often favors
109For a full discussion, see Davy Davy
110Hamilton, James T. Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective
Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities. The RAND Journal of Economics, 24 Spring 1993,
Nr. 1.
111Brion, p. 439.
112Empowerment is discussed in greater detail in Cole, Luke W. Empowerment as the Key
to Environmental Protection. Ecology Law Quarterly, 19 1992.
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firms over communities as they have the resources to enable participation in
bargaining, but also the resources which make the substance of the partici-
pation.113 These resources for bargaining and strategy can be acquired by
communities, but at a non-negligible cost, thus making a diversion from the
Coasian-bargaining situation likely.
In the US, the EPA has acknowledged the problem of lop-sided power, at
least tacitly, with the promotion of Supplemental Environmental Projects.
“Supplemental environmental projects (SEPs) allow entities that
violate environmental policies to provide funds to conduct environ-
mental justice and environmental revitalization projects in small
towns and rural areas. SEPs, with their voluntary commitments
of funds by businesses and other entities, can support projects de-
signed to promote public health and the environment, sometimes
to a greater degree than fines and other punitive sanctions. The
specific projects can be the product of negotiations between the
government and the defendant or respondent in an environmen-
tal hazard case or may include other entities such as community
groups or local elected officials. In any case, the final SEP should
provide a public benefit to offset to some degree the impact of the
environmental insult114.”
Whether or not these do increase meaningful community and third-party in-
volvement in environmental decisions is open to discussion.115 Irrespective of
113Brion, p.444.
114Rosenthall, John Supplemental Projects as Tools for Environmental Justice and Eco-
nomic Development in Small Towns. Human Rights Magazine, Spring 2004 (30). – Technical
report.
115See also Hill Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice, p. 422-425. Bowen
expands here, wondering
“. . . if high quality communication about environmental justice is to be
obtained—by which I mean communication that enables the receiver of the
message to trace clearly through language to the referent—it must necessarily
include some measurements, mathematics or structural graphics. It must also
have a clearly defined conceptual basis, so that the sender and receiver of the
communication have a common frame of reference with which to interpret the
meaning of terms. This necessity of including some level of measurements,
mathematics, and structural graphics is in a sense unfortunate. Given the low
quality of so much of the educational system, too many people directly affected
by environmental risks do not have the intellectual discipline or command of
language needed to meaningfully communicate about such risks.” Bowen En-
vironmental Justice through research-based decision making, p. 40
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the outcomes, such official attempts to level the playing field, coupled with the
emphasis on community organization in the face of LULUs and potential injus-
tices,116 points toward a world that is at a minimum tilted away from Coasian
bargaining and therefore disinclined toward the voices of certain groups in en-
vironmental matters. The system, despite providing potential routes for the
minorities’ voice and protection has in practice not succeeded.
Overtones of fairness aside, this is all an example of two groups with differing
views of the “good” use of environmental space and amenities attempting to
coexist. The coexistence is not a priori based on a level discussion. Even so,
and popular counterexamples notwithstanding, the side attempting to utilize
the environment and inflict some spoilage in the process should not be unduly
demonized. Unless one adheres to a policy of zero-pollution, a policy which
itself does not arrive devoid of negative impacts on health and welfare, there
are legitimate and efficient reasons to utilize the environment. Certain actions,
such as expanding existing LULUs to take advantage of economies of scale,
rather than opening new ones117 bring more “bang for the buck,” or more
benefit for each unit of environmental degradation, and as such have much
legitimacy that can be overshadowed by demonization.118 Again, this is a
single anecdote, but a useful one to mention early in the hopes of keeping
emotions flat when discussing bargaining situations.
Although both sides may have good points in deciding where facilities should
go, and indeed either outcome might be defended as correct, the question re-
mains whether each side has an “equal” chance of achieving their outcome.
The location which minimizes the damage to the surrounding environment or
corrals human exposure and risk the best may not be the locations where firm
decides to operate.119 Public opinion against a LULU might be quite power-
116As in the latest environmental justice textbook: Hill Environmental Justice: Legal
Theory and Practice.
117McDermott, Charles J. Environmental Equity: A Waste Manager’s Perspective. Land
Use Forum, 2 Winter 1993, Nr. 1, p. 16.
118For the critic, the degree or specifics of returns to scale in the industry is however
not mentioned in McDermott’s 1993 article. A recent capacity study in the UK notes that
gains size of the operation do exist, but can be offset by transportation costs as well as
in the increased potential for mistakes in handling and planning. See AEA Technology
Economies of Scale–Waste Management Optimisation Study. UK DEFRA, April 2007 –
Technical report. Callan notes that more modern facilities can offer ranges of services,
notably recycling and disposal, and find increasing returns to scale in both capacities. Callan,
Scott J./Thomas, Janet M. Economies of Scale and Scope: A Cost Analysis of Municipal
Solid Waste Services. Land Economics, 77 November 2001, Nr. 4.
119Hamilton; Hamilton, James Towler Politics and Social Cost: Hazardous waste facilities
in a truly Coasian world. Ph.D thesis, Harvard University, 1991.
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ful. The magnitude to which this is true, and to which political opposition
steers LULUs from active communities into inactive ones is however unknown.
Research does show that community organization—at least in the political
process—has a direct economic effect on the decision making process of firms.
As Hamilton notes, using Coasian imagery,
“the differing degree to which groups organize to demand com-
pensation and raise a firm’s costs of choosing a particular location
drives a wedge between the social costs of its externalities and the
costs voiced through the political process of its site selection.”120
Other anecdotal evidence exists for effects outside of political organization
in that hold-ups in construction to deal with collective action are costly to
firms.121
In general then, the affected spatial minority is not powerless and one can
generally assume that in any given LULU situation each side has tactics. The
proponents of an environmental usage usually have a perceived monetary or
political advantage, while opponents may be the underdogs but privy to their
own tactics. The problem for the overarching democratic discussion however is
that one has a hard time finding an environmental situation where the minority
expected, from the outset, to be or be able to be equal to the majority. There
is always significant costs to leveling the playing field. The tactics utilized
by a minority, when successful, always colour the outcome as an upset.122
This leads directly and quickly to a second component of the general com-
plaint: the fairness is already stacked against the LULU-fighters. It is they
120Hamilton, p. 122.
121See Brion, p. 453-4, who although noting the successful halting effect simply delaying
construction can have, it is unethical according to the American Bar Association to focus on
delaying construction as a method to exhaust one’s opponent. See also Johnston, Craig N./
Funk, William F./Flatt, Victor B. Legal Protection of the Environment. Thomson West,
2005, p. 84, noting that the public participation process brought in by the NEPA process (see
319) is both good and bad. For survey evidence reporting that both blacks and whites ranked
community opposition as having stronger weight in the fight against siting than scientific
evidence, see Mohai, Paul/Bryant, Bunyan Environmental Justice: Weighing Race and
Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards. U. Colo. L. Rev. 63 1992.
These effects are also supported theoretically by the economics literature on competition
for political influence. See, among many others, Becker, Gary S. A Theory of Competition
Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98
August 1983, Nr. 3.
122A good reason why Luke Cole, an influential leader in the environmental justice move-
ment who had much success, attempted to use existing legislation as much as possible,
before getting fancy with them, or as he stated, “with a twist.” Cole, Luke W. Environ-




who have been forced to change course; their daily routines were disturbed by
this LULU-proposal and they now muster their troops against the usage. The
LULU-proponent, without exception, is coming from an institution—public or
private—whose time is directed via either the profit motive or a public utility
need towards the project. Whether or not they succeed in the final analysis
in getting their way, or apply tactics which level the playing field, is irrelevant
when fairness is viewed as the amount of energy needed for parties to get to
the bargaining phase. The frontside of this argument is firmed up in Chapter
3 where theory demonstrates how the environmental quality-table has a pro-
clivity toward planting environmental injustices at minorities’ doorsteps, but
for now the driving goal is an illustration that to push against an encroach-
ing environmental usage requires a non-zero layout of time and energy, if not
explicitly financial resources, from the group that is more likely to be at a
numerical disadvantage already. As Davy expands,
[d]ue to the competition between burden-avoiding communities,
these risks are more likey to be imposed on communities with
an uneducated, poor, and politically impotent population. On
the other hand, it is less likely that a community with a highly
trained, wealthy, and politically active population will be chosen
by a developer for siting a hazardous waste facility. Moreover, it is
also conceivable that the demographic and socioeconomic makeup
of a host community, once a noxious facility has been sited, will
change. [. . . ] Without auxiliary and counterbalancing planning
efforts, the distributive mechanisms of a free market society pro-
vide for a “likely” location, even if developers do not purposefully
target economically depressed areas for siting LULUs.123
While not completely dispositive of a universal wrong (or evil), it is a failing
that begs the question of why there is not an institution or legal arrangement
in between which could forestall inefficient outlays of effort on the part of any
minority group.
Thus, in a literature where successful grassroots campaigns are lauded, the
social justice critique silently asks the question of why the campaign was nec-
essary in the first place. Democracies function on majority rule coupled with
minority rights. Environmental justice, stemming as it does from the nuances
123Davy, p. 238 (emphasis in original, references omitted)
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of environmental and urban economics (Chapter 3) shows a proclivity away
from outcomes preferred by the minority to which the burdens accumulate.
While not all of these are “wrongs” and democracy does not guarantee the
minority to get their way, they do tilt the table in favour of the majority
without any concomitant protection for the numerical minority. This failing
becomes most egregious when one considers that the problem is that a mi-
nority of the populace is by definition bearing a disproportionate burden for
the rest of society, and the only way they can rectify or even hope to address
the situation is through a laborious outlay of energy, especially relative to
the capabilities of the forces behind the majority desire. If the environmental
burdens impact the minority’s ability to grow and participate democratically
then there is the downward spiral of injustice with which social justice is so
concerned, and which does so much damage to democratic principles. Those
sorts of problems are what fundamental rights were created to address.
2.2 Health and Sickness
The above discussion places weight on the ways that groups can be at a dis-
advantage when it comes to projecting their wishes on majority proceedings.
These weakness are generally speaking the vehicle in which environmental in-
justice arrives.124 The disadvantages manifest themselves in continued burdens
and a cycle back toward political organization. The potential for an unending
cycle devoid of a realistic democratic brake pushes strongly toward a question
of rights.
While the above is necessary to motivate the discussion and illustrate why
this research moves rapidly toward the human rights approach, it is not suf-
ficient.125 There are other areas of existing law and regulation that could
provide some level of protection against environmental burdens.126 Although
the planning and siting process is segmented to a degree that seems to allow for
burdens to accumulate, it is well known that serious impacts on humans can
still occur within the permitting of regulated locations and when that occurs
124The motor of that vehicle is discussed in Chapter 3.
125Of course, one might write an entire empirical study on the ability and inability of
local interests to move against LULUs, of which Davy is a good start Davy; Hill has an cur-
rent summary of grassroots campaigns, success and failures in the U.S. Hill Environmental
Justice: Legal Theory and Practice.
126I.a. Gerrard/Foster.
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legal action can be taken.
As such a reader could quite rationally ask why not look at the equity of
the distribution of health rather than taking a step outward on the spatial
scale to discuss environmental quality distributions.127 After all, outside of
the conservation movement, the concern with the health of the environment
is an outgrowth with the concern for our personal health. The application of
this in environmental justice directions would not be a big step; health issues
are known to have a strong correlation to social and environmental forces,128
and the number of chemicals introduced to the environment in the last cen-
tury alone gives the issue an expectation of pervasiveness.129 The question is
then whether we can expect, or have yet seen, evidence that personal health
considerations provide some part of the necessary protection found missing
above.
There is no clear demarcation between environmental issues and social mat-
ters of all stripes—political, health, participation, risk, and information dis-
persion, among others.130 They are all axes of inequality. Moreover, they
are all dynamic factors of inequality, pushing current distributions forward in
time through families, communities, education, and opportunity.131 This, in
general and at the outset, strongly implies that solving a health inequality will
not solve inequality in general. That is not necessarily the goal here however.
We only need to find sufficient protective measure to prevent environmental
matters from hampering the democratic development of a minority.
Is there a way to push health concerns and especially health burdens toward
protection from environmental burden accumulation? More firmly resting on
empirical work, research shows that equalizing environmental burdens will not
127One could, inter alia, apply the work of Susan Cutter on distribution of hazards re-
lated to health and safety; Cutter, Susan Hazards, Vulnerability, and Environmental Jus-
tice. Earthscan, 2006; Cutter, Susan L Race, Class, and Environmental Justice. Progress in
Human Geography, 19 1995, Nr. 1; As examples, see Bolte, Gabriele/Kohlhuber, Martina
PINCHE Project: Final Report WP5 Socioeconomic Factors. Arnhem, 2005 – Technical re-
port; Brulle, Robert J./Pellow, David N. Environemental Justice: Human Health and Envi-
ronmental Inequalities. Annual Review of Public Health, 27 2006; Maclachlan, John C. et al.
Mapping health on the internet: A new tool for environmental justice and public health
research. Health and Place, 13 2007. Also see Liu, Feng Environmental Justice Analysis:
Theories, Methods, and Practice. Lewis Publishers, 2001 for methodological considerations.
128Levins, Richard; Hofrichter, Richard, editor Chap. Is Capitalism a Disease? In Health
and Social Justice. John Wiley and Sons, 2003; Wilkinson.
129Bowen Environmental Justice through research-based decision making, p. 14.
130The lack of a line in the intellectual sand between pure environmental issues and broader




equalize health outcomes132, due to intervening and lasting effects of social
class on outcomes. Put another way,
wherever we put the starting gate, the different resources that peo-
ple bring to it are liable to overwhelm the significance of the dif-
ferential use they may make of those resources.133
By extension, then neither will fixing environmental burdens solve health prob-
lems; we still have class effects in the way. The point is merely that equalizing
one aspect of life cannot guarantee an equalization of another. They are all
pieces in the larger puzzle of social inequality, coupled with income inequal-
ity, historical patterns, and cultural lock-in. And because this is a complex,
interconnected dynamic, the goal of working on one aspect is not to shore up
another, but rather to put the brakes on the system.
The question then becomes would focusing on the disparate health impacts
of all social ills be a better brake than working on environmental regulation?
The weight of health concerns are on par with environmental concerns but
arguably more objective and measurable. Could they then not lead the same
charge to toward justice?
When one begins their journey into the environmental justice literature with
the experience in the U.S.—as one almost must at this stage of development
in the field—they are immediately thrust into the world of causality.134 From
questions of the causes of racism, the remaining momentum behind racial
patterns in income, employment, neighborhoods and city blocks, to the more
direct medical sense of what causes a sickness like cancer, causal chains are
inextricable from the environmental justice discussion. Causality is the weak
link in many of the environmental justice situations tested in court and has
run up against large problems.135 It is equally weak in building a chain toward
using health concerns to stop environmental problems.
In the main, much work still needs to be done on all aspects of the environment-
human chain. Measuring environmental quality and more importantly per-
sonal exposure is an as-yet unrealized quantitative goal. Moving from here,
where science stands on the beginnings of quantitative environmental mea-
surement and record keeping, to establishing causal linkages between negative
132Inter alia, Beauchamp;Wilkinson
133Sunstein Free Markets and Social Justice, p. 54.
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impacts and health outcomes is not a short step either. There is precious little
data with regard to toxic exposure and health risk over longer periods of times.
Admittedly, rough record keeping for some types of air pollution has been un-
derway for centuries,136 but detailed analysis and records are a rather recent
phenomenon. There is even data less establishing effects from mixtures and
combinations of many pollutants over a lifetime.137 Thankfully, path-breaking
work is underway and hopefully will inspire more researchers and government
investment while bringing clarity to the discussion.138 But even when that
research exists, there is a real danger in relying on causal connections as ei-
ther a lever to change policy or engage the legal system for protection. This
is especially visible when one considers the dynamics of the most ubiquitous
concern of human-toxin interaction: cancer. The following discussion, again,
is not a complete picture but rather an illustration of the strong potential for
weakness in the chain which connects health, the regulatory and legal system,
and protection for a minority from environmental burdens.
2.2.1 Cancer and Causality
Cancer is a powerful spectre in the realm of humans and pollution exposure.
Despite a frighteningly large number of lives lost cancer remains a notoriously
difficult disease to which attach causality. As such, it provides an illuminating
case study on the limited nature of protection available for environmental jus-
tice problems via connections with the health and environment. While one’s
soul revolts at the sight of a polluted community contending with multiple
136Brimblecombe, Peter The big smoke: a history of air pollution in London since me-
dieval times. Methuen, 1987;Thorsheim, Peter Inventing Pollution: Coal, Smoke, and Cul-
ture in Britain since 1800. Ohio University Press, 2006
137Tyson, Frederick L. et al. Cancer, the environment, and environmental justice. Cancer ,
83 October 1998, Nr. 8 Supplement.
138See, as an introduction Cutter. Also note studies such as Buzzelli, Michael Bour-
dieu does environmental justice? Probing the linkages between population health and
air pollution epidemiology. Health and Place, 13 March 2007, Nr. 1; Buzzelli, Michael/
Veenstra, Gerry New approaches to researching environmental justice: Combining criti-
cal theory, population health and geographical information sciences. Health and Place, 13
March 2007, Nr. 1; Kohlhuber, Martina et al. Social inequality in perceived environmental
exposures in relation to housing conditions in Germany. Environmental Research, 101 2006;
Kruize, Hanneke On environmental equity: exploring the distribution of environmental qual-
ity among socio-economic categories in the Netherlands. Ph.D thesis, Universiteit Utrecht,
2007; Roorda, J/van Stiphout, W.A.H.J/Huijsman-Rubingh, R.R.R Post-disaster health
effects: strategies for investigation and data collection. Experiences from the Enschede
firework disaster. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 58 2004; Chakraborty,
Jayajit Acute Exposure to Extremely Hazardous Substances: An Analysis of Environmental
Equity. Risk Analysis, 21 2001
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cases of otherwise rare childhood cancers139 and concentrations of adult can-
cers in industrial workers,140 their existence, prominence, and ability to achieve
public outcry have not reduced their impact nor led to widespread changes in
how groups can defend themselves from such situations.
The goal here is not to demonize the industries which create both modern
convenience and modern destruction for bringing disease or to imply that they
are somehow covering it up.141 The goal in this section is merely illustrate
why their impact does not translate into cohesive routes for oversight, change,
and/or remuneration that could prevent a need for rights-based protections.
Consider the basic requirement that, in practice, to change the current reg-
ulatory situation there needs to be a clear connection from a current or poten-
tial polluting source and a negative human health outcome. Negative health
impacts provide the catalyst for change; the more clear and more negative
the impact the greater the chance of necessitating change or granting lever-
age to the concerned cause. There is little less clear or negative than cancer.
Therefore, if there are problems with establishing leverage with something as
destructive as cancer, lesser pollution problems should run into relatively more
difficulty in inspiring change.
Consider then the very different latency periods of cancers. There is a large
difference in timing and duration of harmful exposure to a pollutant and the
appearance of the cancer. The shortest cases, such as those after large-scale
environmental insults like the nuclear detonations in World War II, exhibit
attributable spikes in leukemia in just 18 months following exposure.142 Ex-
posure to ionizing radiation, a far less dangerous but still hazardous exposure,
varies in its ultimate end in breast carcinomas to the tune of 5 to 30 years and
depends on age at exposure and dosage.143 The latter is the more common
139For discussion and details, see Lichtenstein, Paul et al. Environmental and heritable
factors in the causation of cancer. New England Journal of Medicine, 343 2002, Nr. 2
140Of which notable examples in the literature include the Altgeld Gardens housing project
in Chicago and the “Cancer Alley” in Louisiana. See Hill Environmental Justice: Legal
Theory and Practice
141Pollution is not modern. Indoor air pollution has, as an example, been a standing
problem for humanity. See Brimblecombe, discussing sinusitis in early man from smoke
exposure inside rudimentarily-ventilated dwellings, to Medieval and Victorian London. Even
Shakespeare lumped a “smokey house” as a deplorable and apparently common problem
akin to a tired horse or a railing wife (cf. ibid., p. 4, citing King Henry IV, Part I, Act III,
Scene I). The high-built chimneys of silver smelting furnaces in Iberia during the Roman era
even illustrate a knowledge that the smoke was detrimental to the workers and immediate
surroundings. See Hughes, p. 37
142Greaves, Mel Cancer: The Evolutionary Legacy. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 73.
143Ibid.
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progression from environmental problem to health outcome.
In all but the most egregious dosages the pathway from exposure to disease
varies in time and intensity across a population. What does the variable
reality of exposure and health outcome do for a lawyer defending a corporation
(or a country) which, even admittedly, exposed people to a toxic chemical
or continues to pollute an area like Altgeld Gardens or Cancer Alley? It
certainly does not help propel a change in the protection of people from their
environment.144
Greaves145 does a remarkable job of summing up the problematic situation
for the layman trying to understand exposure, latency, and causation of cancer
that he deserves to be quoted at length here. What is also remarkable is how
the dialogue on current views of cancer highlights how well Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring foreshadowed modern themes, nearly half a century in advance.
Since the majority of our cancers do not involve recognized acute
initiation but rather chronic, sustained insults, we have less secure
insight into the evolutionary time frames involved. Even so, it
is clear that it is almost invariably very protracted. Prospective
monitoring of patients with benign tumours or growths, for exam-
ple breast tumours, intestinal polyps, or skin warts, that eventually
progressed into florid cancers indicated that intervals of 10-20 years
are common. For cancers historically associated with chronic in-
dustrial exposures to carcinogenic substances such as coal tars and
oils or asbestos, the interval between first exposure and cancer has
usually been more than 25 years and often 40 or 50 years. Similarly
for cigarette smoking. Of course in these situations, we usually
have no way of knowing when the first mutation initiating clonal
evolution [of the cancer cells] actually occurred. Epidemiological
evidence in melanoma and breast cancer suggests that cancers com-
monly appearing at around 45-55 years of age can be initiated in
the teenage years. Lapses of 15 or more years have been observed
in exposure to radium in small quantities. [. . . ]
144Many readers will already be aware—perhaps from such popular stories and movies
like Erin Brockovich—that defense lawyers find much to attack in environmental statistics.





At any given time, however, there may be many cancers-in-the-
making, but likely far fewer clinically diagnosable cancers. When
does one then begin legal proceedings? When does one aggregate
the sick into momentum for regulatory change? Further, would it
be efficient to have individual citizens bring cases as instances or
concerns of cancer arise, or to wait until there is a critical mass of
statistically significant data to take to regulators?
This uncoordinated time lag tangibly influences many people’s
perception of causation and intuitive weighing of risk. Hazardous
sports and lotteries and a host of other activities have primed us
to expect risks to be closely coupled in time with rewards or penal-
ties. This, despite us being the only species with the ability to
contemplate the future.146
Indeed, our intuitive ability to contemplate the future has failed us for some
time, given that Rachel Carson told the world the story of the 7-8 year lag
between the disposal of 1940s war chemicals and the sickness and death which
followed on the US farms of the surrounding area in the 1950s.147
The phrase “influence many people’s perception of causation and intuitive
weighing of the risk” is especially important here. Those people are both
employees and regulators. “The composite and probabilistic nature of risk
for cancer, plus its extended time frame of evolutionary development, poses
the major intellectual obstacle in understanding causation for the public and
professionals alike.Greaves, p. 213 Further, the nature of the disease means
that people will be in the dark on many aspects of its causality for many years
to come. Consider finally the damaging effect that different latency periods
can bring to the argument; if this cancer was a company’s fault, why are there
only two workers currently suffering, while tens or hundreds more were exposed
and do not (yet) show signs of illness?
Currently, the stringency of current US regulation sets acceptable risks down
to a one in a million chance of developing cancer due specifically to the ex-
146Greaves, p. 73-74
147Carson, p. 43 ; Rachel Carson included the following quote from Dr. David Price of the
US Public Health Service (p. 188): “We all live under the haunting fear that something may
corrupt the environment to the point where man joins the dinosaurs as an obsolete form of
life. And yet what makes these thoughts all the more disturbing is the knowledge that our
fate could perhaps be sealed twenty or more years before the development of symptoms.”
ibid., p. 226
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posure from a properly constructed and maintained waste-to-energy plant.148
Critics are quick to point out flaws and assumptions behind such anecdotes,
but here it serves to show how policy makers already utilize the science, and
especially how they put imperfect information to use for the potential good of
society, at a cost of that one person in a million.149 Confronted with the sys-
tem of environmental regulation balanced on a multitude of such assessments,
the inherent dynamics of cancers, the hope that people, via the legal or polit-
ical system, could utilize the distribution of health in society as a red flag for
the fight for justice begins to show cracks. Again, there are other sicknesses
caused by environmental problems. Moving away to lesser health problems
though reduces the power of utilizing the situation to foment environmental
change. This is all not impossible to accomplish, but it is not a sturdy frame-
work with which to build necessary protections. And no where does it address
the fundamental weakness of the individual to ex ante empowerment.
It does not stretch the imagination or underestimate the pace of science to
assume it will take generations of living—and dying—to work it all out. After
all, the living and the dead are the grisly data points here. In the intervening
years, policy and people will still make decisions on where to live, where to
work, what to do with leisure time as well as what industrial exposures are
“safe” and “permitted” as well as what air/water/soil qualities are allowable
for our citizens. There is not enough protection here.
2.2.2 Correlations and Change
There are many statistical methods with which one can attempt to circumvent
the problems with establishing causality between cancer and environmental
damage. Findings correlations though is notoriously difficult to translate into
legal success and therethrough to create protection. A finding of a correlation
of one risk factor with a group might have, as part of the study design or
necessity of time, left out other arguably more important or interesting risk
factors, the lack of which leads to the conclusion that the correlation discovered
is trivial or incomplete.150 The relationship may well exist but the pathway
from cause to effect gets a bit cloudier. One needn’t mount an empirical
148Measured by living on the firm’s fence line for seventy years. Lambert/Boerner, p. 215
149This critique of causality is not in any sense new, nor is its problems with connections
to responsibility. For a relevant introduction, see Miller, David Distributing Responsibilities.
Journal of Political Philsophy, 9 December 2001, Nr. 4.
150Bowen Environmental Justice through research-based decision making, p. 52.
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study of legal strategy to see that poking holes in statistical weaknesses cannot
be a minor strategy in defending permitting or regulatory standpoints. Did
exposure at a workplace or living near the facility cause this cancer, or was it
years of smoking, unhealthy eating at home, or stress? Even if it was not one of
those factors alone, did they contribute to the exposure in a measurable way,
thus detracting from the culpability of the exposure? An ability to “blame
the victim” and the current culture of driving all problems down to individual
decisions is variably termed market-justice151 or discussed under problems with
meritocratic thinking152: the victim “earned” their cancer through omission
of care for themselves or by not working hard enough to stay healthy, among
other projected faults in those unlucky enough.153 The defense goes on; if
there is a combined effect, does the company still shoulder a fraction of the
burden?
It is easy to say that a government is causally and morally responsible for
a cancer when they expose their soldiers to radiation154 to observe the effects
of nuclear fallout on armies. But what if that soldier also smoked, or was a
beach-going tanner? What method can one use to empirically divide causal
responsibility and thereby dictate a quanta of remedial responsibility to the
military?155 Suffice it to say if there are some exposed who did not contract an
illness the problem is no longer “clearly” factory-produced carcinogen or the
government-imposed assignment. There may be a genetic disease or variable,
or a difference in the worker’s past, unrelated to their employment or living
location, that made them susceptible and therefore the singular “cause” is not
(entirely) responsible. Causality and responsibility are the accepted motivators
of change.
These exploits work in practice, despite knowing that cancer “is not a re-
sult of genetics alone; it is also caused by the environment.[. . . ] There is an
intimate interdependence among biological, genetic, environmental, and social
factors.”156 And while this is unarguable now, the legal system, when engaged
for environmental change still operates on the level of certainty. Proximity, or
the spatial correlation with the pollution which usually serves as the metric in
151Beauchamp.
152Barry.
153Also discussed in literature under the heading the “just world hypothesis.”
154Such as in the ECHR cases of LCB v. the United Kingdom and McGinley and Egan
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any data, rather than a measurement of how long one was in “contact” with
the pollutant, is a bridge further removed from exposure and risk.157 Many
intervening factors change exposure and risk relative to proximity measures.158
There are also the inherent susceptibility of different individuals and variable
climatic conditions that change the probabilities that proximity and exposure
become a health problem.
As one places more and more links between “poor environment” and “harm
to an individual” there are more areas for claiming a permit, regulation, or
siting is or was safe. These are simply weakness which lend greater potential
for the causal chain to snap. The simple ability to push against environmental
protection, predicated on nothing more than the current system’s necessary
requirement of establishing substantial causation supports the conjecture that
health concerns do not provide a satisfactory supplementary protection.
157Boerner and Lambert utilize a telling anecdote on connecting exposure/proximity to
risk. The stringency of current US legislation brings risks down to a one in a million
chance of developing cancer due specifically to the exposure from a properly constructed
and maintained waste-to-energy plant brought by living on the firm’s fence line for seventy
years. See Lambert/Boerner, p. 215. Critics are quick to point out the limited view of risk
here. New research pointing to links between lower oxygen content in the air we breath
and ability for cancer cells to survive might make a more direct link between air quality
and health possible, without a need to break down exposures to chemicals within the air.
See Bakker, Walbert J./Harris, Isaac S./Mak, Tak W. FOXO3a Is Activated in Response to
Hypoxic Stress and Inhibits HIF1-Induced Apoptosis via Regulation of CITED2. Molecular
Cell , 28 December 28 2007. Also, for an explanation of oxygen’s role in both helping and
hurting cancer cells’ chances for survival and growth Greaves.
158Kendall, P.R.W.; Public Health, Department of, editor Determining the Human Health
Risks of Environmental Chemicals. Toronto: Environmental Protection Office, 1991; I.e. ac-
tivity patterns which change the duration of contact/exposure; the changes in the location
of people; and the age of individuals exposed. There is a special concern here for children.
Studies highlight the exposure of minority children to lead and the tendencies toward lead
poisoning. See Foreman Jr.; also McDermott, p. 14, discussing the Agency for Toxic Sub-
stances and Disease Report (ATSDR). The Nature and Extent of Childhood Lead Poisoning
in the United States, A Report to Congress. 1988. The study showed that lead poisoning
impacted black children at a remarkably higher rate—at least 2 to 1. The study included
breakdowns by income as well. Although increasing income lowered black children’s ex-
posure to lead, it did so at a significantly lower rate than for non-minority children. The
well-documented problems which lead exposure lead to highlights the life-long problems
which environmental burdens bring. Also see, Hill Environmental Justice: Legal Theory
and Practice, p. 434-438; McDermott, Charles J Balancing the Scales of Environmental
Justice. Fordham Urb. L.J. 21 1994. General comments see the Center’s for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention’s (CDC) Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention;
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/. The study spotlights that 1) poor environments in which
minorities and low income groups often live in can affect life course prospects and 2) the
links from exposure are tightly and scientifically related to risk. Also see studies by the
Columbia Center for Children’s Environmental Health, cf. Barry, p. 48.
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2.2.3 More Strains on the Chain
While an aging but still oft-cited statistic, the epidemiologists Richard Peto
and Richard Doll concluded that no more than five percent of cancer deaths
in the US were caused by exposure to advanced human technology.159 More
recently, the US National Cancer Institute attributed about 10% to industrial
pollution, broadly defined.160 While this is still not a small number, it is also
not the magnitude one would hope to have as a weapon against polluters; it
is certainly not large enough relative to the changes hoped for and catalogued
by the environmental justice movement.161 Larger numbers simply give much
more power to a test of the chance that a polluting source is causing cancers
and therefore a strong footing for change. Given the above discussion, a low
incidence must be ascribed to the amazing resilience of the human body and
not, without further evidence, to any intrinsic safety of exposure itself. But
the exposure is unlikely to enable—or force—a wave of new protections.
Crucially though, this aging statistic is only referring to toxic exposures and
features of technology. Epidemiologists in general claim that up to 90 percent
of cancers can be traced to a “cause”, though these causes can be cultural,
diet, and exposure related.162 These contrasting statistics sit with each other
when one views cancer as arising through a ratcheting-effect: direct insults to
cellular genetics combine with imperfect cellular oversight, which usually serves
to correct (eliminate) cancerous cells, through repeated largely-indirect insults
like diet163 to ultimately bring a diagnosis of “cancer.” Changes in exposure
are not only coming from outside of our modern bodies either. Oxidative
stress and tribulations of modern life are acting on a body which evolved in a
far different world. Therefore, although 90% of cancers may have a “cause”,
159cf. Greaves, p. 18
160McGinnis, J. Michael; Samet, Jonathan A./McGinnis, J Michael/Soto, Michael A., edi-
tors Chap. Attributable Risk in Practice In Estimating the contributions of lifestyle-related
factors to preventable death. Washington, DC: Institute of Medicine, National Academy
Press, 2005; Health and Human Services/National Cancer Institute Health status objec-
tives. Cancer , 16 1991, Nr. 1
161To say nothing of problems one might like to change in the capitalist-ecological nexus.
See Faber, Daniel Capitalizing on Environmental Injustice: the polluter-industrial complex
in the age of globalization. Rowman and Littlefield, 2008
162Greaves, p. 117.
163Consider the rough statistic that primitive man, 15000 years ago, obtained two-thirds
of the calories from wild fruit and vegetables, and the remaining third from lean wild game,
including eggs and fish. Today’s American receives one-half of their calories from milk
products, cereals, and refined foods, with 17% coming from fruit and vegetables, 28% from
domesticated meats. cf. Ibid., p. 186
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only a much smaller percentage—perhaps as low as the 5% found by Peto and
Doll—would pass the but-for test demanded for establishing legal causality in,
say, a tort case. There is a definite dilution effect here which works against
advocates for change.
These are all unfortunate echoes of stories as old as Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring.
“A group of Long Island citizens. . . had sought a court injunction
to prevent the 1957 spraying [of DDT on Long Island]. Denied
a preliminary injunction, the protesting citizens had to suffer the
prescribed drenching with DDT, but thereafter persisted in efforts
to obtain a permanent injunction. But because the act had already
been performed the courts held that the petition for an injunction
was “moot.” The case was carried all the way to the Supreme
Court, which declined to hear it.”
None of this information shows even remotely that environmental degradation
and physical pollutants do not “cause” cancer but it does illustrate hurdles in
the legal and political routes, both then and now, for those who feel wronged
by such degradation or the potential wrongs prior to the degradation.
Highlighting the amazing capacity of the human body to deal with a chang-
ing environment should not diminish social concerns with pollution and expo-
sure; the discussion here is by no means arguing that the pollution in modern
society is “safe.” The today that humanity has built is bounded by the rather
wide margin of error earned through eons of trial-and-error evolution. It is
not hyperbolic to say that a cancer cell eliminated from one’s body today is a
talent earned by the deaths of many organisms to come before.164 This is a
world which, at least for many among the species, has brought great develop-
ments in human health, economic comfort, and technology.165 But the human
body’s capacities are untested in radically new artificial environs and it stands
to logic that times and situations can change too much, too fast, for even a
machine forged over 2.5 million years of evolution.166
164Stephen Jay Gould referred to this mechanism as the “hecatomb” feature of evolution
in which many, many organisms die as a species drifts through the evolution and mutation
landscape acquiring such talents as anti-cancer policing.
165cf. Hayward, p. 151.
166The figure is expressed back to the general appearance of homo habilis and the homo
genus. One could of course take the evolutionary time frame back even farther.
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Given the tenuous chains of causality between harmful outcomes and envi-
ronmental usage and despoliation environmental justice can not hope to effect
all their desired outcomes by a focus on health effects. When one’s goal is
to force a polluter or a government to clean up their act, or to take into ac-
count the an accumulation of environmental burdens, either for the sake of
human health or for the sake of the environment, one wants as clear a causal
line as possible to engage existing legal routes. This section illustrates, albeit
generally, how the causal chain for health has substantial weak links. The
reduction in explanatory power equally reduces the expectation for political
and legal power to take the role of protecting a subset of society. The weak-
ness here is all the more glaring and disheartening for the advocate given the
inherent weakness of the available political and regulatory processes discussed
throughout the environmental justice literature.
One final point is in order with respect to attempting to address health as
an indirect pressure on environmental distributions: how does one deal with
children? The discussion up until now implicitly assumes a school of adults
swimming through different regions of environmental quality. But we know
that important aspects of child development which bear heavily on social jus-
tice begin as early as 22-months and then continue through the educational
system. Such infantile factors are heavily correlated with the socio-economic
status—and hence environmental quality—of the parents.167 Above the sen-
sitivity of children themselves to environmental problems168 the nutrition and
health of the mother is also critical to the development of the fetus, meaning
the link between health and environment is especially weighty for pregnant
mothers.169 As such, children and mothers in any region of environmental
quality will always be exposed to a more perilous quantity of pollution than
other groups. These two groups tend to find more power to motivate change.
A gradient of danger also exists in income groups as it does for age brackets.
Blood pressure, stress hormones, and even cancer all have demonstrable co-
variance with the kind of society in which we reside.170 There is also evidence
of a class gradient among adults within exposure to harmful substances, in-
cluding smoking. Smokers of higher social classes are less likely to get cancer
167Barry, p. 47.
168Schrader-Frechette, p. 108.
169Geschwind, Sandra A. et al. Risk of Congenital Malformations Associated with Prox-
imity to Hazardous Waste Sites. American Journal of Epidemiology, 135 1992, Nr. 11.
170Levins.
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and more likely to live longer if they do than poor smokers, according to stud-
ies in the U.S.171 The corollary of this is that in addressing health conditions,
even ones as pressing as well documented in modern literature like exposure to
lead in the home, carcinogens in the workplace, or even more omnipresent like
air quality in a city, the poor will still suffer relatively more detriment than
other classes.172 To close with another health example,
“[d]espite the unparalleled research effort which has gone into find-
ing the causes of hearth disease, most of the modern epidemic is
unexplained. Not only do behavioural factors explain only a mi-
nority of the social gradient [the difference in incidence between
social classes], but they are difficult to alter. As Rose put it, if you
are in the lowest risk category for all the behavioural risk factors,
your most likely cause of death is still heart disease.”173
here is even a known potential physical route within the body that can cause
this; the effects of society on the body are not simply psycho-somatic. Levins
relates research on how neurotransmitters, which are triggered by the cerebrum
gathering social data via sensory input, are chemically similar to white blood
cells.174 With such a pathway, “we think with our whole bodies, we feel with
our whole bodies, and so the whole body is the locus of social experience that
comes with these patterns of chronic conditions [. . . ].” Wilkinson continues
to elaborates, taking this idea out of hyperbolic rhetoric and into a concrete
problematic:
171Barry, p. 86. Wilkinson also relates a telling story about the size of the adrenal glands
between the paupers dissected at beginning of the 20th century and the much smaller glands
found in middle-class cadavers once that class began leaving their bodies to science. So odd
were the new, smaller adrenals that they were given a named condition. Later did we find
out that it was the original paupers’ glands which were enlarged, ostensibly due to the
chronic stress relative to the middle class. Wilkinson, p. 49-50.
172See esp. Ibid.. Barry (p. 87, 2005) continues, heading off critics claiming poor choices
among classes are causing the outcomes that “[t]he differences in health and life expectancy
that are left over after allowing for the effects of choices cannot all be accounted for. . . but
they must arise from some way or other in which the better off enjoying a more favourable
environment than the less well off.” Wilkinson (p. 65-66, 2000), also supplies supporting
evidence in that “[i]n the developed world, as much as half of the variation in population
health. . . appears to be due to differences in income inequality alone.”
173Wilkinson, p. 64, citing Rose, G Sick individuals and sick populations. International
Journal of Epidemiology, 14 1985. One should note that although personal behaviour should
not be employed to “explain away” injustice as a social phenomenon (blaming the victim,
see, inter alia Barry), one must still account for personal behavioural variables in empirical




To feel depressed, cheated, bitter, desperate, vulnerable, fright-
ened, angry, worried about debts or job and housing insecurity;
to feel devalued, useless, helpless, uncared for, hopeless, isolated,
anxious and a failure: these feelings can dominate people’s whole
experience of life, colouring their experience of everything else. It
is the chronic stress arising from feelings like these which does the
damage. It is the social feelings which matter, not the exposure to a
supposedly toxic material environment. The material environment
is merely the indelible mark and constant reminder of the oppres-
sive fact of one’s failure, of the atrophy of any sense of having place
in a community, and of one’s social exclusion and devaluation as a
human being.175
Combined with the empirical evidence that “one’s body know’s one’s class
position no matter how well one has been taught to deny it,”176 this is a
potent illustration of disproportionate impacts.
Finally, albeit more speculatively, a focus on health distributions does not
lend an unambiguous direction for improvement. Claiming that one has some
right to health or safety does not necessarily clean up the environment that
caused the problem. Thanks to modern medical technology, health problems
can be fixed by more than just removing the cause. Consider for the sake of
illustration the situation in 17th century London, where rickets—a bone dis-
ease caused by low levels of vitamin D—owed at least some of its resurgence to
the black skies which blocked sunlight necessary for children to metabolize the
necessary nutrient.177 The disease also owes something to malnutrition, as vi-
tamin D deficiencies can be rectified through diet as well as sunlight exposure.
Given this knowledge, would a populace have a right or claim to a clean(er)
environment which could solve the health problems associated with rickets,
or would a claim to the same end-state—namely a rickets-free environment—
suffice? Disregarding the other health effects that the smog,178 Can one jus-
175Wilkinson, p. 215.
176Levins, p. 373; discussing a study finding differences in juveniles’ responses to and
recovery from stress signals. Working-class children had prolonged rises in stress hormones
(cortisol) while upper-class children had quick spikes and declines.
177Brimblecombe, p. 53-55. Historical stories lack the detail necessary for today’s stan-
dards of causation but this story is merely an illustration. But the illustration certainly
lived in the public consciousness, at least up into the 19th century and disaster novels like
W. Delisle Hay’s “Doom of the Great City”, where London succumbs under its own poison
fog and wastes. cf. Davis, p. 286
178A statement which may weaken the parable woven here, as I have yet to think of a
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tify a claim to the environment when aiming first and foremost at improving
health?
A more modern example comes in the form of anti-diarrhea tablet dispersal
in areas of poor sanitation. Is there a right to not having diarrhea, or to a
general human right to water?179 Abstracting away from the modern techno-
logical limitations of anti-diuretics, and assuming technology could someday
build a more perfect pill, it stands to reason that a fundamental right to a
clean environment carries different obligations than an expanded right to life
which recognizes the effects of environmental quality on life. This is a difficult
path to tread. As Barry180 notes,
a deficit in health care can (to a greater or smaller degree) be
cancelled by the expenditure of resources on medical care. But we
at no point need to suggest that we are trying to equalize some
composite score made up of each person’s initial state of health
and the quantity of resources devoted to his or her medical care.
Above all, and even if policy makers were to sit down and have a long con-
versation on the health/environmental nexus and the state’s responsibilities
therein, there is no inherent discussion of the minority of the population which
is affected by the environmental burden in the first place; in all but the most
dangerous and widespread cases, environmental problems can be expected to
remain tilted toward fewer people.181
Suffice it to say that as technology and science improves, the ability to
trade off biologic technology for environmental quality expands the grey area
between using health indicators to protect the environmental and simply pro-
tecting human health. Protecting one is not the same as protecting the other,
not now and not in the future. Further, once the “epidemiological thresh-
old”182 is breached, where degenerative diseases such as cancer and others
associated with aging take over for infectious diseases as the major determi-
nant of life expectancy, focusing on individual health enters areas of potentially
similar story or find a related anecdote in which a poor environment causes one reparable
illness and one alone.
179Hill, Barry E/Wolfson, Steve/Targ, Nicholas Human Rights and the Environment: A
synopsis and some predictions. Geo. Int’l. Envtl. L. Rev. 16 2003-2004; also note World







significantly decreasing returns.183 These are all reasons why we cannot ex-
pect the current legal and regulatory environment to respond to incidences of
health problems in enough ways and with enough force to reinforce a personal
sphere from majority choices. Unless health effects are supremely evident,
there is little momentum available for change. While an environmental bur-
den’s effect on health is real, it simply cannot be expected in all cases to serve
as the necessary erzatz lever of recognition. There must be something greater
to draw attention and recognition of the minorities’ environmental situation.
2.2.4 Discussion
While this is far from an exhaustive proof, it presses strongly against any
assumption that there exist sufficient protections within the existing politico-
regulatory system for the minority opinion. The evidence here suffices to
grant motivation to check whether there is a stronger form of protection. One
is certainly necessary given the detrimental effects continued and clustered
environmental burdens have on those subjected to them. The concern cannot
wait for health problems to rise to the defense of these groups either. This all
leaves the individual at the mercy of a system which tilts the playing field.
But to step away from a focus on pollutants, risk, exposure, and health out-
comes is not to step away from all that work teaches. Perhaps the strongest
potential role for health-outcomes research in the environmental discussion is
in linking environmental degradation to measurable expenditures on health
care. Especially for the European countries184 whose governments play a sub-
stantial role in health care provision, governments would seem to have a vested
interest in improving the environment.185 To the extent that social inequali-
ties are powerful determinants of environmental exposures, and thereby also
determinants of health outcomes, governments’ incentives should be aligned
with environmental justice.
183See, inter alia Rose, G The strategy of preventive medicine. Oxford University Press,
1992; Hertzman, C. Environment and Health in Central and Eastern Europea. World Bank,
1995. Wilkinson notes that individuals in societies which have passed the threshold can be
more than twice as rich as others without being any healthier, implying that tackling an
individual’s problem’s with quantitatively more or more expensive medicine is not unam-
biguously better. Wilkinson, p. 3.
184And, as of this writing, perhaps the US will move in a similar direction, if only with
baby steps.
185Barry, p. 85;Wikler, Daniel Personal Social Responsibility for Health. Ethics and In-
ternational Affairs, 16 2002
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Environmental justice literature implicitly agrees with the view, used by
cancer researchers and implied in the linkages between social inequities and
health, that “cause” “should be considered in a broader context than those
proximal events or agents—such as carcinogens in cigarette tar—that trigger
disease and should include social, commercial, and political factors that have
tangibly influenced risk.”186 This research, and indeed environmental justice
research in general, resides in the realm of this extended definition of cause.
The ethical is engaged because, at all levels of “cause”, risks are not expected
to be born equitably among a given population.187 The political and legal is
engaged because the peoples on which the “cause” is acted do not have realistic
potential to change it. This all adds up to a situation for a minority of people
that must be addressed by the majority, lest the majority continue to violate
foundational democratic principles.
The use of the “case study” of cancer here is in fact a shortcut through
the more exhaustive discussions on rights, causality, and responsibility that
we will trace throughout the paper. Somehow an introduction utilizing the
visceral dialogue of cancer is more suited to an introductory chapter than the
voluminous theoretical discussion.188
But this is a suggestive glance at some reasons why social science is in-
creasingly viewing such situations—perhaps as a necessity given the need to
generalize across many fields—as the outcomes of positional situations.189 To
illustrate this term “positional,” which can be used to modify many nouns, we
use the example provided by Barry (p. 176, 2005).
186Greaves, p. 134, citing lines of arguments from biologist Richard Lewontin, Lewontin,
Richard C. Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA. Harper Perennial, 1993; and science
historian Robert Proctor, inter alia Proctor, Robert N The anti-tobacco campaign of the
Nazis: a little known aspect of public health in Germany, 1933-45. British Medical Journal
(BMJ), 313 Dec 7 1996, among his other books on cancer.
187i.e. Schrader-Frechette. This work, as a first step, focuses on the human impact on
other humans. There is much to critique there but admittedly crops the bigger ecological
picture quite arbitrarily. The case could very well be made that the other species who our
extended reach impacts should be considered. Inter alia Stone, Christopher D. Should Trees
Have Standing—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects. S. Cal. L. Rev. 45 1972. This is
an extensive path of research in the legal literature, focusing on the rights of all objects in a
system in addition to human actors. See Collin, Robert W. Review of the Legal Literature
on Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity, and Environmental Justice. J. Envtl. L.
& Litig. 9 1994, p. 130-31. Non-anthropocentric concerns though will have to wait for just a
moment longer. Hopefully if we can work out the intricacies of human rights to an adequate
environment, we can move on to broader ecological rights.
188An introduction on hazard distributions and risk is found in Cutter
189The term “positional” in this usage is credited to Fred Hirsch, Hirsch, Fred The Social
Limits to Growth. Routledge, 1976
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2 Introduction
“In the job market, what matters is not how much education you
have but how much you have in relation to others. If half the
population have a degree, then a degree will become the minimum
qualification for entry-level positions in many jobs that previously
would have been filled by those who had completed secondary ed-
ucation but gone no further.”
In this sense, when policy makers discuss environmental justice, they are dis-
cussing the morality of social mechanisms which partition better resources to
better situated, regardless of the absolute magnitude of the resources involved
and without questioning the morality behind the causality.190 The same situ-
ation is also prevalent among the problems with income distribution. Consider
Wilkison’s statement that
“[o]ne of the reasons for the continued interest in economic growth
is a belief that every individual’s desire for increased income can
be summed into a societal desire for increased income. But given
what we know about the power of income distribution and the im-
portance of relative rather than absolute income, it is possible that
this is based on a false assumption. Perhaps the individual desire
for increased income is primarily a desire to have the things richer
people have and to occupy the social position of richer people: that
is to say, it may be primarily a desire to increase one’s income.”191
The question here then becomes, are we looking to improve the income of the
disadvantaged class or the distribution of income? And, almost as importantly,
which one is achievable? This research takes the view that, given the need to
protect a minority from the environmental choices, intended and unintended,
of the majority, and the inability of political discourse to guarantee protection
that something substantially more is implied.
After over three decades of environmental justice research, the interesting
questions are no longer of the analytical type, aiming to elucidate the quantita-
190The idea is not entirely novel. Consider an interpretation of obscenity as having no
intrinsic definition itself, but can only be obscene in relation to other, external, metrics.
Janis, Kay, and Bradley note English law, see Director of Public Prosecutions v. Whyte
[1972] A.C. 849,864, [1972] 3 All E.R. 12, 21. Janis, Mark W./Kay, Richard S./Bradley,




2.2 Health and Sickness
tive relationship between race, class, or income and environmental factors.192
One can rest assured that inequality exists, in environmental matters just
as in many others touched on by social justice research. The inequality does
not, however, condemn the system in which it resides. As Risse remarks, “The
global order is not fundamentally unjust; instead, it is incompletely just. . . ”.193
Policy can endeavor to make it more just by granting some power back to those
in the minority who are currently deprived of it.
It was this discussion that this chapter meant to highlight, reasons for the
shortcomings of established policy mechanisms through which the environmen-
tal justice movement has laboured. The problems are real but the existing
solutions are expected to be weak. Further, these shortcomings are not likely
to go away. The illustration sets the stage for a new policy. A right to the
environment cannot be justified by appeals to democratic principles alone194
but the lack of democratic protection coupled with lack of auxiliary protections
does push the conversation in that direction.
The conversation thus rises to the level of human rights because of the
intrinsic weakness of existing democratic and legal pathways toward change.
There is of course the open question of the ethics of placing the burden of
organizing and energizing the change on the people who the environmental
burdens are being placed should that route be significantly empowered to
affect protection where the existing policies do not.
With this in mind the following chapter demonstrates the methods by which
environmental injustice propagates. So far the idea that environmental bur-
dens agglomerate and tend toward positions affecting a numerical minority195
has only been conjecture. Should burdens begin to impact the majority exist-
ing mechanisms are engaged for rectification or at least compromise and there
is the potential for political turnaround. In that case there is no problem left
to be identified as an environmental injustice. The following chapter uses both
the existing canon of environmental justice research and economic theory to
support the mechanics which bring about and concentrate burdens. The in-
vestigation supports the otherwise rhetorical discussion in this chapter with
192Schweitzer, Lisa/Stephenson Jr., Max Right Answers, Wrong Questions: Environmen-
tal Justice. Urban Studies, 44 February 2007, Nr. 2.
193Risse, Mathias De We Owe the Poor Assistance or Rectification? Ethics and Interna-
tional Affairs, 19 2005, Nr. 1, p. 10.
194Hayward, p. 129; Hayward also notes that while principles of democracy cannot fully




some degree of rigor and helps to clarify the pessimism toward the established
routes for environmental change. If environmental justice problems are a fun-
damental tendency and pathways for the minority to fix them are limited then
protective action becomes warranted.
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3 Movement of The Environment
Engineers, like politicians, are
concerned with the art of the
possible, and this requires us,
above all, to think realistically
about what people actually are,
and how they got that way.
Daniel C. Dennett
The established environmental justice literature shows that one should ex-
pect disproportionate distributions of burdens, and that they are likely—as
documented by the environmental justice movement itself—to affect a minor-
ity of individuals. This chapter illustrates the theory behind those expecta-
tions and proclivities. The end goal is to connect with the preceding chapter
which fixed the idea that a minority will find it difficult to effect change polit-
ically due to a deficit in influence. While not a formal proof, the explications
here lend, at a minimum, no reason to believe that the junction of economic
systems and environmental use will not move against a minority of the pop-
ulation. With these dilemmas in mind, one is pressed to ask questions of a
human rights nature. The hypothesis of this research thus fully emerges from
the discussions of this chapter.
This chapter explores the propensity toward environment injustice via mar-
ket mechanisms using many examples from the U.S. literature and augmenting
that discussion with European bridge work where possible. Despite the need
for environmental justice research to be more clear on what exactly “dispro-
portionate” is, especially what distributive outcome is the comparator which
reveals a disproportionality,1 the purpose of this chapter remains to demon-
strate the propensity of the economic system in and of itself to distribute
1Noonan, Douglas S. Evidence of Environmental Justice: A Critical Perspective on the




environmental quality. Evidence of a distribution’s tendency toward impact-
ing lower socioeconomic classes—contentious in some points, but relevant to
the human rights aspect—ties the neutral discussion on economic mechanics
to environmental justice proper. While this chapter will not establish that the
environment is always and everywhere distributed such that the poor and mi-
nority populations of traditional environmental justice literature receive all the
burdens of modern pollution, it does demonstrate exactly why policy should
not operate from the opposite assumption, that the market will adjust itself
toward any sort of equitable distributions.
The majority of the evidence presented here comes simply from the devel-
oped discussions in the U.S. There is no expectation though that economic
dynamics or environmental impacts will differ in any other context. The de-
sire to rest the mechanics directly on a firm footing necessitates the discussion
of economic theory, not any desire to firm up the more limited literature in
Europe. In fact, the literature that does exist makes the point quite explic-
itly, especially the newest and most developed work.2 There is simply more
evidence to work with from the U.S. experience. And while some of the dis-
cussion there cannot be carried in to Europe, especially the racial overtones,3
it still overwhelmingly illustrates the expected, tilted environmental playing
field and the problems those on the downhill side experience.
Understanding the tendency toward awkward distributions helps guide in
asking the right questions about environmental justice. The dynamics illus-
trated here, stemming first from the established environmental justice litera-
ture and then adding some new tools of economics,4 couple with the democratic
problems in Chapter 2 to demonstrate why environmental justice is such an
intractable phenomenon. This is relevant because the idea of environmental
justice is quite a bit older than the conception of environmental justice one is
most likely to encounter during a quick internet search. In fact, early recog-
nition that environmental policy can have localized effects5 can be found in
comments during the 1970s on the then-emerging ecology movement, long be-
fore the 1982 Warren County protests which often serve in the literature as the
movement’s beginning. In 1973, Faramelli saw that “ecology is a profoundly
serious matter, yet most of the solutions suggested for environmental quality
2Esp. Section 3.6.
3Discussed more fully in Chapter 5
4Section 3.4
5There, on the poor and minorities
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will have, directly or indirectly, adverse effects on the poor and lower income
groups.”6 Wolpert similarly commented in 1976 on tendency for regressive sit-
ing of public facilities.7 Early and notable work by environmental economists
also led to the conclusion that lower income predicts lower environmental qual-
ity.8
It was however the socio-political reality in the United States that loaned
a directionality and a momentum that launched environmental justice on a
productive but unfinished path.9 Most new literature however is moving away
from the empirical and methodological discussions which marked environmen-
tal justice’s formative early years. The empirical debates which served to boost
environmental justice to its current status though left critics unsatisfied and
policy changes unfulfilled, and are being either left behind or situated in what
can be seen as this generally larger “new”—or perhaps, renewed—discourse.
The traditional dialogue of environmental justice seems then to have been
asking the wrong questions, focusing on the status of the individuals on the
receiving end of burdens. The idea of environmental justice was searching for a
succinct expression while at the same time advocating for much-needed change
and this change needed empirical backing. Coupled with the recent court
cases there which shut down the most fertile area of commentary,10 scholars
have slowed their pace on environmental justice relative to the pace in other
fields. The new, expanded discourses though are less focused on quantifying
the disproportionate distributions of environmental quality, or utilizing those
results in the courtroom as a lever of change, than it is about the ebb, flow,
6Faramelli, Norman T.; Barbour, Ian G., editor Chap. Ecological Responsibility and
Economic Justice In Western Man and Environmental Ethics. Addison-Wesley Publishing,
1973, p. 188.
7Wolpert, Julian Regressive Siting of Public Facilities. Natural Resources Journal , 16
1976.
8Freeman III, A. Myrick On Estimating Air Pollution Control Benefits from Land Value
Studies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 1 1974; discussed below.
Note these studies too with debates on whether race or income are better predictors of
hazards. See Cousins, Ken Smoke in the Skies, Bread on the Table. College Park, MD, 2001
– Technical report; Foreman Jr., Christopher H. The promise and peril of environmental
justice. Brookings Institution Press, 1998
9One should mention the connection with the United Farm Workers’ Union’s fight
against pesticides and the conditions of black garbage collectors as publicized by Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr. in the 1960s. Such was the first environmental law suit to utilize civil rights
statutes in 1979 and could have equal claim to being the first environmental justice case.
10E.g. Note After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title
VI Enforcement. Harv. L. Rev. 116 2003; Core, Lisa S. Alexander v. Sandoval: Why a
Supreme Court Case about Driver’s Licenses Matters to Environmental Justice Advocates.
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 30 2003; See Section 5.3.1
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and ramifications of observed phenomena.11
In sociology, the new questioning has meant quite literally an expansion of
how “space, place, and scale” matter in investigating situations of environmen-
tal injustice.12 Though not entirely a new notion, the strengthening of this
strand of thought connects the environmental justice discussion more directly
with established discourse on social justice.13 It also connects to the new quan-
titative approach of geographical economics which brings explicit recognition
of agglomeration dynamics into spatial studies14, explaining “why certain eco-
nomic activities tend to become established in particular places”15—a neces-
sary addition to the environmental justice canon since the pioneering critiques
of Been.16 This helps establish a theoretical base for the causality of the pic-
ture the environmental justice-movement contends with in the modern world.
It is not, however attempting to serve as that missing legal lever by redefin-
ing causality.17 Studying the agglomeration tendencies of industries is full of
insights into the patterns of pollution with which environmental justice con-
cerns itself,18 while more traditional economics and sociology tie the results
11Similar in idea to note is available in Walker, Gordon Beyond Distribution and Proxim-
ity: Exploring the Multiple Spatialities of Environmental Justice. Antipode, 41 2009, Nr. 4.
12Holifield, Ryan/Porter, Michael/Walker, Gordon Introduction: Spaces of Environmen-
tal Justice: Frameworks for Critical Engagement. Antipode, 41 2009, Nr. 4; Walker
13See Holland, Breena Justice and the Environment in Nussbaum’s “capabilities ap-
proach”: Why sustainable ecological capacity is a meta-capability. Political Research Quar-
terly, 61 2008; and discussions in Chapter 2
14Inter alia, and discussed herein include Combes, Pierre-Philippe/Mayer, Thierry/
Thisse, Jacques-Françios Economic Geography: The integration of regions and nations.
Princeton University Press, 2008, Huriot, Jean-Marie/Thisse, Jacques-Fran cois, editors
Economics of Cities. Cambridge, 2000; and especially Bowen, William M/Atlas, Mark/
Lee, Sugie Industrial Agglomeration and the Regional Scientific Explanation of Perceived
Environmental Injustice. Annals of Regional Science, 43 December 2008, Nr. 4, so far one
of the only environmental justice-applications of agglomerative measurement. See Section
3.4.
15Fujita, Masahisa/Thisse, Jacques-Fran cois; Huriot, Jean-Marie/Thisse, Jacques-
Fran cois, editors Chap. The Formation of Economic Agglomerations: Old Problems and
New Perspectives In The Economics of Cities. Cambridge, 2000, p. 3.
16Been, Vicki Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dispropor-
tionate Siting or Market Dynamics? The Yale Law Journal , 103 1994, Nr. 6; idem What’s
Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undersirable
Land Uses. Cornell Law Review , 78 September 1993, Nr. 1001; Section 3.5.2
17Discussed infra Section 3.4. Further in economics, though not discussed in detail here,
environmental justice themes run strongly through ecological economics literature, an off-
shoot and sometimes competitor to more traditional environmental economics. Daly, Her-
man Ecological Economics and Sustainable Development, Selected Essays of Herman Daly.
Edward Elgar, 2008; Martinez-Alier, Joan The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study
of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation. Edward Elgar, 2002; Costanza, Robert et al. An
Introduction to Ecological Economics. CRC Press, 1997.
18After all, “[t]he geographical areas in which these industries concentrate include many,
if not most, of the same facilities at issue in environmental justice analyses.” Bowen/Atlas/
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rigorously into the realms of justice. Establishing the expectation bypasses
the need for narrowly-defined causality which so defined earlier environmental
justice literature and pushes the hope of solution into the all-encompassing
fundamental rights territory.
3.1 Naming Issues
There is no better illustration as to the many other questions which have
fallen, and continue to fall under the heading of environmental justice than to
look to the other titles which this research has garnered in the past. These
titles have clear implications for the direction of inquiry and inform the reader
as to why this work—and indeed, most others—continue to use the “justice”
moniker while helping to wade from the preceding general discussions into the
deeper specifics to come.
One could argue that the phenomenon under discussion is better situated
under the more neutral of the terminology:“environmental equity.” “Environ-
mental equity” was indeed the first choice to describe disproportionate envi-
ronmental impacts by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in
1992. The original title though fell out of favor with the EPA because it “im-
plies the redistribution of risk across racial groups rather than risk reduction
and avoidance. . . ”.19 The fixation at the regulatory level was with race, which
at the time was the driving concern for the fledgling movement.20 Equity does
imply an equalization of sorts, but not necessarily of risk, nor necessarily across
racial groups. Equity, minus the EPA’s concerns at the time, is actually the
most general phrasing which would inspire inquiry as to the distribution of
burdens and benefits and is the term which is gaining now importance in Eu-
rope. It does not, however, explain why the various “bads” discussed within
the environmental justice movement should be “equalized.”
The racial history of the U.S. also granted a more inflammatory labels to
original questions of disproportionate burdens., Environmental racism, a term
which provides another framing to the problem and focuses on the characteris-
Lee
19cf. Kuehn, Robert R. A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice. Environmental Law
Reporter , 30 2000, p. 10682.
20For the original EPA terminology discussion, see U.S. EPA Reducting Risk for All




tics of the unequally impacted group, rather than the unequal situation itself.
Robert D. Bullard, a prominent name in the field, defined the term as “any
policy, practice or directive that differentially affects of disadvantages (whether
intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities based on race or
color.21” This definition is only slightly softer than Benjamin Chavis’ earlier
definition of environmental racism as “...racial discrimination in the deliber-
ate targeting of communities of color for toxic waste disposal and siting of
polluting industries. . . ”22 The terminology naturally drove questions as to
the reasons and causality behind observed distributions, implying that if the
disproportionate burden was a ubiquitous phenomenon then the question of
active discrimination (and racism) could not be ruled out. After identifying
a disproportionate distribution, then questions of whether the actions which
brought about that problem were intentional, or failing that have differen-
tial effects are a sufficient condition for labeling the action as racist naturally
arise. And despite the rather short-lived term of the environmental racism
label, making way as it did for the broader and now accepted environmental
justice, the primary and secondary questions which it inspired played a signif-
icant role in the legal development, and indeed in the flavour of the advocacy
in general, of the environmental justice movement in the U.S.
Any choice in title thus carries some baggage; and the reader should note
the possibility of other “loaded” terms in environmental justice research. But
environmental justice term captures the essence of the problem we are address-
ing here, while shedding some of the questions implied by other coinage. This
is not to denigrate those other paths, but is rather typical constructive criti-
cisms enabled by the vision-correcting glasses of hindsight. Research is never
a straight line and none of the directions taken in the established literature
are dead ends.23 And researching the paths already taken is the only way to
21Bullard, Robert D. Environmental Racism and “Invisible” Communities. West Virginia
Law Review , 96 1994, p. 1037.
22Chavis Jr., Benjamin F.; Bullard, Robert D., editor Chap. Foreword to Confronting
Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots In Confronting Environmental Racism:
Voices from the Grassroots. South End Press, 1993, p. 3; See also Evans, Jill E. Challeng-
ing the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent. Arizona Law
Review , 40 1998, p. 1273.
23There are, however, empirical issues that must be addressed and redressed in some
traditional literature before their conclusions should be cited now. For a cogent critique
and check, see Noonan; Ringquist, Evan J Assessing Evidence of Environmental Inequities:
A Meta-Analysis. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management , 24 2005; Bowen, William
An Analytical Review of Environmental Justice Research: What Do We Really Know?
Environmental Management , 29 January 2002, Nr. 1; Liu, Feng Environmental Justice
68
3.1 Naming Issues
identify new paths. So asking a question about justice, as we do here, is an
outgrowth of other questions that have hopefully steered in fruitful directions.
And to address justice, one must understand the systems which bring about
injustice. As Barry notes,
“the aggregate effect of individual acts of injustice will form part
of a pattern that creates a systematically unjust distribution of
rights, opportunities and resources. To offset this unjust allocation
arising from individual decisions, the society’s institutions need to
be changed.”24
But how to change them properly requires an understanding of the mechanics
which lead to the undesirable allocation in the first place; indeed, it often
requires researchers to think deeply about what exactly are the undesirable
components of the system. After all, getting rid of all industry and modern
production of the type which brings pollution burdens would itself bring great
burdens to even more of society. As Risse remarked, “[t]he global order is not
fundamentally unjust; instead, it is incompletely just. . . ”.25
Critical thinking can help research mete out the incomplete portions from
the complete. This leads us first and foremost into the realm of economics.
Economic science already has lent a range of tools to the environmental justice
discourse, including most prominently environmental economics and econo-
metrics. Again, the goal of the research at hand though is not to expand
on these fields relative to environmental justice—although that research is
undoubtedly necessary and interesting—but rather to capitalize on their still-
growing conclusions in order to move motivate legal discussion of a human right
to the environment. After all, examining the incomplete conclusions of earlier
environmental justice work is what leads inquiry upward toward rights-based
inquiries.
Although the following sections pass porously through some academic bound-
aries, the discussion remains bounded by the existing national and inter-
national legal forms as well as established literature as it moves downward
from Chapter 2’s introduction on the democratic problems motivating envi-
ronmental justice research. Given that existing legal forms rely on the state-
Analysis: Theories, Methods, and Practice. Lewis Publishers, 2001.
24Barry, Brian Why Social Justice Matters. Polity Press, 2005, p. 18.
25Risse, Mathias De We Owe the Poor Assistance or Rectification? Ethics and Interna-
tional Affairs, 19 2005, Nr. 1, p. 10.
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centric perspective research does as well. For economics, especially geograph-
ical economists, however, reduced transportation and communication costs,
along with global integration, are erasing some of the absolute nature of these
lines on a map.26 Future legal research following closer on the heels of eco-
nomic geography may wish to relax this stricture with the help of the economic
models.27 The established and continued importance today derives from the
state’s sovereign right to use and utilize their natural environment.28 It is by
exercising this right, and by extending and delegating the use of the grant,
whether in part or whole, to its agencies and especially to business interests,
that environmental inequity begins to propagate; whether that propagation
is limited to the sovereign boundaries from which the choices emanate are
however doubtful.
It is choice which begins to push against equalization, but this chapter will
show that it is not only choice in the form of active discrimination, or even
indirect discrimination. It is a complex interaction of choices that have yet to
be fully elucidated and mapped by theory. This does not mean though that
they will someday show that what we perceive at environmental justice from
the work of the empirical studies of the 1990s and forward is not truly unjust.
That is, there is no expectation that research will somehow explain away the
painful or morally repugnant components of the way society distributes envi-
ronmental quality. To the contrary, the work is making it more and more clear
that environmental injustice is something to expect.
Thankfully, while the topics within the economics discipline which could be
brought to bear on the environmental justice issue are copious, and there are
markers already placed along the way by other researchers in the environmental
justice mainstream who have reached in to economics to aide their work. Much
26Combes/Mayer/Thisse.
27Other branches of inquiry also acknowledge that boundaries are not absolute, such
as those looking at the important role of multinational corporations (MNCs), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and trans-boundary externalities. I.e. Bastmeijer,
Kees/Verschuuren, Jonathan Chap. NGO-Business Collaborations and the Law: Sustain-
ability, Limitations of Law, and the Changing Relationship between Companies and NGOs
In Corporate Social Responsibility, Accountability, and Governance: Global Perspectives.
Greenleaf Publishing, 2005
28UN G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX) (1974). Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the
States, Article 2.1: “Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty,
including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic
activities.” See also discussions in Turner, Stephen J. A Substantive Environmental Right:
An Examination of the Legal Obligations of Decision-Makers Toward the Environment.
Kluwer, 2009, p. 10,n. 25,26
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of that came in the now less-influential research from the 1990s.29 As this
more traditional economic approach ties in with the established environmental
justice-canon, the path toward illustrating the proclivity of economic dynamics
to undermine environmental equity begins here.
3.2 The Economics of Environmental Quality
While there may be many starting points for environmental justice, they all
should pass through A.M. Freeman’s 1972 article, “The Distribution of Envi-
ronmental Quality”.30 This early paper linked the contemporaneous economic
focus on valuing the costs of pollution31 with the tools necessary to investigate
environmental distributions. Without knowing what creates the environmen-
tal picture one sees at any given time there is no hope to create a picture
that society wants. Freeman’s article is one of, if not the, first concrete tools
which could enable enable someone to investigate a perceived environmental
injustice. And although the science has moved on in detail32 this article still
introduces enough of the details while staying tightly connected to the envi-
ronmental justice discourse to come.
The 1970s saw the emergence of large-scale environmental economics re-
search focused, due to policy desires, on assigning monetary figures to pollu-
tion. As the environment is not a good which is bought and sold—although
notable exceptions, like the implementation of emissions permit markets like
tradable sulfur credits exist—33 economists brought a series of valuation tools
to bear on the problem of finding out how much use of the un-purchased envi-
ronment costs. If it was being used or utilized, it must have a value or utility,
29As to the waning interest in empirical environmental justice, see Walker
30Freeman III, A. M.; Kneese, A. V./Bower, B. T., editors Chap. Distribution of en-
vironmental quality In Environmental Quality Analysis: Theory and Method in the social
sciences. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972.
31The segment of environmental economics which is concerned with putting mone-
tary figures to such goods as environmental quality which are not directly priced in the
market is known as “valuation”. While the field has detractors (Martinez-Alier), given
the contemporary discussions on cap-and-trade carbon trading systems (in the U.S., see
http://www.epa.gov/capandtrade) to water-resource rights (Glennon, Robert Unquench-
able: America’s Water Crisis and What to Do About It. Island Press, 2009) valuation
remains a tool that one must contend with in environmental discussions.
32And Freeman has kept up with it. See Freeman III, A. Myrick The Measurements of
Environmental and Resource Values: Theory and Methods. 2nd edition. Washington, D.C.:
Resources for the Future, 2003
33See generally Schmalensee, Richard, et al An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide
Emissions Trading. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 Summer 1998, Nr. 3.
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however implicit in the cost calculations of its utilizers. The argument was,
and is, that the most logical way to put a price on the environment was to do
measure its effect on economic activity.34 This way, the environment reveals
itself as an input to production35—whether industrial or household—whose
price was always there, but previously commingled with the jumble of other
costs associated with an activity.
This exercise is not just for factories who are not taking in to consideration
the amount of clean air they pull into a combustion process and release as
dirty air in their cost calculations; valuation can help put a value on a park
or a public-use lake. The latter is often valued by travel costs calculations;
better environmental quality can bring in more people willing to travel longer
distances for the privilege of better quality. While humans may not purchase
environmental quality directly, they do pay for goods and services which em-
body different levels of environmental quality. The intrinsic value of better
quality is somehow reflected in the price of the traded—or traveled for—good.
Valuation then is the science of getting at that “somehow.”
For a useful example easily tuned to the environmental justice context,
housing and land are known to have value based at least partially on their
surroundings. All other things equal, a house situated in a locale with better
air quality should have a higher market value than one with worse air quality.
Of course, in the market for land, all things are not equal–all houses are not
for sale at the same time, zoning precludes some uses of land while allowing
others, contracts and deeds put limits on building characteristics in different
areas, school systems differ, and even the emotional character of a neighbour-
hood plays a role in the housing decision. Such differences be accounted for
in statistical tests, and one can then carefully extract the singular influence
the environmental quality exerts on the market price. And although people
may have a hard time reliably reporting how much they are willing to pay for
air quality36, the negative impact of pollution is capitalized into, and hence
34Anderson Jr., Robert J./Crocker, Thomas D. Air Pollution and Residential Property
Values. Urban Studies, 8 Oct. 1971, p. 171.
35Krier, James E. The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview.
UCLA L. Rev. 18 1971, p. 430.
36Although carefully designed survey’s, also known as contingent valuation methods, are
another possible way to reveal hidden willingness to pay. For a general description in an envi-
ronmental context, see Portney, Paul R The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists
Should Care. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 Fall 1994, Nr. 4; Hanemann, W. Michael
Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation. The Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 8 Autumn 1994, Nr. 4; Diamond, Peter A./Hausmann, Jerry A. Contingent Val-
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revealed as a portion of the price tag.
In one valuation example, notably cited as an early revelation of connec-
tions between the environmental quality and socioeconomic variables like race
and income, Anderson and Crocker found that even the relatively broad pollu-
tant measurements from the late 1960s depressed residential property prices.37
That is, buyers are aware at some level of pollutant aspects like high particu-
late matter counts in the air and are willing to pay less for a house in such an
area. Other studies have investigated a host of nuances and variables toward
this end.38
Although the current research does not need to focus on nor catalogue the
results of such studies39 it may be notable to the reader to see what estimates
of pollution’s costs are, or were. Anderson and Crocker’s results showed a
$300–$700 (in 1971) value range for damages caused by marginal changes of
10µg/m3 of suspended particulates and 0.1mg/m3 of sulphates. The limited
categories of air pollution measurements40 are certainly problematic, given
the many incarnations of urban air pollution, but this serves as an example
of what one takes away from hedonic breakdowns of housing prices.41 Smith
uation: Is Some Number Better than No Number? The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
8 Autumn 1994, Nr. 4
37Anderson Jr./Crocker, p. 177.
38Notably for the environmental justice-oriented, see Boyle, Melissa A./Kiel, Katherine A.
A Survey of House Price Hedonic Studies of the Impact of Environmental Externalities.
Journal of Real Estate Literature, 9 2001, Nr. 2; and the work of Kiel: Kiel, Katherine A./
Williams, Michael The impact of Superfund sites on local property values: Are all sites the
same? Journal of Urban Economics, 61 January 2007, Nr. 1; Kiel, Katherine/Williams,
Michael An Analysis of the Impact of Multiple Environmental Goods on House Prices.
College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, March 2005 (0505). – Technical report;
Kiel, Katherine A./Zabel, Jeffrey E. House Price Differentials in U.S. Cities: Household and
Neighborhood Racial Effects. Journal of Housing Economics, 5 June 1996, Nr. 2; Kiel,
Katherine A/McClain, Katherine T House Price Recovery and Stigma after a Failed Siting.
Applied Economics, 28 November 1996, Nr. 11. Note too cases where there is no evidence of
changes in housing prices with the addition of new environmental problems, such as Hatton
and Others v. United Kingdom, application no. 36022/97, Grand Chamber judgment of 8
July 2003, at 643.
39Catalogues and critiques do exist, see esp. Bowen. Also Noonan; Ringquist; Liu,
Chap. 3
40In early environmental studies there were only two pollutants examined, suspended
particulates and rates of sulfation, as they were the most extensively reported at the time.
Asch, Peter/Seneca, Joseph J. Some Evidence on the Distribution of Air Quality. Land
Economics, 54 1978, Nr. 3, p. 280.
41Also, adding more pollution variables into hedonic regressions actually can lower the
probability of obtaining usable (significant) statistics. See Smith, V. Kerry/Huang, Ju-
Chin Hedonic models and air pollution: Twenty-five years and counting. Environmental
and Resource Economics, 3 1993, cf. Kiel, Katherine Environmental Contamination and




and Huang also concluded in their meta-study of marginal willingness to pay
studies from 1967 to 1988 that a one microgram reduction in particulates
per cubic meter amounted to an average value of $109.90 (in 1982-84 dollars,
although the median result was a much lower $22.40.) 42
Arriving at these valuations of environmental damage is a technical matter
known today as “hedonic pricing modeling.”43 Choices of data, spatial con-
trols, and demographic information all must be chosen and applied carefully,
but the methods borrow from strong statistics foundations. In an extremely
basic rendition, housing price-data44 makes up the dependent variable in a
hedonic regressions. One then estimates the marginal implicit prices of the
characteristics of a house via a carefully specialized pricing equation—the he-
donic pricing equation. This equation is thus a list of the characteristics of
the house; it breaks up the total price of the house or land into its composite
bundles, or characteristics, in a way reminiscent of completing the transaction
a la carte. The regression analysis then estimates the price for each character-
istic as if there were truly a separate market for each: building an “a la carte”
house.45 And despite the difficulties,46 the theory is sound and finds use in
diverse valuation situations.
For example, one might estimate the marginal value—the fraction of the
total price—of housing characteristics like square footage, the school system,
the size of the yard, the proximity to highways for commuting, etc., as the
42Smith, V Kerry/Huang, Ju-Chin Can Markets Value Air Quality? A Meta-analysis of
Hedonic Property Value Models. Journal of Political Economy, 103 February 1995, Nr. 1.
Also see Smith/Huang. For more recent comments see Boyle/Kiel and Simons, Robert A./
Saginor, Jesse D. A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Environmental Contamination and Posi-
tive Amenities on Residential Real Estate Values. Journal of Real Estate Research, 28 2006,
Nr. 1.
43For a very readable and applicable introduction, see Kiel. For the classic theoretical
introduction see Rosen, Sherwin Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentia-
tion in Pure Competition. The Journal of Political Economy, 82 January 1974, Nr. 1, as well
as Griliches, Zvi Price Indexes and Quality Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1971 and Freeman III The Measurements of Environmental and Resource Values:
Theory and Methods.
44The idea to specifically use land pricing data—a readily available public source—to
obtain estimates for pollution control stems from the late 1960s. See Ridker, Ronald G./
Henning, John A. The Determinants of Residential Property Values with Special Reference
to Air Pollution. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 49 May 1967, Nr. 2, cf. Free-
man III, A. Myrick Hedonic Prices, Property Values and Measuring Environmental Benefits:
A Survey of the Issues. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 81 1979, Nr. 2, p. 154
45In a more technical phrasing, “housing units” sales prices are regressed on measures of
their attributes.” Bowen, William M Environmental Justice through research-based decision
making. Garland Publishing Taylor & Francis Group, 2001, p. 196
46See Bowen, for discussion on when these difficulties trip up researchers. Also see Noo-
nan, Liu, Chap. 3
74
3.2 The Economics of Environmental Quality
composite characteristics of a given house.47. One can then add in “disameni-
ties” such as the presence of a power plant,48 or the distance removed from
a Superfund49 or other polluting sites50 to the a la carte list. The statisti-
cal regression of the dependent variable—housing price—on the explanatory
variables reveals parameter estimates for each included characteristic, from
which one can retrieve the “price”51 of each characteristic by differentiating
the estimated price function with respect to the desired characteristic.52
Of course, this is not the place to learn hedonic regression techniques,53 but
rather to point out the contemporaneous socio-economic linkages with the en-
vironment already revealing themselves as environmental justice first emerged.
These environmental economics calculations were part of the same academic
milieu which gave the—unfortunately unconvincing—statistical support in the
seminal legal case, Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corporation.54
These were only a few of the contemporaneous works which started explic-
itly acknowledging economic/environment relationships as Bullard began his
work in Houston on the Bean case.55 Specifically, valuation begins to show
that environmental value (and utility) is distributed across the economic land-
scape and dependent on factors, especially pollutants. And from the economic
valuation of environmental quality, moving from economic to socio-economic56
47Kiel.
48Blomquist, Glenn The Effect of Electric Utility Power Plant Location on Area Property
Value. Land Economics, 50 February 1974, Nr. 1; Gamble, Hays B./Downing, Roger H.
Effects of Nuclear Power Plants on Residential Property Values. Journal of Regional Science,
22 1982, Nr. 4; Galster, Goerge C. Nuclear power plants and residential property values: A
commentary on short-run versus long-run considerations. Journal of Regional Science, 26
1986, Nr. 4.
49Kiel/Williams.
50Kohlhase, Janet Esty, Daniel C. The impact of toxic waste sites on housing values.
Journal of Urban Economics, 30 July 1991, Nr. 1.
51This is technically the marginal implicit price
52In addition to the aforementioned Rosen and Kiel, see Nelson, Jon P. Residential choice,
hedonic prices, and the demand for urban air quality. Journal of Urban Economics, 5 July
1978, Nr. 3 here for an application specific to air quality.
53For the interested, with the marginal implicit price, the researcher employs a second
regression using the revealed price estimate as the dependent variable against demographic
explanatory variables to retrieve a measure for household’s inverse demand. See Freeman III
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81 [1979] , p. 155-8. For a full textbook introduc-
tion, see Idem The Measurements of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory and
Methods
54482 F. Supp. 673; 1979.
55Bullard, Robert D. Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community. Sociological
Inquiry, 1983 In Bullard/Wright Phylon 47 [1986] .
56As seen in Asch/Seneca; Harrison Jr., David/Rubinfeld, Daniel L. The distribution of
benefits from improvents in urban air quality. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management , 5 1978, Nr. 4; Harrison, David/Rubinfeld, Daniel L. Hedonic housing prices
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quickly revealed social patterns of environmental quality, patterns which would
be seen as disproportionate and injust through the work of the environmental
justice-movement.
3.2.1 The Relevance of Early Valuations
Why exactly is this relevant for the study of environmental justice, a study
which we hope to move in the direction of human rights? First, and before one
moves in to later environmental justice studies, a warning should be heeded:
Bowen notes strongly in his evaluation of the methodology of many of the foun-
dational environmental justice studies, those studies that built off of empirical
underpinnings and that form the core of many histories of the environmental
justice field, that
“[h]ad subsequent research about environmental justice followed
Freeman’s [1972] lead, the current body of knowledge would far
more successfully stand up to a reasonable degree of scientific
scrutiny.”57
Though recently techniques have become more sophisticated and hopefully
surmounted this critique58 the codification, if not the growth, of the environ-
mental justice “field” foundered on the hurdle of empirics. The field is now
recognizing that there are multiple spatialities to the concept of environmental
justice59 and so it is unsurprising that the rather straightforward empirics of
the 1990s failed to be as convincing of the problem as advocates may have
hoped.
and demand for clean air. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 5 1978,
Nr. 1; Berry, Brian J.L./Caris, Susan The social burdens of environmental pollution: a
comparative metropolitan data source. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1977
57Bowen, p. 4.
58E.g. Beve, C A/Brent, K M/Picou, S J Environmental justice and toxic exposure:
Towards a spatial model of physical health and psychological well-being. Social Science Re-
search, 36 2007; Maantay, J/Maroka, A/Hermann, C Mapping population distribution in
the urban environment: The cadastral-based expert daysmetric system (CEDS). Cartogra-
phy and Geographic Information Systems, 34 2007; Fisher, Joshua B./Kelly, Maggi/Romm,
Jeff Scales of Environmental Justice: Combining GIS and spatial analysis for air toxics in
West Oakland, California. Health and Place, 12 December 2006, Nr. 4; Mennis, Jeremy L.
The Distribution of Enforcement of Air Polluting Facilities in New Jersey. The Professional
Geographer , 57 August 2005, Nr. 3; Mennis, Jeremy Using Geographical Information Sys-
tems to Create and Analyze Statistical Surfaces of Populations and Risk for Environmental
Justice Analysis. Social Science Quarterly, 83 March 2002, Nr. 1; Liu
59Holifield/Porter/Walker; Walker.
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This is one reason why a discussion of the roots of environmental justice
relative to econometrics studies are of interest within a study that does not
profess to be a chronology or history of the field; one need not wade into the
extant empirical debate in order to build new research. One must, however,
understand what techniques other researchers are using now to (re)build an
empirical picture of environmental justice. But the substantive reason is to
begin to paint the picture of how naturally value of environmental quality
distributes itself across space. Research need not even take into consideration
what polluting sources are around an area to perform estimates of their burden;
people already put some degree of value on the (dis)amenities.
From finding evidence of a distribution of value, with some of that valu-
able tied to the environment’s quality, it is not a big leap to show that the
environment will have differential impacts on different classes of people. The
environmental justice hypothesis, and substantive problem, emerges naturally
then when one links the ability to show a distributed environment with the
concerns of that distribution being skewed toward a minority of the popu-
lace. The point for the human rights scholar is that one whole branch of
statistical work, which both predates the idea of environmental justice and
continues to be used today60 relies on and confirms the variations in value
across a geographical space of environmental quality. In so framing the dis-
cussion, environmental distributions are simply described and not yet termed
equitable, unfair, or unjust. Yet there is a clear “theoretical expectation that
environmental quality will be positively associated with wealth or income”61;
the lower the income, the lower the ability to purchase environmental qual-
ity. Income distributions are related to other socioeconomic variables which
concern the environmental justice movement, including race.62 Whatever the
mechanisms which come to work on the spatial area to create that valuation
distribution, those with less resources will be expected, on average, to have
less quality. In Freeman’s particular study, the average black family, regardless
60For recent textbook treatments of environmental valuation see Haab, Timothy C./
McConnell, Kenneth E. Valuing Environmental and Natural Resources: The Economics of
Non-Market Valuation. Edward Elgar, 2002
61Bowen, p. 13;also Jaffe, Seth D. The Market’s Response to Environmental Inequity:
We have the solution; what’s the problem? Virginia Environmental Law Journal , 14 1995
62Downey, Liam Environmental Injustice: Is race or income a better predictor? Social
Science Quarterly, 79 December 1998, Nr. 4; Mohai, Paul/Bryant, Bunyan Environmental
Justice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards.
U. Colo. L. Rev. 63 1992. Also Wilkinson, Richard Mind the Gap: Hierarchies, Health,
and Human Evolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000
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of city, had higher exposures than the average family, of any race, who had
income greater than $3000, approximately the then-poverty threshold for a
family.63 This strong distributional result marks a major fork in the road be-
tween environmental economics and environmental justice, although one that
would become visible only in hindsight. It is this expectation that begins to
motivate the moral core of environmental justice, engaging the feeling that
there is something unfair, and potentially discriminatory, with environmental
quality.
Before moving on, a final point is in order relevant to the development of
remunerative policy. It is not entirely straightforward to put hedonic pricing
models to work rectifying environmental justice. There are problems in the
utilization of hedonic pricing models to guide policy, especially policy based
on cost/benefit analysis and aimed at rectifying poor environmental area. Be-
cause the techniques for valuing non-market goods naturally rely on extracting
that information presumed to be commingled within market choices, then ac-
cepting any valuation figure achieved through observing market choices is also
an acceptance of the underlying income distribution.64 As the poor natu-
rally have less market activity, the measured, economically- visible, effect will
likely—to the extent that lower income groups have less market activity, that
affects the revealed measured stemming from market activity—be smaller.
Similarly, there are non-observed damages.65 Health effects can be so mini-
mal as to only manifest themselves over many years,66 and damage can accu-
mulate to non-human sources or to public buildings not included in the mea-
surements of market activity directed toward, for example, residential houses.
Thus, some human damage of environmental problems lie below the threshold
of perception needed to change behavior or external to the relevant proxy-
market activity. Behavior which does not change with environmental damages
will therefore not manifest itself in consumption patterns, and hence not in
market-based statistical approaches to finding the value. If the different levels
of environmental damage are too small to perceive between two houses, then
buyers also cannot record any preference for environmental quality by paying
63Freeman III, p. 264. For Historical poverty tables see the U.S. Census Bureau at




66See discussions on latency in Chapter 2.
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more for houses in imperceptibly better areas.67
The market-power effect is opposite for benefits accruing to higher-income
individuals with more market activity. To some extent, the problem of higher-
income individuals’ choices coming through louder in valuation work can be
avoided by concentrating on the effects to average incomes; using averages
inflates the estimates of benefits to those in lower income brackets and deflates
estimates of those in higher brackets. The downside though is that averages
blur the ability to decide who exactly something is owed to, or required from.
Both criticisms point to a problem of measuring the costs of pollution, and
the problems grow on the lower income area of the spectrum. Given that
research finds income inequality to be a problem in and of itself, with many
of the same problems as environmental justice but without reference to envi-
ronmental or spatial inequalities68 developing a politically feasible regulatory
policy to either prevent or fix the situation is complicated. These are hurdles,
not entirely impossible to overcome. As the problems of environmental justice
expand though, broadening beyond the mapping of environmental burdens, as
sociological research is now angled69 it becomes more complicated to design a
policy which could cut-off environmental injustices via regulations based only
on valuations of environmental quality.70 And, perhaps most critically, siting
67This is the hypothesis stated in Anderson Jr./Crocker.
68See Wilkinson; Wilkinson, Richard D. Unhealth Societies: The affliction of inequality.
Routledge, 1996.
69Walker.
70There is an implicit moral problem here too; is correct to compensate, in any fashion,
those exposed to worse environmental risks than others? See Been, Vicki Compensated
Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention? Fordham Urb. L.J. 21 1994. Also note anec-
dotes such as that from Robbins, Illinois, in Lambert, Thomas A. The Case Against Private
Disparate Impact Suits. Ga. L. Rev. 34 2000, p. 1180, n.84, discussing how a compensated
siting, accepted by the town for a financial boost, fell flat when state legislation, external
to the decision, changed. Indirect compensation is even less plausible, such as job creation
or indirect economic benefits. As Schreder-Frechette shows, there is little evidence that
any sort of compensation currently trickles down to burdened groups. Schrader-Frechette,
Kristin Human Rights and Duties to Alleviate Environmental Injustice: The Domestic Case.
Journal of Human Rights, 6 2007, p. 121.
“Victims do not appear to have more democratic or human-rights opportuni-
ties, especially since earlier statistics show that US quality of life is about 66
percent of what it was 25 years ago. All but the top 20 percent of wealthiest
Americans are economically relatively worse off, in the early 21st century, than
they were a quarter-century ago. This increasing economic inequality has made
it harder for most citizens to fulfill their human rights, equal opportunity, and
democratic participation in government.”
Even above a lack of evidence of benefits of compensation it is hard to argue that burdened
groups have consented to living with all of the conditions that impinge upon them. Further
to the contrary, evidence shows that even their choices of location to live are condensed by
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itself is still dealt with as an individual project, detached from any comprehen-
sive whole of urban, suburban, rural, or other units of spatial aggregation.71
Designing a system of siting based on valuations models does not address the
issue of what unit is proper for total planning. As such, the potential for clus-
tering still looms even though each individual site may pass muster as fair on
smaller scales.
While none of this is to say that empirically-based regulation could not solve
the environmental justice dilemma, it does suggest that the least contentious
way for environmental justice to utilize the conclusions of hedonic valuation is
as a confirmation that the interaction of economics and environment separates
environmental quality. Different places in the economic landscape will have
different values of the environment imputed into usage. The following sections
confirms the distributed view, and goes the “environmental justice-step” fur-
ther to illustrate that burdens tend toward the lower income classes and/or
minorities.
3.3 Early Evidence of Uneven Environments
While hedonic valuations of environmental quality made their debut in eco-
nomics fora, their applicability to what we now recognize as environmental
justice is unmistakeable. The valuation literature continued on its own path,
making valuable contributions to emerging nationwide environmental policy,
while several new studies72 clearly marked where concerns about environmen-
tal distributions diverted in focus.
To be sure, evidence of environmental injustice was already turning up in
government reports.73 The Kruvant report, published as part of an in-depth
study of energy use and pollution commissioned by the Ford Foundation in
1975, explored graphically the air quality distribution in Washington D.C.74
a lack of options. Schrader-Frechette, p. 122.
71Davy, Benjamin Essential Justice: When Legal Institutions Cannot Resolve Environ-
mental and Land Use Disputes. Springer, 1997, p. 51.
72See Kruvant, William Chap. People, Energy, and Pollution In The American Energy
Consumer. The Ford Foundation, 1975; Berry/Caris; Asch/Seneca; Harrison Jr./Rubinfeld;
Gianessi, Leonard P/Peskin, Henry M/Wolff, Edward The Distributional Effects of Uniform
Air Pollution Policy in the United States. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93 May
1979, Nr. 2.
73Council on Environmental Quality, editor The Second Annual Report of the Council
on Environmental Quality. Council on Environmental Quality, 1971.
74Newman, Dorothy K./Day, Dawn The American Energy Consumer: A Report to the
80
3.3 Early Evidence of Uneven Environments
In addition to reinforcing the correlations between income, race, and pollution,
the study also found that the effected groups also are those who produce the
least of the pollution.75 The strong relationship between income, race, and
fuel and energy consumption explored in other chapters of the report strongly
implied that the disadvantaged populations are receiving the costs and less of
the benefits.76
However, as McCaull77 emphasizes, causality appears to stem from low so-
cioeconomic status toward the probability of living in a poor environment, but
the relationship is not fixed. A prominent example appears in the Kruvant
study78 where some of poorest and many members of the U.S. Congress live
in the same areas of the worst D.C. air quality.79 The picture the study paints
is one both supporting economic theory, being the first of many environmen-
tal justice studies showing this proclivity towards accumulating burdens with
lower incomes, and providing cautioning against broad conclusions.
Berry80 elaborated on the conclusions of the Kruvant study in a more de-
tailed breakdown with expanded pollutant indices. That study found it was
indeed more probable to find the “minority poor” exposed to higher pollu-
tion levels in locations where the overall pollution levels themselves are low.
However, it also revealed some non-standard dynamics; that is, dynamics not
readily seen under basic economic models. It appeared that cities with higher
absolute pollution levels seem to drive the highest income earners out of the
Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation, 1975.
75Kruvant, p. 166. The study also cites evidence for similar patterns of distributions
among residents in New York City, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles and San Francisco ibid.,
p. 149. Further evidence comes cited from other contemporary studies of distributions
including: Jeffrey Zupan’s investigation of the New York city area which found much less
exposure to CO and hydrocarbons in higher tax brackets, although middle and low income
brackets were exposed equally Zupan, Jeffrey M. The Distribution of Air Quality in the New
York Region. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973; The Argonne National
Laboratory’s computer simulation model for the Chicago area also found a correlation with
income and sulphur dioxide. cf. Kruvant also see Lavelle, M./Coyle, M. Unequal Protection:
The racial divide in environmental law. The National Law Journal , 21 1992, p. S6
76see McCaull, Julian Discriminatory Air Pollution: If The Poor Don’t Breathe. Envi-
ronment , 18 March 1976, p. 31 and Newman/Day, p. 87-214
77McCaull, p. 27.
78Kruvant.
79Across the Ocean, Laurian found that in France, high household income locations have
more hazardous waste sites than poorer towns. She postulates “[i]t is possible that incomes
are higher in larger cities that also have numerous sites and/or previously industrialized
towns that have been able to convert their economic bases and maintain their income levels.”
She makes the note that one must account for the independent effects of income when trying
to explain hazardous waste siting. Laurian, Lucie Environmental injustice in France. Journal




city—perhaps to suburbia— leaving more room for the middle class in better
quality regions and therefore also more space for the lower classes to distribute
among the remaining lower pollution locations.81 While this dynamic is hard
to predict a priori, it does still rest under dynamics that fit better with geo-
graphical and urban economics.82 They are important to consider given the
emphasis environmental justice studies place on changing the status quo.
Consider as an illuminating and prescient story how the various levels of
government were forced to act to actively desegregate schools even though the
“white flight” from those schools might re-create conditions approaching the
original segregated situation.83 Findings like those of Berry84 are important
because they emphasize the need for more elaborate general equilibrium mod-
els, including not just urban agglomerations but also reactions in surrounding
areas, lest fixing the problem become only temporary.
Berry’s85 research also found similar mechanisms functioning when analyz-
ing the distribution of noise and solid waste pollution. The confluence of
burdens led this study to summarize that
“...the problems of the inner-city poor are overdetermined; a cure
for one of two of the symptoms still leaves enough others to con-
tain and absorb the likely benefits of having one or two symptoms
cured.”86
Given the primary correlation of pollution and income, those with the highest
exposure therefore tend to be disadvantaged groups, being as they are those
with lower incomes. Combined with Freeman’s results that income is nega-
tively correlated with environmental quality and the benefits of environmental
improvements accrue to those with the highest exposure to the measured en-
vironmental burden one really starts to see the modern environmental justice
concern.87
Conscious though of the limits of descriptive analysis, Asch and Seneca88—
often cited as one of the first targeted environmental justice studies—make
81Berry/Caris, p. 587.
82Section 3.4
83Been Cornell Law Review 78 [1993] , p. 1024, n. 119. Specifically, United States v.




87Freeman III, p. 264-6.
88Asch/Seneca.
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a slightly more limited, general claim regarding overall distributions of envi-
ronmental quality. They found that cities with more poverty characteristics—
higher percentages of the population below poverty measures like income level,
income distribution and the poverty tail of the overall distribution—expose
their citizens to higher particulate concentrations.Their data set was much
broader than earlier studies, analyzing more cities in more states, but the
authors were quick to caution that analysis at the city level is large on the
aggregation scale and obscures potentially significant distributions within the
city.
Further scrutiny of a subset of the cities yielded weaker relationships between
the environment and demographics, especially with regard to racial categories.
As they drilled down into the aggregate demographic data, however, aiming
for more clarity in smaller spatial areas, the correlation did reappear.89The
connection between race, as opposed to only income, and environment and
was even more pronounced in their final disaggregation to personal exposure
data.90
Although this is one of the first studies to scrutinize the racial aspect of
environmental quality specifically, it is equally important to notice the aber-
rations between levels of data aggregation. This technicality comes in to play
when environmental justice moved from descriptive investigations to legal ad-
vocacy. Had the researchers here not examined several levels of data, the
study’s use could have been very different. The cursory inspection given should
not though be taken as casting doubt on the correlation of poor environments
and race, or implying that all such relations found are statistically spurious.
Rather, the authors’ own caution should spur further investigation to clarify
the delicate correlations. The aberrations, indicative of the complexities in-
volved in distilling complex relationships from available data, certainly add
some empirical motivation.91 Furthermore, any consistency in their limited
claim that low-income characteristics signal higher pollution burdens over a
nationwide sample is remarkable, especially given the substantial probability
89For a more detailed discussion on choices of data and hedonic pricing models, see Shultz,
Steven D./King, David A. The Use of Census Data for Hedonic Price Estimates of Open-
Space Amenities and Land Use. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 22
2001, Nr. 2-3.
90Asch/Seneca, p. 285.
91For instance, Bowen (p. 5 2002) notes the results would be more compelling if the
examined sites had been sampled at random instead of selected. Also note criticisms of
non-neutral sampling in Noonan.
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for data problems to obscure such a connection.92
While a discussion extending the hedonic models will have to wait until
Section 3.4, policy advocates did not themselves wait to aim to make changes.
Freeman concluded by noting
“that the problem is not so much finding out more about the equity
implications of possible policy alternatives, but getting the political
system to come to grips with them and resolve them.”93
That certainly has been one of the goals of the environmental justice movement
in the decades since his writing and is reflected in the directions taken by
advocates. On the way, however, society and the political machinery have
hit on other hurdles, which came up as advocates pushed for policy changes.
Justice of the social type usually requires urgency, and political systems are
not known for such rapid action.94 And while some blame for the lack of
forward motion certainly lies here, there is a certain lacking in the cumulative
force, if not the descriptive nature, of the mainstream environmental justice
research.
3.3.1 From Evidence to Action
Although they were not, in the main, successful in sparking new policy ini-
tiatives, the early work that moved quickly into the justice realms of inquiry
did add a lot of information as to the connection between distributions and
lower income and socioeconomic classes. So while there was still work to be
done solidifying the valuations and linkages explored above, advocacy moved
quickly toward change. The landmark case of Bean v. Southwest Management,
followed by the research and tenacious advocacy of Dr. Robert D. Bullard
transformed the erstwhile environmental justice-inquiry into movement.95
92Asch/Seneca, p. 283.
93Freeman III, p. 277.
94Huitema, Dave Hazardous Decisions: Hazardous Waste Siting in the UK, The Nether-
lands, and Canada. Institutions and Discussions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2002, p. 9. Further the average citizen has a limited ability to understand science; although
this is not as limited as some have inferred. ibid., p. 9,302,379.
95This work will not catalogue the events, philosophical or substantive, which led to the
environmental justice movement. The emergence of environmental justiceś philosophical
grounds as well as its movement proper are the subject of their own academic inquiry.
See Yang, Tseming The Form and Substance of Environmental Justice: The Challenge of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for Environmental Regulation. B.C. Envtl. Aff. L
Rev. 29 2002; Davies, Lincoln L. Lessons for an Endangered Movement: What A Historical
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A large, lingering, and abhorrent problem in the U.S. is racism. Despite
great strides to combat the history, institutionalized and unconscious racism
remains.96 The fight for equality goes on and some of that fight spilled over
in to the environmental matters which we now know as environmental jus-
tice. This case and its progeny dug deeply into illustrating the connection
between a distributed environment and its tendency toward impacting most
detrimentally a class in the U.S. that has always been burdened.
The question asked in Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corpo-
ration97 was whether environmental distributions could themselves be racist?
And if so, can racist environmental policies be corrected through established
anti-discrimination legal pathways? If so, the connection of environmental
policies and their outcomes to the already well-traveled legal protections against
discrimination could be a powerful tool toward rectification.
The connection between poor environments and disadvantaged groups had
already been shown in several studies by the late 1970s, when the Southwest-
ern Waste Management Corp (SWW) applied for a permit to open a landfill
in a Houston, Texas neighborhood. But was their choice of location steered
by an intentional drive? The hurdle, and the untested legal road of Bean v.
SWW, was to show that policy indeed fomented a racist outcome in distribut-
ing environmental quality. The case became a milestone because in pursuing
this legal path, it gave the concept of unequal environmental distribution its
first name: environmental racism. The suit also gave environmental justice
a birthplace—Houston, Texas—which would provide unfortunately but ample
nourishment for the fledgling movement.98
Juxtaposition of the Legal Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism has to Teach
Environmentalists Today. Envtl. L. 31 2001. Further, while both Bean and the PCB facility
siting can be pointed to as the beginning of the environmental justice movement there are
many other substantive events that could lay claim. Given the strong rights focus of both
the later legal components to the movement as well as the topics explored herein, one should
mention the connection with the United Farm Workers’ Union’s fight against pesticides and
the conditions of black garbage collectors as publicized by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in
the 1960s. Such was the first environmental law suit to utilize civil rights statutes in 1979.
96See esp. as an introduction, Lawrence III, Charles R. The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism. Stanford Law Review , 39 1987; and the
recent revision Lawrence III, Charles Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the
Impact and Origins of the Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection. Conn. L. Rev. 40 2008
97482 F. Supp. 673; 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7827, aff’d mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.
1986)
98E.g. Bullard, Robert D. Dumping in Dixie: Race, class and environmental quality.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1990; Idem Endangered Environs: The Price of Unplanned
Growth in Boomtown Houston. California Sociologist , 7 1984, Nr. Summer; Idem Socio-
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Despite the long history of civil rights and the legislation in place to prevent
active racism in the U.S., the legal roads explored by the Bean case are accessi-
ble only by leaping a high hurdle—proving racist intent. A policy which effects
discriminatory outcomes does not trigger the United State’s equal protection
clauses unless the discrimination can be shown to be intentional. This contro-
versial interpretation rests largely upon the black-letter case of Washington v.
Davis,99 and also on the Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development.100 Since their inception, especially with regard to Davis, the
U.S. courts have been critically testing many discriminatory situations, and
the controversy among interpretations continues today.101
The case began in 1979 when the Texas Department of Health granted a
permit to allow SWW to open a Type I solid waste facility102 on the outskirts
of Houston. The plaintiffs asserted that the approval of the permit for this
particular location was “...at least in part, motivated by racial discrimination
in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Section 1983) and seek an order revoking the
permit.”103
The site, already under construction as the case came to trial, is only 1700
feet (518 meters) from a predominantly minority high school. The high school,
which is adjacent to a residential neighbourhood, had no air conditioning to
offset the potential odours and airbourne material. The plaintiffs asserted
logical Inquiry 53 [1983] . See also Krieg, Eric J A Socio-Historical Interpretation of Toxic
Waste Sites: The Case of Greater Boston. American Journal of Economics and Sociology,
54 1995, Nr. 1 for a similar, contemporaneous methodology and outcome for Boston.
99426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976) See text herein.
100429 U.S. 252; 97 S. Ct. 555; 50 L. Ed. 2d 450; 1977 U.S. LEXIS 28
101Rakoff, Todd Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contracts. Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 29 1994.
102In Texas, a Type I landfill is the ‘standard landfill for disposal of MSW [Municipal
Solid Waste].’ Texas Administrative Code, Title 30, Part 1, Chapter 330, Subchapter A,
§330.5
103Bean at 675. Under Title 42, Chapter 21, Subchapter 1 §1983,
“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ex-
cept that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.”
See infra Section 5.3.3.
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that these characteristics made the siting questionable for a landfill. Despite
the problems with the location, the facility complied with the boundaries of
the applicable permits and hence was duly approved. It was, after all, the
municipality’s job only to review the application brought to them by SWW.
This is an important point, given the hurdle of intent, as it is sometimes con-
strued that municipalities themselves decide when and where to open landfills
and waste treatment. Although access to landfill services can be provided by
taxes, the waste companies and landfills are not, in general, state businesses.
There are limited cases where towns can announce that they are interested in
hosting a facility, given a known need in the area.104
In the United States, it is easier to see landfills and waste treatment facili-
ties as factories like any other productive industry. Instead of making money
by producing goods or services for consumption, they make their money by
accepting the waste goods of others. Therefore, a new landfill permit is ap-
plied for by the company in much the same way that a building permit is
applied for by a traditional company opening a new factory. And just as a
traditional factory which complies with all local regulations will receive a per-
mit to operate, the application by SWW to begin a landfill was approved.
The thrust of the plaintiffs’ case then was to show that the permitting choice
itself was discriminatory. Filing for injunctive relief via Section 1983, although
not providing explicit rights in itself, serves to link the permitting process to
the discriminatory prevention clauses in the U.S. Constitution.105 The legal
reasoning—and logic behind many subsequent cases—was to show that the ac-
tion of permitting itself was purposefully discriminatory, thus depriving them
of rights guaranteed by the Constitution via intentional action.106
Because the route to the constitutional right was initiated through a re-
quest for injunction, the plaintiffs’ had to establish four prerequisites. The
court agreed that the effects of the permitting supported three of the four:
substantial threat of irreparable injury;107 injury outweighing the harm an in-
104Lambert, Thomas/Boerner, Christopher Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes,
Economic Solutions. Yale Journal on Regulation, 14 1997, p. 217-18, telling the story of
Robbins, Illinois, south of Chicago. Also see Gover, Kevin/Walker, Jana L. Escaping Envi-
ronmental Paternalism: One Tribe’s Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal
Project in Indian Country. U. Colo. L. Rev. 63 1992 discussing the desirability of estab-
lishing of a waste disposal facility on a native American reservation.
105U.S. Constitution amend. XIV, §1.
106A more thorough treatment of this important legal path and legislation is below.
107citing Henry v. Greenville Airport Commission 284 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1960) and
Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 88-89 (S.D.Ohio, E.D. 1967), which held that a
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junction puts onto the defendants;108 and the injunction will not dis-serve the
public interest.109 The fourth prerequisite, supporting a substantial likelihood
of success under the merits of Section 1983, was however blocked by the hurdle
to show a discriminatory intent.110
The court held the interpretation that proving discriminatory purpose is to
be measured against the aforementioned two black-letter cases of Davis and
Arlington Heights. These two cases spelled out the need to prove a purpose,
or intent, behind the discrimination. That is, the action must be proven to be
racist in intent and not only outcome. There was no disputing the fact that the
waste facility would impact the largely minority neighbourhood into which it
was placed more than any majority-inhabited areas. Proving, at least in a legal
sense, requires a wealth of evidence to bolster a theory in the face of critiques,
knowing full well than only one criticism passing through the theory spells its
downfall. The burden of proof laying, as it does here, on the accuser, is rather
large in volume alone. More damagingly, the necessary proof is often laying in
the hands of the defendants, completely out of reach of the plaintiffs.111
The best case scenario for the plaintiff looking to surmount the intent hurdle
in a discrimination case is to have a “smoking gun’:’ a piece of clear evidence
showing the decision was racially motivated. Perhaps a committee transcript
or a phone conversation can show the purpose behind the decision was indeed
to discriminate. But such evidence is rare. More often, a plaintiff will attempt
to establish a body of persuasive evidence. Sometimes this can take on a sta-
tistical component. The ability of a plaintiff to establish substantial statistical
evidence making it clear, in absence of a smoking gun, that there must have
been a racist gunman has its own legal history.
deprivation of constitutional rights can itself be an irreparable injury. The prerequisite was
aided by the fact that damages would not compensate for the lasting impact on land values
and health and safety, Bean at 677.
108ibid
109ibid
110The intent hurdle is central to a large body of environmental justice literature. Notable
in this early context, and to illustrate its centrality, the 1994 Public Health Equity Act, as
amended by Senator Paul Wellstone and mentioned above in Chapter 1, would have allowed
demonstration of disparate impacts to be sufficient to demonstrate discrimination in cases
involving federal environmental agencies. This would remove the “intent” hurdle stumbled
over many times by environmental justice court battles. cf. Boerner, Christopher/Lambert,
Thomas Environmental Injustice. Public Interest , 118 1995, p. 73.
111Note After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title VI
Enforcement. Harv. L. Rev. 116 2003, p. 1784.
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3.3.2 The Statistical Hurdle of Intent
Two early U.S. cases, Yick Wo v. Hopkins112 and Gomillion v. Lightfoot113
set the bar for inferring from numerical rationale an intent to discriminate.
The breakthrough, in terms of civil rights litigation, was to establish that a
law, which was written in non-discriminatory language could nevertheless be
applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, and thus could be held
unconstitutional because of infringement of rights granted by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In Yick Wo, the enforcement of a laundry permitting process granted no per-
mits to facilities belonging to Chinese laundry proprietors, and only one other
non-Chinese facility, although there were no differences between the Chinese-
owned facilities denied and the non-Chinese-owned facilities which obtained
permits. Due to the entirely selective exclusion of the Chinese facilities, and
the lack of intervening explanatory characteristics, the court inferred an intent
to discriminate. Gomillion v. Lightfoot established that a redrawing of an elec-
toral district’s boundaries, although within the powers of the state, violated
the 15th Amendment rights of the black voters which it effectively excluded.
The redistricting changed the shape of the city of Tuskegee, Alabama, from a
square to a (highly) irregular 28-sided polygon which removed nearly all black
citizens from the city’s electorate, but did not remove any white voters. The
court found that, although there was no direct proof of racist intent within
the political choices, the effect was such that the choice itself could only have
come from a racist animus.
These early cases set the stage to allow for statistical evidence to serve as
proof of discriminatory intent.114 The plaintiffs relied on the weight of the
numbers to support the inference that no other reason, except for a racist mo-
tive, could explain the outcomes. The connection in these cases were rather
strong. In both, the minority excluded from their constitutional rights was at,
or nearly 100%. Such a near-perfect exclusion could only, the courts found,
stem from a discriminatory intent, as no non-discriminatory reason could ac-
count for the statistical facts. As set down in Yick Wo and Gomillion then
the interpretation of intent has a distinct temporally correlated aspect between
112118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886).
113364 U.S. 339, 81 S. Ct. 125, 5 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1960).




decisions and patterns. First there was a primary pattern or distribution, then
a decision, and following that the pattern changed. The new pattern reflected
statistical evidence of discrimination.
The perverse effect of these victories, however, is that the hurdle for prov-
ing racial discrimination through numbers was set very high. It remains so in
today’s cases, despite the intervening decades’ lack of success in rooting out
remaining corners of discrimination in U.S. society. Bean vs. Southwestern
Management Corp. was not nearly so clear cut. Although, like the Yick Wo
and Gomillion cases, the surface evidence raised civil rights issues, the under-
lying statistical connections were less absolute and their case was eventually
lost on these grounds. Such problems illustrated proving discriminatory intent
via statistical evidence reappear often in environmental justice cases. It is far
easier to show a discriminatory effect—that the outcome of a policy reveals a
pattern of discrimination—than it is to show discriminatory intent.
In the Bean case, in particular, and following the Arlington Heights case, the
plaintiffs noted that the same potential site was surveyed but denied a permit
in 1971. The intervening years only saw the site become more populated by
minorities. The historical picture was not sufficient to serve as a pattern or
inference of discrimination, however. But, although this single fact did not
convince the court or point to a smoking gun of intentional discrimination, it
did persuade the court to note that “if [they] were TDH [Texas Department of
Health], [they] might very well have denied this permit.”115 There is, however,
more evidence not shown in the case tha is even more disturbing. Of the five
garbage incinerators located in the city from 1920 through 1975—a period
of time where the city itself maintained the facilities—four were located in
predominately black areas and the fifth was in a Hispanic area.116 In a later,
short-lived, ‘mini-incinerator’ project, two of the three test sites landed in
minority neighborhoods.117 Furthermore, all five city-owned landfills were in
black neighborhoods.
The state of Texas also did not appear to be even-handed in the permitting
process which it oversaw from 1970-78. The Texas Department of Health
allowed permits for eleven solid waste sites in black neighborhoods out of
the twenty-one total sites.118 The 54.2 percent of new permits is a distinct
115Bean at 679.
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contrast to the 26-27.6% black population. Perhaps even more damaging is the
evidence that two largely white locales adjacent to Houston proper had also
located their landfills in the black neighborhood of Riceville, which notably
did not have universal garbage collection, paved streets, or running water.119
And such types of evidence as to an organized pattern of siting extends to solid
waste disposal sites and their proximity to other Houston schools. In addition
to the landfill in the Bean v. SWW, Bullard reported that of the 47 schools in
proximity120 to the new landfills, 66% were predominately black schools.121.
Despite this collection of evidence, Bean failed to show that the Texas De-
partment of Health’s approval of the permit was consistent with some previous
pattern of discrimination. There was a very clear line between race and out-
come in the two blackletter cases but here, 58.8% of the sites already permit-
ted were in census tracts with less than a 25% minority population. That is,
over half of the landfills sat in census tracts with a lower minority populations
than even the plaintiffs’ definition of what constitutes a Houston-area minority
tract: a minimum 39.3% minority population.122 Furthermore, a cumulative
picture of census tracks with 50% or less minority would have encompassed
82.5% of all their permitted sites in the area.123 The collective weight of the
historical story of waste siting in Houston and the specific statistics simply did
not reach the Yick Wo and Gomillion standards.
Other statistics were available and put forth in court as well. The plaintiffs
divided the city into quadrants and looked for patterns of siting. In this
case, 53.3% of Houston’s white population lived in the southwest quadrant,
accompanied by only 17.1% of the solid waste sites. Similarly, directly north
in the northwest quadrant were an additional 20.1% of the white population
but only 15.3% of the landfills. The math means that the west half of the
city carries 73.4% of the majority population, but a mere 32.4% of the trash,
leaving the eastern half, with 61.5% of the minority population encumbered by
67.6% of the waste. The data here appear to show a discriminatory pattern.
However, there are other patterns obscured in this larger spatial level of
analysis that are not intentionally discriminatory. For instance, there may be
119Bullard Sociological Inquiry 53 [1983] , p. 281.
120Here again, a definition of spatial variables is missing.
121Ibid., p. 285.
122Moving up a level in spatial aggregate unfortunately reveals an adjacent area with only




underlying systematic discrimination in housing issues which in turn lead to
minorities clustering in the industrial sectors. Drilling down into these quad-
rants reveals that the eastern half of the city contains a dominant amount of
the industrial sectors, including the city’s shipping district. Taking the finer
details that more waste is already probable in industrial areas into consider-
ation makes the larger spatial pattern murkier, and the direct link between
siting and race seems less substantial. This illustrates the point being made
recently that spatial agglomeration, like an industrial district, must be taken
in to consideration lest empirical tests bias the individual variables.124 The
numbers simply did not convince the court. The critical question of what
statistical level would, however, convince the court in this situation remained
(and largely remains) unanswered.
Also left unanswered is the question of what material in an environmental
justice context would count as Yick Wo and Gomillion type proof? Another
often cited case, East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Assoc. v. Macon-Bibb County
Planning & Zoning Commission125 also failed to prove statistical evidence of
racial intent or a pattern of racially-tied siting. The landfill in questions under
that case had only one other census tract’s landfill to compare with, leaving
little data to work with. The court noted that “while the [Macon-Bibb County
Planning & Zoning] Commission’s decision to approve the landfill for location
in census tract . . . does of necessity impact to a somewhat larger degree upon
the majority population therein, that decision fails to establish a clear pattern
of racially motivated decisions.” Steering away from a reading of intent was
also the aforementioned fact that municipalities do not actively solicit landfill
applications but rather reviews applications from third party facilities who
wish to establish a landfill. This fact further removes the town planning board
from assertions of racial animus.
These were the first two cases to try and link a perception of dispropor-
tionately partitioned environment with the law. Economics predicts that en-
vironmental distributions will occur, and related research adds the conclusion
that it is the poorer areas that will experience poorer environs. It was these
first cases which took that information in the discrimination direction, in the
hopes of changing the status quo, by moving to show that its not only a cu-
mulative economic system which pushes that outcome, but active choices by
124Bowen/Atlas/Lee. Also see Section 3.4.
125706 F. Supp. 880 (1989).
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regulators. And while there were several concrete criticisms which could have
increased the plaintiffs’ chances126 the outcome is not likely to change in the
many similar cases, given the apparently high hurdle of establishing intent.
This particular problem is prevalent in environmental justice cases, gener-
ating a substantial subsection of literature,127 and lends itself to a physical
analogy. The trade-off between resolution power—in the sense of looking at
an area or spatial relationship under a ‘legal microscope’—and the ability to
view a pattern supposedly stemming from the intrinsic relationship, is that in-
creasing the magnification to detail the inner workings simultaneously removes
the ability for the viewer to show an overlying pattern. The more tightly one
126For instance, census tracks are often larger than the group research is focused on. Good-
man, Allen C. A Comparison of Block Group and Census Tract Data in a Hedonic Housing
Price Model. Land Economics, 53 November 1977, Nr. 4 One misses a potential correlation
between minorities and permitted sites if the sites are clustered in black neighborhoods, but
the larger census tract demographic does not identify the tract as predominantly minority.
Similarly, even if one identifies the tract as impacted, the addition of data from non-affected
individuals in the larger census tract area can be “improperly folded into the statistical
data.” Worsham, Julia B. Latham Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602:
Can A Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice? B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev , 27 2000, p. 690.
Examining data on a case-by-case basis, noticing that a predominantly white census tract’s
two environmental hazards are clustered in the two minority communities or subdivisions is
relatively easy. Dealing with only the census tract level data, however, can easily obscure
this micro-relationship. Examining smaller data scales in pursuit of information comparable
with the Yick Wo and Gomillion cases presents its own problem, partially because of the
small numbers of landfills available as comparisons. As one tries to pinpoint an area to a
smaller and smaller degree, aiming to form a strong attachment to a waste site, one natu-
rally has smaller quantities of any measurable quality or attribute at hand. For example,
the two solid waste sites planned by Houston were both located in the same plaintiff-defined
target area. While this might be indicative of a potential discrimination, the fact that one
is only observing two decisions hurts attempts to add information together toward showing
an incontrovertible prevailing pattern of discrimination.
127I.e., and including more than conversations limited to Section 1983, Ayres, Ian Mar-
ket Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing When Disparate
Impacts are Unjustified. Cal. L. Rev , 95 2007; Seicshnaydre, Stacy E Is the Road to Dis-
parate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on a State of Mind in Antidiscrimination
Law. Wake Forest Law Review , 42 2007; Seiner, Joseph A. Disentangling Disparate Impact
and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach. Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 25
2007; Lewis, Browne C. Changing the Bathwater and Keeping the Baby: Exploring New
Ways of Evaluating Intent in Environmental Discrimination Cases. St. Louis U. L.J. 50
2006; Foster, Sheila R. Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact.
Hous. L. Rev. 41 2005; Galalis, David J. Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake
of Alexander v. Sandoval: Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron. B.C.
Envt. Aff. L. R. 31 2004; Primus, Richard A. Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:
Round Three. Harvard Law Review , 117 2003, Nr. 2; Cody, Brendan South Camden Citi-
zens in Action: Siting Decisions, Disparate Impact Discrimination, and Section 1983. Ecology
L.Q. 29 2002; Worsham; Evans; Coleman, Leslie Ann It’s the Thought that Counts: The
Intent Requirement in Environmental Racism Claims. St. Mary’s L.J. 25 1994; Eisenberg,
Theodore/Johnson, Sheri Lynn The Effects of Intent: Do we know how legal standards
work? Cornell Law Review , 76 1991; Eisenberg, Theodore Disproportionate Impact and
Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication. N.Y.U. L. Rev. 52 1977
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makes a case for a discriminatory relationship in a small area, the less likely
it is to be able to maintain substantial connections with the overlying pattern
that can withstand defendants testimony and judicial scrutiny. This problem
then only disappears when the underlying discrimination is so gross or coarse
as to be clearly recognizable from a spatial resolution that retains the overall
pattern—such as the racial quality of the pictures at any level on analysis in
Yick Wo or Gomillion. These cases, as seen in the microscope analogy, take
on a near fractal quality in that their pattern remains no matter the scale of
viewing.
3.3.3 Finding and Losing Intent
Even before more recent court cases which have cast doubt on, or completely
closed off, such attempts at connecting distributions with legal protections,128
researchers can conclude from the sheer lack of success that this is a high
burden for plaintiffs to shoulder given the tools of traditional statistics. New
techniques may help that,129 or may continue to lend evidence against inten-
tional discrimination.130 But if courts continue to have set high hurdles from
proving intentional discrimination, successfully battling pollutants on grounds
like Bean and East Bibb Twiggs are unlikely.131
But that does not imply that we should focus research efforts on defining
scales and metrics for the boundaries of environmental burdens, nor neces-
sarily on strengthening the methodology of distribution-investigations.132 In-
128McCaughey2004,Cody2002,Laufer2002
129See discussion of agglomeration formation models in geographical economics, Section
3.4
130See especially Bowen/Atlas/Lee; Mennis, and South Camden Citizens in Action v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 274 F.3d 771 (3rd Cir. 2001).
131Other oft-cited cases include: a failure by the NAACP to stop the PCB disposal dump
in Warren County, NC, on discriminatory grounds in NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-5
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982). See Lazarus, Richard J. Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The
distributional effects of environmental protection. Northwestern University Law Review , 87
1993, Nr. 3, p. 832 A court in Virginia also failed to see discriminatory intent to reject the
permitting of a new landfill in R.I.S.E. (Residents Involved in Saving the Environment) v.
Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144. (1991) cf. Lavelle/Coyle, p. S8 The R.I.S.E. decision shows that
when decision makers have “balanced the economic, environmental, and cultural needs of
[the Locale] in a responsible and conscientious manner”, more evidence of injustice will be
necessary to move a court.
132Nor should the focus here be seen as attacking or detracting from the environmental
justice-argument, especially as criticism implying there is no injustice. As Bowen explains:
“[w]hile it would be seriously mistaken to claim that a scientific view is the only one that
matters, it would be equally mistaken to discount the potential for scientific research to
contribute positively to the solution of related problems.” Bowen Environmental Justice
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deed, the sociology literature has already moved away from the methodology
debate.133 Because of the ability of environmental burdens to easily transcend
borders around the world, the degree of justice one sees is often a function
of “what spatial scale one considers and how far along the commodity chain
one follows a product.”134 Expending research to define spatial terms more
precisely for the benefit of legal certainty and legal action does not scratch the
underlying problem.
Bowen135 provides a wonderful example that illustrates the statistical me-
chanics and the potential for different outcomes in a very brief fashion. Con-
sider a 2x2 contingency table, such as the one illustrated here.136 One first
Table 3.1: Elementary Comparisons
Environmental Risk
Type of Neighbourhood Present Absent
Minority of Low Income I II
Not Minority or Low Income III IV
chooses a spatial area—neighbourhood, census tract, government area, postal
code, etc.—and then fills in the number of observed situations. For instance,
Quadrant I will be the number of minority or low-income residences in the
area. With the spatial area set and the data collected, we must then make
comparisons. Data in any single quadrant carries no intrinsic information
about disproportion. It is only a comparison of the frequency in Quadrant
I to the other 3 quadrants which reveals a disproportionate burden. Bowen
explains that
[i]f the number of residences in quadrant I is sufficiently greater
with the expected number, on the basis of statistical hypotheses
through research-based decision making, p. 12. Perhaps too the fixation on race exerted
too strong a force in steering the agenda away from strengthening empirical foundations
and rather toward rapid political action.Bowen, William/Wells, Michael V The Politics
and Reality of Environmental Justice Research: A History and Considerations for Public
Administrators and Policymakers. Public Administration Review , 62 2002, Nr. 6, p. 696
133Esp. Holifield/Porter/Walker; and contributions in the special issue of Antipode (2009),
vol. 41, no.4. Compare with earlier special editions in the sociology literature, like Perrolle,
Judith A. Comments from the Special Edition Editor: The Emerging Dialogue on Environ-
mental Justice. Social Problems, 40 February 1993, Nr. 1 Special Edition.
134Pellow, David Naguib Resisting Global Toxics. The MIT Press, 2007, p. 34.
135Bowen Environmental Justice through research-based decision making, p. 55-57.
136Adapted from Table 3.1, Ibid.
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tests, the conclusion would be that there exists a disproportionate
exposure to risk at the minority and low-income locations.
But the numbers in each quadrant, which in turn dictate the outcome of
statistical tests depend on the spatial area selected for analysis, sometimes sen-
sitively.137 Picture yourself as the collector of such data, simply going around
the area dictated to you to investigate—a census tract with a waste site, or a
zip code with a bus refueling station—putting a tally mark in each category
as you find an example of minorities living within said area, or non-minorities
living within it, before moving to the zip codes or census areas without a haz-
ard. The number of tally marks in each column would clearly change if you
changed the boundaries under investigation. This is the problem of choosing a
spatial area. A relationship between race and risk might pop up at one spatial
choice but disappear at another; choosing one set of boundaries to investigate
may lead to a pile of tally marks in the minority box and few in the majority
box, while adjusting those arbitrary boundary lines shifts the location of your
tally marks.138 This problem is separate but related to selection issues such
as crop up when a particular form of environmental justice is sensitive to the
region one selects to look within.139
Now, there are rules of thumb to follow when choosing a spatial area for
statistical investigation. In the context of environmental justice, one should
choose an area of risk or hazard where some exposure has meaning.
“In general, the principle is that the appropriate level of spatial
aggregation is a reflection of the underlying process or mechanism
that gave rise to the data. For example, if one wants to study
contagion of a disease such as flu, one would probably prefer to ag-
137This is known as the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) cf. Bowen Environmen-
tal Justice through research-based decision making, p. 57; Note Taquino, Michael/Parisi,
Domenico/Gill., Duane A. Units of Analysis and the Environmental Justice Hypothesis:
The Case of Industrial Hog Farms. Soc. Sci. Q. 83 2002. See also Cutter, Susan L. Issues in
Environmental Justice Research. Proceedings, Third National Conference on GIS and Pub-
lic Health, 3 1999; Cutter, Susan L./Holm, Danika/Clark, Lloyd The Role of Geographic
Scales in Monitoring Environmental Justice. Risk Analysis, 16 1996, Nr. 4; Zimmermann,
R. Social equity and environmental risk. Risk Analysis, 13 1993.
138examples include situations found in Asch/Seneca; Zimmermann; Bowen, William M./
Salling, Mark J. Toward Environmental Justice: Spatial equity in Ohio and Cleveland.
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 85 1995, Nr. 4; also notes in Cutter.
139e.g. Anderton, Douglas L. et al. Environmental Equity: The Demographics of Dump-
ing. Demography, 31 1994; Anderton, D.L./Oakes, J.M./Egan, K.L. Environmental Equity
in Superfund: Demographics of the discovery and prioritization of abandoned toxic sites.
Evaluation Review , 21 1997, Nr. 1. Also see general critiques on these lines in Noonan
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gregate to census tract or perhaps counties, not states or nations.
The reason for this is that diseases are communicated through con-
tact of one person and another at a microgeographical level, and
the larger levels of spatial aggregation such as states or nations
miss this process.”140
But besides such methodological common sense, there is nothing that will
fully remove the arbitrary nature of the choice of spatial area. Of course, the
researcher is limited to the spatial scale that information is collected at as
well.141 And the fact that environmental justice often must choose a spatial
area based on the dependent variable they are studying142 makes single studies
largely ungeneralizable.143
The debate on spatial area is mentioned in passing but occupies a cen-
tral place in the environmental justice literature. Hopefully new techniques
of computerized mapping (Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and GPS)
will make it an irrelevant discussion.144 The point again here is illustration;
so while early legal action was quick to try and tie pictures of disproportion-
ate environmental burdens to legal action, and added examples of where this
arguably was true, their relevance for the research at hand is mainly to show
the weakness of the approach to solving environmental justice issues. It is
entirely possible that a small scale reveals environmental justice, or equity,
while expanding the view shows an entirely different result. To try and define
140Bowen Environmental Justice through research-based decision making, p. 57.
141Census data cannot be related below certain levels of aggregation for privacy concerns,
for instance.
142Noonan, p. 1154, citing Ringquist; Bowen/Wells; Bowen Environmental Justice through
research-based decision making
143Baden, Brett M./Noonan, Douglas S./Turaga, Rama Mohana Scales of Justice: Is there
a Geographic Bias in Environmental Equity Analysis. Journal of Environmental Planning
and Management , 50 2007, Nr. 2; also Cutter, p. 527
144Porter is a recent example of applying GIS/GPS systems to quantifying environmental
justice outside of considerations of politically-defined scales: Porter, Rob Environmental
Justice and North Georgia Wilderness: A GIS based Analysis. VDM Verlag, 2009. Also
Pearce, J/Kingham, S/Zawar-Reza, P Every breath you take? Environmental justice and
air pollution in Christchurch, New Zealand. Environmental and Planning A, 38 2005, Nr. 5;
Also see Mennis: Mennis. His analysis focuses on access of different socio-economic groups
to use and non-use value of wilderness area in the US Southeast. Also note Jerrett, M et al.
A GIS-environmental justice analysis of particulate air-pollution in Hamilton, Canada. En-
vironment and Planning A, 33 1996. Further see Maclachlan, John C. et al. Mapping health
on the internet: A new tool for environmental justice and public health research. Health and
Place, 13 2007; Buzzelli, Michael/Veenstra, Gerry New approaches to researching environ-
mental justice: Combining critical theory, population health and geographical information
sciences. Health and Place, 13 March 2007, Nr. 1; Fisher/Kelly/Romm. Liu demonstrated
the utility of GIS as far back as 2001. Liu, Chap. 7-9.
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any given picture as “an example of environmental injustice” can leave the
advocate chasing their tail.
The illustrations here convey the desired image that the burden of proof for
the plaintiff can become become quite complex, not only in terms of volumes of
evidence, but also in finding and maintaining the discriminatory correlations
through the levels—coarse through fine—of analysis, while maintaining that
this is likely a moving scale for environmental justice advocates anyway. The
failure of the courts to bite into cases of environmental justice is not just
a function of cunning defense teams punching holes in plaintiffs statistical
and spatially-dependent arguments, but a fundamental problem in defining
environmental burdens in spatial terms. The picture is then, as predicted, one
of distributed environments impacting a particular group to the level that they
feel discriminated against, but without enough statistical evidence to connect
that feeling to the letter of the existing law.
3.4 Describing Space: Geographical Economics
The traditional environmental justice paradigm, while doing a good job of pro-
viding a catalogue of events where one can look to see examples of what are
generally accepted types of environmentally-based injustices, still has many
criticisms to answer. Some criticisms came in the form of court rulings, as
above. More specifically though are criticisms on the methodology, perhaps
implied or implicit in the court rulings, which supported initial claims of envi-
ronmental injustice. Recently, Noonen145 levied the cogent criticism, notably
also evident in Bowen’s earlier critique146, that
“the predominantly static or cross-sectional analysis of the [envi-
ronmental justice] research generally fails to incorporate a struc-
tural model of what might give rise to such equilibria. As such,
many claims of environmental injustice might be seen as no more
than lamenting that the group driving into a store’s parking lot
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That this critique has been repeated for some time now, perhaps finding its
earliest incarnation in the form of Been’s early and much-cited study,147 dis-
cussed at greater length below, is of much concern. In the limit, without
addressing these methodological criticisms, environmental justice can become
just an incarnation of social justice, without any special connotation.148
Only a few researchers have heeded the need to explain not only proximity of
certain groups to burdensome environmental activities but also how that situa-
tion emerged. Bowen, Atlas, and Lee149 are in that group, and note that failing
to account for the pre-existing picture when testing for a group’s propensity
to be located near polluting facilities will bias the results of empirical work.
The simple reason for this is that
“geographical proximity relations have co-evolved through innu-
merable historical industrial and residential location decisions and
their interactions. In turn, regional science theories indicate that
these decisions have tended to be made directly and indirectly un-
der the influence of agglomeration. One can thus deduce that the
geographical density of firms at any given location will be related
to the density of firms at neighboring locations.”150
More simply stated, this observation means that the current state of affairs
in an area influences the next state of affairs. Not accounting for this “mo-
mentum” in statistical regressions aimed at ferreting out a tendency for en-
vironmentally damaging activities to gather where disadvantaged groups are
will grant too much explanatory power to variables that are in the regression.
Again, this does not imply that there are not agglomerations of poor and
minority populations clustered around polluting facilities or burdened dispro-
portionately by the production side of the economy. What the call to account
for agglomeration does criticize is the implication that where these distribu-
tions occur they are indicators of a ubiquitous discrimination. It does not
147Been, Vicki Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice. Journal of Land Use &
Environmental Law , 11 1995, Nr. 1 Also note Been, Vicki/Gupta, Francis Coming to the
Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal analysis of environmental justice claims.
Ecology Law Quarterly, 24 1997 and the challenge levied at empirical researchers to move
away from cross-sectional studies and toward estimating structural rather than reduced-
form models in Helfand, Gloria E./Peyton, L James A Conceptual Model of Environmental
Justice. Social Science Quarterly, 80 March 1999, Nr. 1.





lessen the descriptive power of the Bean case, nor the cases explored below.
The criticism that nearly all environmental justice studies have not ac-
counted for agglomeration is somewhat lessened by the fact that the tools
to deal with it are only recently entering a more mainstream consciousness.151
Some of this mainstream work identifies itself under the title of economic ge-
ography, or geographical economics. And while more concerned with the eco-
nomic implications and outcomes than with their relation to the environment
or justice, their work is highly relevant given the largely still-unaddressed crit-
icisms in traditional environmental justice work. The following sections give
a very brief overview of the subject, coming on the heels of the above in-
troduction of the economics of environmental distributions, to illustrate both
a promising direction for more rigorous investigations of environmental jus-
tice and as further theoretical confirmation that modern economic activity
will tend toward a clustering that could very well manifest itself as injust or
inequitable environments.
3.4.1 The Field of Geographical Economics
Economic geography, or geographical economics,152 is a relatively new field
within the modern economic canon. Its goal is to incorporate spatial and geo-
graphical realities into more traditional economic analysis, building on top of
and tangential to established subfields like trade and urban economics. The
field diverges from trade economics as it allows for mobility of factors of pro-
duction, not merely the exchange of goods, while it takes in to consideration
that what is near to a particular locale imposes more influence on it than
what is farther removed.153 While these changes differentiate it from the more
established trade economics literature, it is the fact that this focus allows
for it to incorporate and investigate geographic concentrations which excites
the environmental justice researchers. Geographical economics’ stated pur-
pose therefore is to “explain why certain economic activities tend to become
established in particular places.”154
Population alone is a weak determinate of the economic activity of an area;
it is the type of economic activities which occur within the area that dictate
151Perhaps codified by the awarding of the 2008 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
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its role in the larger economy.155 Those types of activities are linked together
in dynamic relationships that reinforce decisions and cause patterns of orga-
nization to persist. The persistence via linkages is relevant for environmental
justice both as an explanatory factor of the patterns advocates see and fight
against and also as a rationale for why discriminatory intent is unlikely to reach
levels of Yick Wo and Gomillion. These linkages are the economic benefits of
locating economic activity in certain areas, benefits that may accrue external
to those who are saddled with the environmental burdens, but benefits that
rationalize choices without recourse to discrimination.
Three founders156 of the field in economics describe it thusly:
“The linkage story is easy to tell if one is willing to be a bit vague
about the details. Producers, so the story goes, want to choose
locations that have good access to large markets and to supplies
of goods that they or their workers require. However, a place that
for whatever reason already has a concentration of producers tends
to offer a large market (because of the demand the producers and
their workers generate) and a good supply of inputs and consumer
goods (made by producers already there). These two advantages
correspond precisely to the backward linkages and forward linkages
of development theory. Because of these linkages, a spatial concen-
tration of production, once established, may tend to persist, and
a small difference in the initial economic size of the two otherwise
equivalent locations may grow over time.”157
The tone of the explanation is obviously steeped in economic thought, and
depends on the assumption of some increasing returns to production, but
is nevertheless important to the environmental justice discussion, especially
coming on top of criticism that these are exactly the dynamics left out of
mainstream environmental justice research. One is struck, however, in read-
ing purely economic introductions to the subject at how similar the trains of
thought between geographical economics and environmental justice research
155Huriot, Jean-Marie/Thisse, Jacques-François; Huriot, Jean-Marie/Thisse, Jacques-
François, editors Chap. Introduction In The Economics of Cities. Cambridge, 2000, p. xi.
156Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman, and Anthony J. Venables. Paul Krugman won the
2008 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences for his work in this area, specifically “for
his analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity.” From nobelprize.org. ff
157Fujita, Masahisa/Krugman, Paul/Venables, Anthony J. The Spatial Economy: Cities,
Regions, and International Trade. The MIT Press, 1999, p. 5.
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are; the same feeling that one gets with the benefit of hindsight in reading
early environmental economics prior to the codification of the environmental
justice-term.158 When an academic of one stripe reads a sentence that could
be cut-and-pasted in to a book on another academic subject, there must be
some room for collaboration.159 An entire field within the rigorous context
of economics which examines the spatial evolution of economic activity, the
exact activity which causes environmental degradation, can only be beneficial
for getting to the core issues of environmental distributions.
A few studies have already begun to account for agglomeration in their
studies specifically aimed at environmental justice, traditionally framed.160
Although there is a difference between accounting for agglomeration in spatial
studies and the economic study of geography, there are similar underlying
ideas for environmental justice.161 And while this is assuredly not the place
to introduce the legal audience to the details of the economic modeling162 it
does fill in a hole in the usual environmental justice chronology.
What one is looking at when investigating the appearance of cities is the
balance (and imbalance) of two forces: agglomeration and dispersion. An
area “grows” when agglomerative forces over power dispersion forces, shrinks
when the opposite is true, and remains stable when the two balance. One of
the big questions for the science—and for anyone interested in the overlay of
environmental pollution—then is what comprises agglomerative and dispersive
forces?
In the LULU example in Chapter 2 we already met one major agglomera-
tive force: economies of scale. Expanding existing LULUs to take advantage
of economies of scale, rather than opening new ones bring more “bang for
the buck,” or more benefit for each unit of environmental degradation.163
158Esp., as discussed at length above, Freeman III; Also Wenz, Peter S. Environmental
Justice. SUNY Press, 1988
159For example, Huriot and Thisse explain in their introduction to geographical economics’
view of cities that “the variables explaining spatial or regional imbalance within a small
country are likely to differ from those explaining economic imbalance between the North and
the South.” Is this not a thought found in many environmental justice books, concluding
that more research must be done to explain their own findings in larger, or, equally smaller,
regions? Huriot/Thisse, p. xiii-xiv
160Esp. Bowen/Atlas/Lee; Mennis
161A good introduction is in Brakman, Steven/Garretsen, Harry/van Marrewijk, Chalres
The New Introduction to Geographical Economics. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009
162Nor is the author qualified for that task. But see the textbook treatments of Combes/
Mayer/Thisse; Huriot/Thisse; Fujita/Krugman/Venables.
163McDermott, Charles J. Environmental Equity: A Waste Manager’s Perspective. Land
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Landfills—and for that matter, other LULUs—are in actuality no different
than any firm or industry which pollutes, and it is hard to think of any pro-
duction process of a relevant magnitude in the contemporary economy which
does not pollute. And so dynamic forces which drive agglomeration include es-
tablished industrial districts and business clusters, manufacturing areas, avail-
able transportation options and connecting routes, and the proximity of cities
themselves.164 Studying the agglomeration tendencies of industries, gleaning
insights from the realities, efficiencies and costs of production, then is likely
full of insights into the patterns of pollution with which environmental justice
concerns itself. After all, “[t]he geographical areas in which these industries
concentrate include many, if not most, of the same facilities at issue in envi-
ronmental justice analyses.”165
Cities do not only agglomerate though. Cities also can push and break apart.
This is the counteracting force of dispersion; cities grow and evolve, bringing
in businesses and people as well as spinning them off to the outlying areas.
A great visual is the situation in the U.S. after World War II. Such evolved
the now glorified “American dream” of a family home, a yard, and a car in
the driveway. As subdivisions, cars, and transportation infrastructure drove
the housing boom outside of more traditional city centers the outward motion
“stole jobs and tax revenues from central cities.”166 Cities then changed and
the utility provided by them for their residents took on different qualities and
affected the relative benefits of other locations. But this is just an illustration
of the many possibilities in studying the locations and dynamics of economic
space. This story highlights not only the existence of transportation infras-
tructure, but the importance of cheaper transportation. Transportation costs
play a central role in explaining the geography of economic activity.
This is only the first effect too. To continue with the illustrative U.S. story,
as new population and business centers sprang up in the spaces surrounding
Use Forum, 2 Winter 1993, Nr. 1, p. 16. Note for completeness that this article was writ-
ten as a contemporaneous response article from Charles J. McDermott, the then-director of
Government Affairs at Waste Management Inc., to environmental justice-advocates. Nev-
ertheless, he illustrates the technical, geographical, and geological problems of disposing
other industries’ wastes are increased by the commonly held belief that landfills, unlike the
industries which they dispose for, should meet a zero emission standard, a belief which does
not sit well with the benefits to agglomeration (should they be legitimately measured).
164Bowen/Atlas/Lee.
165Ibid.




cities, and concentrations formed in particular spots relative to others, “edge
cities” then began to siphon revenue away from the original suburbs. The
fiscal downside could be repeated; pressure builds on how to maintain infras-
tructure of original suburban areas and other “exurbs.”167 These dynamics,
while decidedly not new168 start to paint a picture similar to the lumpy envi-
ronment which environmental justice advocates worry about, albeit focusing
on production and consumption.
A reader versed in the economics of trade literature will find many similar-
ities with geographical economics. Where traditional trade literature aimed
at explaining production patterns mainly through differences in a location’s
endowments—factors of production, existing infrastructure, natural resources,
etc169—and the uneven spatial distribution of original endowments gives each
region its own comparative advantage and therefore trading momentum, ge-
ographical economics brings in the important aspect of increasing returns to
scale. Attempts to apply international trade theory to spatial economics found
that unequal endowments of resources is not enough to explain the trading
patterns we see and the spatial ramifications they create.170 That is, the eco-
nomics of trade proved to be too limited in explaining the patterns of trade
and, notably, agglomeration, which we see in reality.171 Puga172 explains that
“[r]ecent theories of location can help us explain these [spatial]
trends. [T]raditionally, international and regional economics have
explained income disparities on the basis of differences between
regions in their endowments of natural resources, factors of pro-
duction, infrastructure, or technology. In this context, the removal
167Exurbs, or “extra-ubran” areas, are largely commuter (or “bedroom”) areas, serving a
nearby metropolitan or other concentrated employment area.
168The Chicago School triumvirate of sociology—Burgess, Park, and Janowitz— started
on many of these research ideas in the 1920s with their concentric ring model. See Park,
Robert E./Burgess, Ernest W./Janowitz, Morris The City: Suggestions for Investigation of
Human Behavior in the Urban Environment. University of Chicago Press, 1984 (1925).
169Puga, Diego European regional policies in light of recent location theories. Journal of
Economic Geography, 2 2002, p. 382.
170Fujita/Thisse, p. 7-8.
171Differences in the economics literature appear between those identifying external
economies of scale—traditional economic literature, inter alia Arrow, Kenneth The economic
implications of learning by doing. Review of Economic Studies, 29 1962; Romer, Paul Increa-
seing returns and long-run growth. Journal of Political Economy, 94 1986)—and external
economies of scale—notably Krugman, Paul Increasing returns and economic geography.
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of obstacles to the movement of goods and/or factors would by
itself cause convergence of factor returns and living standards. Yet
both casual observation and empirical work in the area show there
are relevant forces missing from the traditional analysis, which can
widen regional disparities—even without large differences in un-
derlying characteristics—and prevent convergence.”
It is increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition173 in addition
to allowing productive factors to be mobile, which are these missing forces in
explaining the patterns we see. Increasing returns to scale recall are process
which start, at some, level giving larger marginal increases in output than the
marginal change in input. Imperfect competition adds in a twist that different
actors or productive sectors face different cost structures in their production
of competitive goods.
And while the pure geographical economics literature remains, in the main,
focused on explanations of economic activities one can see how this view per-
tains to discussion of environmental justice. The study of spatial agglomer-
ation simply reveals that there are cost and competitive advantages to being
spatially close to others.174 For the most simple factor, being close to oth-
ers means lower transportation costs for both outgoing goods and incoming
intermediates–spatial factors dictate a firm’s costs structures. The change in
costs structures have obvious effects on the competitive potential of other firms,
often pressing them to locate in the same areas; a firm’s choice of location is
very rarely starts from a clean slate.
The common-sense observation that economic activity is “lumpy” coupled
with ideas on how that lumpiness came to be makes for revealing and rigorous
economic work. And while this introduction is only the sparsest of explana-
tions, it reveals that attempts to explain a spatial pattern without accounting
for these underlying forces would bring inaccurate conclusions.175 The ob-
served agglomeration then, in a real sense, becomes a variable capturing the
history of an area, and established efficiencies take that history as inertia
173Note esp. the prescience of Hotelling, Harold Stability in Competition. The Economic
Journal , 39 Mar 1929, Nr. 153
174see Bowen Environmental Justice through research-based decision making
175In an statistical sense, causal models aimed at explaining proximity relations but failing
to incorporate agglomerative dynamics will be misspecified by omitting this relevant variable.




toward the future. When one is attempting to explain the current spatial sit-
uation it stands to reason that the historical progression—and thus also the
contemporaneous lock-in effects—could be important explanatory variables.
Geographical economics then speaks highly of the interaction which ag-
glomeration fosters, interaction which brings productive advantages and even
individual utility enhancements.176 These benefits accrue to society in general
and are reflected in growth, both in numbers (population) and in traditional
economic measures like output. Here then environmental justice-minded sim-
ply notes that the detriments do not follow the same pattern of distribution as
the benefits, at least insofar as environmental quality goes. And while the eco-
nomic science is explaining the productive side of the picture, the environmen-
tal picture which goes along with casts the shadow we know as environmental
justice.
3.4.2 The Relevance of New Economic Geography
This introduction is unfortunately bounded by the larger goal of this thesis
from delving into more detailed descriptions and the literature’s well-developed
models. The relevance, however, of this field to the environmental justice dis-
cussion should be clear. First, there are well established benefits to clustering
economic activity which have nothing to do with active discrimination of the
type alluded to in the Bean case, or implied in many other studies. This does
not mean, however, the environmental justice is somehow not an issue. To the
contrary, geographical economics lends more support to the prediction that, at
a minimum, the usage of economic space will not spread environmental bur-
dens equally. In this sense, geographical economics could be a rigorous tool
for modeling the usage of environmental resources. Secondly, and most im-
portant for those looking to address environmental injustices, all policies will
feed back into spatial separation. Building a new rail line, commuter rail or
expanding highways, education subsidy, community develop or urban renewal,
along with traditional environmental policies, will all create new linkages in
economic space, shifting the map of economic activity in complex, but quan-
tifiable, ways. New economic geography helps us understand the movements,
and, to some extent, predict outcomes. This ability, and the potential for much
growth in the field, will serve a practical purpose in the law of environmental
176I.e. Akerloff, George Social distance and social decisions. Econometrica, 65 1997
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justice. Moreover, it must play a role in the management of environmental
justice.
Bowen, Atlas, and Lee177 are among the very first to start bringing agglom-
eration studies—regional science and aspects of economic geography—into the
environmental justice literature proper.178 Their recent work is notable be-
cause of its use in the environmental justice case South Camden Citizens in
Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection179 The work
shows that accurately incorporating agglomeration effects into analysis is “in-
dispensable to an accurate representation and reasonably complete explanation
of the proximity of environmentally regulated facilities to people in environ-
mental justice research.”180
“If environmental disamenities are more prevalent around certain
population groups, identifying the appropriate environmental pro-
tection, public health, and community planning remedies requires
knowing what actually caused the situation. Ignoring or incom-
pletely considering regional science factors such as agglomeration
can mislead the public, researchers and policy-makers into pursu-
ing costly and ineffective solutions.”181
If agglomeration is the problem environmental justice wishes to address, this
research shows that it is likely to be a problem. It is unlikely that one can
address this on any discrimination stance, however.
There will be a lot of work to do before one can bring geographical eco-
nomics into the environmental justice literature. To be sure, controlling for
agglomeration in statistical works is a smaller adjustment to “traditional” en-
vironmental justice work than to start explaining from whole cloth the emer-
gence of agglomerative forces. The thrust of the economic research still runs
strongly parallel to traditional trade concerns, and therefore could be seen to
focus on output, urban structures, and transportation costs more than would
be helpful to rural environmental justice concerns or areas with static polluting
industries sans growth. Perhaps economic geography even drills down too far.
177Bowen/Atlas/Lee.
178Also see Dijkstra, Bouwe R/de Vries, Frans P Location choice by households and pol-
luting firms: An evolutionary approach. European Economic Review , 50 2006
179South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-





Examining the scale economies of production at the firm level, transportation
costs,182 and the makeup of the consumer and working population only to then
have to build a picture of the environmental impact of the emergent picture
might grant more heat than light to the environmental justice discourse.
The point of this otherwise digressive section was not to attempt to build,
nor to attempt to convince others to try and build, a model of environmental
justice based on structural economic models. It was rather to highlight, in the
face of cogent recent critiques183 stressing the need to account for agglomera-
tion of industry and the momentum that such dynamics lend to the emergence
of environmental justice-situations, that an entire section of economics dedi-
cates itself already to the pursuit of explaining agglomeration. Perhaps more
importantly is the very basic notion of that research that modern productive
society tends to cluster productive activities in specific areas for very specific
economic reasons.
Geographical economics is constantly adding economic rationale as to why
firms live where they do, and by extension, why they utilize the environment
and generate burdens where they do. It is a science which rationalizes why
firms exist—or hope to exist, in the case they are looking for a permit—
completely outside of racial or socioeconomic concerns. As this was the most
damaging to environmental justice efforts toward change in academia and in
the courtroom, it is a field which advocates must understand in order to evolve
their concerns as science’s understanding of the shapes economic activity take
increase.
To wit, the current state of geographical economics does not yet have many
insights into what policy even economics would advocate as spatial policy;184
if economists cannot yet help to plan a city on economic grounds, then en-
vironmental justice cannot yet work on a optimal response or compensatory
reaction for environmental concerns.185 But it also cannot continue to ad-
182The lowering of which often can promote agglomeration. Centripetal forces—linkages—
can perhaps counterintuitively convince firms to form clusters even though transportation
costs are low and less important in cost considerations. Fujita/Thisse, p. 46-7
183Notably Bowen/Atlas/Lee; Noonan
184Fujita/Thisse, p. 60.
185Nevertheless, none of this implies that a discrepancy between environmental goods and
lower incomes is a new or newly recognized phenomenon to policy makers. Mike Davis (p. 67,
1999) cites a particularly telling acknowledgement in a 1930 planning report for the booming
Los Angeles area, written by Frederick Law Olmstead Jr and Harlan Bartholomew. “Those
of lower incomes generally live in small-lot, single-family home districts, and have more
children and less leisure time in which to go to distant parks and recreational areas. These
families comprise 65 percent of the population, and they should be given first consideration.”
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vocate in the same fashion that it did before, nor continue to assume that
agglomeration and social momentum is an ignorable factor.
The concerns though are more than just a cry for advocates to arm them-
selves against the increasingly armoured academics; it goes to the heart of
what environmental justice should advocate. Recall the concern of the “hyper-
spatiality” of environmental burdens where a successful environmental justice
advocacy program in one area merely shifts the burden to another area, until
the burden is met with less resistance.186 It very well might be that in an
economic geography sense, the first choice of where to pollute is indeed the
most efficient locale. Shifting it to another area only burdens another group
of people and society gains an economic inefficiency tax on that industry’s
product. The end result is in any event even more pollution for the world to
deal with than would have been created in the more efficient location. What
then did environmental justice advocacy accomplish?
That is not to say that advocacy is wrong; certainly the people who are
not burdened now by the pollution gain much. And they are due their say,
as we will discuss in the upcoming chapter. But the economics has muddied
the water of how to regulate or set up policy that could effectively address
the myriad problems identified by not only environmental justice research but
the various strands of economics that now surround and infuse it. Continued
work in economic geography could lead to new insights, especially if research
attempts to overlay environmental distributions on to geographical economics
models. But for now, the conclusions outlined here support the conclusion
that, like in the simpler models, the modern economy is tilting the environ-
mental burdens towards certain areas. If those areas are also connected to
certain socioeconomic groups, minorities, or the poor, then economics will be
burdening those least able to bear the burdens, and also least able to change
the situation. The following section returns then to the environmental justice
literature proper to continue reinforcing the connections between a tilted and
agglomerative environment and such groups.
Davis, p. 67 The reality in modern L.A. harkens back to the problems of democracy and





While the early environmental justice movement did not gain a legal victory
to hang its hat on in Bean v. Southwestern Management Corp., it did gain
a toehold in academic and legal literature. The toehold, and the studies to
follow, help make the point of this chapter—connecting the empirical reality of
a distributed environment to the proclivity to impact a minority of the popu-
lace. This conclusion arises in hindsight from the same literature that saw the
currents of social injustice, racism, and the shortcomings of environmentalism
begin to coalesce around a central idea, environmental justice, and begin to
“become aware of itself”187 in the early 1980s.
Also in hindsight, the pull away from the wider social issues and toward
advocacy and change based on charges of racial discrimination are also quite
obvious. The problems with the Bean case revolved around a lack of com-
pelling evidence that the siting of waste facilities followed a discriminatory
pattern. As such, the case tied in strongly with others where minorities and
low-income groups felt slighted by the lack of resolutions to discriminatory
effects. The feeling of being victimized twice, once by the environmental prob-
lem and then again by a justice system that was failing to bring change in what
had all the hallmarks of discrimination. And all because the causes themselves
could not be proven to be intentional discriminatory, a rather esoteric legal
loophole to a populace shouldered with day-to-day environmental burdens.
The literature on discrimination in the United States is nothing if not expan-
sive, and a full exploration would be beyond the focus of this book. However,
as the civil rights literature is a prominent area where the United States dif-
fers from Europe, it is necessary to slowly develop a broad strokes pictures
of the situation in the U.S.188 The development helps both secure the aim of
this chapter with more illustrations of the proclivity to impact minorities with
burdens, now illustrated by the need for, and failings of, anti-discrimination
policy, and the general weakness of the existing regulatory structure for the
ends desired by environmental justice.
In addition to the high hurdle of intent, the fact that the remedies for
187Martinez-Alier, p. 12.
188Kruize (p. 139, 2007) notes explicitly that the racism undertones and the grassroots
support so central to the U.S. environmental justice literature are not present in the Nether-
lands. Also see Elvers, Horst-Dietrich/Gross, Matthias/Heinrichs, Harald The Diversity of
Environmental Justice: Towards a European Approach. European Societies, 10 2008.
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discriminatory impacts are quite broad makes for difficult judicial headway.189
As the statutes appealed to in this and subsequent environmental justice cases
were meant to fight the persistent racism and segregation in the United States
following not only the Civil War—embodied in the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution—but also the “separate but equal” doctrine left
over from the legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson,190 and the 1964 Civil Rights
Act—especially Title VI191—the remedies were significantly strong.192 An
action deemed in violation of the strong and complete protection of civil rights
naturally results in an injunction of the activity, and remedies theretofore.
Ruling in favor of a plaintiff then labels the infringing activity inherently illegal
and opens the door for a multitude of similar litigation.193 Courts are usually
quite mindful of making decisions which would open the proverbial floodgates
of new litigation.
Due to this difficult legal position, potential claimants find themselves in a
very strongly bounded position where maneuvering in directions not already
charted by previous discrimination cases is unlikely to yield a favorable rul-
ing. Therefore, much of the U.S. environmental justice literature subsequent
to Bean has focused on creating a tight and replicable link between the dis-
tributions of environmental quality and an undeniable discriminatory pattern.
In a paper setting out to bolster claims like these, Bullard presented the work
he started as an expert witness in the Bean case and worked to show that
there was, indeed, a pattern.194
The evolution of environmental justice away from economics or environmentalism-
proper really begins here, transformed now into a perspective that the overly-
189See also Lawrence III, p. 354 and discussions therein, and also Brest, Paul Forward: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle. Harvard Law Review , 90 1977, Nr. 1
190163 U.S. 537 (1896) In this landmark case, the Supreme Court limited the federal
government’s ability to hinder individuals’ racist actions. The case’s famous “separate but
equal” quotation comes from the court’s ruling that the State of Louisiana could require
separate accommodations on trains for blacks and whites. The court made its findings based
on the superficial fact that the law itself made no mention of an “inferiority’ of blacks” and,
quoting the majority opinion penned by Justice Henry Brown, it was only the “colored race”
who ”chooses to put that construction upon it.” The ruling was not overturned until 1954,
in Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
191Discussed in more detail, including the differences between the EPC, Section 1983, and
§601 and §602 of Title VI, in Chapter 5
192For a thorough discussion, see Idem Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle. Harvard Law Review , 90 1977, Nr. 1
193Lawrence III, p. 320.
194See Robert D. Bullard’s personal write-up on the Environmental Justice Resource Cen-
ter’s (EJRC) website. Also on file with the author.
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ing environmental inequity is a reflection (or manifestation) of the underlying
inequity among minorities. Therefore, environmental injustice must be ad-
dressed and rectified as a standing situation. At best, environmental justice
finds examples of minorities burdened more than the majority by environmen-
tal ills, but at worst it casts light on a form of active discrimination embedded
in American society.195
The idea that there is an embedded racism comes across strongly in Bullard’s
work, especially in that Houston’s housing distribution itself is “somewhat er-
ratic,” with a “proliferation of waste disposal facilities” throughout.196 At the
outset, the somewhat peculiar dynamics of Houston—a port city with rapid
expansion197 and without zoning—can be both a good and bad laboratory to
explore environmental justice. On the one hand, without zoning one could
argue that the outcomes are the pure, or unencumbered and unbounded and
therefore reveal the way market mechanisms work with regard to distributing
environmental quality. With the one major preventative measure for segment-
ing different land uses removed we then observe what “naturally” wants to
happen—including racist tendencies that zoning ostensibly tries to keep in
check.198
On the other hand, because zoning is such a well-employed method for
protecting against a broad-stroke realization of environmental injustice, to
examine a city without zoning may lead to stronger conclusions than can be
supported in a more global perspective. With that in mind, Bullard’s focus on
a small area and the small number of actual waste-handling sites in Houston
195For an introduction into intrinsic racism in the context of discrimination—especially
with regard to the discriminatory intent debate implicit in environmental justice legal dis-
cussion, see Lawrence III, Charles R. The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism. Stanford Law Review , 39 1987. While there are many references
for studying latent racism in the U.S., this is contemporaneous with the discussion here, and
hence reveals perspective prior to the entry of environmental discrimination concerns.
196Bullard Sociological Inquiry 53 [1983] , p. 274. Houston has the somewhat dubious
distinction of being the only large American city without zoning laws. The city is still
without zoning laws today. Zoning laws, as described by Bullard, “[have] been the major land
use control of external diseconomies and disamenities imposed by nonresidential activities
on nearby residents.” ibid. Zoning’s goal of separating incompatible land uses, such as
industrial production and residential neighborhoods.
197Ibid., p. 274,75 and also see Bullard, Robert D./Tryman, D. L. Competition for De-
cent Housing: A Focus on Housing Discrimination Complaints in a Sunbelt City. Journal
of Ethnic Studies, 7 Winter 1980 for more information on the preexisting conditions and
Houston’s growth.
198Whether zoning actually operates to reduce racism is another matter. Barry notes that
zoning is not equally applied or enforced, and is responsive to wealth, property, and political
power. See Barry, p. 48
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did allow for detailed research into the then-current situation—an approach
aimed at winning the Bean trial by convincing the judge of a strong pattern
of discrimination.
But the pattern of today is not the pattern of yesterday. While a critique of
methods could take another book, suffice it to say that other variables could
influence not only the original siting decision, but the demographic compo-
sition of the surrounding area; both contemporaneously and in the future.
These were factors in the larger causality of agglomerations explored above in
Section 3.4 There is also the problem of causality, a factor which plays heavily
in trying to convince a court of a direct linkage between a distribution and
an intent to discriminate. Did these waste sites come to minority neighbor-
hoods, or did the neighborhoods expand around the nuisance, due to perhaps
depressed property values?199 Also, did the need for the waste site derive from
the growth of the community into which it was placed, or from the growth of
a “richer” neighbourhood in the vicinity? As Levins quips,
“. . . neighborhoods are not simply random pieces of environment.
They’re structured. Wherever there is a rich neighborhood, you
need a poor neighborhood. . . to serve it.”200
Here, again, the point is not a catalogue of weak points but to highlight some
of the studies which gave birth to environmental justice and link unequivocally
the ability of the distributed environment to impact a minority of the populace
to such a degree that they seek legal redress, but find little to no protection.
3.5.1 Congressional and Congregational Studies
Continuing on the path of illustrating the linkages between a distributed en-
vironment and the human condition, a descriptive study of four southern haz-
ardous waste sites was published by the United States General Accounting
Office (USGAO). The study came at the request of a U.S. Congressman who
was personally involved in the protests surrounding one of the proposed waste
sites.201 Although the stated objective of the study “was to determine the
199For more comments alone these lines, see Been The Yale Law Journal 103 [1994] ; Been/
Gupta
200Levins, Richard; Hofrichter, Richard, editor Chap. Is Capitalism a Disease? In Health
and Social Justice. John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p. 377.
201Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy was one of the over 500 people arrested at the Afton,
in Warren County, North Carolina site. See Mohai/Bryant, p. 924
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correlation between the location of hazardous waste landfills and the racial
and economic status of the surrounding communities,”202 the study looked
at four arbitrarily chosen sites confined to the southern United States—a lo-
cation previously of concern for discrimination.203 With so many things the
report did not do, the conclusions are similarly bounded to descriptions; good
for the illustrations necessary in this research but not for the legal direction
environmental justice was angling.
The four sites selected204 all had significant black populated census tracts
surrounding them.205 In each case, the surrounding area’s population of black
residents was larger than the state’s average black population.206 Also, the
percent of the adjacent population below the poverty line was higher than
state average of poor individuals. Furthermore, of those below the poverty
lines in the adjacent census tracts, between 90 and 100% were black.
202United States General Accounting Office Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their
Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities. Washington,
D.C., June 1 1983 – Technical report, p. 2 the study was purely descriptive. The committee
explicitly reports,
“...we did not verify Bureau of the Census supplied data nor determine why
the sites were selected, the population-mix of the area when the site was es-
tablished, the distribution of the population around the landfill, nor how the
communities racial and economic status compared to others in the State. Also,
we did not determine whether any of these sites pose a risk to the surrounding
communities.”
ibid., p. 3. But compare with Hornstein, Donald Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Nor-
mative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis. Colum. L. Rev. 92 1992 for a criticism of
defining risk in terms of expected losses rather than expected utilities.
203To be specific, the hazard sites were selected from EPA Region IV states: Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi. The U.S.’s Deep South is over-represented in the
bottom of the U.S.’s list of environmental quality indicators Cutter, Susan L Race, Class,
and Environmental Justice. Progress in Human Geography, 19 1995, Nr. 1; See also Hall, B./
Kerr, M. L. 1991-1992 Green Index: A State-by-State Guide to the Nation’s Environmental
Health. Island Press, 1991 for relevant semi-contemporaneous visual data.
204Sumter County, Alabama; Chester County, South Carolina; Sumter County, South
Carolina; and Warren County PCB landfill, North Carolina. The PCB landfill siting and
the protests it ignited—including a strong presence from the Congressional Black Caucus—
was the impetus for the GAO study. See Bullard, Robert D. The Quest for Environmental
Justice. Sierra Club Books, 2005, p. 20, and Baugh, Joyce A. African-Americans and the
Environment. Policy Studies Journal , 19 Spring 1991, Nr. 2, p. 184. Also see Warren Co.
v. State of North Carolina 528 F. Supp. 276 (1981) and Henry F. Twitty v. State of North
Carolina 527 F. Supp. 778 (1981). These two cases were levied against the siting, although
the issues therein were based on non-discriminatory grounds.
205The ‘neighborhood’ here was defined as census areas (not tracts) within a 4 mile radius
of the landfill. See Appendix p. 1, United States General Accounting Office.
20690% in adjacent census areas versus 26% (Alabama) or 35% (Mississippi) for Sumter
County, Alabama, which borders Mississippi; 38% versus 30% for Chester County, South
Carolina; 52% versus 30% for Sumter County, South Carolina; and 66% versus 22% for
Warren County, North Carolina.
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The evidence here, just as in Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management
Corp., lends more eyebrow-raising descriptions giving the equity-conscious an
impression that something is unjust, that there is a tendency here that needs
explanation.207 More damaging—and motivating—imagery appeared in per-
haps the most famous descriptive study: the Council on Racial Justice.
The United Church of Christ208 (UCC) study is arguably the most cited
document in the traditional environmental justice canon. Propelled by their
experience at the 1982 Warren County protests,209 the council conducted a
nationwide study on the spatial connection between minority populations and
toxic waste. The study revealed earthshaking talking points. According to
their statistical analysis they found that the proportion of minority residents
in communities with a hazardous waste facility was double the proportion of
minorities in non-hosting communities.210 In communities which hosted two
or more facilities, the proportion of minorities was triple that of non-hosting
communities. Given their data, they were also able to show that race was
indeed a better predictor of the presence of a hazardous waste facility than
income.211 The economics behind land pricing, discussed above, coupled with
lack of political power and mobility were institutionalized forms of racism
seemingly led to discriminatory outcomes in the same way as overt forms of
racism.
Although the CRJ study imbued the fledgling environmental justice move-
ment with momentum, its major conclusions came under fire in later years.212
Been’s critique is perhaps the most comprehensive and is discussed below. And
while it could be seen to have angered the environmental justice literature as
it was evolving at the time, its criticisms can be seen to lend support to the
207But compare criticisms in Been The Yale Law Journal 103 [1994] ; Boerner, Christo-
pher/Lambert, Thomas A. Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions.
Policy Study, 1995 – Technical report; Lambert/Boerner
208United Church of Christ Toxic Waste and Race in the United States: A National
Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous
Waste Sites. New York, 1987 – Technical report.
209Mohai/Bryant.
210United Church of Christ. Also discussion in Mohai/Bryant, p. 63
211Other studies also supported that race outperforms income as a predictor of proximity
to hazardous waste. See Ibid.
212And earlier. In 1991, Waste Management Inc., conducted their own study of their waste
disposal sites mimicking the CRJ methodology in so far as using 1980 demographics within
5 digit ZIP code areas around their 130 sites. They found that 76% of their facilities were




tact this research is taking.
3.5.2 Correlation and Causation
The studies quoted thus far have all found a correlation between social dispar-
ities and pollution. Their empirical question has been simple: given two areas
with notable environmental burdens, is the area around said factors likely to
be populated by minorities and/or low income members of society?213 There
is a small problem however. As Laurian214 cogently noted in her study on
French environmental distributions, the correlation does not
“establish causal relationships between population characteristics
and the location of hazardous sites, or to identify the mechanisms
that lead some towns to host more hazardous sites than others. In
other words, it does not reveal any procedural injustice.”
Although the lens of hindsight has made this clear, it appears that courts in
the original cases reflected the judgement.
Been took the first critical look at the founding research of the environmental
justice movement in the United States. One of her studies215 re-examined
the data utilized by Bullard in “Solid Wastes Sites and the Black Houston
Community” and the United States General Accounting Office (USGAO) in
their report, “Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation with
Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities”. The criticism
eluded to previously is the role that market mechanisms play in bringing people
to, and pushing people away, from waste sites. This study was the first—
though certainly not the last216—to investigate the way market mechanisms
operate over time. The conclusion shows that to fully explain the phenomenon
of disproportionate environmental distributions, research must consider the
movements over time. Without the temporal dimension, the snapshots cannot
accurately answer the question of whether the siting was discriminatory or
not; they only can show that the sites are largely minority at the time of the
snapshot.
213Bowen Environmental Justice through research-based decision making, p. 43.
214Laurian, p. 73.
215Been The Yale Law Journal 103 [1994] .




In this sense, Been’s research is a formal example of the concerns voiced in
the preceding section: the data and methodology employed necessarily limits
the degree to which one can interpret and extend results. That is, they can
illustrate an uneven environment, as the research at hand contends is preva-
lent, but they cannot prove a degree of targeted malice or even unfortunate
ignorance on the part of policy makers.217
In stating a correlation between the siting decision and the disproportionate
impact assumes that the demographics of the site at the time of taking the
snapshot were the same during the decision. Although the decision to site a
hazardous facility occurs several years prior to the snapshots of demographic
characteristics used in the studies, this temporal dimension was not inspected.
Therefore, Been repeated the studies by analyzing the demographic charac-
teristics of the sites shortly218 before the construction of the site, and then
further watching the progressions of demographic characteristics as the site
opens.
Echoing economic modeling, Been states that a LULU affects its surround-
ing territory in two ways: 1) Neighbors with the means to do so can be induced
to leave because of the LULU’s negative presence and 2) the LULU can de-
press the surrounding land values. The first situation is often dubbed “white
217As noted by Bowen Bowen, William M Comments on “Every Breath You Take...”:
The Demographics of Toxic Air Releases in Southern California. Economic Development
Quarterly, 13 1999, Nr. 2, p. 124, this is fundamental in doing research, citing from a
classic text on experimental design, Campbell, Donald T./Stanley, Julian C. Experimental
and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963. Been
carefully preempts unsupported conclusions stemming from her work by noting strongly in
the introduction that “[l]ike the original studies, the extensions involve samples too small
to establish conclusively the cause of disproportionate siting.”Been The Yale Law Journal
103 [1994] , p. 1387
218Been utilized the U.S. Census data available immediately before the sites became op-
erational. That is, for sites such as the GAO sites, permitted in 1972-1977, the appropriate
census data to examine bias in the siting decision is 1970. The same logic is applied to
the other sites given their time of permitting. See Ibid., p. 1398,1400-01. Furthermore,
she utilized Census tract data, instead of US Postal Service ZIP code data. In addition to
spatial arguments, examined in detail in Fahsbender, John J. An Analytical Approach to
Defining the Affected Neighborhood in the Environmental Context. New York University
Environmental Law Journal , 5 1996, as to what size reveals the right relationships, there is
the argument that census tracts are less apt to change over time than ZIP codes. They are
specifically drawn to vary little over time and when changes are made the Census Bureau
publishes the reason.Been Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law 11 [1995] , p. 4. ZIP
codes, on the contrary, change based on the convenience of the US Postal Service. See
also Monmonier, Mark Zip Codes, Data Compatibility, and Environmental Racism. GIS
Law , 2 1994. For discussion on the many issues to choosing physical space measurements




flight”, carrying the connotation that only the relatively richer and more mo-
bile whites can escape from the coming LULU. The second effect operates in
two directions. Directly, the lower prices will make the real estate more avail-
able to those with less wealth. Supplementary to this is the effect of the more
wealthy becoming less attracted to land around the LULU, either through as-
sociation effects such as desiring to live near other of similar socioeconomic
status—who via effect 1) are already leaving that area219—or through worries
that the land will not retain or increase its value as much as similarly priced
property left unexposed to a LULU. Been summarizes that lowered land prices
can bring in other, new industrial uses,220 and
“[t]he dynamics of the housing market therefore are likely to cause
the poor and people of color to move to or remain in the neighbor-
hoods in which LULUs are located, regardless of the demographics
of the communities when the LULUs were first sited.”221
The quote carries the implication then that researchers should expect to find
correlations between environmental disamenities and poor and minority com-
munities,222 as well as a gravity to the siting process, a gravity that can account
for some, if not all, of the pollution agglomeration.223
That said, Been indeed found that the siting of the four landfills in the
GAO study were, in fact, disproportionately minority tracts at the time of the
siting decisions. The census data predating the operations of each landfill are
distinctly more minority oriented than the rest of the state—the metric used
for comparison. Counterintuitive to this supported conclusion however is that
the tracts actually experienced a decrease—albeit somewhat insignificant in
two tracts—in the population of black residents in the following censuses.224
Furthermore, the relative poverty levels, relative median family incomes, and
even the relative median housing values of the affected communities changed
only slightly in the subsequent censuses.225
These financial results are marginally discordant with prevailing expecta-
tions in a LULU situation, even if their magnitudes are relatively slight. The
219Been The Yale Law Journal 103 [1994] , p. 1389.
220Lambert/Boerner, p. 202.
221[p. 1390]Been1994 (emphasis added).
222Schweitzer, Lisa/Stephenson Jr., Max Right Answers, Wrong Questions: Environmen-
tal Justice. Urban Studies, 44 February 2007, Nr. 2.
223Agglomeration is taken up in more detail in Section 3.4.
224Been The Yale Law Journal 103 [1994] , Appendix, Table 1
225Ibid., Appendix, Table 2-4
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demographic conclusions however support the suggestion that siting focused
on black communities. A re-examination of Bullard’s study on Houston, how-
ever, does show evidence of significant market dynamics at work in creating
the pattern of disproportionate environmental impacts.
Between the sitings in the 1970s and the census in 1980 all of the census
tracts neighboring the sites show significant relative growth in their minority
population, a trend which largely continued through the 1990 census.226 The
sitings also negatively impacted the poverty rates in the affected census.227
Furthermore, the sitings in general hurt the surrounding property values.228
The magnification of disproportionate effects through market mechanisms is
claimed in other studies, and also in defense of industry.229
The GAO sites, in contrast to those in Houston, were significantly larger
and set in rural areas.230 A large landfill is similar to a larger factory; it needs
more resources to operate than a smaller factory. If size of the landfills dictate
the personal required to operate them, then size also affects the potential for
economic growth effects via job creation. The particular nature of the LULU
creates different job dynamics and therefore drives the demographic change in
226see Been The Yale Law Journal 103 [1994] , Appendix, Table 5
227Notably increasing poverty rates while the rest of the County saw a decrease in poverty
rates between 1970 and 1980, and then even larger than the overall poverty increases the
County experienced from 1980-1990.Ibid., p. 1404, Appendix Table 6
228Ibid., Appendix Table 7.
229See Hill, Barry E. Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice. Environmental
Law Institute Press, 2009, p. 442, relaying the testimony of a former Chairman of the
Chemical Manufacturers Association, Roger Hirl, who states “some in industry have argued
that many industrial facilities were constructed 20-40 years ago, when the land was cheap and
the areas were relatively unpopulated. After the facilities were constructed, people moved
into those areas and built homes so that they could be close to their jobs.” That is, industry
can and has appealed to temporal information to dilute causality and intent in discriminatory
siting. See again Section 3.4. Also see the situation discussed by Kruize (Kruize, Hanneke
On environmental equity: exploring the distribution of environmental quality among socio-
economic categories in the Netherlands. Ph.D thesis, Universiteit Utrecht, 2007, p. 140). In
her dissection of the history of exposure to railroad noises in the Netherlands a historical
study finds that although there were income-related aspects to the groups currently most
exposed to railroad traffic, it was an income-related historical “lock-in” that was to blame;
an explanation of the same sort as that in Houston though the outcome and did not have
any racial backstory. The same lock-in occurs with higher incomes and green space. Another
Dutch example from Kruize’s study is the more prosperous in the 19th century. They were
the first to be able to buy land outside the cities. In many cases, they still own those
properties which are still contained in greener areas. The lock-in is the income distribution
of earlier times.
230Been The Yale Law Journal 103 [1994] , p. 1405-06.
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the area.231 The urban nature of the sites in Houston meant both a smaller
operating size and also a lower inducement for migration to the area; given
the housing and transportation dynamics of city life.
Seen from this perspective, both the GAO and Houston examinations give
support to the hypothesis the market mechanisms are important to consider
in the siting of LULU’s, they can affect both the initial characteristics of the
burden’s distribution, as well as effect changes both toward, and away from,
disproportionate impacts in the future. Been therefore draws a critical line
between disproportionate siting, and disproportionate outcomes. The distinc-
tion is important in that the former is a human action which can be labeled
as discriminatory. In the latter, it is the complicated “confluence of the forces
of housing discrimination, poverty, and free market economics”232 which carry
the discriminatory burden.233 In this latter, and arguably more general case,
the solutions to environmental justice concerns are then also much more com-
plex than legal action on discriminatory grounds. The burdens are still accu-
mulating, tilting toward certain groups, but the causality is not a single policy
decision. As she herself notes, environmental justice is
“a much more ambiguous and complicated entanglement of class,
race, educational attainment, occupational patterns, relationships
between the metropolitan areas and rural or non-metropolitan cities
and possibly market dynamics.”234
231Been reports that the Sumter County facility employed 300 people, 60% of whom lived
in the county. Ibid., p. 1405, footnote 91, cf. McDermott, Charles J. Environmental Equity:
A Waste Manager’s Perspective. Land Use Forum, 2 Winter 1993, Nr. 1.
232Been The Yale Law Journal 103 [1994] , p. 1406.
233Kiel and Zabel Kiel/Zabel break down the blanket term “housing discrimination”, into
discrimination and prejudice, exposing what Bean eluded to as the “confluence of forces.”
Discrimination then becomes the act of selling houses to non-whites at prices higher than
that which whites could purchase the house for. Prejudice is a less direct impact, stemming
from a feeling or attitude against minorities, where the house prices are affected by the
presence or absence of whites in the neighborhood. In this situation, “white flight” is a type
of prejudice which impacts house prices. Kiel and Zabel expand Bean’s interpretation and
show that
“[t]he combination of discrimination and prejudice can lead to submarkets de-
fined by the racial composition of neighborhoods, resulting in price differentials
within and between these submarkets. ibid., p. 144
The warning from their paper is that without measuring discrimination too broadly leads
to incorrect inferences on the extent of discrimination and prejudice in housing markets
234Been Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law 11 [1995] , p. 21-22.
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3.5.3 Discrimination in Enforcement
The copious literature documenting the early rise of the environmental jus-
tice movement in the U.S. points clearly toward a connection between certain
groupings and environmental damage. That connection was not significantly
strong enough to convince the courts to view it as discrimination, however.
The number of cases, combined with the magnitude of the outcry, help to
move the discussion here along, as does another famous environmental justice
study.
The National Law Journal (NLJ) and authors Lavelle and Coyle uncov-
ered another form of environmental discrimination in 1992–that of unequal
enforcement of environmental regulations and penalties. Their analysis of en-
vironmental lawsuits in the seven years proceeding 1992 showed that235
1. Violations of environmental regulations in areas having the greatest rel-
ative white population were a staggering 500% higher than the penalties
assessed at sites in minority neighborhoods.
2. The relationship between penalties and racial demographics is not mir-
rored when one looks at the relationship between areas of similar income
and penalties. The difference in penalties between areas with the lowest
median incomes and the highest median incomes was a mere 3%.
3. Hazardous waste sites listed under the relatively young Superfund ini-
tiative took 20% longer to reach the National Priorities List if they are
in areas of minority concentration.
4. Cleanup efforts for Superfund sites led by various regional EPA programs
begin 12% to 42% slower in minority areas than the startup times in
majority areas.
5. The EPA chose the less expensive—and less desirable from the point of
the citizens and under the law—option of “containment” of waste areas
rather than the more expensive treatment and elimination of wastes more
often at minority sites relative to white areas.
The stark statistics made for high-octane fuel to the early environmental jus-
tice movement. The evidence of disproportionate exposure to environmen-




overarching phenomenon, but the evidence from Lavelle and Coyle’s study
seemingly could only stem from underlying racist animus.
The evidence presented drew some strong critics, just as in the spatial stud-
ies. For instance, while it certainly highlighting the most eye-catching com-
parisons, it did not include data tables with all relevant comparisons, as would
appear in a reviewed statistical work.236 Furthermore, the continued use of
Zip Codes (postal codes) to define boundaries reflect choices made for the
efficiency of the postal service and do not demarcate “homogeneous socioe-
conomic communities.”237 There is, after all, “a great deal of geographical
variation in [the US] that has nothing to do with injustices perpetrated by
society on any given socioeconomic group.”238
So while, again, informative, Lavelle and Coyle’s study and for much of the
early environmental justice research data proved not always to be a friend. As
Bleich239 notes, collecting racial data has pros and cons.
“While openly recognizing race through ethnic monitoring can pro-
duce benefits for society, it can also cause confusion and give rise
to misdirected actions. Racial and ethnic data that reveal group-
based differences do not by themselves demonstrate the signifi-
cance of race or the existence of racism. Such differences may be
explained by a host of other factors, ranging from incomplete lan-
guage acquisition by immigrants, to socioeconomic disparities that
happen to overlap with ethnicity (but are not caused by racism), or
236There is always the possibility too that a hazard listed in a database is also spatially
inaccurate, something that Susan Cutter found in almost 60 percent of EPA databases on
South Carolina. Cutter.
237Monmonier, p. 5 The are also larger than census tracts and thus inherently more diverse.
With large areas like ZIP codes, it is entirely possible to have a sufficiently large minority
population within the boundaries, but also for them to be clustered the farthest distance
possible from the polluter.This had to do with census tract data, however, and so the
magnitude is not applicable directly to the ZIP debate. Hence, the data analysis will tag
that area as minority area near a polluter, even though a case-study type approach (a
vignette clearly reveals the opposite. See also Cutter. compare Barry, p. 77; “Anyone who
lives in Manhattan and looks at a map of zip codes will instantly recognize that they are
drawn up to make life easy for marketers by demarcating each zip code area so that it is as
economically and ethnically/racially homogeneous as possible.” Likely, the New York city
anecdote does not generalize across the US to the level necessary to utilize the postal codes
in general as ethnic demarcations.
238Bowen, William M./Wells, Michael V. The Politics and Reality of Environmental Jus-
tice: A History and Considerations for Public Administrators and Policy Makers. Public
Administration Review , 62 Nov/Dec 2002, Nr. 6, p. 693.
239Bleich, Erik Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the
1960s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 207.
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even to statistical anomalies. [. . . ] Ethnic data may be seized upon
as evidence of racism without adequate digging into the meaning
of the statistics.”
Further, it is not even clear in all cases where boundaries between race and
ethnicity, or even social classes are. Spatial segregation plays a part, but
not all countries enjoy the luxury of space. The US does have strong spatial
segregation, but in Europe, majority working classes are often integrated in
space with minorities thanks to the urban constraints.240
The criticisms highlight some worthy concerns, revealing several factors
which mitigate the starkness of Lavelle and Coyle’s statistics but do not
point away from the conclusion that environmental burdens tilt toward certain
groups in society.241 They do point to the conclusion that existing legislation
will find it difficult to address environmental justice concerns, however. Lastly,
and ironically, urban populations access to clean, treated, city water through
existing piping systems can slow down cleanup efforts.243 As significant risks
from polluted urban sites comes from seepage of contaminants into the ground,
and then into the ground water, populations which depend on the groundwa-
ter directly for drinking get on the faster track for cleanup than populations
which can mitigated exposure by appealing to city water sources.244
Again, those with concerns about the distribution of environmental burdens
find plenty to worry about without finding compensating benefits. Here too
we see very clearly a potential weakness for even well-intentioned regulation.
240Laurian, p. 59.
241Other criticisms include that many minority areas in the study’s sprawling database
are urban. Urban waste sites are smaller than rural and suburban sites, and therefore
automatically give less area for a polluter to damage. The extent of damage done affects the
calculation of the fine.Lavelle/Coyle, p. S6. Furthermore, the EPA’s goal in assessing fines
is to compel compliance. Hence, they take into consideration the infringing firm’s ability to
pay. For smaller facilities or facilities in “economically depressed areas”ibid. small fines can
achieve the same results as large fines. One final mitigating factor is that the EPA does not
decide all penalties directly. A small percentage242 are decided in court litigation. Hence,
the EPA does not always have control over the final outcome, although the percentage of
these cases was rather small.
243See, for instance, the situation regarding the Altgeld Gardens community in Chicago
at Hill Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice, p. 76-79.
244As only 18.4% of Superfund sites at the time were in urban areas, where access to
clean water can be a “quick mitigation”, this pattern could play into the revealed figures.
However, fines levied under the Clean Air Act, Superfund, and Safe Drinking Water Acts in
low income communities were higher than in wealthy areas. cf. Lavelle/Coyle . For more
recent studies in the same vein, see Fletcher’s (2003) thesis investigating New York State;
Fletcher, Brian M Environmental Equity or environmental discrimination: An assessment
of hte New York State Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Program. Ph.D thesis, State
University of New York at Binghampton, 2003
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The control exerted via regulation is still with human hands and subject to
choices. While it is again unlikely that these choices are demonstrably racist
in intent, it nevertheless shows another pattern of a lumpy environment—this
time the regulation of that—and here again it is tilted towards an already
disadvantaged group. Lavelle and Coyle’s study also serves as an introduction
to more subversive forms of discrimination which collectively act to keep pres-
sure on certain groups. Lavelle and Coyle specifically noted the exacerbated
problems that low property values lend to minority and low-income mobility
populations.245 As property values sink due to encroaching development, the
most significant bargaining chip and leverage held by many minorities—their
land ownership—also disappears.246 The lowered property values around the
environmental burdens is exacerbated by the relatively higher, untouched land
prices, locking the minorities into their current situation lending a certain in-
ertia to ownership that the law does not take into account.247 Although this
is not a hard and fast rule, and situations of property values bouncing back
or even appreciating are known.248 Above and beyond the environmental
problems themselves, then, their collective impact factors in to questions of
mobility among affected classes.249
In conclusion then the study represented a milestone and additional cumu-
lative evidence, if not statistical proof, toward the overarching environmental
justice conclusions that “global inequalities. . . are . . . highly correlated with
245Note that damage to property values could be evidence of discrimination falling within
purview of Title VIII (Fair Housing Act). Discussed infra at Section 5.4.2. See Cox v. City
of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734 (Fifth Cir. 2005).
246The devaluation of land as a principle asset also plays a role in the uneasy ethical sense
of a “taking” from a single individual for the proposed greater benefit of society. For U.S.
blackletter case law see this topic discussed in Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corporation,
258 N.Y.S. 229. June 29, 1932.
247Brion, Denis J. An Essay on LULU, Nimby, and the Problem of Distributive Justice.
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review , 15 1988, p. 475. The U.S. Supreme
Court does recognize zoning as a potential taking, establishing criteria for when it is an
is not permissible. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
248See Kiel/McClain. Also note reactions to the news of a LULU can be different than
reactions to the site itself. Kiel, Katherine A./McClain, Katherine T. House Prices during
Siting Decision Stages: The Case of an Incinerator from Rumor through Operation. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management , 28 March 1995, Nr. 2
249E.g. Katz, Lawrence F./Kling, Jeffrey R./Liebman, Jeffrey B. Moving To Opportunity
In Boston: Early Results Of A Randomized Mobility Experiment. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 116 May 2001, Nr. 2; Kiel, Katherine A. The Impact of House Price Appre-
ciation on Household Mobility. Journal of Housing Economics, 3 June 1994, Nr. 2; Boehm,
Thomas P./Ihlanfeldt, Keith R. Residential Mobility and Neighborhood Quality. Journal of
Regional Science, 26 May 1986, Nr. 2. Also see for an illuminating discussion on lower-
income mobility within constraints, Katz/Kling/Liebman.
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global racial inequalities.”250 The cumulative nature of race an inequality
comes from studies showing the correlation across a plethora of sociological
indicators, an expanded palette of causality and spaces through which that
causality operates.251
“Pick any relevant sociological indicator—life expectancy, infant
mortality, literacy, access to health care, income level—and apply
it in virtually any setting, global, regional, or local, and the re-
sults will be the same: the worldwide correlation of wealth and
well-being with white skin and European descent, and of poverty
and immiseration with dark skin and ‘otherness.’ [There is a
. . . planetary correlation of darkness and poverty.”252
Lavelle and Coyle’s study in particular shows a weak safety net. And if it
is unlikely to engage the U.S.’s anti-discrimination machinery toward change,
perhaps advocates could address the continued shortage of minorities in U.S.
political power positions, a shortage which plays a further enabling role for
limited minority mobility and ability to change.253
3.5.4 Emergence of Grassroots Organizations
More evidence for the widespread feeling of environmental injustice comes from
the Grassroots organizations which grew in response to the problems. In ad-
dition to the Northeast Community Action Group, which started to prevent
the Southwestern Waste Management Corporation’s landfill in 1979 new orga-
nizations began in response to both local problems and the feelings which fed
from the legal actions and research.254 These organizations championed local
250Pellow, p. 42.
251Walker.
252Winant, Howard The World is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War II.
New York: Basic Books, 2001, p. 305, from Pellow, p. 42
253Mohai/Bryant.
254Bowen cites examples extending back into the early 1970s, including a note that the
President’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) brought up the issue of distributional
equity and socioeconomic ties in 1971. Bowen Environmental Justice through research-based
decision making, p. 7. See too The Mothers of East Los Angeles, founded in 1979, the People
for Community Recovery was founded in 1984 in Chicago, founded in the Altgeld Gardens
housing. See Boerner/Lambert, p. 62–63, Bullard The Quest for Environmental Justice,
p. 19; also Hill Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice, p. 76-79. Note also
the seminal Piven, Frances Fox/Cloward, Richard A. Poor People’s Movements: Why They
Succeed, How They Fail. Pantheon Books, 1977, and West Harlem Environmental Action
(WHEACT). Some recent treatments on the grassroots movement and continued application
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environmental causes at a time when the mainstream environmental groups
were focused more on nature and wildlife preservation.255 These are the first
branches of the environmental justice-grassroots movement, following on the
similar grassroots outcry which arguably gave birth to US-environmentalism
following Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.256 More to the point, these groups
grew because it was being recognized that minorities, and in particular, blacks,
had been left out of the mainstream environmentalist movement that began
in the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s.257
The need to create new organizations at a time when environmentalism
was already sweeping the United States is notable in and of itself. If showing
patterns of inequitable environmental distributions was not enough to motivate
the urban populace, showing that no one was doing anything about them
certainly did. The incomplete project of civil rights in the U.S. certainly left
substrate which could catalyze a movement. The more examples which came
to light, such as landfill siting cases, minorities exposed to more pollutants in
their jobs, and lack of action to complaints, the more the patterns viewed in
summation took on racist tones.258
can be found in Checker, Melissa Polluted Promises. New York University Press, 2005, with
relation to Hyde Park , in the state of Georgia. Further Sze, Julie Noxious New York. MIT
Press, 2007, discussing locations inside New York City.
255For a discussion of this and other theoretical reasons—including empirical support—
why the early environmental movement neither caught the attention of nor actively recruited
black participants see Taylor, D. E. Blacks and the environment: Toward an explanation
of the concern and action gap between blacks and whites. Environment and Behavior , 21
1989. Also Bullard/Wright; Mohai/Bryant; Baugh. Notably, a 1971 Sierra Club member
survey which asked if “the Club should concern itself with the conservation problems of
such special groups as the urban poor and ethnic minorities?” Fifty-eight percent of the
club was opposed or strongly opposed to the idea. Cole, Luke W. Empowerment as the Key
to Environmental Protection. Ecology Law Quarterly, 19 1992, p. 19
256Carson, Rachel Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962 (2002), p. xviii, Preface
by Linda Lear
257As Joan Martinez-Alier points out, environmental justice is a third current of environ-
mentalism which
“is not a sacred reverence for Nature [preservation] but a material interest in
the environment as source and a requirement for livelihood; not so much a
concern with the rights of other species and of future generations of humans
[conservation] as concern for today’s poor humans. It has not the same ethical
(and aesthetic) foundations of the cult of wilderness. Its ethics derive from a
demand for contemporary social justice among humans.”Martinez-Alier, p. 11
258Baugh, p.187-88 Also noted in the literature were the contemporaneous Love Canal
and Time Beach environmental scandals, which exposed the lax practices of corporations in
their hazardous waste disposals and brought the widespread problem to popular concern.
The two cases are notable in U.S. environmental history as playing a large role in the
creation of CERCLA, or Superfund, legislation. Although neither of the two sites are cited
as discriminatory incidences, the U.S. government’s response to these was contrasted with
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It was in the 1990s then when the movement had generated enough research
in a similar vein and with related conclusions to codify its goal of changing the
distributions of environmental quality. But the codification under the grass-
roots organization-rubric brought not only energy but forced a phase-change,
moving beyond a narrow focus on the environment to include the problems
inherent in changing the environmental distributions. This includes political
dynamics, the legal loopholes or high-hurdles discussed above, and in gen-
eral instances where any group could arguably be said to be lacking in power
and influence relative to the spheres with which they were concerned.259 The
broader focus brought more political notice260, and corporate involvement.261
The environmental justice movement was off and running with a focus on re-
moving the environmental burdens which so often were thrust upon a segment
of U.S. society least able to deal with them.
3.6 Europe and Distributed Environs
With the place of environmental justice inquiry seemingly cemented in the
U.S., the reader may be wondering what the state of environmental justice is in
Europe. First and foremost, and while there are parallels to the U.S. literature,
the European take on environmental justice has been much more focused on the
social aspect as opposed to the racial aspects.262 The environmental justice
discourse within Europe—separate from the EHR discussion in the ECtHR
discussed in Chapter 4—also takes a top-down approach to change, in contrast
to the grassroots organization of the U.S.263
its arguably less speedy response to similar cases in minority and poor cases. See Bullard/
Wright, p. 75-78
259Cutter.
260By the mid 1990s twelve US States had environmental equity bills passed. Oakes,
John Michael/Anderton, Douglas L./Anderson, Andy B. A Longitudinal Analysis of Envi-
ronmental Equity in Communities with Hazardous Waste Facilities. Social Science Research,
25 1998, Nr. 2
261Bowen Environmental Justice through research-based decision making, p. 8.
262Elvers/Gross/Heinrichs.
263Ibid., p. 841; Agyeman, Julian/Evans, Bob ‘Just sustainability:’ the emerging discourse
of environmental justice in Britian? The Geographical Journal , 170 June 2004, Nr. 2, p. 155.
Note however grassroots environmental action in the Netherlands. Leroy, Pieter/Nelissen,
Nico Social and Political Sciences of the Environment: Three decades of research in the
Netherlands. International Books, 1999; giving a brief overview of the Dutch environmental
movement in general from a social mobilization perspective. Also see the contemporaneous,
although perhaps unlikely at the time to have been inspired by the U.S. environmental
justice movement, example of a social movement to prevent poor or uniformed siting as
in Krasnodar, southwest Russia, where activists caused the cancelation of a power plant.
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It should be no surprise given our discussion of the economics of environmen-
tal distributions that one finds distributions of environmental goods skewed
toward the hypothesis of environmental inequity on other continents as well.
The outcome in the U.S. after all did not turn on any special aspects of their
economic or political systems.264 After all, the predictions rely only on shared
market economics for assumptions, and therefore should play out similarly
in related countries. There are, of course, differences too. Consider for in-
stance how economic activity in Europe is less concentrated geographically
than in the US.265 The lower concentration in Europe also comes, perhaps
counter intuitively, with larger differences in incomes across European regions
than across US States. The patterns are not identical, but can be explained
with the same concepts. Globalization, standardization, and the European
Common Market all help to bridge the conclusions on distributions detailed
above to the European setting. They also help to bring environmental justice
concerns across too.
Indeed, studies have found evidence of environmental inequity in France,
Canada, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, the Netherlands, Eastern
Europe, and South Africa.266 As the market mechanisms detailed above, how-
Keller, Bill Soviet Scraps a New Atomic Plant in Face of Protest Over Chernobyl. New York
Times January, 28 1988
264For measurements in countries as politically different as Sweden supporting a regres-
sive distribution of environmental quality, see Hökby, Stina/Söderqvist, Tore Elasticities of
Demand and Willingness to Pay for Environmental Services in Sweden. Environmental and
Resource Economics, 26 2003
265Puga, p. 375; Approximately one-half of the US’s industrial employment is concentrated
in just 14 States. Further, these 14 States cover only 13% of the US’s surface area with about
1/5th of the population. As contrast, by the turn of the millennia, income differences across
member states in the EU had fallen, but disparity within states, that is, between national
regions, rose. ibid., p. 374,376
266cf. Laurian; citing studies by inter alia: Arcioni, Elisa/Mitchell, Glenn Environmental
Justice in Australia. Environmental Politics, 14 2005, Nr. 3; Köckler, Heike Coping Strate-
gies of Households Exposed to Unequal Environmental Quality in Germany. In Paper for
the 4th Global Conference Environmental Justice and Global Citizenship: Environments,
Sustainability and Technology. Oxford, July 2005; Buzzelli, Michael et al. Spatio-temporal
Perspectives on Air Pollution and Environmental Justice in Hamilton, Canada 1985-1996.
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 93 2003, Nr. 3; Pearce/Kingham/
Zawar-Reza; Agyeman/Evans; Lloyd-Smith, M E/Bell, L Toxic disputes and the rise of
environmental justice in Australia. International Journal of Occupational Health, 9 2003;
Kruize, Hanneke/Bouwman, Arno The Distribution of Benefits and Costs of Environmental
Policies: A Case Study on the Distribution of Environmental Impacts in the Rijnmond Re-
gion, the Netherlands. Utrecht, 2003 – Technical report; Varga, Csaba/Kiss, István/Ember,
István The Lack of Environmental Justice in Central and Eastern Europe. Environmental
Health Perspectives, 110 November 2002, Nr. 11; Mitchell, Gordon/Dorling, Danny An en-
vironmental justice analysis of British air quality. Environment and Planning A, 35 May
2003, Nr. 5; McDonald, David A. Environmental Justice in South Africa. Ohio University
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ever, can be assumed to operate the same across the Atlantic, at least in the
broad strokes with which we will paint the European economic landscape, and
the further the studies cited come to the same conclusions that are painting a
picture of a tilted-burden world, we can focus on just a few examples.
The decreased less emphasis on bottom-up economic mechanisms to curb
or control environmental pollution in Europe though deserves some mention.
Because of the commercially connected, but as of yet politically decentral-
ized continent, less policy can be implemented at regional levels. This has to
do with the complexity of incorporating fiscally neutral environmental policies
into the European Union.267 Economic policies attack environmental problems
through taxes, subsidies, and tradable permits. Implementation of any of these
“involve questions of both national and [European] Community Law.”268 Na-
tional legislatures cannot impose their own desired taxation or other push/pull
mechanisms to achieve desired environmental goals as they invariably impact
trade and the single market. And despite the Danish Bottles judgment,269
which allows certain limited derogation of the zero trade barriers for environ-
mental protection, the allowances are still very low. So low, in fact, that even
arguably very environmentally beneficial programs such as the German volun-
tary scheme of common packaged good recycling are scrutinized and not free
from the possibility of being closed out by the ECJ.270 As the single market
is the foundation of the collective Europe which we focus on in this study, we
cannot delve into the intricacies of the European Union’s environmental law.
But that is not required for this chapter to make its point. The free move-
ment of goods allows, at least at this level of abstraction, to connect with the
knowledge that economic activities will tend to cluster or agglomerate, with
all the potential concomitant environmental justice problems.
Despite the parallel concerns, the flood of research which took place in the
United States from 1984 through the 1990s did not find as captive or debate-
ready an audience in Europe interested in repeating the studies. There were
some, however, which pointed in the same direction. The UK’s Environment
Press, 2002
267Bothe, Michael; Bosselmann, Klaus/Richardson, Benjamin J., editors Chap. Economic
Instruments for Environmental Protection: Introduction to the European Experience In
Environmental Justice and Market Mechanisms. Kluwer International, 1999. Note at the
time this paper was written this was the European Community, now, after the ratification
of the Treaty of Lisbon, under the title of the European Union.
268Ibid., p. 253.




Agency conducted correlation studies of social status and landfill sites.271 In
France, Laurian found a simple but high correlation between population and
waste disposal sites relative to least populated towns.272 Similar outcomes
exist for the towns with the largest proportions of residents born abroad,
although France does not collect statistics based on ethnicity as the U.S. does.
Therefore, breakdowns other than country of origin are often impossible.273
It appears though that instead of aiming to repeat the research pathways
attempted in the American literature, different entities in Europe sought to
incorporate the concept of environmental justice into their existing agendas.274
For example, in the UK, we see a tight connection between the philosophy of
environmental justice and the emerging policies of sustainability.275 A con-
nection between various philosophies of “equity” and sustainability has found
growing support in international documents as well,276 moving directly from
environmental justice’s roots to its newer expanded version277 and skipping
over some of the empirical debates.
In Germany, there is a growing core of research linking the empirical sci-
ences of epidemiology and the demographics of risk via environmental expo-
sure and the philosophy of environmental justice,278 in addition to the equally
271See Environment Agency. 2002. The Urban Environment in England and Wales: a
Detailed Assessment. Environment Agency. Bristol.
272Laurian.
273See Bleich Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the
1960s.
274Elvers/Gross/Heinrichs; Agyeman, Julian Environmental Justice: From the Margins
to the Mainstream. Town and Country Planning Association, 2000
275Inter alia Walker, Gordon/Bulkeley, Harriet Geographies of en-
vironmental justice. GeoForum, 37 2006 and the Institute for Envi-
ronment, Sustainability and Regeneration at Staffordshire University,
http://www.staffs.ac.uk/schools/sciences/geography/links/IESR/home.htm. Also see
Chalmers, Helen Policy Profile: Addressing Environmental Inequalities through UK
Research and Policy. European Environment , 15 2005; Agyeman/Evans; and Ruhl, J B The
Seven Degrees of Relevance: Why Should Real-World Environmental Attorneys Care Now
About Sustainable Development Policy? Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’Y F. 8 1998 for a general
note on how sustainable development bleeds into environmental justice literature, and vice
versa.
276See, Commission of the European Communities (CEC) 2001. A Sustainable Europe for
a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development, Communication
from the Commission (2001), Brussels.
277I.e. Holifield/Porter/Walker
278See, inter alia, Elvers/Gross/Heinrichs; Kohlhuber, Martina et al. Social inequal-
ity in perceived environmental exposures in relation to housing conditions in Ger-
many. Environmental Research, 101 2006; Kuckartz, Udo/Rheingans-Hans, Anke Trends
im Umweltbewusstsein. VS Verlag, 2006;Kunst, Anoton E. et al. Trends in socioeco-
nomic inequalities in self-assessed health in 10 European countries. International Jour-
nal of Epidemiology, 34 2005; Bolte, Gabriele/Mielck, Andreas Umweltgerechtigkeit.
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important issue of whether environmental protection measures are financed
disproportionately by different social groups, contributing inequitable finan-
cial burdens to those who already statistically more likely to be bearing the
environmental burden itself.279 The German literature still lags behind the
more developed UK literature though,280 and other country’s works tail off
behind the two leaders.
But the recent move toward “sustainability” or health dialogues across coun-
tries does not by any means exclude what could be called “traditional” envi-
ronmental justice conversations. In fact, some commentators have suggested
that “[g]iven the problems in defining sustainability, and the lack of targets
for resource consumption reductions in developed countries. . . [environmental
justice] provides an alternative discourse. . . ”281 The quote summarizes the
feeling, illustrated at longer lengths with the U.S. literature, that focusing on
the environmental criteria quickly leads to substantial roadblocks. Getting
members of the still-young European Union to agree to targets on sustain-
ability or reductions in use will not be easy; and that is not only a matter of
political will. The grounding of the single market in the Union creates a mine-
field for environmental policy. But if it is truly environmental betterment that
the Community desires, it may be achievable through environmental justice
criteria, instead of environmental regulation.
It is though the absent of examples in the European context which echo
the American undertones of racism that must be noted. Whether explicitly
stated282 or not, the topic of environmental injustice or the phenomenon lead-
Die soziale Verteilung von Umweltbelastungen. Juventa, 2004; Maschewsky, Werner
Umweltgerechtigkeit-Gesundheitsrelevenz und empirische Erfassung. Hamburg, 2004 – Tech-
nical report. For for Europe-wide discussion on health inequality Kunst et al.. See also
early notes on the interaction between environment and society, illustrating early concerns
in the topic, in the Netherlands discussed by Tellegen, Egbert/Wolsink, Maarten Milieu
en samenleving: een sociologische inleiding. Leiden, 1992. For broader references on the
growth of interdisciplinary literature between social, political, and environmental sciences
in the Netherlands see Leroy/Nelissen. Also see comments on central and eastern Euro-
pean health/environment linkages in Hertzman, C. Environment and Health in Central and
Eastern Europea. World Bank, 1995.
279Kloepfer, Micheal Umweltgerechtigkeit. Environmental Justice in der deutschen Recht-
sordnung. 1st edition. Duncker & Humblot, 2006.
280Elvers/Gross/Heinrichs, p. 841.
281Quoted in Todd, Helen/Zografos, Christos Justice for the Environment: Developing a
Set of Indicators of Environmental Justice for Scotland. Environmental Values, 14 Novem-
ber 2005, Nr. 4, p. 485, paraphrasing from conclusions of Eurig Scandrett. Specifically,
Scandrett, Eurig Community Work, Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice.
Scottish Journal of Commnity Work and Development , 6 2000
282As in Kloepfer, p. 21, noting the difference between American and German literature
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ing up to an instance of injustice, is not examined as a potential piece of a racial
trend in environmental decision-making.283 Where racism is a problem—as
against the Roma284—it is often directed at their way of life, which is a mi-
nority opinion on how to live.285 As such, discrimination issues in Europe
can emerge as situation of “traditional” minorities, in addition to “recent”
minorities like immigrants.286 The focus on immigration issues and ways of
life though give the topic of “discrimination” in Europe a far different feel
than the history of racism gives to discussions of discrimination in the U.S.
The focus in Europe can therefore largely be classified as centered on social
class.287
It is perhaps indicative of the difference in situations that even in the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, perhaps the most developed Human
Rights system in the world288, there is only one reference to “minorities”; Ar-
ticle 14.289 This article binds States to provide the rights contained in the rest
of the Convention regardless of categories of association, such as race, religion,
or “association with a national minority.”290 This protection, guaranteed in
such a tremendous instrument, is quite reminiscent of the U.S. legal framework
in the Equal Protection Clause.
Despite this uniting thread though there is far less common focus in the
European environmental justice literature. That is not, however, to say that
and examples
283Kruize (p. 139,2007) notes this and the parallel US-based grassroots movement are
absent in the Netherlands. Compare Leroy/Nelissen, who give a brief overview of the Dutch
environmental movement from a social mobilization perspective.
284The Roma are a notable exception to the lack of racist overtones in Europe. See the
European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) .
285The ECtHR does take into consideration that persons differently situated have a right
to be treated differently in the protection of their rights. Note Thlimmenos v. Greece
application no. 34369/97 judgment of 6 April 2000 and discussions below.
286Åkermark, Sia Spiliopoulou The Limits of Pluralism–Recent Jurisprudence of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights with Regard to Minorities: Does the Prohibition of Discrim-
ination Add Anything? Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 3 2002,
p. 8.
287Elvers/Gross/Heinrichs, p. 840. Again, see also the equally important issue of whether
environmental protection measures are financed disproportionately by different social groups,
contributing inequitable financial burdens to those who already statistically more likely to
be bearing the environmental burden itself, similar to Lavelle and Coyle in Kloepfer.
288Gomien, Donna/Harris, David/Zwaak, Leo Law and practice of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and the European Social Charter. Council of Europe Publishing,
1996, p. 18.
289Åkermark, p. 1.
290Article 14, ECHR. See also the similar protection afforded in Article 1 of Protocol 12,
and the treatment of aliens and nationals as separate groups in Article 16, and discussions
in Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 357
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the European literature is somehow less coherent than the American. The
multitude of viewpoints present in the rest of the world on what “environmen-
tal justice” means, however, “underscores a decentering of the United States
as the geographical core of environmental justice. . . ”.291
Knowing that examples of environmental justice struggles across the At-
lantic exist, and parallels in environmental justice literature exist, certainly
supports the claim that similar economics drive similar environmental inequal-
ity concerns. One then needs to connect the distribution dynamics to a connec-
tion with a minority grouping. Consider statistics from the UK where one sees
how the poor are twice as likely to live near polluting factories, and thereby are
exposed to the worst air quality and most particulate matter in the UK.292 In
fact, the locales which house the most deprived 10% of the population there
are five times as many sites and seven times as many emission sources.293.
Such statistics are the hallmark of environmental injustice, the linkages that
take predictions of distributed environs and connect them to a minority, just as
demonstrated in the U.S. The following recent study, conducted in the Nether-
lands, helps to situate the European situation comfortably next to the picture
derived of the U.S.
3.6.1 Disproportions in the Netherlands
Recent studies in the Netherlands have questioned how Dutch policy and cul-
ture in general have distributed environmental goods and bads among the
populace. Similar to the U.S., the results do not lend to hard conclusions.
They do, however, fail to speak against negative distributions. For even the
most favorable study, where Coenen and Halfacre294 did not find appreciable
differences in the presence of polluting industries or noise levels among low-
income locations and minorities, there was evidence of procedural inequity in
that there was an “unequal distribution of measures on noise reduction, soil
sanitation, and difference in maintenance and punishment for environmental
contraventions.”295
291Pellow, p. 79. As to widening viewpoints, written from a European perspective see
Walker.
292Madden, Peter Escape from pollutionville. The Guardian, Society January 14 2004.
293Chalmers.
294Coenen, F. D./Halfacre, A. De verdeling van milieueffecten en milieurisico’s over de





Similarly, Walda296 found an equal exposure to high noise levels across socio-
economic strata in the Rotterdam area. On the inequitable side, higher classes
did live more frequently in quiet areas, implying that while the environmental
“bad” of high noise levels was relatively equally distributed, environmental
“goods” could cluster around more well off citizens. On the official front,
the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM)297,
found that older neighborhoods are often correlated with low-incomes, and
also found that these areas were indeed built more densely and were more
frequently found in areas near major roads where air-quality standards are
exceeded, along with the noise levels that come with such pollution.298
Hanneke Kruize’s299 dissertation and publications stemming therefrom though
has the most current and detailed pictures of environmental distributions in
the Netherlands, and perhaps for all of Europe. Most notably, she incorporates
in addition to environmental bads measures of access to environmental goods.
The approach—as noted in other Dutch studies like Walda300 and also in work
in the UK301—allows for not only a picture of the distribution of burdens but
the possibility of offsetting factors in environmental goods. In that sense, the
picture contains more scope for revealing individual choice in environmental
matters and hints at subjective perspectives on quality, as well as offering more
parallels with geographical economics where push and pull dynamics can offset
each other in the utility of consumers and producers.
The newness of measuring “goods” along with “bads” in the environmental
justice canon is evident in the simple fact that there is no legal standards for
access to green/clean areas as there are for protection against levels of certain
pollutants. Kruize uses a rough measure contained in another Dutch study of
75 square meters per inhabitant within 500 m (a 5 minute walk) as the thresh-
old for access to green space.302 Such an inclusions is no doubt required for the
296Walda, I Bestaat er een verband tussen sociaal-economische status en blootstelling aan
omgevingslawaai? Geluid , 2 2002.
297in Dutch: Het Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu
298RIVM Milieubalans 2001-Het Nederlandse milieu verklaard. Kluwer, Alphen a/d Rijn,




302Kruize, p. 44 and for discussion on the measurement Middelkoop, M van/Bruls, E J/
Golen, A J van Rood en groen in balans: verkenning van groene normen en alternatieve be-
naderingen. Foundation on Recreation, Knowledge and Innovation Centre, 2001. See, alsofor
a discussion on the evolution of some standards, such as the broad rule of thumb “10 acres
of recreation space per 1,000 population. . . ” Ammons, David N Municipal Benchmarks:
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future of investigation of environmental distributions. Kruize303 discusses the
anecdote that the spatial pressure in the Rijnmond region forced construction
along the river itself. But the housing construction there has been of the more
pricey variety. Despite the larger risks and the noise, it is a apparently a nice
place to live—tradeoffs between perceived quality and actual quality exist and
must be discussed, although research likely must delve into exposure and risk
calculations lest they run afoul of moral critiques of allowing “environmental
mercenaries.”
In the Netherlands as a whole, Kruize finds that low incomes do tend to live
in slightly worse environments than higher incomes. Furthermore, green space
trends with income and highest incomes have access to twice as much green
space as minimum incomes. Further, where legal standards are exceeded, it is
most often the lower incomes who are worse off,304 a fact reminding European
readers of Lavelle and Coyle’s critique of environmental enforcement.305 The
outcome is less surprising, even given the detailed economics introduction in
this chapter, given the ignorance of policy makers to the possibility. In inter-
views with policy makers around the Rijnmond (Rotterdam harbor and the
surrounding river areas) Kruize306 found that
“[m]ost of the informants had never actually thought about how en-
vironmental quality was distributed among socio-economic groups.
Nor do environmental policy documents relating to the Rijnmond
region make this distinction. [. . . ] Policy is geared to the reduction
of human exposure to environmental pollutants, especially at lev-
els above the legal standards. It’s focus is thus on environmental
quality in general rather than on specific subpopulations.”
If people are unaware of the possibility, how would one expect the problem to
be fixed?
Assessing local performance and Establishing Community Service Standards. 2nd edition.
Sage, 2001, p. 254-55, Chap. 19. For economic approximations of demand for open space,
note Bates, Laurie J./Santerre, Rexford E. The Public Demand for Open Space: The Case
of Connecticut Communities. Journal of Urban Economics, 50 July 2001, Nr. 1
303Kruize, p. 76.
304Ibid., p. 54-56.
305Section 3.5.3 For comments on delays in European enforcement, see Hedermann-
Robinson, Martin Article 228(2) EC and the Enforcement of EC Environmental Law: A
Case of Environmental Justice Delayed and Denied? An analysis of Recent Legal Develop-




An important conclusion from this study is that it’s rarely the environmental
conditions that are the make-or-break decision for whether to move in or out
of an area.307 Environmental issues do not always—that is, one cannot sup-
port the assumption a priori that environmental pollution necessarily pushes
individuals from an area—form a push factor. From the Dutch instances, note
the correlation in areas between high incomes and noise pollution. The impli-
cation is that there are tradeoffs being created: environmental benefits are or
can be traded for other benefits–location near roads or rail lines for benefit of
transportation, perhaps.308
Another conclusions is that there does not appear to be a greater pressure
toward inequitable distributions as one increases spatial pressure. Kruize309
found that differences between socio-economic categories did not increase in
regions with high spatial pressure, such as the Amsterdam Airport area and
the greater Rotterdam city area. Here, both actual and perceived environmen-
tal quality was lower than the perceptions in the Netherlands as a whole, but
the already-established clustering did not serve as a fulcrum enabling greater
dispersion of environmental benefits away from the poor and toward the rich.
Moreover, and perhaps most applaudable, even though lower incomes did have
overall a greater exposure to various environmental bads than higher incomes,
there was not significant evidence of accumulation of bads. That is, even in
an area which did not achieve the legal standard for one measured pollutant,
it did not simultaneously suffer under other environmental burdens. Of the
measures included in the study, only 1% of Dutch homes were exposed to mul-
tiple “bads.”310 This is starkly contrasted with the case in the U.S., where
the (EPA) has been strongly criticized for their failure to take into account
aggregative risks in their permitting and standard-setting practices, leading to
greater health concerns.311 Even in the Rijnmond area, where the relative ac-
cumulation was the highest, it did not display a relationship with income. An
307Kruize, p. 79.
308It might interest the reader, especially the North American reader, to note that most
rail lines in the EU are for commuter traffic. A mere 8% of goods transport occurs over
traditional rail lines in the EU. In contrast, 40% (as measured by tons per kilometre) of
transport goods go by rail in the US. Thus, when one discusses rail noise in Europe, there is
higher probability that these are people transports, and not the heavily laden (and possibly
diesel) locomotives. See Puga, p. 395.
309Kruize, p. 126.
310Ibid., p. 136.
311Lazarus, Richard/Tai, Stephanie Integrating Environmental Justice into EPA permit-
ting authority. Ecology L.Q. 26 1999.
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interesting side note to the Rijnmond story is that it is successfully decreased
industrial emissions although industrial production has increased.312 The req-
uisite levels of air quality are impacted most not by industrial emissions but
by traffic.
Kruize attributes the outcome to two potential explanations: the Dutch
egalitarian mindset, and the overarching policy focus and goal of a better
overall quality environment in the country as a whole. Of course, these are ex-
posure measures and are not necessarily directly connected to risks and health
outcomes. We know that lower pollution levels should be better for the human
condition, but the tradeoffs between costs and benefits need more investigation
through biologic and epidemiological studies for policy to be optimal and ef-
fective. Further, perceptions-measures, as used in this study, of environmental
quality are not always aligned with reality, and therefore cannot be used as
a “hard” proxy for exposure. Kruize313 notes that although good air quality
is perceived accurately to be good air most by high-income brackets, other
categories of quality do not show a tight recognition-trend with income.
As public policy stands now in a position to retreat—both potentially in the
Netherlands,314 as sentiment moves away from egalitarian policy and toward
libertarian, and already present in other developed countries such as the U.S.—
we leave more room for the market. Policy lets go of the reins and relinquishes
the outcomes to the choices of, among others, developers, industrialists, and in
general private parties. Understanding the outcome is a function of the market,
and must be understood before one discusses policy to change or retroact the
outcome, and certainly before one dicusses questions of what ought to be.
And although Kruize315 found little in the Netherlands to indicate a pressing
social problem from the limited differences in environmental quality between
income brackets, we know that socio-economic “bads”—such as crime etc.—
can accumulate in lower economic classes just as the potential for enviromental
bads.316 The picture we see when discussing the environmental quality is only
one aspect of the distribution.
The important fact is to take note—explicitly—of the tradeoffs. The envi-








unevenly in the U.S. That lumpiness can have a multitude of impacts and the
variety and magnitude of which can be investigated, again, like the U.S., in
studies such as Kruize’s.317 The tilted environment can unfortunately still be
most burdensome on classes of people least able to deal with them, even when
magnitudes and lack of burden-agglomeration do not generate much cause for
concern. That is, even the relatively ambiguous results of the Dutch studies
do not show a tendency away from the injustices which brought environmental
justice to the forefront of concern in the U.S. There can be multiple intervening
factors which keep empirical studies from finding large reasons for concern, but
as multiple equilibria are to be expected in economic geography models;318 the
observed is potentially one of several outcomes. With economics still tilting
the environmental playing field, there needs to be some mechanism in place,
in both the similar economies and environmental policies of Europe and the
U.S., to protect against the environmental justice-outcome.
And this is exactly the type of problem that is best structured inside open
debate, with access to legal scaffolding to structure the conversation. Until
geographical economics or other policy work can adequately predict spatial
outcomes and the impact of policy and changes on that outcome, a safeguard is
called for. The demonstrable fact that the concerns of the U.S. environmental
justice movement are reflected in Europe only strengthens the conclusion that
to address the problem, one must work at the highest levels of policy.
3.7 Conclusions
The goal of this chapter was to illustrate the proclivity of economic systems
toward, rather than away from, environmental equity. And while the environ-
mental justice literature, read as a search for empirical verification of unjust
environs around racial and socioeconomic groupings leads to several as-yet un-
corrected criticisms, it does not lend any semblance of hope that a minority
section of society will be able to avoid becoming the recipients of burdens.
Society clusters its pollution, impacting a minority of the population to the
benefit of a majority. This outcome, combined with the previous chapter’s dis-
cussion of the democratic shortcomings which conspire to hamper a minority





need some help along the way.
This chapter presented only the core cases which launched the environmen-
tal justice movement, and expanded those with the precedents, economics,
and legal history which contributed to them. There are many reference works
available on the history of environmental justice in the United States which
can expand on the foundations here.319 The analysis here falls within the
same lines as Bowen laid out when he reviewed the empirical literature of en-
vironmental justice nearly a decade ago; research cannot go forward on the
belief that a large body of work establishes that well-defined, and indeed,
mainly racially-defined minorities are disproportionately exposed to environ-
mental hazards.320 A far more defensible position, relative to “traditional
environmental justice,” is that
“[a] fairly small and largely heterogeneous body of research hints
or perhaps even indicated (but by no means demonstrates) that
in some specific areas, some ostensibly identifiable groups in the
population may in some instances live closer to some selected en-
vironmental hazards.321”
There is a cogent and constructive body of criticism, including Bowen’s work,
unfortunately remains largely unapplied while it should be read and under-
stood by all embarking on empirical investigations of environmental burdens.322
But it serves also as a summary of the reasons why the research to follow does
not attempt to measure the incidence of environmental injustices or to define
the spatial groupings which might cement measurement and definitions. Nor
does it attempt to base new regulations or laws on any of the established em-
pirical results, proceeding to defend or shore up any of their flaws. Instead, it
moves decidedly and deliberately into a human rights agenda.
The weak view of “traditional” environmental justice literature does not
slow the momentum toward an environmental-style human right. The chorus
of criticism rests on weaknesses in pinning down a relationship between specific
319References such as Schlosberg, David Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Move-
ments, and Nature. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007; Bullard The Quest for Envi-
ronmental Justice; Gerrard, Michael B./Foster, Sheila R., editors The Law of Environmental
Justice. 2nd edition. American Bar Association, 2008; Foreman Jr.; provide ample room to
begin.
320Bowen Environmental Justice through research-based decision making, p. 179.
321Ibid.
322Other prominent works include Liu; Davy.
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groups and polluted environs. The work at hand takes that criticism to heart
and finds the least contentious—and hence most supported—aspect of the tra-
ditional canon. That is, society must worry about a minority of its populace, a
probable numerical minority whose voice will have trouble reaching the surface
when and where their exposure to extra pollution occurs. This chapter needed
only show the proclivity and back that up with empirical possibilities.
Nevertheless, the preceding analysis is necessary and prudent to establish
lest the transition to human rights discourse seem arbitrary and biased, de-
riving itself from the emotional sense rather than the economic reality. One
can of course conjure a human right for any perceived injustice in the world,
of which there remain many. But there are abundant reasons for not reach-
ing to that legal level unless necessary.323 This chapter, and that preceding,
gives the rationale why the environmental justice problem does ascend. At a
minimum, it presents a reason external to advocacy for the jump into human
rights territory.
The meta-conclusion of a survey of the environmental justice literature, both
in the U.S. and in Europe and across disciplines from economics to law to so-
ciology, must be then that there is substantial evidence of a concern among
an under-served population within the electorate who have little or no legal
protection nor legal remedy for their concerns.324 Those concerns are driven
by economic dynamics and therefore forces the analysis of the problems at
a democratic level, a location where the spontaneous order created by the
market can be checked. The law is not protecting a minority at the implicit
behest of the majority, tilting the cost/benefit analysis toward those expect-
ing benefits devoid of localized costs. To bring the costs to the majority, the
minority has expended time and effort into utilizing existing methods ranging
from civil rights litigation, asserting procedural rights, and creative usage of
environmental regulation provisions. Their work thus far has come to little
or no avail. The current situation forces the question of whether the system
is functioning properly and whether the system has, intentionally or uninten-
tionally, circumscribed justice. How then do we bring about environmental
justice?
323Alston, Philip Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal For Quality Control.
American Journal of International Law , 78 1984.
324This is the outcry that Davy describes as the failure of the doctrine of efficiency in
settling pollution siting questions. Davy
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4 Human Rights and
Environmental Protection: The
European Experience
If the misery of our poor be
caused not by the laws of nature,
but by our institutions, great is
our sin.
Charles Darwin
The previous chapters laid out the profound and confounding issues of en-
vironmental justice. The existing environmental justice research, and the now
expanding work in sociology, political economy, and economics, show that
there is no reason to expect the environment not to be tilted—potentially
painfully—toward a minority of the population. This is again not necessar-
ily the minority envisioned by “traditional” environmental justice—a racial
or socioeconomically defined class of people. Rather, the least contentious
aspects of theory predicts that environmental usage will cluster, bringing en-
vironmental degradation along with it and impacting a minority of the voting
population (Chapter 3). Being this numerical minority they will not necessar-
ily have recourse to stop the action, even with the potential for concomitant
health impacts acting as momentum for extra legal pathways (Chapter 2). At
worst, in cases where traditional environmental justice concerns are realized,
and this minority is also a racial or socioeconomic minority, the power dif-
ferential only becomes more burdensome and the glaring problem for modern
democracies which early work brought to the public conscience.
It is the twenty-plus years of environmental justice research which grants
evidence that such groupings do exist and find it an uphill battle to secure
healthy environs. The economic and statistical work supports this direction-
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ality, if not necessarily the magnitudes held up by the bulk of environmental
justice research. The point following and motivating rights-based discourse
flows from the fact that those affected have not been able to change their envi-
ronmental lot in life, either through regulation, the democratic process or legal
proceedings. Admittedly, the preceding discussion did not give evidence that
the tilt could not be toward a powerful or wealthy minority, but that would
not generate the concern, emotion, grassroots organization and democratic is-
sues and spirited legal discussion we see in the copious environmental justice
literature. Further, this work does not detail the parallel and ancillary role
that regulation could have in protecting against the environmental problems
labeled as injustices, the persistence of environmental justice problems them-
selves speaks to the point that they have not provided sufficient protection.1
Despite all intervening policy then environmental injustice remains a failing of
both democratic ideals and regulatory oversight, and one that is cemented in
economic dynamics.
One can certainly view this situation as reaching a moral transgression, as
much of the timbre of the literature would suggest. Then, we know that
“[p]rofound moral issues demand a profound response from the law,
and as we enter the twenty-first century, human rights is (at least at
a rhetorical level) the law’s best response to profound, unthinkable,
far-reaching moral transgression. More fundamentally, it is the
1That is not to say the conversation is not worth having, especially in moving toward
any explicit recognition of environmental rights or environmental justice rights within hu-
man rights (ECHR) or civil rights (US) canons. But for the work at hand, a comparison
would not yet add much to the conversation. Especially because there is less emphasis on
economic mechanisms to curb or control environmental pollution in Europe. Much of this
has to do with the complexity of incorporating fiscally neutral environmental policies into
the European Community. Implementation of any economaicly-tuned measures “involve[s]
questions of both national and [European] Community Law.” See, for discussion, Bothe,
Michael; Bosselmann, Klaus/Richardson, Benjamin J., editors Chap. Economic Instruments
for Environmental Protection: Introduction to the European Experience In Environmental
Justice and Market Mechanisms. Kluwer International, 1999, p. 253. National legislatures
cannot impose their own desired taxation or other push/pull mechanisms to achieve desired
environmental goals as they invariably impact trade and the single market. And despite the
Danish Bottles judgment, which allows certain limited derogation of the zero trade barriers
for environmental protection, the allowances are still very low. So low, in fact, that even
arguably very beneficial programs such as a German voluntary scheme of common packaged
good recycling are scrutinized and not free from the possibility of being closed out by the
ECJ. The U.S. however uses many more, and notably homogenized mechanisms including
the Clean Water Act2 (CWA), the Clean Air Act (CAA),3 and the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act4 (CERCLA, also known as Superfund)
among many others. Comparisons on the role regulations play for environmental justice
across continents would have to be tightly structured.
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law’s strongest condemnation of the exploitation of the weak by
the powerful.”5
As the preceding chapters show why the failings brings us to a level demanding
profound change, this chapter is tasked with describing that profound legal
response, and as such it stays within Sinden’s definition that “the core function
of human rights is to counteract gross imbalances of power in society. . . ”6
The idea of or hope for an environmental human right (EHR), variably
conceptualized as a right for all to a certain quality of environment (substan-
tive rights) or a collection of claims to information, participation, and justice
in decisions on the utilization of the environment (procedural rights), is not
entirely young.7 As far back as 1975, Anderson and Miller introduced the
swelling sense of a need for a fundamental environmental right as
“the inchoate sense that the ‘law’ should protect society against
ultimate threats to survival has caused the public to seek reassur-
ances that such a legal backstop does exist. The movement for an
environmental bill of rights is the public’s way of trying to cod-
ify a widespread public moral conviction (and not incidentally to
reassure it) that the law will, somewhere, draw a line which will
protect us all.”8
From the breadth and depth of the environmental justice research and move-
ment it is easy to conclude that the law has not thus far provided that back-
stop.9
5Sinden, Amy Climate Change and Human Rights. Journal of Land Resources and
Environmental Law , 27 2007, p. 257.
6Ibid., p. 4.
7See, for example Gormley, W. Paul Human Rights and Environment: The Need for
International Co-operation. A.W. Sijthoff, 1976. Also comments on an early Japanese move-
ment toward rights-based protection in Nito, Hajime; Husimi, Kodi, editor Chap. A Legal
Right to the Environment In Science for Better Environment Fundamental Rights and Envi-
ronmental Quality: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Human Environmental.
Pergamon Press, 1977. Also Anderson, Frederick R./Miller, Alan S.; Husimi, Kodi, editor
Chap. Fundamental Rights and Environmental Quality In Science for Better Environment
Fundamental Rights and Environmental Quality: Proceedings of the International Congress
on the Human Environmental. Pergamon Press, 1977 and notes therein.
8Ibid., p. 825, notes in original
9In the case in the U.S., one can even claim that the claims of environmental justice
have resulted in a dismantling of the backstops that did exist. See Gorod, Brianne J. The
Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency Power to Define Private Rights of
Action. Yale L. J. 113 2004; Note After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Administrative
Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement. Harv. L. Rev. 116 2003; Cody, Brendan South
Camden Citizens in Action: Siting Decisions, Disparate Impact Discrimination, and Section
1983. Ecology L.Q. 29 2002, all discussing the removal of standing on civl rights grounds.
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This research does not rely merely on public opinion to reach this level
though. Again, it is the universality of the evil demonstrated through Chapters
2 and 3 working against requisite minority protections of a modern democracy
which necessitates a rights-based legal mechanisms. The theory sits within
the larger liberal tradition touched on in Chapter 1. It is decidedly not some
universal characteristic of the right which causes its emergence. As Gray10
explains, cementing this introduction and chapter’s work with the liberal tra-
dition in the prologue,
[t]here can be no definitive list of human rights. Rights are no
theorems that fall of theories of law or ethics. They are judgments
about human interests whose content shifts over time as threats to
human interests change. When we ask what rights are universal, we
are not inquiring after a truth that exists already. We are asking a
question that demands a practical decision: Which human interests
warrant universal protection?
The distinction, while academic, is important to note at the outset in order
to justify the placement of the discussion. As in the previous chapter, one must
be careful to ask the right questions. Attempting to extricate an environmental
human right from either philosophic considerations or existing treatises on
human rights is a path well traveled.11 Coming at the issue of environmental
degradation via the environmental justice discourse however lends the different
perspective examined here, and notably avoids—or largely avoids—the larger
discussion for the time being.
After all, if the failures illustrated by environmental justice do demand a
rights-based approach for full redress, there is already much legitimate concern
in human rights (theory and practice) as to the creation of new rights,12 and
even the management of existing rights.13 The concern for environmental
10Gray, John Two Faces of Liberalism. The New Press, 2000, p. 113.
11See, inter alia, Kravchenko, Svitlana/Bonnie, John E Human Rights and The Environ-
ment: Cases, Law, and Policy. Carolina Academic Press, 2008; Hayward, Tim Constitu-
tional Environmental Rights. Oxford University Press, 2005; Hancock, Jan Environmental
Human Rights: Power, ethics and law. Ashgate, 2003; Anderson, Michael R.; Boyle, Alan/
Anderson, Michael, editors Chap. Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection:
An Overview In Human Righs Approaches to Environmental Protection. Clarendon, 1996
12Inter alia Alston, Philip Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal For Qual-
ity Control. American Journal of International Law , 78 1984. Also van Lanen, J.J.M.
Mensenrechten en milieubescherming: van een wankel evenwicht naar een sterk samenspel.
Nederlands Juristen Comité voor de Mensenrechten (NJCM), 24 Dec 1999, Nr. 8
13Notably, much concern on the role of Corporations or non-state entities in the human
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injustice in the preceding chapters warrants, at the very least, a discussion
about fundamental protection.
The goal of this chapter then is to first illustrate what protections at the
fundamental rights level can and do exist and what forms they take (Section
4.1), followed by a concrete illustration of the existing protection using the
established jurisprudence of the most advanced human rights instrument, the
European Convention on Human Rights (Section 4.2). There is some mixing
in the discussion of levels of law at this point. It is unarguable that the form
of environmental protection or derivation of auxiliary protection will depend
on the level of law at which it operates. As the goal of the research here is
a first attempt at identifying the existing protections within the context of
environmental justice, as opposed to the broader discussion of environmental
protection or conservation proper, a more precise analysis of what each level
means for the protection is left to later work. This is somewhat unfortunate
as it limits the conclusions allowable here though. The truncation though is
necessary for the scope of the project and the immediate needs of the literature.
Within those boundaries, the final section (Section 4.3) uses the theory and
the practice to summarize the protection which does exist at different levels in
the form of EHR and how that relates the protection needed by environmental
justice. The outcome is heartening for advocates, and lends towards the posi-
tive discussion of utilizing the rights-based direction for environmental justice
protection in general.14
4.1 Environmental and Human Rights
As there is currently no scheme in the world fully acknowledged as an “environ-
mental right,”15 research in this direction must explore the various categories
rights landscape. Alston, Philip; Idem, editor Chap. The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the
International Human Rights Regime Accomodate Non-State Actors? In Non-State Actors
and Human Rights. Oxford University Press, 2005; De Schutter, O; Alston, Philip, editor
Chap. The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European
Law In Non-State Actors and Human Rights. Oxford University Press, 2005 Also note
Osiatyński, Wiktor Human Rights and Their Limits. Cambridge University Press, 2009,
p. 43: “No international political mechanism exists capable of regulating the global economy
and imposing rules of conduct on multinational corporations outside their home countries.
Often, those of their activities that violate human rights wind up escaping the coercive
power of any given state. As a result, traditional mechanisms for the protection of rights
from abuse by private actors via instruments of national laws are inadequate.”
14Also in specific, as is discussed in Chapter 5
15But see African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 24 and p. 150
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within the literature on what an EHR should and could—and perhaps glim-
mers of what one already does—look like. The discussion helps significantly in
understanding the “derived and extracted” forms of environmental protection
one sees flowing from existing human rights, such as is discussed in Section
4.2. Naturally one must discuss some general points regarding human rights
to establish a common foundation. Perhaps most important for a discussion
of EHR is the differences between substantive and procedural rights, and the
aspects of negative and positive obligations contained in each.16 Most intro-
ductions to EHR reveal these partitions of rights discussions along categorical
grounds, including the substantive/procedural, negative/positive, and gener-
ations of rights. The partitions are generally overdone, however, and can be
minimized here for want of focusing specifically on EHR specifically rather
than HR generally.
Exploring the substantive and procedural aspect of fundamental rights is
important, as noted, in helping to illustrate how environmental rights already
exist in some forms in and between existing rights,17 while understanding
negative and positive obligations clarifies the duties placed on rights-givers as
participants in governance. Also important, especially for an understanding
of the ability of existing human rights protection to expand judicially in the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), is the history of major human
rights documents. A full discussion on EHR could easily fill volumes though.18
16See, for instance discussion in Turner, Stephen J. A Substantive Environmental Right:
An Examination of the Legal Obligations of Decision-Makers Toward the Environment.
Kluwer, 2009. Also for an introduction see Cameron, James/Mackenzie, Ruth; Boyle, Alan/
Anderson, Michael, editors Chap. Access to Environmental Justice and Procedural Rights
in International Institutions In Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection.
Clarendon, 1996
17Most notably, in the European context, Gomien, Donna Short Guide to the European
Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe, 2005; DeMerieux, Margaret Deriving
Environmental Rights from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. Oxford J Legal Studies, 21 2001, Nr. 3
18Excellent introductions are available in Janis, Mark W./Kay, Richard S./Bradley, An-
thony W. European Human Rights Law. 3rd edition. Oxford University Press, 2008;
Nickel, James Making Sense of Human Rights. 2nd edition. Wiley-Blackwell, 2007; Steiner,
Henry J./Alston, Philip International Human Rights In Context. 2nd edition. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2000, among others on human rights in general. More specific to environmental
topics though is the established introduction: Anderson, Michael/Boyle, Alan, editors Hu-
man Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection. Clarendon, 1996. For recent additions
and discussions, the see, inter alia, the books which collectively form a rough superset of the
information collected and analyzed herein: Turner; Kravchenko/Bonnie; Boyle, Alan Hu-
man Rights or Environmental Rights—A Reassessment. Fordham Envtl. L. Rev , 18 2007;
Hayward; Mowbray, Alastair The Development of Positive Obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights. Hart Publishing,
2004; Hancock; Déjeant-Pons, Maguelonne/Pallemaerts, Marc Human rights and the en-
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The introduction contained here is a bare minimum. The combination of
language and history introduced here, when coupled with the leading example
of the ECtHR, helps to illustrate why we do not yet have a codified right to the
environment,19 but nevertheless have been able to derived or extract certain
protections simply from the existence of other, non-environmental rights.
4.1.1 Negative and Positive Rights
While the division of rights into negative and positive categories can today
been seen as somewhat of a rhetorical rift, played out in political bargaining
in the bipolar zeitgeist of the Cold War, it remains a useful pedagogical break.
Granted, all fundamental rights share common characteristics, be they posi-
tive or negative rights. They all must be universal, definable in a justiciable
form, clearly define who bears duties because of the them and spell out what
institutions must be in place to carry out the guarantees.20 These criteria
place high hurdles on legal construction, if not also philosophical concerns, on
all claims of rights.
In practice, it is negative rights which clear such hurdles with more ease.
This is because negative rights are “freedom from” rights, predominately free-
dom from coercion.21 Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and rules con-
cerning the sanctity of human life fall into this category. They are rights which
exist without any further coaxing; they exist in the absence of coercion. Hence,
the “right” comes from tying the hands of those who would seek to infringe
these privileges.22 The duty-holder is bound simply to keep their hands out,
off, and away. Negative rights are rights that require prohibitions on those
with the potential to act on an individual.
Negative rights stand in contrast to positive rights, or “freedom to” rights.
These guarantee a positive right “to” a privilege. They are “positive” because
they require activity—above and beyond establishing agencies and working
vironment. Council of Europe Publishing, 2002; Handl, G; Eide, A/Krause, C/Rosas, A,
editors Chap. Human Rights and the Protection of the Environment In Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights. Kluwer, 2001; Steiner/Alston
19Also see Hancock; who argues that if existing human rights were properly enforced they
would necessarily cover the area outlined by a basic substantive EHR.
20Beetham, David What future for economic and social rights? Political Studies, 43 1995,
Nr. 4.
21Steiner/Alston.
22Also referred to as “abstentational requirements” cf. Gomien, Donna/Harris, David/
Zwaak, Leo Law and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Euro-
pean Social Charter. Council of Europe Publishing, 1996, p. 379.
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institutional structures—and not just hands off a particular area of individual
life. Examples include the right to work, the right to organize, and the right to
bargain collectively.23 The outlays or “positive” activities required are clear
in the case of the right to work; what steps does a government or other duty
holder have to take to discharge the duty for all to work? Must they go in to
debt to create public works projects when jobs are scarce? In the same sense,
a right “to” environmental quality might very well force the duty-holder to go
out and actively clean an environment, at their cost, which has fallen below the
metric set as “quality.” In that sense, positive duties can also create functional
limits on private conduct like negative rights, because foresight of the problem
can prevent action today.24 There is then less difference between the types of
rights as might be indicated at first glance.
Commentators have recognized this in noting that while environmental rights
are usually treated as “second generation” positive rights, their existence in
full form would be a functional negative right. More specifically, the positive
nature of the right though does not always imply a correlative positive duty.
Unlike the positive, goal-oriented, proposed rights to healthcare, work, educa-
tion, or welfare, which do not exist at all without creating them, a “natural”
environment is the de facto state of affairs. It is human involvement which by
in large is the culprit for changes there. Thus, the correlative duty of an EHR
is, in most case, a negative duty to refrain from interfering with the “natural”
order.25
The debate is both theoretically deep and tangible in practice. Hayward
notes that most modern constitutions have an explicit or implicit reflection of
the political/social, negative/positive rights dichotomy.
“The chief difference between the two sets of rights is that the for-
mer are taken to be directly justiciable individual rights whereas
the latter are normally interpreted more as manifestations of po-
litical programmes and are not necessarily directly enforceable by
courts.”26
23Articles 6, 7, 8. of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights. See below Section 4.1.3
24Here is a direction for further legal research in operationalizing the conclusions in
this thesis. Composing a positive right to the environment, derived or otherwise and its
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The view illustrates why positive rights also are often collectively referred to
as welfare rights and encompass most conceptions of an environmental right;
protecting the environment will require the expenditure of resources not cur-
rently allocated in that direction. Most conceptions of a right to the envi-
ronment would impose an obligation on a State to provide a certain level of
environmental quality. Even if requiring only procedural access to environ-
mental decision making currently not available to citizens, the right remains
a positive endeavor by the State.
This bifurcation may be a bit of a caricature though, as it is now well estab-
lished that all rights require some form of positive outlays, be that monetary
or in the form of institutional structures.27 After all, freedom to own private
property not only presuppose a government who refrains from coming to take
one’s property, but the bureaucratic structures that exist to register property
and the police power to enforce the right against those who choose to ignore
its power. Hence, authors have noted that the boundary between positive and
negative rights is quite blurry28 and far from bright line boundaries of “hands
off” versus “hands on.” In the main, the argument is that “all human rights
require governments to take costly actions.”29
Despite the blur, the picture here is useful in the sense that many structures
which support negative rights already exist as part of the foundation of demo-
cratic states and therefore the largely financial outlays are already in place;
they only need to continue running and, indeed, keep the government from
encroaching, a feat which does not require extra money. Extra requirements
come with political costs, costs that must be born by political will. Hence,
discussions on new rights which fall into the positive-obligations territory trig-
ger concern and arguments which keep them from being, in many senses, as
accepted or implemented as negative rights.
27Hancock; Holmes, Stephen/Sunstein, Cass The Cost of Rights. W.W. Norton & Com-
pany, 1999.
28Shue, Henry Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 2nd edi-
tion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
29Hertel, Shareen/Minkler, Lanse; Hertel, Shareen/Minkler, Lanse, editors Chap. Eco-
nomic Rights: The Terrain In Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement and Policy
Issues. Cambridge, 2007, p. 10, (emphasis in original), notable examples include the right
to be free from slavery, a right usually cast with the right to life as unambiguously negative
(freedom from) in its obligations on states, still requires resources on the part of the state to
keep others from engaging in slavery. Expenditures include obvious tasks such as policing,
labour inspections, and the like.
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4.1.2 Substantive and Procedural Rights
A reader from outside legal fields may already notice that the simple term
“environmental right” is, like its “environmental justice” cousin, not clearly
defined. The term as used here so far expresses the idea of a human right
encircling environmental issues, but authors have proposed a cornucopia of
conceptions, including a right to a quality of environment, a right to a clean
environment, a right to a decent environment, a right to a viable environment,
a right to a sustainable environment, and a right to a safe environment, to
voice a sampling.30
Note the form of all of these listed rights. They all guarantee a right to
the environment, modified by some adjective like “safe,” “viable,” or “clean.”
These adjectives are the “substance” of the right. The substance has some
definable characteristic that can be held up as a measurement or metric with
which an individual rights-holder can make a claim against the duty-holder–
the environment is not “clean” enough, or is not “viable” for a dignified or
sustainable existence.31 This form of EHR stands in contrast to a procedural
right which does not aim at a metric of protection but rather at a protection
of a process.
While the introduction states that there are no EHRs yet in practice, this
is only partly true. Substantive EHRs as of yet exist mostly as soft law in-
struments, with the tenable exception of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights32 and a protocol in the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR).33 Among the two, only the African Charter has been proven to pro-
30For a more exhaustive list, see Turner, p. 46-47, and references therein. Also Saward,
Michael The Terms of Democracy. Cambridge University Press, 1998; Hayward, p. 149. Also
note real-world examples in Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 479-481, including
Article 48A of the Indian Constitution; Article 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Korea; Article 45 of the Spanish Constitution; Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution;
Article 42 of the 1993 Russian Constitution; and the 1996 South African Constitution.
Discussions on these with a U.S. focus are found in Hill, Barry E/Wolfson, Steve/Targ,
Nicholas Human Rights and the Environment: A synopsis and some predictions. Geo. Int’l.
Envtl. L. Rev. 16 2003-2004.
31But note that some of the constitutional examples given in the note above, while being
substantive in their form, do not create enforceable rights. Rather, they exert influence on
“interpretation and application” of general law. Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] ,
p. 481
32AFCHPR (1981) O.A.U. Doc CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 and 21 ILM. 59, also known as
the Banjul Charter. Turner notes that the existence of a substantive right (Article 24) is
exceptional, although cases have been protracted and one must most often exhaust domestic
remedies before coming to the human rights body. See Turner.
33The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of
economic, social and cultural rights (Protocol of San Salvador) (1989) 28 ILM. 156 (1989)
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vide a substantive level of protection.34 The 1992 Rio Declaration35 also con-
tains a human-centered—relative to the earlier Stockholm Declaration’s treat-
ment of the environment’s place in human rights discussions36—substantive
goal (not right) for environmental stewardship.37
The UN’s Stockholm declaration,38 though being the first notable document
to explicitly connect personal life to the environment,39 does not get a detailed
treatment here. The document is important in its own right for becoming the
first significant condensation of international environmental thinking into a
unified legal area.40 Here, we see the acceptance that an environment must
have a certain quality to it that “permits a life of dignity and well-being”41
and that it’s the positive duty of the State to secure such an environment, for
both the current and future generations.42 But, this remains in the realms
of positive responsibilities. The benefit of protecting the environment is still
seen as beneficial mainly through its expression in the attainment levels of the
other fundamental rights, as well as promoting economic, social, and cultural
rights. As such, the Stockholm Declaration, like the UDHR, is a directional
document, and will not become an explicit right for individuals to assert claims
to environment quality. From the citations alone here, there has been much
work on the idea of EHRs in general, work indicative of a substantial level of
concern for the environment. The African Charter and American Convention
on Human Rights of course garner much attention from legal scholars, as have
the Stockholm and Rio Declarations. Why then are practicable EHRs still
viewed with some skepticism and generally only as goal oriented statements?
For substantive EHRs, the main problem is that of definition. What ex-
See, for an discussion, Déjeant-Pons/Pallemaerts, Chapter 1
34Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , citing the Ogoniland case.
35officially the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
31 ILM. 814 (1992); also U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev.1 (1992).
36See Déjeant-Pons/Pallemaerts
37Principle 1: “Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development.
They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.”
38officially Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
adopted June 16, 1972.
39Pallemaerts, Marc; Déjeant-Pons, Maguielonne, editor Chap. Introduction: human
rights and environmental protection In Human rights and the environment. Council of Eu-
rope Publishing, 2002, p. 11.
40Birnie, Patricia/Boyle, Alan International Law & The Environment. 2nd edition. Ox-
ford, 2002.
41Stockholm Declaration, princ. 1
42Gast, Kristen Marttila Environmental Justice and Indigenous Peoples in the United
States: An International Human Rights Analysis. Transnational Law & Contemporary Prob-
lems, 14 2005, p. 274.
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actly is a “clean” environment? How does one define that in terms that are
both legally serviceable and yet agreeable to environmental advocates?43 The
problem of defining is unavoidable in crafting a substantive right; as Boyle
explains,“definitional problems are inherent to any attempt to postulate en-
vironmental rights in qualitative terms.”44 Arguably, the cleanliness would
be defined relative to human health concerns.45 Chapter 2 discussed curso-
rily some problems with linking human health and environment, but there are
many more.46 The metric chosen though is unavoidably arbitrary; the term
“environment” itself has not even been nailed down by the UN documents
which discuss environmental rights47 and the ECHR has equally wrestled with
these issues.48
Some have used the problems of definition to speak as justification of con-
tinued utilization49 of existing human rights to address environmental issues,
instead of working on creating a substantive right.
“The virtue of looking at environmental protection through other
rights, such as life, private life or property, is that it focuses atten-
tion on what matters most: the detriment to important, interna-
tionally protected values from uncontrolled environmental harm.
This is an approach which does not need to define such notions as
a satisfactory or decent environment, falls well within the compe-
tence of human rights courts, and involves little or no potential for
conflict with international environmental institutions. . . ”50
There is something to say about this approach; keeping EHR in a soft law or
goal-oriented role allows courts to slowly expand existing rights as cultural and
legal conditions permit. At some point, perhaps that growth will be clearly
enunciated in practice by a critical mass of court cases and can then be formally
treated. Other commentators have similarly noted that, if existing regulatory
structures were in fact strictly adhered to, then there would already be this
43For more detailed criticisms on this point, see Handl, Günther; Trinidade, Antonio,
editor Chap. Human Rights and the Protection of the Environment: A Mildly “Revisionist”
View In Human Rights, Sustainable Development and the Environment. 1992
44Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 507.
45Or, perhaps, to living beings’ health concerns should one take a position outside the
anthropocentric mainstream.
46Also discussing problems of foresight, note van Lanen.
47Birnie/Boyle, p. 256.
48Janis/Kay/Bradley, Chap. 8.
49Discussed in detail infra at Section 4.2
50Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 507.
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defined area of environmental rights;51 the existing regulations define the area
of a substantive right already in a photographic negative sense.
If this were the end of the story, there would be however no problem in
simply stating that protected area positively. Perhaps the difficulty in writing
even these defined boundaries is that the photograph is still hazy, and needs
more time—and more cases combined with regulations—to firm up its outline.
It is also plausible that the boundaries are not entirely continuous. Instead of
mapping a single area of already-defined environmental protection, there are
islands in the human rights landscape which are “recognized” as containing
environmental protection. Then the problem of stating positively what already
exists in- and between-existing rights becomes clearer. And despite beneficial
aspects of attempting to define that area, including notably limiting overlap
with other rights and the judicial clarity that comes with it, the problems have
been viewed as hefty enough relative to their benefits to keep many people
looking at procedural rights, instead of continuing to argue merits of adding
substance; Procedural environmental rights do not have such problems with
definitions.
Procedural rights are guarantees of access to government decision making
processes which affect its citizens. While substantive rights place obligations
on the state, procedural rights offer participatory claims, claims to informa-
tion, decision-making processes, and judicial redress.52 Procedural rights go
back to founding documents in the HR canon53 and are now well established
as a feature of international law, including international environmental law.54
A procedural EHR is currently the most developed form of EHR recognized,
derived as they are mainly from the provisions guaranteeing citizens access
to information and decision making processes.55 They have also received the
most support from legal analysis of costs and benefits to rights-based environ-
mental protection56 largely because the procedural machinery is already more
practicable,57 although it does not necessarily incorporate a lower bound on
51Hancock.
52Hayward, p. 84.
53Esp. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Articles 8, 19, 21. cf. Turner
54Notably; The Aarhus Convention, infra at Section 4.2.4.2. Also see, Ibid., n. 40.
55Hayward, p. 143.
56Most notably, Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] ; Boyle, Alan; Idem/Anderson,
Michael, editors Chap. The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of
the Environment In Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection. Clarendon,
1996
57Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] .
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environmental quality, or better said, degradation.
Much of their support comes from a sense that they are “easier” or more
practical to justify because they do not commit the government to environ-
mental goals which can be measured and judged reached or fallen short. Goal-
orientation is a similarity between what has become over the past half century
environmental law58 and second generation rights. As Hayward states suc-
cinctly,
“[t]he usual argument in favour of procedural environmental rights
is that they are less problematic to justify than a substantive right
to an adequate environment because they do not commit govern-
ments to the achievement of specific substantive outcomes, but
only to allowing the possibility of a hearing to those (whoever they
are) who seek to influence the outcomes.”59
Most broadly speaking then, the key difference between describing a proce-
dural right, which would empower but not dictate an outcome60, and a sub-
stantive right is defining that desired outcome. It is the desired outcome which
is hard to specify and more likely to cause dissent across potential signatory
parties. The procedural right gets around this sticking point while creating
steps toward the goals of a substantive right, although not guaranteeing that
substantive outcomes.
Procedural rights are not simply train tracks toward substantive goals though.
They should not be presumed to be duty-less for States, nor are they entirely
passive. Just as all negative rights do not exist in a vacuum, the State guaran-
teeing a procedural EHR would still fulfill significant duties in order to enable
and sustain the preconditions for exercising procedural rights.61 Again, like
the false dichotomy between negative and positive rights, and as noted by
commentators like Holmes and Sunstein,62 among others,63 all rights require
input. Furthermore, the form that the State decides the preconditions can
take are not entirely neutral with respect to environmental outcomes. That is,
58“Environmental laws and policies are predominantly goal-oriented. Ebbesson, Jonas;
Idem/Okowa, Phoebe, editors Chap. Introduction: dimensions of justice in environmental





63Gray Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 111.
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the choice of a procedural right can potentially exclude substantive outcomes
which would be preferable to EHR advocates. Thus, the problem which gave
rise to concerns for an EHR not only remains unsolved but is excluded from
solution by the procedures enacted as a compromise protection.
Additionally, the subtle move of the problem of definition into the demo-
cratic realm, via enacting procedural rights instead of substantive rights is not
necessarily preventing any polluting evil. It remains to be seen if granting
citizens’ participation, access to informations, or legal standing could actually
be used to affect the outcomes desired by EHR drafters. Access to procedures
does not solve everything. There is already much concern in the environmental
justice movement about procedural access. Citizen participation in the early
U.S. siting issues is well discussed.64 Many of those criticisms would remain
valid for protections hoped for by EHR advocates as well. And criticisms
certainly abound, mostly in the well-tread direction that
“[e]ven when public input is sought, projects are often presented
as ‘take-it-or-leave-it,’ a tactic that has understandably left many
with the sense that public hearings are ‘empty rituals,’ more form
than substance.”65
Others have noted more strongly that procedural allowances have simply “pro-
moted the veneer of responding to environmental concerns whilst simultane-
ously facilitating a continued focus on economic efficiency by eviscerating the
rights of any effective impact.”66
64See esp. Cole, Luke W. Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection. Ecology
Law Quarterly, 19 1992. Also Spyke, Nancy Perkins Public Participation in Environmental
Decisionmaking at the New Millennium: Structuring new Spheres of Public Influence. B.C.
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 26 1999;
65Szasz, Andrew EcoPopulism: Toxic Waste and the Movement for Environmental Jus-
tice. University of Minnesota Press, 1994. Also see more extensive comments in Kravchecnko,
Svitlana The Myth of Public Participation in a World of Poverty. Tulane Environmental
Law Journal , 33 2009; Cousins, Ken Smoke in the Skies, Bread on the Table. College Park,
MD, 2001 – Technical report; Guana, Eileen The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public
Participation and the Paradigm Paradox. Stan. Envtl. L. J. 17 1998. Also recent disserta-
tions by Fraser, Leah Marie Participation and policy: A case study of environmental justice
government-social movement interaction. Ph.D thesis, University of California, Irvine, 2005
66Hancock, p. 103; Hancock goes farther:
“It is not only the assertion here that legally stipulated environmental human
rights are not being implemented in practice it is rather that they cannot
be realized in a global political economy given (i) the current configuration
of power in civil society that favors economic values over ecological protection
and (ii) the ideological and functional nature of law as a hegemonic instrument
reflecting powerful social interests.” ibid.
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These are criticisms to be noted when discussing taking the procedural right
route for an EHR; guaranteeing participation, even in the highly polished form
of a right, can still end up being only a gloss.67 Other high-level international
documents already acknowledge procedural environmental rights too, includ-
ing prominently Principle 10 of the aforementioned Rio Declaration,68 and
Principle 6 of the Brundtland Report.69 The European Union has as well
been quite proactive in promulgating Council Directives in this direction.70
Yet there remain reasons for more extensive environmental protections; the
environmental movement and, in particular, the environmental justice move-
ment still speak to that end.
In theory then, there is no cut and dry route to environmental protection via
either substantive or procedural rights. If one decides an EHR is necessary,
there is little guidance as to which path to choose. And although longer
discussions in this direction could certainly be conducted, there is more theory
to be investigated, historical insights which give more clues to the direction
the human rights winds are blowing. The background of the major human
67Note discussions too around the Aarhus Convention in Europe. (Convention on Access
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environ-
mental Matters).
68“[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens,
at the relevant level At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access
to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including
information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity
to participate in decision-making processes.” The declaration goes further in asking States
to play an active role in disseminating information.
69Principle 6. Prior Notification, Access, and Due Process: “States shall inform in a
timely manner all persons likely to be significantly affected by a planned activity and to
grant them equal access and due process in administrative and judicial proceedings.” The
report is published as World Commission on Environment and Development, editor Our
Common Future. Oxford University Press, 1987.
70See Déjeant-Pons/Pallemaerts, p. 23-27; discussing Council Directive 90/313/EEC of
7 June 1990 on “the freedom of access to information on the environment;” Council Direc-
tive 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 discussing responsibilities in major hazardous accidents;
Council Directive 89/618/Euratom of 27 November 1989, discussing radiation emergencies;
Council Directive 90/219/EEC of 23 April 1990, discussing genetically modified organisms
(GMOs); and Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 on assessment of effects of
public and private projects. There are more recent procedural directives as well, arising
as consequences of the European Community’s conclusion of the Aarhus Convention (with
2005/370/EC: Council Decision of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the
European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters). Also Council Directive
2003/4/EC of 28 January 2003, on public access to environmental information and repeal-
ing Council Directive 90/313/EEC. Also Council Directive 2003/35/EC of 26 May 2003,
providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and pro-
grammes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and
access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC.
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rights instruments provides more support for the implied desire to protect
human environs, and the jurisprudence of major human rights organs like the
European Court of Human Rights back that up.71
4.1.3 The Universal Declaration and an Introduction to
Human Rights
The now central place of human rights in legal theory and modern jurispru-
dence was scarred into the cultural conscious by the Second World War. The
catastrophic failure of the international order brought not only tragic military
consequences, but, for the first time on such a scale, civilian as well. The
intellectual effect was a recognition that the documents of the Enlightenment
movement and subsequent revolutions were necessary but not sufficient for se-
curing human freedom.72 Those documents, while ostensibly securing rights
of those making up society relative to the supreme power of the state73 did
not protect those same rights when the boundaries of sovereign control were
shattered by war.
There, at the end of the war the groundwork for the human rights pro-
tection took shape in the form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR).74Composed by the United Nations in 1948, the document is ground-
breaking both in general and as seen from an environmental justice perspective.
The declaration guaranteed a “standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family.”75 This early idea that rights can bring
about “adequate” levels of individual existence persists into what is now used
to bring environmental claims into the purview of recognized human rights in-
struments, even instruments that do not explicitly mention the environment.
71When unambiguously referring to a case or situation in Europe, the term “The Court”
is used as shorthand. But here, the term is augmented by “the European Court,” to main-
tain unambiguous references and a direct contrast to the “U.S. Court,” referring to the
Supreme Court. It should not be confused with the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) is similarly left out of the discussion herein.
72Documents including the US Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights, and the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.
73Sinden, p. 6.
74Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
75at Art. 25. On a historical tangent, one might hasten to point out this is ground-
breaking in the modern age. Ideas on the duty of the state, especially a ruler, to tend to
the welfare and well being, even as far as such modern second-generation rights as medical
care, appear in the Edicts of Ashoka in India during the 3rd Century B.C.E.
157
4 Europe and Rights
The UDHR is the outcome of the post-WWII visceral feeling that the rule
of law and nations had failed in a tremendous way and needed to be corrected
immediately, coupled with the entrenched philosophy of legal positivism. Legal
positivism, prevalent during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, saw
international law as law for and among states and states alone.76 States were
responsible for protecting the rights and freedoms of their citizens, both from
without and within, but individuals did not enjoy access to the international
legal forum to enforce or challenge the application of States’ duties. The reac-
tion to World War II pushed strongly against this, holding Axis participants
liable for violations of international law77 and began the non-positivist revision
that individuals’ actions run parallel with states’ actions in the international
legal order.78
The “I-know-it-when-I-see-it” emotional and reactionary attitude toward
violations in aftermath of the the War spun the wheels of legal change rapidly
and the UDHR was the result. The desire to maintain world peace, and to
utilize civil and political rights in changing the social order toward those ends
was pressing.79 But the transformation from one legal paradigm to another
was not yet complete. Arguably, it is still incomplete. Although the physical
machinery to enforce international law by both individuals and states is now
in place,80 albeit sometimes slow in emerging and functioning,81 humans still
get caught in the gaps.82 The human rights discourse of today can be seen as
the motion in progress towards full realization of protection via plugging the
gaps which still exist.
Most importantly to the EHR discussion, the UDHR contains both civil
and political protections and social and economic rights guarantees, or so-
called “second generation” rights. First generation rights are generally liber-
tarian rights and include most of the protections from State encroachment into
76Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 9.
77Moscow Declaration of German Atrocities, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/5 (3 March 1949).
78cf. Ibid., p. 11
79Osiatyński, p. 25.
80a hurdle noted by Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 12
81Steiner/Alston, p. 557-778 Osiatyński notes that the UDHR overlooked enforcement
because “culture is prior to law,” focusing on changing society towards enforcement and
leaving the rest to the nascent Security Council. See Osiatyński, p. 25.
82A good illustration of the gaps is the Trafigura/Probo Koala toxic dumping case in
the Ivory Coast. See, inter alia, Verschuuren, Jonathan/Kuchta, Steve; Letschert, Rianne/
van Dijk, Jan, editors Chap. Victims of Environmental Pollution in the Slipstream of
Globalization In The New Faces of Victimhood: Globalization, Global Justice and Victim
Empowerment. Springer, 2010.
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speech, religion, and political organization, the negative rights spoke of above.
The term second generation rights is used to describe, in general, rights which
embody goals for States dedicated to human betterment. The focus on bet-
terment helps to explain why second generation rights were viewed as having
a higher degree of import than civil and political rights to developing coun-
tries.83 One might summarize them as rights focused on equality rather than
on liberty and rules of political conduct. The divide between “generations”
of rights mirrors that discussed between negative and positive rights, with the
second generation rights often categorized as “less universal in the sense that
they constitute standards to be attained depending on the level of economic
development.”84
The divide between generations of rights was codified by the UDHR’s off-
spring, the twin Covenants on human rights: the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)85 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).86 As the UDHR was de-
signed itself as a goal rather than a binding instrument the Covenants were
drafted to put obligations on their contracting parties. The drafting process
saw the emergence of these differences in opinions on the importance of Civil
and Political (first generation) rights relative to Economic, Social and Cul-
tural (second generation) rights. The gulf eventually caused two, instead of
one, Covenants.
Today, economic and social guarantees remain goal-oriented.87 More con-
crete administration applies to civil and political rights, both in the UN’s
documents and in regional rights instruments. There is oversight machinery
for breeches of ICCPR rights but no such teeth for failure to work towards
the goals in the ICECSR.88 The oversight body of that instrument, named
83Osiatyński, p. 24.
84Ovey, Clare/White, Robin The European Convention on Human Rights. 4th edition.
Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 5. Also see Brems, Eva Human Rights: Minimum and
Maximum Perspectives. Human Rights Law Review , 9 2009, discussing problems with reach-
ing above the minimum human rights requirement.There are also third generation rights,
which are the rights of collective groups or peoples. Sometimes referred to as cultural rights
which go beyond the relatively traditional economic and social goals of second generation
rights.
85G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966)
86G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966)
87Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 379, although the Covenants do have many procedures for
reviewing and recommending policy and progress which could have expanded rights ibid.,
p. 415-429.
88Branco, Manuel Couret Economics Versus Human Rights. New York: Routledge, 2009,
p. 11-12.
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the Economic and Social Council, merely reports potential violations in its
own reports or to the General Assembly of the UN. Even though the ICESCR
guarantees the right to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health”, and does so by putting the positive obligation for
a healthy environment on State parties,89 there is no opportunity for debate
between individuals questioning their State’s adherence to the rules.90
Not having access is not the only problem though. There is a substantial
tranche of criticism of EHRs, subsumed under the heading of the “means” test.
Prominently, the ICESR qualifies these duties and goals of signatory countries
to “the maximum of its available resources.”91 As a country could always claim
that they do not have the resources to, say, assure every working person of a
job, there is always a way out. As Branco notes, “by introducing an availability
of means clause, rights are objectively placed on the same footing as wants.”92
That is, society cannot supply everything, and so scarcity governs not only
goods but also these types of rights. Nothing could be a more clear abrogation
from “fundamental rights” than this loophole, and from it flows many of the
thoughts that second generation rights are somehow lower than first generation
guarantees. Gaining a committee to evaluate claims of derogations on social
rights could easily but up against the means test.
The codified split between Civil and Political rights and Economic, Social,
and Cultural rights, and the continued reference to “first” and “second” gener-
ation rights, illustrates the longevity of the disagreement about the place and
power of each group and the role the State is committed to playing.93 To be
sure, some of that argument was prodded by the Cold War bi-polar world, fol-
lowing U.S. adherence to rhetoric on the necessity of civil and political rights
in democratic society and the Soviet Union’s claims that economic and social
rights are foundational.94 And although (or perhaps because) the superpower-
89art. 12(1), See also Gast, p. 275
90This does not mean the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is entirely
powerless. For this work though, suffice it to say that they are aligned with the general
direction of other human rights instruments’ motion toward positive rights. See Bodansky,
Daniel Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues. Georgia Journal of Inter-
national and Comparative Law , 38 2010. Also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights General Comment 14, The right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN
Doc E/C.12/2000/3 (2000).
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dichotomy in rhetoric is a bit of a caricature95 the civil and political rhetoric
apparently took the lions share of the spotlight with the collapse of communist
spheres of influence, there has been a shift away from the emphasis on the dif-
ferences, especially as expressed in terms of negative versus positive duties.96
Nevertheless, the split still reflects a difference in opinion on the means with
which to enforce the categories of rights.97
The two forms of rights and the history they carry from the twin Covenants,
come to the forefront in Article 1 of the ECHR: “The High Contracting Par-
ties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in Section I of this Convention.” The phrase “shall secure” implies
both negative obligations to not infringe protected spheres and positive guar-
antees to give—secure—rights where they do not exist on their own. On a
technical point, the construction of the ECHR is to have Articles enunciate
rights in paragraph one with derogations in paragraph two under the Article,
which “proscribes certain actions that ‘interfere’ with or restrict that right
except in special circumstances.”98 Most article have derogations written ex-
plicitly in paragraph two. Technically, though, the judgment of X. and Y.
v. the Netherlands implies that even in the absence of explicit paragraph
two restrictions in individual Articles, the mere voicing of the right (its mere
existence) in paragraph one would place obligations on the state. That is,
positive obligations can result entirely from paragraph one.99 The duty “to
secure” also arises from wording in the text of the Convention in other loca-
tions, such as that the framework of the rights secured must be “practical and
effective.”100 Article 13 also calls for Contracting Parties to supply the reme-
dies domestically. These are all positive obligations on the state to provide
and begin to illuminate reasons for reluctance in adopting more positive-type
rights; without accurate definition and boundaries, such rights are potentially
open-ended commitments. Nevertheless, the original commitments do open
95Osiatyński, p. 18, n. 79,80, p. 36, clarifying that although it was not a split that started
at the beginning, it did evolve along those lines, though for reasons due to the evolution of
the states themselves and not the ideological outset conditions.
96Inter alia Holmes/Sunstein
97Osiatyński, p. 31; Donnelley, Jack/Whelan, Daniel J. The West, Economic and Social
Rights, and the Global Human Rights Regime: Setting the Record Straight. Human Rights
Quarterly, 29 2007, n. 132
98Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 392.
99Although one hastens to add that the ability for respondents to “justify” discrimination
arguably amounts to a derogation.
100Mowbray, p. 5.
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up toward positive obligations for signatory countries. This is the intellectual
inertia stemming from the UDHR and the twin Covenants and continues to
shape jurisprudence today.101
The fact though remains, despite the open-endedness of the document, the
major human rights inertia stems from a post war milieu, an intellectual history
which draws from the outcomes of overreaching State power into their subject’s
private sphere. The evolution of negative rights, as well as their success on
checking State power against the individual, stands as a great success story
but also as a relatively more developed area of law because of this past. As
Steiner and Alston quip “What good is free speech when you’re starving an
illiterate?”102 Second generation rights, requiring more positive involvement,
while not being as entirely different in commitment as earlier thought, could
be a second wave of protections only now beginning to show the same fruits
as their earlier siblings.103
The last decades have seen a dramatic increase in the power of the ECHR,
and the ECtHR, including their acceptance of a great range of positive duties
on States, despite concerns of overreaching or burdening States with too many
positive burdens. The relative growth of the ECtHR compared to other major
instruments with rights-based goals104 then explains much of the excitement
101Explicitly recognized in Kosiek v. Germany application no. 9704/82, judgment of 28
August 1986, para 34.
102Steiner/Alston, p. 273. In this vein, Judge Weeramantry of the International Court of
Justice summarized that
the protection of the environment is. . . a vital part of contemporary human
rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as
the right to health and the right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to
elaborate on this, as damage to the environment can impair and undermine
all the human rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other human
rights instruments.”
Judge Weeramantry, separate opinion, The Case concerning the Gabcikova-Nagymaros,
ILM, Vol 37, 1997, p. 162.
103Rachel Carson noted a similar thought in the epigraph to this chapter. Not to mention
authors who see a “right” as existing if regulations were only fully implemented. Hancock
104Including the European Social Charter, which we do not discuss at length here. Briefly,
the formal split between “families” of fundamental freedoms seen in the two Covenants is
also embodied in the two major rights instruments of the Council of Europe (CoE). The same
disagreements in the UN led to the adoption of the ECHR and the European Social Charter,
which focused on social and economic rights, instead of a single human rights document.
See Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 377; discussing the need to split the two concepts in order to
speedily ratify and put into practice traditional civil and political rights. At the European
level then the ECHR is thus a rough analogue of the ICCPR, while the European Social
Charter is akin to the ICESCR. Differences include the ability for parties to choose which
articles under the Charter they become party too, while the Covenant is an all-or-nothing
treaty. See ibid., p. 380,407-409. This is a relatively superficial introduction, however. For a
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and literature on environmental human rights, and comments that Europe is
moving toward securing to individuals the full gamut of rights set forth in
the Universal Declaration.105 Even if some claims of positive trajectory are
exaggerated, we are certainly seeing ”second generation outcomes” by stricter
adherence to first generation rights as applied to the needs of others.106
In either case, the power the Court has gained is leading policy change inside
Europe. Much of these changes are directly in line with hopes of environmental
justice advocates and serve as examples of what protections exist at the human
rights level as well as how they function. Furthermore, one can expect the
function of the European Court to trickle down its affects to domestic policy, in
forms such as increased regulation, preemptive action, and protection between
all parties in society.
To be clear, the European Court can find a member state’s internal law
contrary to the Convention and thereby oblige the state to alter that law.107
The European Court however cannot itself alter the law nor instruct the state
on how it should change. It is the duty of states to be in compliance with
the Convention, but the Convention need not specify what form that com-
pliance takes. Nevertheless, the Convention does not merely govern direct
State-individual interaction. This influence on realms of law and interaction
external to the text of the Convention is often referred to as Drittwirkung.
Further, this “trickle down” extends from the ECHR into other supranational
realms. For instance, Canada and the UK have been noted as incorporating
precautionary environmental law as a direct result of international laws.108
Trouwborst also notes that the flow in places like Germany has been reversed;
stringent national environmental law has been brought up to the inter- or
supra-national level.109 From both directions then Europe is seen to be ratch-
deeper study on the relationships, see Gomien/Harris/Zwaak. It is noted here as a continued
indication of the strife between the two camps of rights—globally at the UN in the mid-
twentieth century, and continuing into the unified Europe today. Even today, applicants to
the Council of Europe must sign the European Court, but are not required to adhere to the
ESC. See Steiner/Alston
105Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 378.
106See San José, Daniel Garcia Environmental protection and the European Convention
on Human Rights. Council of Europe Publishing, 2005
107Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 75.
108Scott, Dayna Nadine The Mutual Constitution of Risk and Precaution. Ph.D thesis,
York University, 2005, p. 24; citing Trouwborst, Arie Evolution and Status of the Pre-
cautionary Principle in International Law. Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 17. Also
note how international criminal law has functioned similarly, “imposing duties directly on
individuals. . . ” Bodansky, p. 11
109Trouwborst.
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eting environmental protections upward and toward harmonization, though
specifics of EU law are not discussed herein.110
One can see from this introduction why the United States, with a heavy
influence on individual rights, has been more hostile toward social rights. This
was not always the case though, and perhaps the best example of this once
promising terrain in the U.S. is Franklin Roosevelt’s proposed “Second Bill
of Rights” in his State of the Union speech in 1944.111 The proposal, which
would have guaranteed rights to a home, job, living wages, medical care, ed-
ucation, and economic protection from detrimental but largely unavoidable
circumstance bears many similarities to today’s positive rights embodied in
the European Convention. But, basing their opinion on the wording in their
national constitution, the U.S. Court now view “rights” guaranteed to citi-
zens to be negative in nature, limiting state power to act instead of positive
requirements to guarantee standards, and the forward-looking Second Bill of
Rights is all but forgotten.112 The story is noted in passing to show that the
U.S. is not diametrically opposed to the European movement toward positive
rights, although they are presently lagging behind.
The worries in the U.S. are the same as those in Europe. At the time of
the adoption of major human rights instruments like the UDHR, there was
little way to bind parties to such a seemingly open-ended commitment as
economic rights. To get the Covenant signed at all required such compromise,
likely predicated on the hope that years to come would bring steps toward a
more binding protocol. As that day has not yet come, economic rights remain
subordinate to Civil and Political rights and discourse, and concerns of open-
ended commitments make the political discourse hostile. Nevertheless, even if
placed in the U.S. context, goal-oriented rights are not rendered “soft” simply
because there is no court oversight.
110Note that this is arguably unlike what one sees in the U.S. discussion on international
human rights, whose discourse has an entirely different feel to it. Note Bodansky, Daniel
Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues. Georgia Journal of International
and Comparative Law , 38 2010 and contributors therein.
111Fleischacker, Samuel A Short History of Distrubive Justice. Harvard University Press,
2004, p. 82-83.
112See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109
S. Ct. 998 (1989). cf. Steiner/Alston, p. 252, noting in contrast Brennen J.’s dissent that
inaction can be just as much of an abuse of power as action on the part of the State.
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4.1.4 Drittwirkung and Conclusion
The Convention, as a human rights treaty, is designed first and foremost as
a regulator between State and Individual. But the Convention also has a
Drittwirkung, or third-party influence.113 Read narrowly, the Convention in-
deed would only bind direct State-Individual114 action and interaction. In this
sense, the Convention, and all human rights treaties similar to it, elevate the
status of the individual above that which they enjoy under international law
governing actions between States alone. In the latter form of regulation, the
individual enjoys protection only as an object at their location within the terri-
tory which is adhering to international law.115 In the realm of rights protected
by the Convention however, the individual is a subject, not an object.
If the Convention is only a document governing dynamics between a State
and a Subject, overseen by a supra-national court, then we can expect to
see ample protection of negative rights. The existence of positive obligations
flowing from several passages within the Convention however bind the State
into taking action where it is necessary to secure rights for its subjects. This
may consequently force the State into the role of legislating conduct between
private parties, not merely checking its own behaviour with respect to the
individual. This extra duty then impels the State to control actions between
private parties where there is no State contact.116 Thus, the Drittwirkung
of the Convention is “third-party” rights which “flow from the national law
implementing the State’s obligations under the Convention rather than from
the Convention itself.”117
It is quite impressive how the Court’s jurisprudence has shifted more and
more toward recognizing what once could be called sweeping views of rights
granted. The extensive literature on positive obligations and Drittwirkung of
the Convention say much to the European commitment to achieving a previ-
ously unknown standard of human rights. Indeed, this is a metric with which to
measure the past 3 decades’ of “partial erosion of the generational gap between
113Dröge, Cordula Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in der Europischen Menschen-
rechtskonvention. Max-Planck-Institute für ausländsiches öffentliches Recht und Völker-
recht, 2003.
114And State-State actions, though they are more rare.
115Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 17.
116For example, Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom application no. 13134/87 judg-
ment of 25 March 1993.
117Ovey/White, p. 52.
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Convention rights and later generations of human rights.”118 By allowing and
influencing a move in this direction, the Court has affirmed a commitment to
forcing the State to take on more responsibilities in more situations toward
securing individual rights. Although the expansion of the Court was some-
thing of a concern in the days of the treaty’s negotiation,119 the remarkable
level of compliance compliance120 of signatory countries to the rulings are an
affirmation of the leadership role of the Court.121
This is the broad brush with which the European Convention paints. Taking
into consideration the explosion of method and means for the modern State
to invade the classical sphere of liberty, as envisioned by the Enlightenment
thinkers who laid the foundation for modern democracies, this expansive stroke
might be the necessary counter.122 And it is into this brave new world of ex-
panding human rights’ duties in Europe that we begin to discuss now. And
despite the fear-filled milieu in which this, and the European Convention on
Human Rights, brought to the world modern human rights, there was noth-
ing inevitable about their emergence and certainly not of their acceptance as
governing documents.123 Therefore it really is a brave new world, as opposed
to a planned world, into which the jurisprudence is expanding. Th expansion
currently sketches what protection has grown from the humble civil and po-
litical rights base into a forward-focused, but as-yet undefined, environmental
human right.
118Mowbray, p. 231; discussing Airey v. Ireland, application no. 6289/73, judgment of
9 October 1979, which states that “fulfillment of a duty under the Convention on occasion
necessitates some positive action on the part of the State”, at para. 25.
119Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 115.
120Problems do exist, though not often referred to in the literature. For discussion see
Council of Europe Implementing Judgements of the European Court of Human Rights.
Strasbourg, 18 September 2006 (Doc. 11020). – Technical report; Greer, Steve The Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems, and Perspectives. Cambridge
University Press, 2007, p. 278-313
121Janis, Kay, and Bradley (p. 19, 2008) note that at the time, the Europeans were familiar
with bills of rights akin to the US’s version, but were unfamiliar with judicial enforcement
of those rights. To move from that shaky footing to near perfect compliance is quite an
accomplishment.
122See Ferguson, Niall The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-
2000. Basic Books, 2001, p. 362; citing de Tocqueville’s fears of a diminution of liberty.
Note Osiatyński’s history of human rights, drawing attention to the Enlightenment change
of liberty from the Medieval context, Osiatyński, p. 3
123Regarding the UDHR and inevitability, see Ibid., p. 22.
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4.2 The European Court and Derived
Environmental Rights In Practice
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is the judicial body overseeing
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). As suggested above, the
ECHR has grown into the world’s strongest and most developed system of
the protection of fundamental freedoms.124 As the most developed system
it also carries the distinction of coming quite close to creating, through its
jurisprudence, something like an environmental human right. Though not
explicitly recognized anywhere in the Convention, the human/environment
nexus is fleshed out in important albeit tangential contexts. Through the
decisions of the European Court one can though see outlines of a conception
of EHR. That shape is sketched below in the exploration of the cases which
constitute the form and substance to the idea.
The aim of this section is not to show or “prove” that an EHR exists, or
that it is already explicitly recognized, or that it is needed in the human rights
canon; these topics have been addressed more directly and in far more detail
already.125 The purpose of this section of the chapter is rather to illustrate
simply the protection of the environment that exists via the Convention, and,
in doing so, clearly spell out what it does and what it does not accomplish.
With that information in hand, one can clearly see where the human rights
canon already provides rights-like protection of the environment and where
it comes up short relative to ideal subjective or procedural rights discussed
above. Furthermore, one sees where the derived protection both succeeds and
falls short for environmental justice ends. The picture dimly suggests though
a hidden strength that could be adapted toward environmental justice ends.126
4.2.1 The Convention and Court
The ECHR was adopted by the Council of Europe shortly after its own cre-
ation.127 Like the Council, the Convention then is also an example of the
124inter alia Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 114; Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 18
125See Gomien; Hancock; Eide, Asbœrn/Krause, Catarina/Rosas, Allan, editors Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook. Martinus Nijhoff, 2001; Anderson/Boyle;
Gormley
126See Chapter 5.
127For an introduction to the history of the Convention see Ovey/White; Gomien/Harris/
Zwaak.
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solidification of European ideals following the devastation of World War II
and as a counter-weight to the emerging Soviet-bloc ideology. The milieu gave
the Council a very strong motivation to compose the Convention on Human
Rights giving form to the protection of “spiritual and moral values which are
the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual free-
dom. . . ”128 The spirit of the times make it easier to see how such a broad
instrument was able to congeal among such heterogeneous peoples. As Janis,
Kay and Bradley explain,
“[i]t was relatively easy in the wake of the brutal experience of the
war against fascism for the European survivors to agree both on
the importance of protecting human rights and on the inadequacy
of relying solely on national enforcement system.”129
This move to secure fundamental freedoms mirrored the young United Nations’
parallel attempts, enshrined in the UDHR and, as such, could be viewed as
a young “Bill of Rights” for the European nations.130 Indeed, as the most
advanced human rights machinery in the world, this analogy grows stronger
with each passing judgement.131
The European Court is the judicial strength behind the Convention. Their
job is to interpret the Convention for the CoE.132 The strength and teeth come
from the Court’s empowerment via the Convention as having jurisdiction over
all member states 133 and from the ability of both States and individuals
to lodge complaints.134 To effect its responsibilities, the Court, located in
Strasbourg135 employs one judge from every CoE nation, elected into their
128Preamble of the Statute of the Council of Europe (CoE), May 5, 1949. The Council of
Europe has since expanded to include many ex-Soviet bloc nations, and extends well past
the more restricted membership of the European Union.
129Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 114.
130See Abdel-Monem, Tarik How Far Do the Lawless Areas of Europe Extend? Extrater-
ritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights. J. Transnational Law
& Policy, 14 2005, p. 165 and intra Section 4.1.3. UN—seeUnited Nations niversal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/810 (1948)
131Notably, in support of the claims both of being the most advanced and growing stronger,
the European Court is having troubles keeping up with case load. See discussions on changes
in procedures and future plans in Janis/Kay/Bradley
132Abdel-Monem, p. 164; European Convention for Human Rights, art. 19.
133Convention, art. 1, 32(1), 32(2), 46(1)
134Convention, art. 34
135The city is often used in literature in place of saying “the Convention” or “The Court
of Human Rights”, and distinguishes the legal actions from the European Court of Justice,
located in Luxembourg.
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positions for six years by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council.136
Petitions for alleging violations are admitted to the Court only after re-
view and unanimous decision by a three-judge Committee.137 Cases are only
admissible if
1. the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies
2. the application is not anonymous and cannot be “substantially the same
as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or has already
been submitted to another procedure
3. the application is not found manifestly ill-founded or an abuse of the
right to petition.
Admissibility is arguably the most important aspect of the ECHR-system given
that 97% of applications are never declared admissible.138 Some rejections
have to do with failure to exhaust domestic remedies while others are rejected
on their merits. Given that much of the implementation of Europe’s human
rights goals happens at the domestic level, the high rejection rate should be
seen more as a purposeful positioning of the Court as a guiding hand and
not the operative hand, and certainly not as an indication that the European
Court does not have an impact.139
Prior to the recent entering into force of Protocol 14, the Court itself con-
sisted of these admissibility Committees of three judges each, followed by
Chambers of seven judges, and a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges cap-
ping the hierarchy.140 Now,141 admissibility can be decided by a single judge
formation where there is no question as to admissibility.142 The three-member
admissibility Committees above the single-judge formation can now also decide
cases on their merits in stead of focusing on admissibility/inadmissibility.143
They can also take action on admissibility and merits jointly. In addition,
136Abdel-Monem, p. 165.
137Article 27-28, creating the new Committee structure after the adoption of Protocol 11.
Article 35 (1-2) spells out specific admissibility criteria.
138Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 28.
139Of course, the increasing case load and increasing application numbers do give pause
and concern that valid and important complaints are lost in the filing or fail to garner the
attention they would otherwise.
140Article 27
141As of 1 June 2010
142The judge in such a single decision cannot address cases from their home country.
143See Article 26, ECHR (old Article 27 with amendments.)
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new admissibility requirements have come into effect which allow the Euro-
pean Court to focus on the most pressing of issues, issues which clearly rise
to the level of a human right violation. All of these measures are meant to
streamline the increasing caseload of the European Court.
The Grand Chamber hears especially difficult cases which raise questions of
the interpretation of the Convention or when decisions may not be consistent
with past decisions.144 With Protocol 14 now in place this also appears to be
the renewed focus of the entire court system. This is an important focus be-
cause the Court is purposefully not bound by its previous decisions; an aspect
designed by the framers to allow for the Convention be a living instrument and
to move with the times and underlying social currents.145 The Chambers are
motivated by their own precedent, the common law doctrine of stare decisis,
as a guiding element in developing a common European standard for human
rights.146 Now with the new Protocol 14 that goal of elaborating their own
precedents becomes even more explicit.
Petitions come to the Court in the form of individuals lodging complaints
against a State of a violation, or failure to guarantee, a right granted by
the European Court.147 Less often, complaints by States against States are
lodged. The individual’s ability to bring a case on their own—individual legal
standing—is an important structural design, fought for at the very outset of
negotiations.148 “Individuals” can include persons, NGOs and groups of indi-
viduals claiming to be victims, as described in Article 34 and Gorraiz Lizarraga
and Others v. Spain.149 The right to petition the Court individually is secured
in Article 25.150 Protocol 14 however limits petitions from situations where
“the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires
an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may
be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic
144Article 30
145Council of Europe Manual on human rights and the environment. Council of Europe
Publishing, 2006, p. 7.
146Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 18.
147Ovey/White, p. 10.
148See Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 16-18
149application no. 62543/00 judgment of 27 April 2004 para 46,47.
150Class action suits are also permitted in situations where a systemic shortcoming in
Convention adherence by a State warrants “general redress,” though these are not routine.
See Broniowski v. Poland application no. 31443/96 judgment of 22 June 2004.
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tribunal.151
The changes are again meant to streamline the European Court’s caseload
and the focus on rendering decisions which help clarify interpretation of the
Convention and the signatory states’ responsibilities thereon. As the degree to
which this strengthens the individual’s access to redress is currently unknown,
this chapter continues under the assumption that it will at a minimum not
reduce access. After all, the protocol’s changes aim to free the Court’s time
for interpretive functions in new or less-well defined areas of Convention law,
exactly where new areas of environmental protection may be derived. And
the individual’s right to petition is unchanged; it is only the magnitude of the
complaint which may need to be larger before being dealt with by the Court
proper.
The power granted to individuals here is a right in itself which should not be
understated, either in its effects on the individuals affected or on the European
Court itself. According to notable scholars,
“[i]t seems that the right of access of private suitors has been crucial
to bringing the system of human rights law alive. Between 1955 and
1997, there were only 13 state petitions filed with the Commission,
but there were 39,034 private claims.”152
Obviously, a person can decide to bring a suit without the oft-present politi-
cal baggage that might weigh against the decision for a State to bring a case
against another State. Allowing individual petitions thus is a massive devel-
opment in the forum of international law because of both its substantive and
formative effects on the system as a whole.153 In this sense, the Convention
elevates the status of the individual above that which they enjoy under in-
ternational law governing actions between States alone. In the latter form of
regulation, the individual enjoys protection only as an object at their location
within the territory which is adhering to international law.154 In the realm of
151Protocol 14, Article 12; now Article 35 ECHR, paragraph 3(b).
152Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 75. Note that the term“Commission” here refers to the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights, a tribunal that existed until 1998’s reorganization of the
Court under Protocol 11 which did away with the Commission as the first step to admitting
a human rights violation case to the Court.
153Here is not the place to discuss, in a comparative law sense, the right of individual
standing in the ECHR versus the now-truncated standing of individuals to bring actions on
§602 of the US Civil rights act, vis-á-vis environmental justice or EHR concerns. See instead
Chapter 5, esp. Section 5.3.2.4
154Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 17.
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rights protected by the Convention however, the individual is a subject, not
an object. While empowering for individuals, the construction does dictate
that the individual must be the victim in fact, or be exposed to a threat of
injury in the future, by a human rights violation and cannot lodge complaints
in abstracto.155
How the Contracting Parties elevate the individuals to this level differs
across nearly all countries. To foreshadow, this has relevance for the study
of environmental justice in Europe in that the complexities of how the na-
tional jurisdictions give specific force to the Convention can make the path
of an individual’s claim to the Court complex, but the Contracting Parties in
all circumstances are fully accountable in the end for giving full effect to the
rights and for adequate remedy for complaints.156 For instance, the ECHR
was given domestic legal status in the UK by the Human Rights Act of 1998,
while it has constitutional law status in Austria, and lies between constitu-
tional law and domestic legislation in France.157 Domestic courts are tasked
to incorporate—to give full affect to—the protections of the ECHR in whatever
manner fits the idiosyncrasies of their particular legal system. The flexibility
has no doubt smoothed the uptake of fundamental protections into national
law, sliding past many legislative and political hurdles.
Smoothing transitions from international human rights law into heteroge-
nous domestic practice is a codified and purposeful part of the Court. The
European Court operates on the overriding principles of “subsidiarity” and
“solidarity.”158 Both convey the tone that the solution to human rights vio-
lation lies at the lowest and smallest levels of social and political interaction.
Solidarity means that Contracting Parties will secure the rights guaranteed by
their signatures by tuning their national legal systems to prevent violations.
Subsidiarity means that political actions toward remedy should be taken at
the lowest possible level; that is, the Court will play a subsidiary role to na-
tional legal entities. This principle also gives us the rule that, in all but the
extreme cases, the Court will only hear cases which have exhausted domestic
possibilities for remedy.159 In this case, that means the national jurisdictions
should play the foremost role in prevention of violations as well as guaranteeing
155Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 44.
156Article 52.
157See, inter alia, Ovey/White.
158Ibid., p. 18.
159Article 35(1); Article 26 of the old Convention (pre-1999).
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positive freedom.
When prevention of violations fails, decisions rendered for the plaintiff,
whether rendered by a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, are overseen toward
execution by the CoE’s Committee of Ministers. The Committee of Ministers
is the executive branch of the CoE and enforces the rulings of the ECtHR,
which can include monetary damages to plaintiffs or a change to a member-
state’s domestic laws.160 There is, however, little power the ECtHR can wield
over the offending party, save for the draconian measure of removing a State
from the CoE.161 The Court did gain some new oversight powers with the
newly imposed Protocol 14, where they may render interpretation on a final
judgment of which the Committee of Ministers finds a member state having
trouble with in order to more quickly bring them into compliance. The Court
can now also more rapidly pursue action from non-compliance.162
Above these limited oversight powers, the power of the Convention rests—
simply but securely—on a commitment by the contracting parties,163 which
160Convention, art. 46(2) (supervision of execution of judgements), art. 41 (just sat-
isfaction). See esp. X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, A/93 cf.
Alkema, Evert Albert; Matscher, Franz/Petzold, Herbert, editors Chap. The third-party
applicability or “Drittwirkung” of the European Convention on Human Rights In Protecting
Human Rights: The European Dimension. Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1990, p. 44 . See
also Osiatyński, p. 40.
161Abdel-Monem, p. 169-70; Greer, p. 278. The only time a state has almost been forced
to leave the Council of Europe was after the Greek coup d’état in 1967 and an inquiry into
the new government’s human rights offenses. Greece chose to leave the Council instead of
facing expulsion. See The Greek Case, 196 (1969); 12 Yearbook of the European Convention
on Human Rights. Also Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 57-66
162Article 16 of Protocol 14, paragraphs 3,4: (3) “‘If the Committee of Ministers consid-
ers that the supervision of the execution of a final judgment is hindered by a problem of
interpretation of the judgment, it may refer the matter to the Court for a ruling on the
question of interpretation. A referral decision shall require a majority vote of two thirds
of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. (4) If the Committee of Ministers
considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to
which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted
by a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee,
refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfill its obligation under
paragraph 1.”
163Article 46 Binding force and execution of judgments 1) The High Contracting Parties
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.
2) The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers,
which shall supervise its execution. Note, inter alia Vermeire v. Belgium judgment of 29
November 1991, 15 E.H.R.R. 488, discussing permissible and non-permissible lags between
ECtHR judgments on domestic practice and legislative action to remedy the breach. For
examples of judgments that led to significant changes in national systems, see, inter alia,
Benthem v. the Netherlands judgement of 23 October 1985, 8 E.H.R.R. 1; judgment which
is bounded by, at a minimum, the fact that the Convention does not require States to give
direct effect to the rights in national law. See Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom
judgment of 18 January 1978, 2 E.H.R.R. 25. Although the structure of some national legal
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although lacking true police power functions quite well. Even without enforce-
ment power, compliance with judgements is nearly perfect.164 Though that
fact does not necessarily imply that national regulators take European Court
decisions and quickly implement them, as the domestic courts can (and do)
play a very significant role in implementing the Convention’s goals, it nev-
ertheless is strong evidence that goals enshrined at the ECHR level do not
remain simply goals but are, through several channels, implemented on the
ground.165 It is also notably in a comparative view with the U.S.’s human
rights themes, where there is significantly less discussion on translation of
international rights’ goals through the practical levels of domestic courts.
Above the technicalities of bringing cases and enforcement of judgments,
and more germane to the issue of environmental justice, is that domestic legal
systems that sit uncomfortably in some respects with ECtHR precedents have
measurable pressure to conform.166 This includes of course States which are
not party to the action or judgement at hand. The positive obligations to
which each State consented means that they will feel pressure and influence
to change their own situation should they find themselves sitting similar to
another State whose laws and practices are questioned.167 Similar influence
flows through drittwirkung channels.
The track record, both in execution of judgments and bringing national
law into cooperation with the Convention, and despite the lack of punishment
procedures, is what makes the ECHR the “most developed Human Rights
system in the world.”168 In fact, this level of adherence and deference to the
judgements of this international court sit quite contrary to the predictions and
the evidence in other areas of international attempts at co-operation. There
is always a concern as to the willingness or readiness of states to concede
systems, for instance, the Netherlands, gives the Convention, as a treaty, effect in domestic
law without any further act of legislation such as the U.K.’s 1998 Human Rights Act. Full
discussion of the Convention’s impact and operation in national legal systems is found in
Blackburn, Robert/Polakiewicz, Jorq, editors Fundamental Rights in Europe: The ECHR
and its Member States, 1950-2000. Oxford University Press, 2002.
164Abdel-Monem, p. 170; also discussed in depth at Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 103-116.
165Again, this is strengthened by the new and as-yet untested additions under Protocol
14.
166Perhaps the most important illustration of this is the U.K.’s 1998 Human Rights Act.
See Ibid., p. 854-873
167Compare The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Series A No 30 judgement of 26 April
1979 and Ibid., p. 86-88
168Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 18.
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“independent legitimacy to inter-governmental committees and assemblies.”169
The ECHR though has triumphed handily in this regard.
One thing notably missing from the ECHR, relative to the environmental
justice discussion, is a focus on minorities.170 There is only one substantial
mention of “minorities” in the ECHR.171 Hence, the Convention would ap-
parently seem to have little direct say against discrimination, and prevention
thereof would have to flow from protecting the general canon fundamental
rights. Nevertheless, the Court’s jurisprudence has been broad in addressing
even indirect discrimination.172 The Convention, and the Court supporting
it, are thus prepared to address discrimination, but similar to the situation in
the US,173 the Court comes at the issue indirectly and requires a “thick set of
statistical and narrative evidence.”174
In the end, the amazing ability of the Court to become one of the first
truly supra-national and legitimately powerful forces in the new Europe is an
unquestionable success. The level of deference to which national governments
have granted this new body is remarkable, especially considering its age. The
jurisprudence shows a powerful trend toward direct involvement in imposing
human rights responsibilities on a large swatch of State-related phenomenon,
including third party interactions. The Convention is therefore already primed
for protection of values and areas not necessarily included in the text of the
document itself.
The focus here on the European Court (and Convention) on Human Rights
stems from the simple fact that, in recent years, human rights instruments have
169Strange, Susan The Retreat of the State. Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 184.
Note also the acquiescence of the parties to the EC to Article 234 EC, under which national
jurisdictions submit to oversight by the ECJ, which “obliges the national jurisdictions to
submit to the interpretation of the requirements of EC law by the European Court of
Justice. . . ” De Schutter; as well as to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR under Article 46 of the
Convention.
170See discussion in Osiatyński. Osiatyński, p. 21
171Article 14 ECHR, also note Article 1 of Protocol 12, para 1. Like Article 14, Protocol
12 is aimed at preventing discrimination. Unlike Article 14, it is freestanding. Unfortunately
to the project on hand, its newness and unratified status in many major countries leaves
little for us to explore. Nevertheless, it deserves short mention here for the role it may play
in EHR generally. The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities (1995) also similarly lacks reference to the ECHR.
172See Thlimmenos v. Greece, application no. 34369/97, judgment of 6 April 2000; Note
however discussions as to the limits on the autonomy of Article 14 infra at p. 211; and in
Åkermark, Sia Spiliopoulou The Limits of Pluralism–Recent Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights with Regard to Minorities: Does the Prohibition of Discrimination
Add Anything? Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 3 2002.
173See infra Section 3.3.2.
174Ibid., p. 21.
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truly become a viable path toward addressing environmental harms. Theoret-
ical discussions aside, the connection between pollution and human safety,
health, and rights to a protected private sphere has been strongly recognized
by the ECtHR, more than perhaps any other legal body. And although there
is still no direct right to an environment, or even a procedural requirement,
there is clearly an evolving indirect protection of the environment via the hu-
man rights approach.175 The above introduction helps illustrate how and why
this expansion has been possible.
More specifically, the trend toward a more expansive reading of the Con-
vention’s articles can be traced back to early cases whose decisions set out
the rules of interpretation of the Convention. The Court relied on the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed in 1969, as support and for
guidance in their analysis.176 The “good faith” doctrine of interpretation,
which the Court incorporated in the early Golder case,177 coupled with other
early cases178 stating that the Convention will be read to realize the aims and
objectives of the treaty, set the trajectory for the Court.
It is these “aims and objectives” that have been read now to include prob-
lems with the environment which touch on other protected aspects of human
security. The European Court has now heard claims of environmental issues
creating violations of the right to life,179 the right to respect for the home and
private life,180 the right to effective domestic remedies,181 and the right to a
fair hearing in the courts in relation to environmental problems.182.
An expanding relationship between established human rights and environ-
mental issues is treated as unambiguously beneficial for proponents of more
175Or, protection par ricochet cf. San José.
176Ovey/White, p. 38.
177Golder v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A, No. 18. para 29,
following Vienna Convention article 31(1).
178Wemhoff v. Germany, application no. 2122/64 judgement of 27 June 1968, para 8;
stating interpretation is that which is“. . .most appropriate in order to realise the aim and
achieve the object of the treaty. . . ”
179Article 2 of the Convention. e.g. Öneryildiz v. Turkey, application no. 48939/99 Grand
Chamber judgment of 30 November 2004.
180Article 8 of the Convention. E.g. Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, applica-
tion no. 36022/97, Grand Chamber judgment of 8 July 2003; Guerra and Others v. Italy,
application no 116 /1996/735/932, Grand Chamber judgment of 19 February 1998.
181Article 13 of the Convention. E.g. Powell & Rayner v. the United Kingdom, application
no. 9310/81, judgment of 21 February 1990.
182Article 6(1), E.g. Taskin v. Turkey, application no. 46117/99, judgment of 10 Novem-
ber 2004
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environmental protection.183 Under the European system, as mentioned, there
is a strong chance that a State found at fault to the Convention must change
their legislation to reflect the Courts negative ruling. This has the benefit of
preventing future cases, thus making the litigation a boon for future genera-
tions as well.184
Given both the jurisprudence and the range of books covering the ECHR’s
expansion into environmentalists’ terrain,185 it is surprising that there is not
yet any concrete discussion of the derived-rights relative to environmental
justice concerns. Although the Court is expressly not an appeals court, and the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which it oversees, is not an
instrument guaranteeing any rights to the environment,186 the European Court
has clearly shown that environmental factors and national authority decisions
on how to use the environment can impact the rights that the ECHR does
explicitly recognize. In addition to situations where a State Party has violated
a right via their environmental actions or inactions, the Court has shown a
willingness to interpret the Convention as imposing limited positive obligations
on States to secure the rights guaranteed via there environmental actions (and
inactions). These positive obligations on the State have been voiced specifically
in both environmental contexts and non-environmental contexts.
In light of the expansion there have been calls for a formal protocol clarifying
the Convention’s commitments to environmental situations. One example was
a call to recognize procedural rights to environmental protection.187 Though
the talk of substantive rights has been great, the attempts to put one in to
place have been less, but certainly not absent, especially where toxics and im-
minent danger are concerned. Reasons for the limited explicit uptake lay with
the problems outlined in Section 4.1 and can be found discussed at length
183This is a topic though which needs more research, especially from a victimology stand-
point.
184The Court’s ruling may, indeed leave no alternative to the national jurisdiction other
than to change the national law. e.g. X and Y v. the Netherlands judgment of 26 March
1985, A/93. cf Alkema, p. 44. For discussions on environmental justice vis-à-vis inter-
generational justice, see recently Hiskes, Richard P. The Human Right to a Green Future:
Environmental Rights and Intergenerational Justice. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
185Especially official books by the CoE itself, like Council of Europe Manual on human
rights and the environment
186See Ibid.; Also Fadeyeva v. Russia application no. 55723/00, judgment of 6 September
2005, esp. para 69; Kyrtatos v. Greece, application no. 41666/98, judgment of 22 May 2003.
para 52.
187Recommendation 1614 of Parliamentary Assembly 27 June 2003, cf. San José, p. 5,n. 1
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in texts.188 The following paragraphs though lay out the human rights di-
mension of environmental situations as seen from a European human rights
perspective, describing what has been put down on paper, if not in the form
of an explicit right. The concrete exposition, utilizing established cases con-
necting the environment to explicit rights in the convention, illustrates both
how broad the European Court has gone, the potential for further protection,
and the potential role on environmental justice issues.
4.2.2 The Right To Life and the Environment
The most powerful human rights article available to those attempting to deal
with environmental problems via a human rights claim would be an action
against Article 2, which safeguards the right to life. The Court has recognized
that it is the duty of States to not only protect citizens from actions of agents of
the State which could result in the taking of life,189 but also to take appropriate
forward-looking, positive actions to safeguard life.190 In doing so, they have
put the onus on the State to show that, in the myriad of circumstances in
which modern life can put the Individual at risk, they have met their burden
in actively protecting life, and not merely refraining from taking it.191
The question before the ECtHR in situations where the environment puts
lives at risk is not, however, whether the citizens involved had a right to a cer-
tain environment—a substantive weighing of the environmental conditions—
but whether the States failure to regulate on the basis of the dangerous envi-
ronmental conditions violated the positive obligations under the Convention
to safeguard human life. In that sense, Article 2 creates derived obligations
for the state to proactively regulate dangerous environmental scenarios that
could come back to impact the right to life.
Such obligations fit within existing Article 2 jurisprudence of non-environmental
188Notably the recent Kravchenko/Bonnie, as a textbook treatment.
189Which was the primary purpose in composing Article 2., Council of Europe Manual on
human rights and the environment , p. 25
190Öneryildiz v. Turkey, application no. 48939/99, judgment of 30 November 2004, para
71. Also Budayeva and Others v. Russia, application no. 15339/02 judgment of 20 March
2008, for cases in the environmental context. For general discussion, Janis/Kay/Bradley,
Chap. 4.
191LCB v. United Kingdom, application no. 23413/94, judgment of 9 June 1998. Much
of the high burden of protection jurisprudence comes from cases involving individuals in
state custody. E.g. Timurtas v. Turkey application no 23531/94 judgment of 13 June
2000; Salmun v. Turkey, application no. 21986/93, judgment of 27 June 2000; Anguelova
v. Bulgaria, application no. 38361/97, judgment of 13 June 2002.
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threats. For example, threats to life do not only arise in situations where a
death has occurred; there is a positive duty in exceptional situations where
there was a danger of loss of life.192 If danger of the loss of life via a state’s
failure to, say, properly regulate its police force, engages Article 2, then so does
the state’s failure to foreseeably protect from environmental dangers. Viewing
the derivation in this way helps one to keep in mind that the danger must
be clear and foreseeable; the regulations which restrain a state’s use of force
against human life must run parallel with the regulations which restrain a
state’s utilization of the environment, even if the environment’s effects against
human life are not desired.
Other Article 2 claims reveal an expressed procedural aspect of the positive
obligations.193 In the event of an environmental tragedy, there should be
domestic procedures in place capable of determining the chain of command
which failed, and hence, assess responsibility. Especially in the case where
life is lost, there are strong procedural requirements to investigate emerging
as positive obligations under Article 2.194 These safeguards are only logical;
“[t]he obligation is to have a certain kind of legal regime, one that by its rules
of conduct, and by its machinery of enforcement, enhances everyone’s prospect
of staying alive.”195
These positive obligations under Article 2 explicitly extend into environ-
mental factors that involve both the State’s knowledge of, and information
pertaining to, environmental hazards as they impact human life. In LCB v.
United Kingdom, an episode of childhood leukemia triggered a question of
whether the State had a positive duty to inform the family of soldiers exposed
to radiation in early nuclear weapons tests. Although the Court recognized a
State’s obligation to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction from
known hazards they also presented a test of foreseeable causality. In the case
of the cancer, it was not clear that the exposure, especially at the levels in the
case, could have caused the illness, at least to the degree that would trigger
192See Markaratzis v. Greece, application no. 50385/99, Grand Chamber judgment of 20
December 2004.
193Council of Europe Manual on human rights and the environment , p. 28.
194Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the UK, application no. 46477/99, judgment of 14 March
2002. The Edwards case found a “systematic collapse” in the state’s safeguards and policy
which should have operated to protect a particularly vulnerable prisoner. Other cases,
including Keenan v. United Kingdom, application no.27229/95, judgment of April 2001,
and Osman v. United Kingdom, application no. 23452/94, judgment of 28 October 1998,
29 E.H.R.R. 245 help define the minimum protections in the European Court.
195Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 153.
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a State’s positive obligation to warn and prevent. A similar case, McGinley
and Egan v. the United Kingdom,196 established however a duty on the gov-
ernment to have procedures in place for individuals to “seek all relevant and
appropriate information” regarding possible health risks they were exposed to
by the actions of the State. Read together the cases, although acknowledg-
ing that environmental hazards can reach to human rights levels when they
endanger life, limit culpability only for foreseeable consequences and instruct
states to allow for informational access.197
Article 2 jurisprudence predicts that issues emerge most strongly in a pollu-
tion context when actors engage in regulation involving the use of the environ-
ment that can have dangerous and foreseeable effects on human life, becoming
even more problematic when there is a lack of information flow and official
procedure. The most notable case in this regard is Öneryildiz v. Turkey. The
Öneryildiz case involved the death of family members of the applicant follow-
ing an explosion at a garbage dump near their familys home. The Court found
that the State knew and tolerated the housing, although the development was
technically illegal. Remedy also failed at the domestic level, exposing the state
to questions of its ability to secure Article 2 rights. This section details the
arguments in more detail.
4.2.2.1 Öneryildiz v. Turkey and the Right to Life
Öneryildiz v. Turkey is perhaps the black-letter case in the canon of derived en-
vironmental rights.198 The case is so prominent because it ties unambiguously
the State to a positive duty to protect citizens from dangerous environmental
situations, at least from dangers of which they have knowledge. And while it
is often held up as a clear example of an implied environmental right inside
the ECHR one should always keep in mind the central role that the magni-
tude and foreseeability of danger played. Furthermore, the role played by the
lackluster domestic investigation of the incident, an explosion which claimed
the lives of the applicant’s family members, is not trivial in the outcome. The
196application no. 10/1997/794/995-996, judgment of 9 June 1998, para 101. See also
page 154.
197As such, and reminiscent of the discussion in Chapter 2, there are limits to the pro-
tection of humans and their environments available via linkage to human rights like life.
Notably, with very few exceptions, domestic courts do not take the view that toxic pollution
is a de facto violation of the right to life. See Hancock, p. 118; Anderson.
198application no. 48939/99, judgment of the Grand Chamber, 30 November 2004.
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handling raised questions of proper provision of access to justice under Article
13, in addition to related questions regarding destruction of property and the
home under Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol Number 1, above the Article
2 claim.
The case claimed a violation of the right to life when nine members ap-
plicant’s family perished during an explosion at a garbage dump near their
home.199 The rubbish tip (landfill) started in the 1970s on an uninhabited
stretch of land but soon attracted unauthorized housing, which grew into the
“slums of Ümraniye.”200 The explosion killed thirty-nine people in all.
Though the residences were illegal there was no evidence of effort to enforce
that law. In fact, the toleration was quite explicit; the area was under the
authority of a local mayor, himself under a district council.201 The rubbish
collection was under the control of the Istanbul City Council and ministerial
authorities. In 1991, the representative district council brought action against
the Istanbul City Council questioning the safety of the landfill; action which led
to experts deeming the tip was not in compliance with domestic regulations.202
The government, however, hedged and initiated redevelopment plans when the
district council asked for the tip to be closed and monetary compensation be
paid to those forced to move.203 The State tolerated the ongoing risk to
citizens as they negotiated a way forward. This acceptance proved crucial in
the Court’s judgment of a violation under Article 2.204 Clearly the situation
carries some of the strongest parallels with U.S. environmental justice concerns
seen in official European jurisprudence, combining minorities, powerlessness,
administrative carelessness, and concentrated pollution.
Through the de facto toleration, the State could not fulfill its positive obliga-
tions under Article 2 to safeguard the lives of its citizens. This was especially
199Garbage dumps create significant quantities of methane as their contents biodegrade.
The methane quantities are so great that they can be captured for sale as fuel. Properly
managed, this is an economic side-benefit to rubbish dumps. Improper management however
can leave pockets of gas poised for explosion. Methane can combust when mixed with air in
proper ratios. Gerry, Alison Case Comment Öneryildiz v Turkey. European Human Rights





204Compare toleration of danger in a different context, in Tatar v. Romania, application
no. 67021/01, judgment of 27 January 2009. In the Court’s admissibility decisions (of 5
July 2007) they moved the applicants claim of Article 2 infractions (para. 46.) to Article 8
(para. 47).
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the case within the known probability of such an explosion. The Government’s
defense that they had no responsibility when the threat was not immediate did
not suffice. Convention rights at all times must be practical and effective,205
and, as industrial activities already garnering the attentive nature of State’s
via policy and permitting are, by their nature, dangerous,206 the effective-
ness and practicality of the state’s protection was viewed as eroded by their
toleration and slowness.
Turkey then found it hard to defend a position of either ignorance or that
a level of positive protection had been reached. Further damaging, domestic
remedy was rather lacking. Criminal proceedings were lodged at the domestic
level against the authorities, and two mayors were found criminally negli-
gent.207 Their minimum sentence of jail time was later commuted to fines,
and finally suspended entirely.208 There were additional administrative legal
action, ending with a monetary award to the applicant.209 The monetary
award, however, was never paid.210 The failure of domestic remedy and over-
sight pushes the case more easily into human rights territory.211
From this situation, the European Court found that Article 2 can create
derived obligations for the state to proactively regulate dangerous environ-
mental scenarios though this outcome derives prominently from the failure
of the Turkish government to mount a proper investigation into the deaths.
“Where negligence goes beyond error of judgment or carelessness, the fact that
no one has been charged with a criminal offence or prosecuted may amount
to a violation of Art.2, irrespective of what other type of remedy there may
be.”212 This in essence allowed the State to operate devoid of an incentive
system aligning the interests of the supervisory organs to the interests of the
residents around the tip. Where such a nexus of environmental danger, gov-
ernment policy, and human life exists, so does a positive duty under Article
2,213 a positive duty that must be fulfilled by sufficiently aligning the incen-







211Recall that domestic remedies must, in most cases, be exhausted before the European
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tives of actors involved. The Court subsequently found a violation of the right
to life, along with violations of Article 1 of Protocol 1, as the Turkish courts
had awarded them satisfaction for the destruction but had not yet paid, and
Article 13 for the lengthy administrative proceedings which did not meet the
threshold of effective remedy.
Such a strong criticism of the national government’s procedures rightfully
gives Öneryildiz v. Turkey a prominent place among the cases relevant to
EHR in Europe. Here, not only did the government receive criticism for not
protecting their citizens from probable danger, but they failed in providing
legal pathways for rectification of the tragedy. The solidification of ideas on
what role environmental protection plays in safeguarding human life lets re-
search today firmly claim that there are derived protections to humans via
their environs within the Convention.
4.2.3 Right to Respect for the Home and the Environment
Derived environmental protections also extend from the a right to respect for
private and family life. Here in Article 8 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, as with rights protected in Article 2, the Court has found positive
obligations to safeguard the quality of private life and the amenities enjoyable
in a home setting by properly regulating the external environment.214 The
concept of a right to a private life is naturally a broad notion215 but jurispru-
dence has, as with Article 2, clarified when environmental issues cross into the
protected sphere.
This line of ECtHR jurisprudence wrestles with definitions as amorphous as
“respect”, “private life,” and “family life.”216 The fact that the Court wrestles
and continues to allow these cases though is a broad positive for the equally
amorphous idea of environmental rights, insofar as a signal that the European
Court does not shy away from even more difficult interpretations than where
environments encroach on protections for life itself (Article 2). With respect
to difficulties, the Court must, in addition, tackle the ubiquitous concerns of
214See Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom, application no. 9310/81, judgment of 21
February 1990. General discussions are explored in Janis/Kay/Bradley, Chap. 8
215See Niemietz v. Germany, application no. 13710/88 judgment of 16 December 1992.
esp. para 29.
216esp: Johnston v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, 9 E.H.R.R. 203; X and Y v.
The Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985 8 E.H.R.R. 235
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derogations in the second paragraph of most stated rights.217
Granted, a willingness to wrestling with the issues is not the same as issuing
clarifying rulings. As far as setting bright line definitions of such amorphous
concepts goes, there is a noticeable hesitance on the part of the European
Court, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court.218 But in the former’s case, to a
level of abstraction that is helpful to the environmental justice discussion, we
can say that the Court errs toward creating and cultivating a social milieu
and inertia toward the establishment and maintenance of connections. They
do this by leaning heavily on a doctrine of extending margins of appreciation
to the State. The Court allows states and their own unique culture and history
to decide how to weigh the connections fostered by family and a home against
the larger connections and necessities of society.
Connections is perhaps just as vague a word as “family” or “private life”
but has the benefit of being invariant to context.219 Article 8 contains a
unique construction relative to the rest of the Convention protocols, speak-
ing to “respect for. . . ” where other rights specifically connect “a right to. . . ”
something. The addition of “respect” into the phraseology has elicited caustic
criticism relegating the term to “the world of manners rather than the law.”220
The raising of legal hackles is more than a matter of editorial preference. The
major, if not primary, role of the European Court in many cases is to evaluate
the balance of rights between people and the State; situations where rights,
especially as exercised via valid choices on either side of the argument, come
into conflict are the most difficult. Such situations are not aided by phrasing
which leans toward “a general character of individual autonomy.”221 For the
purpose of Article 8 inquiry then the invariant and therefore question of the
first order becomes whether or not the affirmation or negation of the environ-
ment surrounding these connections foments and maintains connections—both
similar and dissimilar from this case—in greater society.
217The notably exception is Article 3: Prohibition of Torture. There there are no permissi-
ble derogations. Article 2—Right to Life—however and in contrast does permit derogations
in certain “absolutely necessary” situations.
218Although the Supreme Court has had opportunity to touch on and spark significant
comment in that direction in the conservative milieu of the U.S. See as an introduction and
among many other contemporary discussions Sunstein, Cass R. What did Lawrence Hold?
Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage. Supreme Court Review , 2003 2003.
219A worthy point of note that the protection of family life under the ECHR presupposes
the existence of a family. See Fretté v. France, 26. Feb. 2002, 38 E.H.R.R. 21
220Fawcett, J.E.S. The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2nd edition. Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 211; cf. Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 374
221Ibid.
184
4.2 The ECHR and EHR
Signatory States must put procedures in place to balance the use of the
environment with often the unavoidable detriment to personal life and famil-
ial connections that utilizing environmental resources causes. The Court has
already heard cases where sounds,222 smells,223 emissions,224 and industrial
processes225 have encroached on the positive obligation to safeguard the home
sphere.
Laying further importance on the connections of the home is Article 1 of
Protocol 1, which serves to protect property and possessions. The peaceful
possession requirement can trigger positive obligations for adequate compen-
sation in expropriations by the State, especially where a State project may
subject citizens remaining in the area to environmental burdens.226 These
established rights are most powerful in environmental contexts when there is
an industrial nuisance coupled with a “failure to take adequate preventative
measures to control these known sources of serious risk to life, health, private
life or property.”227 Risks to life were illustrated in Öneryildiz, and similar
tones for the latter connections are enunciated in Kyrtatos v. Greece,228 where
the relevant aspect is clearly to protect humans vis-à-vis harmful environs, but
not necessarily to protect the environment for the sake of itself.
One should note though that protection of the environment itself can be
a cause for the State to derogate from Article 8 (and Article 1 of Protocol
1) obligations. This is the case when the State would like to protect areas
of their environment, especially from development, which puts conditions and
constraints on the plans of individuals for their private sphere and possessions.
In these situations the State is effectively securing the rights of other individ-
uals, not including the applicant, to an environment that would otherwise be
encroached by the applicant.229 The State is allowed to weigh the connections
222Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 8 July 2003;
Powell & Rayner v. the United Kingdom, application no. 45305/99, judgment of 21 Febru-
ary 1990; Moreno Gómez v. Spain, application no. 4143/02, judgment of 16 November
2004.
223López Ostra v. Spain, application no. 16798/90, judgment of 9 December 1994.
224Guerra and Others v. Italy, application no. 116/1996/735/932, judgment of 19 Febru-
ary 1998.
225Fadeyeva v. Russia, application no. 55723/00, judgment of 9 June 2005.
226See Bistrovic v. Croatia, application no. 25774/05, judgment of 31 May 2007.
227Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 487.
228application no. 41666/98, judgment of 22 May 2003.
229See, inter alia, Papastavrou and Others v. Greece, application no. 46372/99, judgment
of 10 April 2003; Chapman v. the United Kingdom application no. 27238/95 judgment of
18 January 2001, para 82; Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), application no. 12033/86, judgment
of 18 February 1991; Pine Valley Developments Ltd. and Others v. Ireland, application no.
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fostered by one side of the argument against the other, bounded by safety
concerns of course.
It should be noted too that some commentators believe that the expanding
readings of the Court are not a reflection of indirect rights to the environment,
but a wider appreciation for national authorities’ considering use of the en-
vironment as a general interest.230 That is, the activism of finding indirect
environmental rights and the restraint of allowing certain external factors to
encroach individual rights are really “two sides of the same coin.”231 Indeed,
this is an interesting perspective to justify the Court’s allowance of “economic
well-being” as a counterpoint for individual rights infringed in many environ-
mental instances. The “economic” arguments are a proxy for the many aspects
of enjoyment of rights which come into play with economic stability, jobs and
job creation, and local economy.
This boils down to a coherent Article 8 jurisprudence where the European
Court has acknowledged that the State enjoys a margin of appreciation—a
significant amount of decision-making leeway—in determining how to strike a
balance between economic interests and protection. Citizens in turn enjoy a
narrowing of that margin as the danger they are exposed to increases.232 The
enunciation of the concept of margins of is important, as a defendant State will
often—and likely—argue that the environmentally damaging activity is in the
economic interest of the community. Such arguments are valid, but the States
allowance of the damage must be proportional to the level of benefit to the
community and bounded by degrees of safety afforded by other rights. Though
not completely amorphous then, the concept of a margin of appreciation, while
admirable in its goal of providing flexibility within reason, is not necessarily
predictable. With the benefits of flexibility arrive the immediate downside of
12741/87, judgment of 29 November 1991; H̊akansson and Sturesson v. Sweden application
no. 11855/85 judgment of 23 January 1990, para 44.
230San José, p. 9.
231Mahoney, Paul Judicial activism and judicial self-restraint in the European Court of
Human Rights: two sides of the same coin. Human Rights Law Journal , 11 1990, Nr. 1-2,
cf. San José, p. 48
232The ECHR jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation is broad and deep. For a
textbook introduction, see Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 242-53. The general deference cases and
situations arise often in cases of morality and civil discourse. But many of the points are
discussed infra in the application of the concept of deference toward states in environmental
cases. A similar narrowing occurs in the Aarhus Convention, where duty to (positively)
inform of danger increases as the environmental threats become imminent. See art. 5(1)(c)
and Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 492.
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malleability.233
The approach now often taken by the Court leaves the judges address-
ing the proportionality and fairness of the balance—and the availability of
remedy/remediation—between competing interests instead of defining sub-
stantive metrics of respect for family life.234 When dealing with such po-
tentially threatening environmental tradeoffs such as disposal or use of haz-
ardous materials and waste, the State would have limited recourse to economic
justifications. Even if allowed, the activity would have to conform to local reg-
ulations and permitting, as well conforming to the positive obligations put on
the State to allow access to information concerning dangerous activities that
potentially infringe on Article 2 and 8 rights, dictated by Article 10.235
There are several cases which have helped the European Court define the
nexus of environmental connections to Article 8 duties and, along the way,
elucidated this idea of margins of appreciation. The following cases illustrate
the situation with specific detail.
4.2.3.1 Hatton v. the United Kingdom: Margins of Appreciation
The case of Hatton and Others v. The United Kingdom236 plays a central role
in ECtHR cases alleging a violation of Convention rights perpetrated through
environmental decisions. Here, an environmental burden need not threaten
lives but rather—and rather simply—threatens the enjoyment of daily life
itself. Most prominently, it establishes a “wide margin of appreciation” for
State parties in balancing the interests of the individual against the needs of
the community.
The Hatton case revolves around night flights coming into Heathrow Air-
233Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 255.
234San José, p. 50 As an enlightening example of a very early balancing of health versus
polluting activities, consider the question of what to do about air pollution from burning coal
in 17th Century London. Although the air was dirtier, there was evidence of less deaths than
in the “cleaner” cities of Liège and Paris. Some of the variation in deaths was postulated
to be from the availability of cheaper heating materials (coal) in London. Naturally, the
science at the time leaves much to be desired would we wish to debate the situation using
today’s standards. At the time, however, how would one have gone about setting policy
or deciding when rights (to life or home) were infringed? cf. Brimblecombe, Peter The
big smoke: a history of air pollution in London since medieval times. Methuen, 1987. The
story is eye-opening, if not instructive, to bear in mind when we tackle issues today where
scientific uncertainty or limited knowledge play strong roles in the policy discussion.
235Council of Europe Manual on human rights and the environment , p. 17. For a discus-
sion of the positive obligations to allow access to information, see Section 4.2.4
236application no. 36022/97, judgement of the Grand Chamber, 8 July 2003
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port and the disruption the regulated flight patterns had on the surrounding
neighborhoods’ inhabitants. The disruption was severe enough to warrant
an inspection of Article 8 rights promised by the European Court.237 The
case was seen as a new test for the wider margins of appreciation left in a
similar cases, Powell and Rayner,238 which also addressed the government’s
balancing of the needs of the community and the rights of the individual.239
Hatton revolved around noise complaints and the right to a satisfactory home
life in the neighborhoods surrounding Heathrow Airport. Although common
law remedies did exist, their power to satisfy the complaints within domestic
law were demonstrably truncated. The truncated powers were not, however,
found in violation protection to access the Courts or effective remedy. The
proper functioning of the appeals and administrative system then satisfied the
State’s positive obligations toward being able to balance society’s use of the
environment and the rights to family life enjoyed by those local to the airport.
The Court’s logic was that, where health effects and the environment were
potentially impacting Convention rights, the State had two obligations. They
first must minimize interference with rights by exploring alternatives or options
and secondly must conduct complete investigations and fact-finding missions
into fleshing out these solutions.240 Article 38 of the Convention binds the
States to “furnish all necessary facilities” necessary for an investigation and to
“assist the Court as needed.”241 By burdening a State to carry a substantial
inquiry in seemingly all such cases, the Court put procedural requirements on
the establishment of the margins of appreciation left to national authorities.
Further, should those procedures be insufficient, there is nothing to preclude a
domestic finding of innocence from being referred to the Court.242 The Court,
however, stops well short of repeating national investigations when contentious
points arise in front of them. Here there is clear deference to national, het-
erogenous, systems and a subsidiary role of the European Court, so long as the
particular methods utilized at the national level meet the minimum standards
237The case also claimed violations of Article 6 and 13 of the European Court.
238Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom, application no. 9310/81, judgement 21 Febru-
ary 1990.
239Hyam, Jeremy Hatton v United Kingdom in the Grand Chamber: One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back? European Human Rights Law Review , 6 2006.
240Ibid.
241Janis et al. (2008) note that specific commitments were fleshed out and added out
of frustrations with previous investigations, such as Timurtas v. Turkey, application no.
23531/9413, judgment of 13 June 2000. See Janis/Kay/Bradley.
242e.g. Eğda̧s v. Turkey 27 July 2004.
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for enabling Convention rights.243
The problem here in Hatton, then, was how to weigh the cases when there
were two very convincing claims. Procedures allowed for appeal had failed
to find a compromise where local residents felt as though their rights were
fulfilled. A further restriction of night flying would have a deep impact on
local and even nation-wide economics. On the other hand, the neighbors of
the airport were suffering a heavy burden dealing with the interruption in
their sleep and their enjoyment of familial connections within the home, which
was a potential failure of the State to protect their right to private life. The
environmental degradation at hand was both direct and serious enough to
trigger scrutiny of Article 8,244 that is, to surmount admissibility criteria.
How did the Court compare apples and oranges in a transparent fashion?245
In the end, the Grand Chamber left the matter open to the State, overturning
the lower Chamber’s decision, by reaffirming their commitment to allowing
wide margins for domestic regulators to best strike a bargain between eco-
nomics and home life.246 The Grand Chamber saw no reason to “adopt a spe-
cial approach in this respect by reference to a special status of environmental
human rights.”247 Although the residents were not satisfied with the choices
made by the State, the Court found that the State had indeed taken their
concerns in to consideration, at least enough consideration to surmount con-
cerns and land the State safely in their margin of appreciation. And although
the situation was grounded in the control of night-flights, differentiating it in
scope from the earlier Powell & Rayner v. the United Kingdom, there was
not enough reason given by the intrusions into the private sphere to warrant
overturning the State’s judgment on the margins of the balance.248
Notably to this case, there was no evidence of a decrease in home prices,
meaning that the economic improvement claimed by the State, while poten-
tially coming at the expense of the enjoyment of life for the residents at that
243Janis et al. note that the Court may be more receptive to facts from domestic cases
with the elimination of the Commission as a filter to the Court, see Janis/Kay/Bradley,
p. 165, citing McKerr v. United Kingdom, application no. 28883/95, judgment of 4 May
2001.
244Hatton para 96.
245See dissenting opinions by Judges Greve and Kerr, who question how tightening the
margins in this case does not mesh with the existing case law.
246Noting the judgement of Buckley v. the United Kingdom, application no. 20348/92,
judgment 25 September 1996, also establishing precedent for wide margins to States in
planning issues.
247para 122
248San José, p. 34.
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location did not prevent or reduce the ability for the residents to enjoy their
possessions elsewhere.249 Boyle notes, as did the Chamber judgment and dis-
senting Grand Chamber opinions, that the State did not demonstrate explicitly
the value of the night flights (the intrusion) however and so one has nothing
against which to weigh any changes in value. In absence of this assessment,
one sees an even greater deference to the State’s policy in the abstract than
the usually concrete comparisons detailed in a margin of appreciation argu-
ment. The Court, while reaffirming and indeed solidifying its previous stances
on granting wide margins of appreciation to domestic authorities, and focus-
ing their own investigation on whether the domestic authorities gave enough
thought, time, alternatives, and weight to alternatives and proper procedure,
refrained from widening the path toward environmental rights via Article 8.250
The Court clearly stated though that it was not a question of whether the
duty to secure a right to a private and home life under Article 8 was analysed
as a positive obligation or negative duty.251 From either perspective, the Court
must determine whether a fair balance was struck. The implicit wide margin
afforded to the State was filled by the many measures taken to control and
regulate the noise and annoyance experienced by any neighbor. These included
abatement protocols and barriers, noise certifications for aircraft, night flying
restrictions, noise monitoring points, alternate runway usage, and grants to
homeowners for sound isolation. The measures put in place must, in the eyes
of the European Court, be proportionate to the aim of the domestic authority
in encroaching on rights. In this case, the abundance of measures put in place
to mitigate the negative aspects of the otherwise (ostensibly) lucrative benefits
of expansion at the country’s largest air center satisfied the Court’s scrutiny.
A recent comparator case comes from Taskin v. Turkey,252 where the do-
mestic courts failed, in the eyes of the European Court, as the weighers of
public interest. The outcome is important as Article 8 provides no explicit
procedural requirements; the process must only be fair and afford due respect
for interests of individual as safeguarded.253 Both questions of proper pro-
cedure and the levels of permissible environmental invasions into the home
249cf. Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] .
250Hyam Although the access for complaints stands in notable contrast to the narrowing
of standing for environmental complaints in the U.S., analogous to this issue.
251Powell & Rayner, para 41. Also Hatton & Others, para 98.
252application no. 46117/99, judgment of 10 November 2004.
253McMichael v. the United Kingdom, application no. 16424/90, judgement 24 February
1995.
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came to the forefront in López Ostra v. Spain, which further illustrates the
Court’s grappling with defining margins of appreciation, and when the State’s
decisions lie within that sphere.
4.2.3.2 López Ostra v. Spain: The Levels of Environmental Damage
Like Hatton, López Ostra v. Spain254 is bound to be cited in any human rights
complaint stemming from environmental complaints. The case involved an ap-
plicant whose house sat near a treatment plant for liquid and solid waste from
the tannery industry, continuing the thread of “living near unpleasantness”
running throughout the cases. Also related is the lack of effective oversight;
the plant began operating without a license and soon after suffered a malfunc-
tion which released gases into the surrounding the community. The plant had
also been built with subsidies from the State,255 therefore pulling the State
into the nexus of responsibility although the pollution was not directly the
fault of the state, as it was with decision making in Hatton.256
In response to the health problems and nuisance caused by the emissions
the town relocated those affected to the city center, away from the emissions.
The treatment plant though continued to operate with few new restrictions257
and the regulations already in place did not address human health risks. The
lacuna gave weight to the applicant’s view that the authorities took a passive
stance in a matter which bore on their Convention rights. The continued op-
eration, lack of health-focused responses, and questionable relocation policy
brought issues of interference with the home, ability to choose place of resi-
dence, physical and psychological intrusions, and infringements of liberty and
safety to the forefront.258
This case shows first the important doctrine of the European Court of re-
lying strongly on the decisions of domestic courts in evaluating any subjective
qualities relevant to the human rights question. 259 The domestic decision
254application no. 16798/90, judgment 23 November 1994
255para 7, 52.
256There was a nexus of connection to State action and thus this is not purely a case the
Convention’s Drittwirkung.
257Operating through 1993, having begun operations without their permit in 1988.
258The fact that another plan had gone into effect by the time of the case reaching the
ECHR was immaterial. The present facts could be a factor in assessing damages but not
in determining the extent of human rights violations. L’opez Ostra para. 42, citing Marckx
v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, pp. 13-14, para. 27; and Inze v.
Austria, judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p. 16, para. 32.
259See also the more recent Giamcomelli v. Italy, application no. 59909/00, judgment of
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makers already acknowledged the danger in their decision to relocate affected
individuals and, at a level removed from immediate risk, that the emissions
were a nuisance, recognized the life-impairing quality of emissions that were
not in and of themselves dangerous to health. The domestic actions thus
become the cultural thermometer for the Court. With the judgement of the
domestic courts cementing the fact that the local laws considered the situation
to be problematic to the applicants, the Court could set to work on the very
important question of how to analyze the question of infringement.
In moving again toward assessing margins of appreciation, the Court noted
that it could analyze the situation through either a positive obligations or
negative duties lens, as the two approaches are, in fact, “broadly similar,”260
having acknowledged that
“[i]n both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that
has to be struck between the competing interests of the individ-
ual and of the community as a whole, and in any case the State
enjoys a certain margin of appreciation. Furthermore, even in re-
lation to the positive obligations flowing from the first paragraph
of Article 8 (art. 8-1), in striking the required balance the aims
mentioned in the second paragraph (art. 8-2) may be of a certain
relevance. . . ”261
The Court first articulated that the positive approach as an area where they
would have limited competence, allowing thus for a more fixed, wide mar-
gin of appreciation, but have since then moved toward clarifying and solid-
ifying where they will and will not tread in dictating adjustments to that
margin.262 The Court here defined its task—and its future tasks in similar
circumstances—“not as determining what level of environmental quality is
compatible with the enjoyment of protected rights, but as ensuring that de-
2 November 2006.
260Guerra para 51
261See, in particular, Rees v. United Kingdom, Series A no. 106, judgment of 17 October
1986, p. 15, para. 37, and Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom, para. 41.
262See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, application no. 9214/80;
9473/81; 9474/81, judgment of 28 May 1985: “especially as far as those positive obligations
are concerned, the notion of respect is not clear-cut: having regard to the diversity of
the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notions
requirements will vary considerably from case to case. Accordingly, this is an area in which
the Contracting Parties enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be
taken to ensure compliance with the Convention with due regard to the needs and resources
of the community and the individuals.” (para 67)
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cision to tolerate activities conducive to environmental degradation are based
on a process that duly takes individual interest into account.”263 The Court
then only looked at the issue of whether the State adequately secured the right
to a home and family life for the applicants.
Here, as in newer cases, the environmental damage and therefore infringe-
ment on rights guaranteed must reach a certain level before it breaches the
margins allowed to the State and triggers Convention protection.264 The Court
clarified this in Kyrtatos v. Greece,265 where the level of activity and envi-
ronmental damage, although done in an unlawful manner implying a poorly
established balance by the State, was ruled not to reach the levels of subjec-
tive damage needed for an infraction of Article 8. The case by case approach
to weighing margins appeared also in López Ostra, where the Court found it
relatively easy to delineate the scope of the claim as within the boundaries of
home, private, and family life as stated in Article 8, but did not elaborate on
defining the nexus. The absence of clarifying words leaves an evaluation of
environmental detriment to familial connections to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis. That is unfortunate in the sense that lawyers do not even know if
the Court will distinguish the sphere of “home” as separate from the spheres
of “private and family life,” to say nothing of defining the borders of either.
For instance, would this case be as clear cut if the environmental pollution
had only affected the applicants at their place of employment?266 Since that
time, the Court has seemed to favor viewing environmental pollution’s en-
croachment as hindering “family life” as opposed to the more limited viewing
of direct effects on “the home.”267 That is, familial connections seem to draw
the weight of infringement analysis, drawing a protected sphere around the
private sphere.
While this remains an open question, building from Hatton and López Ostra
shows that the European Court is up to the task of challenging the State to
explain its behaviour in regulating the environment. A State who steps on
connections engendered by family and private life while deciding environmental
263Desgagné, Richard Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on
Human Rights. American Journal of International Law , 89 1995, p. 791.
264Ibid., p. 790.
265Kyrtatos v. Greece, application no. 41666/98, judgement of 22 August 2003.
266Ibid., p. 789. See also Niemietz v. Germany, application no. 13710/88, judgment of
16 December 1992para 29,30.
267Noted by Kovler, J in Concurring Opinion to Fadeyeva v. Russia, application no.
55723/00 judgment of 9 June 2005.
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usage puts itself in a position to be questioned on human rights grounds.
Following from the acceptance of cases by the ECtHR then situations which
could reach this level must have procedures and remedies in place to question
and prevent the situations from reaching to the ECtHR too. And when the
State cannot show an adequate balancing of rights between parties, the Court
will step in to evaluate.268
In López Ostra, the treatment plant may have been in the economic interests
of the town, but there was little weight on that side of the argument, given
the years of pollution the residents endured without responses from the gov-
ernment regarding the non-existent regulation. Even if there was an economic
benefit, the State went little way toward striking a balance between rights
and economic well being, and neglected the process afforded to those affected
in the meantime. The State was found to be in violation of Article 8 of the
Convention. And more recent cases have backed up the logic found here as
well as extended the Court’s willingness to weigh margins of appreciation.
It bears mentioning that weighing margins of appreciation does not place
judges outside of their competences. It does not place judges in the main in a
binding situation asking them to weigh specifics or measurements.269 Judging
whether the State met its burden in considering sound insulation and noise-
abatement in increasing the size of an airport, both of which fit into the general
need for active consideration on the part of States in protecting home life, has
been demonstrated to be different than the court judging particulars such
as whether a police force is sufficient for protection.270 The crux is for the
respondent State to show that they have given life to the obligations under
the Convention, and that burden is most easily adjudged against the backdrop
of an active legal regime.
268See also page 4.3.2.3.
269E.g. in X and Y v. the Netherlands, application 8978/80, judgment of 26 March, 1985
we see a clear ability to weigh the prevailing legal regime versus the positive obligations im-
plicit in Article 8 against. Also Hatton & Others v. United Kingdom shows a willingness to
weigh individual steps taken by the government in order to assuage their positive obligations
under Article 8.
270Arzte für das Leben v. Austria, application no. 10126/8221 judgment of 21 June 1988.
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4.2.3.3 Fadeyeva v. Russia: Health and Promises
A final illustration of the Court’s protection of the environment via Article
8 comes from the case of Fadeyeva v. Russia.271 Here we find a small town
pitted against regulations promulgated in the Soviet era to establish a safety
zone around a large and economically important steel manufacturing plant.
At its height, the smelter employed 60,000 workers,272 and produced pollution
significant enough to warrant a 5,000 meter wide “buffer” area, chosen by the
government, where people were prohibited from living. The prohibition, like
the Öneryildiz situation had little practical effect, however.
Pollution output later caused a widening of the buffer area, as the plant fell
under regulations forcing it to adhere to more rigid pollution requirements.
Residents living inside and close to the new buffer zone were suppose to be re-
housed. The rehousing, however fell under funding restrictions and there was
a waiting list for 6,820 people looking to move. Again, as in previous cases,
the the decision to analyze the case on grounds of Article 8 disturbances did
not then fall on a subjective judgment of the impact the pollution had on the
occupants. Though the complainants brought forward current illnesses, they
could not conclusively prove their current illnesses to be linked to their home’s
location inside the buffer. It was much clearer that the pollution negatively
affected their home life, without addressing direct health impacts. In light
of cases like LCB v. United Kingdom,273 the ability of environmental cases
to steer clear of having to directly link environmental pollution or hazardous
exposures to medical conditions is quite interesting for the expansiveness of the
human rights pathway. Fadeyeva shows there must be a direct link between
the environmental problem and the civil right at stake, but not to the health
situation.274
The Fadeyeva case is similar to the above cases in that situations which
gave rise to a question of Article 8 rights are frequently predicated on problems
within the domestic legal apparatus to comply with its own findings.275 Specif-
271application no. 55723/00 judgment of 30 November 2005.
272para 11.
273application no. 23413/94, judgment of 9 June 1998.
274This applies most directly to questions of access to fair trials under Article 6. The Court
has stated that, in the case of environmental disputes, “tenuous or remote” consequences of
environmental situations to secured rights are not sufficient to warrant Court oversight. cf.
Council of Europe Manual on human rights and the environment , p. 18
275Kotzeva, Anna Towards environmental accountability. New Law Journal , 155.7184
2005.
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ically here they failed to execute their judgements—rehousing—in a manner
which appeared to the Court to adequately guarantee rights to protected fam-
ily life spheres, a sphere recognized explicitly (and geometrically) by the State
itself in setting the safety barrier. The bumbled rehousing was also a disturbing
factor for López Ostra.
The Fadeyeva case though explicitly cemented some criteria necessary to
raise Article 8 claims from environmental pollution. The claim must, first and
foremost, directly affect the applicant’s home, family, or family life.276 The
direct effects must also reach a certain minimal threshold. This is illustrated
in the recent case of Fägerskiöld v. Sweden,277 the Court found that noise and
light pollution caused by a new windmill did not reach the threshold of damage
required to trigger questions of infringement of private sphere rights. The
windmill provided a positive economic benefit in the form of energy for 40-50
houses, which offset the limited noise pollution incurred by those in the direct
neighbourhood. To ensure the noise pollution remained low, and to surmount
its duty to positively balance the benefits and the negatives, the government
had placed restrictions on its operation designed to limit its highest noise
levels. And while the threshold depends on the specifics of the case, it must be
higher than the environmental problems implicit in modern city life.278 These
statements outline more definitively criteria on the environmental nexus of
protection.
Most importantly, from the Fadeyeva case we find the Court imploring the
State to “justify, using detailed and rigorous data, a situation in which certain
individuals bear a heavy burden on behalf of the rest of the community.”279
There is a clear environmental justice subtext to the Court’s statement, and
begs whether it could be restated as a requirement for the State to justify
the burden on a subset of the community? That is perhaps a bit too far
to interpret at the moment but merits attention. In either respect, the case
shows, to the benefit of the community, that the duty to prove the connection
between environmental problems and Article 8 rights can be surmounted by
“clear and concordant inferences” or “similar unrebutted presumptions of fact”
because the more rigorous information may be in the hands of the defendant,
276Kotzeva.
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and therefore unavailable to those alleging the infraction.280
The case also marked an unprecedented willingness of the Court to wade
through difficult domestic legislation, speaking directly against concerns of
the Court side-stepping quagmire cases. The time frame involved in the mate-
rial facts of the Fadeyeva case straddled communist-era and post-communist
Russia, with regulations from both eras being interpreted in light of Russia’s
accession to the ECHR.281 But the complexities could all be boiled down to
the State’s lack of action toward the ends it itself aimed for in regulations.282
Legal difficulties did not deter the Court, as they lay within the competences
of the Court, and the idea that previous domestic decisions could solidify a
conception of a substantive environmental on which the European Court could
hang its hat was set in concrete. Whether or not the Court will tackle environ-
mental questions where the substantive impact of the pollution are not already
decided by the domestic courts though remains to be seen.
4.2.3.4 Conclusions on Connections to the Home
These three cases spell out how the Court has, slowly but surely, evaluated sit-
uations of environmental degradation impinging on Article 8 rights. In brief,
where environmental problems are severe enough, and have been evaluated so
by domestic action affecting regulation or other protective actions, the State
must remain aware and justify their impact on those whose private lives stand
to suffer. The focus is the connection between a private sphere and burden-
some environs, and health outcomes remain on the fringe of the discussion.
Where the State has taken the citizen and their Article 8 connections into
consideration, they have already started down the correct path for balancing
interests. Should they have failed to do so, they are already at risk of having
violated Article 8’s balancing test. There is certainly no right to home owner-
ship here, nor is there a right to a certain measurable quality of environment
surrounding one’s home. What there is though is a recognition that a State’s
failure to double-check their permitted uses of environs can rob its citizens of
any usable protection of their home, family, or possessions.
Implicit in much of this conversation and the views on balancing rights,
280para 79.
281Russia ratified the Convention on 5 May 1998.
282Also see Case of Ledyayeva, Dobrokhotova, Zolotareva, and Romashina v. Russia,
applications nos. 53157/99, 53247/99, 53695/00 56850/00; judgment of 26 October 2006;
cases which also came from the same Severstal steel plant and situations.
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economics, and the home sphere is the need for equitable information flows
among participants. Balancing is an active process, with all participants in-
formed, a dynamic which points to the central role that information flow plays
in enabling rights. Indeed, the dynamics of information flow regarding the
environment deserves greater explanation. The following section explores the
role of information explicitly in the ECHR.
4.2.4 Rights to Information
Article 10 of the ECHR safeguards the right to receive and impart information.
While it does not impose a positive duty on the State to collect and disseminate
information,283 it does secure a right to access information, especially infor-
mation relevant in a citizens decision to bear risks. A duty to provide relevant
information grows proportionally with the risks involved, though the leading
case on this issue, Guerra and Others v. Italy, shows that any danger quickly
moves toward violation of Article 8 and safety concerns.284 If the information
is not available, then it is hard to show either that the State has considered
impacts at any level, or that citizens have had access at any relevant level to
any decision-making discourse. That pushes against the safeguards for home
and private spheres described in the previous paragraphs.
The limited Convention-based rights to environmentally relevant informa-
tion is now backed-up by the United Nations Aarhus Convention, a broader
right pushing toward imparting information rather than simply allowing ac-
cess.285 The Aarhus requirements are further supported by European environ-
mental law.286 The additions reinforce the importance of information within
283Guerra and Others v. Italy, application no 116 /1996/735/932, Grand Chamber judg-
ment of 19 February 1998, para 53.
284Council of Europe Manual on human rights and the environment , p. 53; note recently
Budayeva and others v. Russia application nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02
and 15343/02 judgment of 20 March 2008; along with Öneryildiz v. Turkey discussed above.
285Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 491.
286Ibid., p. 490, noting Council Directive 2003/4, 2003 O.J. (L 041) (EC). See Council
Decision of 17 February 2005 (2005/370/EC) on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-
making and access to justice in environmental matters). Also Council Directive 2003/4/EC
of 28 January 2003, on public access to environmental information and repealing Council
Directive 90/313/EEC. Also Council Directive 2003/35/EC of 26 May 2003, providing for
public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating
to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice
Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC. All decisions and directives can be found at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/index.htm\#legislation
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the environmental/rights discourse.
From the cases above, the European Court recognizes that environmental
damages can infringe on the negative rights to life and the home sphere. The
government is restricted in these areas normally, and in environmentally sit-
uations their failure to act to secure the environment leads to a failure to
“not interfere” in the individual’s protected space. But individuals need infor-
mation as to the environmental quality to which they are exposed, including
the polluting activities of local firms, in order to have any hope of keeping
the State in check. Article 10 of the Convention serves to push toward ac-
cess to information held by public authorities engaging in health/environment
trade-offs though it stops significantly short of forcing any level of information
exchange.
Nevertheless, as Guerra shows, in cases involving environmental use and
abuse, Article 10 rights can impact the individual’s ability to obtain satis-
factory Article 2 and Article 8 outcomes, bookending an incursion into the
home with the potential issue of withholding information. This is yet an-
other forward-focus of the Convention, with momentum backed up by extra-
Convention law like the Aarhus Convention.287 So while the facts of the case
do not speak to a strong requirement of information exchange in environmen-
tal matters, they do press the role information plays in securing rights and
proving positively fulfilled obligations towards those rights.
4.2.4.1 Guerra and Others v. Italy: Access to Information
The case of Guerra and Others v. Italy288 cements the importance of infor-
mation exchange in environmental matters. The ruling stops short of placing
requirements on the government to collect that information but nevertheless
allows the lack of information to play a supporting role in violations of Article
8.289 The case involved complaints on Articles 8 and 10 in relation to the
toxic emissions from a local chemical plant. The applicants complained that
the State failed to act, therefore failing in their positive obligations to protect
287See Section 4.2.4.2
288 application no 116 /1996/735/932, Grand Chamber judgment of 19 February 1998
289The US, by way of contrast, has legislation that mandates collection of data on toxic
releases (the Toxic Release Index), based on a philosophy of a community’s right to know.
Bowen, William M Environmental Justice through research-based decision making. Garland
Publishing Taylor & Francis Group, 2001, p. 6 . This is, however, a small part of pollution
releases of which communities might have the need to know.
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private and family life by not releasing requested information for the families
to assess their own risks of living near the factory.
The families involved lived around a chemical plant which had been judged
a “high risk” by existing regulations.290 Accidents involving arsenic exposure
had already occurred, and the factory was non-compliant in several areas of
inspection. Affected citizens eventually initiated criminal proceedings against
the managers for this non-compliance as well as the existing pollution. Al-
though the directors were fined and faced jail time, the sentences were later
remitted while awaiting more information regarding rationale for the lapsed
permits and quantification of the environmental damage.
The case as it appeared before the European Court is interesting in that it
is one of the exception cases that continued although domestic remedies had
not yet been exhausted. The Court noted here that the domestic remedies
available would not have enabled the applicants to achieve their aim anyway,
even if it were successful on its merits, and therefore were not relevant to the
discussion.291 This finding puts a limit on the otherwise standard requirement
to exhaust domestic remedies;292 ineffective remedies are not remedies for the
sake of exhaustion.293 A corollary is that the Convention does not require
a right to actually be violated to raise an actionable issue. As the ECHR
requires under Article 13 States to have the possibility or remedy,“. . . [i]n the
Court’s view, Article 13 requires that where an individual considers himself
to have been prejudiced by a measure allegedly in breach of the Convention,
he should have a remedy before a national authority in order both to have his
claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress. Thus, Article 13 must be
interpreted as guaranteeing an ‘effective remedy before a national authority’ to
everyone who claims that his rights and freedoms under the Convention have
been violated.”294 Further, the ruling continued the trend in López Ostra
where criminal proceedings did not have to run to completion before raising
human rights issues with the Commission.295
290Council Directive of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial
activities (82/501/EEC) (Seveso I or Seveso Directive).
291Guerra, para 49.
292Article 35(1)
293The legal maxim, “where there is a right, there is a remedy” is fitting here. See Holmes/
Sunstein.
294Klaas v. Germany Series A, No. 28, (1979-80), judgment of 6 September 1978. para
64.
295As the case took place in 1998, there was still a separation between the European
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court. The original intent was to have
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Above the modification of the domestic remedy rule, the Guerra ruling
specifically addresses positive obligations to information flows. The wording
of Article 10, which secures the freedom of expression, is predominantly con-
cerned with possible derogations from the absolute right. The derogations
allow for states to truncate expression and its intrinsic ability to spread in-
formation “in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the au-
thority and impartiality of the judiciary.”296 As such, the State in the Guerra
case claimed that there is no positive obligation to distribute information in
the hope of protecting health of morals, but only a negative obligation not
to hinder information or expression when it would not be to the detriment of
health and morals.297
Indeed, the prevailing EC directives298 spoke only of access to information
in environmental matters, not of providing information.299 The Commission
which reviewed the case before sending it on to the Chamber however sup-
ported the applicants’ view that Article 10 did in fact support a positive free-
dom to receive information, based partly on the underlying facts of Italian law
which recognized a duty to collect, process and disseminate information.300
Here again there is a connection with the implicit substantive thermometer of
domestic precedent. It was not sufficient however for the Chamber to find a
domestically-guaranted right.
The Chamber thought there was a more literal interpretation. The case
law surrounding Article 10 notably focuses predominantly on freedom of press
issues, and in light of that a positive duty construction was a stretch.301 The
the Commission shield the Court from “a possible deluge of individual complaints, a function
hat also protected the traditional sovereignty of the member states.” Janis/Kay/Bradley,
p. 25 Recall that there was concern during negotiations of the Convention with respect to
the perceived handing over of national jurisdiction for human rights-related issues.
296Article 10(2)
297Sunstein discusses some of the paradoxes of disclosure rules as a form of regulation,
showing that it is not always the case that they are beneficial for citizens. See Sunstein,
Cass R. Free Markets and Social Justice. Oxford University Press, 1997, p 284-285
298Directive 90/313/EEC, repealed by Council Directive 2003/4, 2003 O.J. (L 041)




301For recent comments on rights and responsibilities of the Press in information dissem-
ination, see Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom application no 68416/01 judgment of 15
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freedom of expression could not be construed as placing a duty on government
to collect and disseminate information. The lack of a ceiling on such require-
ments would, indeed, make compliance quite an opaque undertaking. What
level of information collection and dissemination could assure the government
in all in all situations of absolving its liability? This was, however, one of the
few strikes against positive rights emerging relative to information supply in
environmental case law.
The applicants were more successful with direct complaints that the gov-
ernment failed to protect their Article 8 rights to private and family life. The
State relied heavily on a defense of non-interference with Article 8 rights; that
is, they did not violate their negative duties to abstain from interfering.302
The Court, consistent with López Ostra, noted that the government did not
meet its positive duty. The situation showed that the applicants had applied
for information but waited all the way up until production at the polluting
facility finally ceased, without receiving it.303 That information was crucial, in
the Court’s eyes, for the applicants to be able to judge for themselves whether
to continue living inside the risky area. That itself is a violation of a Contract-
ing Party’s duty under Article 8.304 The lesson emerging from the Guerra case
then acknowledges the possibility of a stronger obligation to actively inform
or disseminate information in situations involving imminent injury or serious
health risks,305 and impacts on the health of the family sphere, but stops
short of requiring a state to collect or actively disseminate all environmental
information.
Thus, the Guerra case is important for how it clarified the borders of positive
obligations arising from information in environmental matters. It rejected the
idea that there is an absolute duty for a State to collect and disseminate
information on environmental matters, opting instead for a lesser but more
transparent requirement for the government to supply timely information for
families to decide for themselves what hazards are and are not acceptable in




304For discussions on the ability of a State’s internal organs to remain independent and
impartially relate judgements, a topic which could become an issue in conjunction with
positive duties to disseminate—as opposed to suppress—environmental information, see
Bryan v. the United Kingdom, case no. 44/1994/491/573, judgment of 25 October 1995.
305Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] .
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pursuit of their fundamental right to respect for home and family life.306 The
ruling fits well beside the margins of appreciation logic that allowances shrink
when dangers increase, as confirmed by the recent Tatar v. Romania.307 There
is still grey area as to what particulars of environmental dangers do to shrink
or loosen the margins of appreciation dedicated to the State to decide how
much information is enough. Nevertheless, Guerra puts states on notice that
they could be liable for human rights damages should they not pay attention
to information gaps as part of their encompassing environmental regulation
policies, and as such Guerra is now listed quite commonly alongside López
Ostra in discussing rights and the environment.
4.2.4.2 Aarhus Convention
Mentioned but not yet discussed as an auxiliary instrument for European en-
vironmental information is the The Aarhus Convention—or more formally, the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters—was finalized by the UNECE in 1998. As a
treaty outside of the European Union framework, it took some time to be rati-
fied and is now slowly coming into full force with new domestic and European
Community legislation being added to guarantee full compliance. It is the
first multilateral agreement focused on imposing obligations, and not just es-
tablishing goals, of environmental quality for a signature country’s citizens.308
The duties follow the words of Jean Rostand, quoted in Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring : “The obligation to endure gives us the right to know.”309 It merits
mention here as it stands to play the positive roll in information exchange to
which Guerra did not reach.
Motivation for this powerful informational supplement derived, at least in
part, from a desire to quickly bring the newly independent countries of the So-
viet bloc in eastern and central Europe in compliance with EU environmental
306In this respect, also note McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom application no.
10/1997/794/995-996, judgment of 9 June 1998.
307An original claim against Article 2 due to toleration of dangerous mining operations
was moved to a claim of Article 8 and questions of information needed to make informed
decisions on private and family life. Tatar v. Romania, application no. 67021/01, judgment
of 27 January 2009. In the Court’s admissibility decisions (of 5 July 2007) they moved the
applicants claim of Article 2 infractions (para. 46.) to Article 8 (para. 47).
308Pallemaerts, p. 18.
309Carson, Rachel Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962 (2002), p. 13.
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standards.310 In fact, the Aarhus Convention now covers all of Europe, the US
and Canada,311 and also parts of Central Asia, focusing on access to justice
via granting the rights of all to first receive environmental information and
second to participate in environmental decision making. Reflective of the logic
of the plaintiffs’ claim in Guerra, access to justice should be secured via access
to information held by public authorities and by allowing that information
to be utilized by public participants in changing forward-looking decisions on
environmental use and non-use.
Officially, the Aarhus Convention secures
• “the right of everyone to receive environmental information that is held
by public authorities (‘access to environmental information’). This can
include information on the state of the environment, but also on policies
or measures taken, or on the state of human health and safety where this
can be affected by the state of the environment. Applicants are entitled
to obtain this information within one month of the request and without
having to say why they require it. In addition, public authorities are
obliged, under the Convention, to actively disseminate environmental
information in their possession;
• the right to participate in environmental decision-making. Arrangements
are to be made by public authorities to enable the public affected and
environmental non-governmental organisations to comment on, for ex-
ample, proposals for projects affecting the environment, or plans and
programmes relating to the environment, these comments to be taken
into due account in decision-making, and information to be provided on
the final decisions and the reasons for it (‘public participation in envi-
ronmental decision-making’);
• the right to review procedures to challenge public decisions that have
been made without respecting the two aforementioned rights or environ-
mental law in general (‘access to justice’).312
The reflection of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is rather clear. Recently there
have been calls for a formal protocol addition recognizing individual procedu-
310Hayward, p. 144.
311These two North American countries were not involved in the process. Ibid., p. 57
312Quoted from the European Commission website at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/ Last Accessed [27 May 2010]
204
4.2 The ECHR and EHR
ral rights to environmental protection in the European Court, essentially to
bring it formally inline with the Aarhus Convention protections,313 because
questions have been raised as to whether the European Community regula-
tions implementing the Aarhus Convention are strong enough to give proper
effect to the goals of the treaty.314 The details of this discussion will certainly
impact the EHR discourse as it moves forward, but for now the existence of the
discussion can be taken simply as another illustration of the way European reg-
ulations reinforce, shape, and extend others in related national, international,
and supra-national levels.
And the Convention has indeed had a direct impact on the jurisprudence
of the ECtHR.315 The Aarhus Convention spurred the French government to
provide public access to data on point source emissions.316 The new (2003)
European Polluting Emissions Register, however, is quite a few years behind
the American Toxic Release Inventory317, which came into being in 1988.318
The push toward more common provision of information is certainly a benefit
for environmental concerns. Thus, as discussions move forward, the Aarhus
Convention can, for the purpose of the ECHR focus herein, be viewed as codi-
fying existing “procedural and remedial guarantees”319 and bringing awareness
of such guarantees to the individual, while not requiring national authorities
313Recommendation 1614 of Parliamentary Assembly 27 June 2003, cf. San José, p. 5,n. 1
314Specifically, Regulation 1367/2000 is potentially flawed in that it does not allow indi-
vidual participation to decision making at the Community level. This is only a potential,
however, and should be discussed further in light of the procedural guarantees it does give
to the individual, notably the power to request internal reviews be conducted. See, for
a further and more in depth discussion, Wenner̊as, P̊al Erik EC Environemental Law in
National and Community Courts. Ph.D thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2006, p. 242
315Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 477.
316French Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development (MEDD), Directorate on the
Prevention of Pollution and Risks, cf. Laurian, Lucie Environmental injustice in France.
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management , 51 2008.
317The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) is a data set compiled by the US EPA. It keeps
track of the quantity and location of releases of chemicals classified as toxic. The TRI
was established in 1986 by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act. The aim
of the project is to provide necessary information to citizens who may need to prepare or
face a toxic release. cf. Bowen, William/Wells, Michael V The Politics and Reality of
Environmental Justice Research: A History and Considerations for Public Administrators
and Policymakers. Public Administration Review , 62 2002, Nr. 6, p. 692 Notably, however,
not all industries are required to report to the EPA for inclusion, and there is no data
verification process, making the data set incomplete and error-prone. Further, hundreds of
chemicals have been added to the list since its 1980’s inception, meaning one must be careful
in using its data toward measuring disproportionate distributions; see Bowen Environmental
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to create procedures for popular action.320
The Aarhus regulations stop here, similar to where Guerra placed bound-
aries, for practical reasons, Member States in the EU, constituting a large
section of the Aarhus signatory countries, have different traditions regard-
ing access to justice. Vera et al.321 note that some allow actio popularis
and others have more limited options. Implementing a popular action pro-
cedure across the national jurisdictions would have serious ramifications on
the number and type of cases brought for consideration. Boyle then connects
the Aarhus Convention and ECHR logic, stating “[i]f Aarhus can therefore be
viewed as promoting public interest participation, the ECHR case law remains
firmly grounded in individual rights.”322 The interaction of the ECHR, the
European Court of Justice, and the Aarhus Convention, as well as the poten-
tial for a complete incorporation of its ideals, carries potential energy toward
forward motion in codifing environmental rights.323 But for now, the Aarhus
Convention, like the derived rights illustrated above, only help to sketch out
the consensus areas established protection. In fact, now that these areas have
been acknowledge, some, such as the U.K., worry about their expansion and
take steps aimed at circumscribing responsibility.324 Notably, the UK ap-
parently did not believe their declaration was a reservation at all, failing to
characterize it as such in their ratification,325 but seen in the light of expand-
ing positive environmental obligations it is hard to see it as anything less than
320Vera, Esther Pozo/Masson, Nathy-Rass/Krämer, Ludwig Milieu-Environmental Law
and Policy. European Union Environment Directorate General, September 2007 (Study
Contract 07-010401/2006/450607/MAR/A1). – Technical report
321Ibid.
322Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 497
323It not only has the potential to change national law, but also the possibility to change
directions of research. For instance, Laurian (2008) notes that her research (in 2007) would
not have been entirely possible prior to the Aarhus Convention’s mandates on information
access.
324Provisions like those added by the UK to the body of the declaration (See Aarhus
Convention Declarations) tacitly acknowledge that the treaty could lend momentum toward
an environment and take steps to limit the degree this is possible.
“The United Kingdom understands the references in article 1 and the seventh
preambular paragraph of this Convention to the ’right’ of every person ’to live
in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being’ to express
an aspiration which motivated the negotiation of this Convention and which
is shared fully by the United Kingdom. The legal rights which each Party
undertakes to guarantee under article 1 are limited to the rights of access to
information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in
environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.”
325Kravchenko/Bonnie, p. 5.
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a clarifications of the boundaries of obligations.
Besides derogations by signatory countries, the most lacking aspect of the
Aarhus Convention relative to securing out environmental duties is a clear
standing for individuals to enforce any rights derived from the treaty. De-
spite its clear emphasis on activism, NGO’s, and goals-based language focused
on guaranteeing participation at planning stages—which commentators have
noted lend much potential strength for public environmental protection326—
the Convention ultimately lacks the means for citizens to directly enforce a
right through national law.327 E.U. legislation implementing the Aarhus Con-
vention however does now extend to individuals the opportunity for enforce-
ment, though only in E.U. countries and not the entire contingent of ECHR
signatory countries.
Although the right to information stemming from instruments inherent in
the ECHR is more restricted than what is proposed in the Aarhus Convention,
it may prove easier to access the right through the established mechanics of the
European Court. If the two instruments reinforce each other, then there is no
problem. Boyle states, for example, with regard to the recent Taskin decision
that “the broader public interest approach of the Aarhus Convention and the
narrower ECHR focus on the rights of affected individuals are “very evident”
in the jurisprudence surrounding both.328 If they continue clarify these areas
of focus, they will not only reinforce each other but stand to clearly map out
areas of environmental protection. If they and the jurisprudence inspired by
cases brought to each however do so only clumsily, there is a chance for holes
in intended protection. The need for clarification both of access to information
and the legal proceedings guaranteeing that access is evident. Nevertheless,
the Aarhus Convention is another positive step towards enunciating and codi-
fying the minimum standards of information flow necessary for citizens in the
modern world to be truly involved, and as such reinforces the momentum the
European Court has taken in its own jurisprudence.
326Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 477.
327Hayward, p. 180. As is the case with other documents, such as the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), among others. Here, in Article 24, we find a “right
of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities
for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.” The CRC is notable though for
explicitly recognizing the linkage between health and environment, especially in the notably
more sensitive world of children.
328Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] .
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4.2.5 Rights to Process and Remedy
Difficulties in managing the aftermath of environmental pollution can also trig-
ger Convention rights parallel to the derived rights to information or extracted
forward protections to life and familial connections. Convoluted, excessively
long, or ineffective legal process may call into question a States ability to pro-
vide access to justice, and thereby to rights protected by the Convention itself,
raising visible issues under Article 6. Once again, ineffectual remedies are no
real remedies at all. Article 6 covers the standard liberty to a fair trail, which
has been expanded by the Courts jurisprudence to include a right to access
the court system.329 The basic dynamic desired is for national authorities to
provide a domestic forum to dispute and define civil rights and obligations. If
the requisite dynamic does not exist to the extent a plaintiff believes it should,
then they can appeal to the Convention alleging that the lacuna affects the
determination of their civil rights under domestic law.
In order to find recognition that access to the legal system falls short of
Convention protections in environmental contexts, the relation between the
civil right and the environmental problem must be quite direct.330 As there is
no defined right protecting against environmental issues this is not surprising;
how does one claim that their access to justice has been abridged when there
is no promise of justice with which to begin? This imposes high hurdles on the
employment of Article 6 when the underlying complaint is environmental in
nature. Some national constitutions clearly establish a constitutional right to a
certain quality of environment, and thereby a codified direct relationship, but
this is still the exception.331 But it remains difficult to claim Article 6 infrac-
tions before an environmental problem occurs, limiting access to claims against
Article 6 as ex post options. Nevertheless, the protection provided by Article
6 serves as a motivation for national authorities to have and maintain just and
329Golder v. the United Kingdom, application no. 4451/70, 21 February 1975.
330Balmer-Schafroth and Others v. Switzerland, application no. 67/1996/686/876, Grand
Chamber judgment of 26 August 1997.
331E.g. Zander v. Sweden, application 14282/88, judgment of 25 November 1993. Also
Taskin v. Turkey, application no. 46117/99, judgment of 10 November 2004. Also, the
Ksentini Report noted over 60 constitutions which “contain specific provisions relating to the
protection of the environment”; Ksentini, Fatma Zohra Human Rights and the Environment.
UN Commission on Human Rights; Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 6 July 1994 (UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9). – Technical report,
p. 58. See also recent discussions in Turner, 27-38; Kravchenko/Bonnie; and Boyle Fordham
Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] . But note Bothe, M. (1998). The Right to a Healthy Environment
in the European Union and Comparative Constitutional Law, in: Développements récents
du droit européen de lenvironment. Antwerpen. p. 1-9.
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effective domestic procedures, including adequate appeals processes.332
Beyond Article 6, Article 13 provides more flexibility in its application to
environmental situations, securing remedy where violations occur.333 Article
13 guarantees that where a possible violation of Convention rights exist, there
is also an effective remedy should the applicant succeed in their argument.334
Notably for the complainant, a violation of the claimed Convention right need
not be found in order to succeed in a claim alleging a missing remedy.335 Ar-
ticle 13 looks similar in its empowerment to that given to victims in situations
such as those that the Aarhus Convention also tackles. Like the powers of
Article 6, the rights secured under Article 13 are a motivation for a State to
create and maintain a well-functioning judicial system, and, where necessary,
to take up legislation that would more effectively secure the rights under the
Convention. All in all, the procedural rights to fair trials and legal processes
are the cement to bind the substantive rights together and cover situations
where individual rights are infringed by environmental burdens.
These Article 6 and 13 rights stem from a long history of jurisprudence
that overlaps with our preceding examples. The European Court has found
that access to courts must include access to courts at a local enough level to
serve as a reachable option for satisfaction336 This is naturally a precondition
for the functional principal of subsidiarity. The access must also have the
possibility of leading to true remedies; the process cannot be illusionary or
simply process oriented. State actions or laws which can effectively move
around proper procedures, to the detriment of individuals, trigger protection
of Article 6.337
332McMichael v. the United Kingdom application no. 16424/90 judgment of 24 February
1995.
333Although where an Article 6 claim, especially article 6(1), exists, or a similarly an
Article 5(4) claim, the Court will not touch on Article 13 claims. Articles 5 and 6 are
considered stricter and therefore are assumed to subsume any potential Article 13 issues.
See, inter alia Hentrich v. France, application no. 13616/88, judgment of 22 September
1994; Murray v. United Kingdom, application no. 14310/88, judgment of 28 October 1994.
Balmer-Schafroth v. Switzerland judgment of 26 Aug. 1997, 25 E.H.R.R. 398.
334Leander v. Sweden, application no. 9248/81, judgment of 26 March 1987, para 77.
335Klass and Others v. Germany, application no. 5029/71, judgment of 6 September
1978, para 64; Silver and Others v. United Kingdom, application nos. 5947/72, 6205/73,
7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75, 7136/75, judgment of 25 March 1983, para 113. Also
note Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, where a violation of Article 13 was found
in spite of no violation of Article 8 being found.
336Mats Jacobson v. Sweden, application no 11/1989/171/227, judgment of 21 May 1990.
Also Hornsy v. Greece, application no. 18357/91, judgment of 1 April 1998.
337Kyrtatos v. Greece, application no. 41666/98, judgment of 22 May 2003. Here, author-
ities had continued to issue building permits on a rezoned piece of land, which was found
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The bar though is set above a question of whether the situation at hand
breaches a true “civil right.”338 In the early case of Powell & Rayner v. the
United Kingdom, the Court rejected the applicant’s claim under Article 6 as
no civil right existed in English civil law. In that case, the applicants’ would
have needed a right to compensation for aircraft noise. The Court saw that
their issue was more directed at domestic law which limited their ability to
compensation, and not at a fundamental imbalance by the State’s decisions in
when compensation could be paid. This is one of several cases in which the
Court determined the threshold of where a civil right exists, and when it does
not.339 The absence of a “civil right” stemmed from an absence in domestic
law of a right to compensation for noise pollution from aircraft.340 Despite
this particular outcome, the Court has expressed that it will not always limit
a discussion involving civil rights by what is nominally prescribed in national
legal systems between private and public law.341
There is a tight link though between Article 6 and 13. A problem generating
a failed Article 6 claim, however, could still be valid as viewed from Article
13; an available but truncated remedy could indicate a failure on the State’s
part to secure sufficient Article 13 protection. In the Powell & Rayner case,
the lack of a domestic civil right again played a part in the Court’s finding
of no violation of Article 13. Since Article 13’s provisions are less strict than
Article 6§1, if a complaint against Article 6 §1 is found lacking, a subsequent
claim in the same case against Article 6 §1 will also be struck out.342
While the lack of underlying environmental civil rights abbreviates extrac-
tion of much environmental protection, the most important aspect of Article
6 and Article 13 protections for the positive requirements remain the power to
push public participation. In making environmental decisions, not only must
there be effective remedies for wrongdoing, and ability to challenge perceived
to be unconstitutionally rezoned. The access to the rezoning proceedings by the applicants
had no real effect on the ability or inability to permit buildings.
338Powell & Rayner v. the United Kingdom
339E.g. Mats Jacobsson v. Sweden, and Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden, application no.
10842/84, judgment of 25 October 1989. finding civil rights were indeed at issue.
340Noting the Land Compensation Act of 1973, which did not provide compensation for
loss in value from intensification of, rather than new, noise sources; also Noise Abatement
Act of 1960 and Civil Aviation Act limited the liability of operators and officials.
341Golder v. United Kingdom, application no. 4451/70, judgment of 21 February 1975;
compare Ünver v. Turkey, application no. 36209/97, judgment of 26 September 2000,
limiting claims of civil rights against where the right is a procedural right under domestic
law.
342Inter alia Powell & Rayner v. the United Kingdom.
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wrongs, but a requirement to take into account ex ante the opinions of those
who will be affected by government decisions.343 Presentations by developers
and those applying for environmental use permits must be accessible by the
public, both to collect information relevant to them and to present their ideas
and interests.344 Like the positive obligations for access to information, the
obligation for public participation does not impose a collection duty on the
State. It is in the best interests of all parties to bring and debate relevant infor-
mation, but there is not a requirement to bring a certain level of information
to the discussion. The logical extension then allows for States to take decisions
even in the absence of measurable data, or where data cannot be secured for
any number of reasons, most notably technological and time limitations.
The mechanics of environmental regulation remain tilted in favour of indus-
try, as there is no hard-and-fast backstop here for the public, but even the
porous acknowledgment that hindering information is unacceptable is a small
step towards empowerment. The combined forces of Article 10, 13, and 6 place
these procedural and informational duties on the State. States must undertake
more positive actions the more risks or dangers present for the populace for
whom they are charged with securing the rights in the Convention. Further
combined with the substantive rights in Article 2 and Article 8, the Euro-
pean Court has sketched out some significant areas where damaged environs
trigger human rights-level protections. But there is one more section of the
Convention which, though not yet as relevant to the environmental aspects
discussed above, is quite important to the as-yet undiscussed justice side of
the environmental protection.
4.2.6 Article 14: Discrimination
Unlike the discussion in the U.S., this chapter has gone quite far in discussion
rights to environmental quality without invoking the concept of discrimination,
or even of “disproportionate.” Indeed, the ECHR focus has done much in the
direction of environmental justice without invoking groups or power struggles.
There is, however, protection from discrimination within the human rights
document.
Article 14 of the ECHR secures the enjoyment of rights “set forth” in the
343Council of Europe Manual on human rights and the environment ; Hatton, para 99
344Hatton, para 128
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Convention “. . . without discrimination on any ground. . . ” This, like the pro-
hibitions on torture, allows for no “paragraph 2” derogations. The logic here
is that human rights permit no variation across the human spectrum. This
is not a right that is meant to rectify past discrimination like the U.S. anti-
discrimination laws which make up so much of their environmental justice
discourse, it is to secure the other human rights in the Convention across all
individuals living within the jurisdiction of any state party to the Convention.
Specifically, it secures the “enjoyment of the rights and freedoms. . . without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a na-
tional minority, property, birth or other status.” The wording emphasizes
right away a distinction with the Equal Protection Clause found in the U.S.
Constitution.345 As Gomien et al. note, Article 14
Is not framed in general terms of equality before the law or equal
protection of the law. Instead, it guarantees to everyone within
the jurisdiction of a State Party (cf. Article 1) the enjoyment of
the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention itself.346
This explains why Article 14 is “parasitic” in that it does not convey in-
dependent or free-standing protection. It protects through these other sub-
stantive rights, making sure that those rights are applied and received equally.
Nevertheless, there need not be a violation of the underlying right for a viola-
tion of Article 14.347 According to Abdulaziz and Others v. United Kingdom348
“. . . Article 14 compliments the other substantive provisions of the
Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent existence
since it has effect solely in relation to ‘the enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms safeguarded by those provisions. Although the ap-
plication of Article 14 does not necessarily presuppose a breach of
those provisions—and to this extent it is autonomous—there can
345There is, however in Europe the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (FCNM), which does have parallels with the proactive U.S. approach to discrim-
ination against minorities. See discussions in Letschert, Rianne M. The Impact of Minority
Rights Mechanisms. T.M.C. Asser, 2005.
346Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 345.
347Inter alia, Gaygusuz v. Austria, application no. 17371/90, judgment of 16 September
1996.
348application nos. 9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/81, judgment of 28 May 1985, para 71
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be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within
the ambit of one or more of the latter.
In that sense, Article 14 does indeed add value349 to the protective landscape,
protection that is notable for environmental justice ends.
Because of its nature, the first level of inquiry in a claim involving Article 14
is to establish the applicability of an underlying right, even if it is clear there
is no violation of that underlying right. That step completed, one focuses on
establishing a comparator group. Favourably for its application, the list of
protected classes in Article 14 is open ended.350 That is, the Court has not
brought forward a limited number of categories to serve as comparator groups
when looking for evidence of discrimination. Notably for environmental jus-
tice discussants, there is no current evidence of an acceptance income-defined
classification, there is however evidence of discrimination between “ranks,”351
trade unions,352 types of homeowners,353 intentional versus unintentional tort
victims,354 and large and small landowners.355 The most general statement of
the Court’s view is from Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark,356
defining “status” as “a personal characteristic by which persons or groups of
persons are distinguishable from each other.” Though there is no evidence for
recognition of income-segmentation then does not mean this is not a path then
toward leveling the tilted playing field.
The extent to which one can define “classes” for comparisons is speculative,
but introduces the substantive topic of comparators. Once the court or the
jurisprudence has accepted the ability to draw lines on some metric—race,
gender, rank, status, or income—it is up to the applicant to establish their
similarity to that comparator group.357 It is not up to the State to explain
349Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 463.
350Ibid., p. 470.
351Engel and others v. Netherlands, application nos. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72,
5370/72, judgment of 8 June 1976
352National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, application no. 4464/70, judgement of
27 October 1975.
353Spadea and Scalebrino v. Italy, application no. 12868/87, judgment of 28 September
1995.
354Stubbings v. United Kingdoom, application no. 22083/93, judgment of 22 October
1996.
355Chassagnou and others v. France, application nos. 25088/94, 28331/95, 28443/95,
judgment of 29 April 1999.
356application nos. 5095/71, 5920/72, 5926/72, judgment of 7 December 1976, para 56.
357Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), application no. 12033/86, judgment of 18 February 1991. .
van der Mussele v. Belgium, application no. 8919/80, judgment of 23 November 1983.
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“why you and not them.” Rather, it is up to the respondent first to establish
that there is much similarity between “me” and “them;” one cannot prevail on
a claim that you have been treated differently until you prove that you are the
same.358 Establishing similarity then—counterintuitively—is the first hurdle
in showing discrimination. Inquiry can then proceed to the facts which either
justify or fail to justify the differential treatment among sufficiently similarly
situated entities. This does not, however, mean that the groupings must be
similar in all aspects. That is, one does not have to find a grouping that is
only different on the characteristic—race, income, status etc.—on which one
is claiming discrimination. “[T]he fact that there are some differences between
two or more individuals does not preclude them from being in sufficiently
comparable positions and from having sufficiently comparable interests.”359 In
the Paulik case, the Court stated that the groups at issue, while not identical,
were analogous positions with respect to Article 14 and their interests in the
utilization of the right.
Once an applicable comparator is established, inquiry proceeds. In the main,
where there is no blatant or conspicuous discrimination, a weighing of the mar-
gins of appreciation commences. States enjoy space to decide which situations
they deem fit for differential treatment,360 which is indeed what “discrimina-
tion” is, but that margin contracts according to the subject matter. Similar
to the case-law in the U.S. on discrimination, and following the precedents in
interpreting other substantive rights in the ECHR, there is an inherent hierar-
chy of situations which shrink margins of appreciation; deciding how and if to
expose citizens to bodily dangerous or potentially risky situations is narrow,361
whereas the realms of morals or other subjective cultural choices enjoy wider
margins. When it comes to differential treatment on the terms of race and
gender, the margin narrows considerably. Beyond the measuring, the Euro-
pean Court will weigh whether the justification presented is accomplished by
means which justify the ends.362
There is suggestion, though, that Article 14 is aimed more at direct dis-
358This paradox of discrimination cases was pointed out to me by Professor Richard Kay.
359Paulik v. Slovakia judgement of 27 July 2004.
360Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, application no. 9214/80, judgment of 28 May 1985, para
78.
361Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 242-53.
362Sidbaris & Džlautas v. Lithuania, applications nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00 judgment
of 27 July 2004.
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crimination than indirect discrimination.363 The more recent case of DH and
Others v. Czech Republic364 seemed to speak in that direction, where the
Court overlooks the enablement of discrimination that a domestic policy cre-
ates. The significant debate which the Second Section of the Court created365
and the eventual finding by the Grand Chamber of an Article 14 violation (in
conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol 1)366 seems though to speak toward
a larger and growing European momentum in a broader anti-discrimination
direction.
In the venerable Belgian Linguistic Case367 the Court establishes that equal
protection applies to both negative and positive obligations arising from the
existing rights.
“No distinctions should be made in this respect according to the
nature of these rights and freedoms and of their correlative obliga-
tions, and for instance as to whether the respect due to the right
concerned implies positive action or mere abstention.”368
Following this logic, States cannot avoid a charge of discrimination in one area
by being more liberal or accommodating in other areas. Anti-discrimination
is a laudable and integral component of the ECHR and despite its lack of au-
tonomous standing in Article 14 the principles it injects into the Convention
pervade all areas.369 This elevates the goals of non-discriminatory application
of rights, being “laudable and integral,” and becomes another component of
the inertia in the ECHR’s forward-looking protection. Nevertheless, the dif-
ferential treatment can be found to be justified and hence left alone by the
European Court.370
To summarize then, discrimination for the European Court follows the logic
set out in the Belgian Linguistics case, and thus can occur when 1) the facts
363Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, application no. 9214/80, judgment of 28 May 1985.
364judgement of 6 February 2006
365Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 493.
366Application no. 57325/00, judgment of 13 November 2007.
367Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education
in Belgium” v. Belgium”, application nos. 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63;
2126/6423, judgment of 23 July 1968.
368para 9. On positive obligations specifically, see Botta v. Italy, application no. 21439/93,
judgment of 24 February 1998, para 33.
369Notably, but not discussed at length here, is Protocol 12 to the Convention. Like Article
14, Protocol 12 is aimed at preventing discrimination. Unlike Article 14, it is freestanding.
370Fretté v. France judgment of February 26, 2002; challenging a refusal on gay adoption.
215
4 Europe and Rights
of the case disclose a differential treatment 2) the distinction does not have
an aim, that is, it has no objective and reasonable justification having regard
to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration 3) there is no rea-
sonable proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to
be realized.371 Notably, the European Court has been more permissive than
the historically-minded US Court in finding certain instances of discrimination
“justified.”372 And so it is
“the inequality of particular treatment that is at issue under Article
14, not the comparison of different options a State chooses among
when restricting the exercise of a given substantive right.”373
Under the guidance of Belgian Linguistics, the disproportionate impact (differ-
ential treatment) triggers scrutiny. The State then can show that the difference
has an aim, and finally then show that the aim has a reasonable justification
commensurate with the means used to achieve it.374
Although the the protections from discrimination in the US and Europe
share this similarity, the anti-discrimination protection in the ECHR is not a
large point for the environmental justice debate. Though the connection that
the protection a substantive EHR could provide against injustice is known,
there is little cross-over to discussing discrimination provisions in the ECHR.
To illustrate, the U.S. jurisprudence on discrimination covers prominently both
sex and race discrimination, the European Court literature however weighs
more heavily on sex issues, predominately where national provisions are ap-
371Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 350.
372Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 503; see expanded discussion in Chapter 5
373Gomien, p. 146.
374More guidance can be found in the The International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, art 1, 5 I.L.M.
350 (entered into force Jan 4, 1969). The ICERD is a United Nations document aimed at
doing just what its title states. As such, it clarifies and gives weight to the earlier UDHR.
Article 14 of the ECHR is the working equivalent within Europe. The ICERD notably
goes beyond the US’s focus on intentional discrimination, and moves toward the positive
obligations of States to secure fundamental rights Gast, p. 272. Like the ICESCR, it is a
positive focused instrument. As with the European Convention though, it does not directly
grant environmental rights in reaction to racism, but environmental issues are noted by the
committee overseeing implementation of the goals. See also Dommen, Caroline Claiming
Environmental Rights: Some Possibilities Offered by the United Nations’ Human Rights
Mechanisms. Georgetown International Environmental Law Review , 11 1998. Secondly note
ICCPR Art. 20 and 27. Finally note margins of appreciation are not unlimited. See
Chassagnou and others v. France, application nos. 25088/94, 28331/95, 28443/95, judgment
of 29 April 1999. .
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plied differently across men and women with rather anachronistic justifica-
tions.375 Commentators have noted the lack of mentions of overt racism in
European environmental justice literature, along the lines of the ECHR logic,
although there is a focus on national minorities and aliens.
That is not to say racism or even similar components to racial histories are
not shared across the Atlantic. Although lacking the history of slavery, as colo-
nial powers like France did not allow slavery on the European continent, there
is a legacy of intra-colony slavery with which to contend.376 There are too
some of the same racial history which permeates the U.S. civil rights saga of
the late 20th century, stories which lend strongly to the legal landscape of Civil
Rights discussed in Chapter 5. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, it was
legal for European pub owners to deny a drink to non-whites, racial insults at
work were legal, employment discrimination was legal, as were advertisements
for apartment rentals for whites only, strongly paralleling the U.S.’s separate
but equal philosophy.377 The 1980s saw a reversal of this trend and an overar-
ching acceptance by the European Union that problems exist and need to be
rectified.378 The similar experiences do tend today to manifest themselves in
different ways in different locations, a fact which shows above all that racism
is not a universal language.379 Aliens and immigration though occupy the his-
torically relevant issue today in Europe over the scars of the slave trade which
generate the focus on race in the U.S.380 Several articles mention immigra-
375See Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom application no.
9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/81, judgment of 28 May 1985, regarding differential immigration
treatment of employed women who wish to bring their husbands in to the country and the in-
verse situation; or Wessels-Bergervot v. the Netherlands application no 34462/97 judgment
of 4 June 2002.
376Bleich, Erik Antiracism without Races. Politics and Policy in a “Color-Blind” State.
French Politics, Culture and Society, 18 2000, Nr. 3, p. 54.
377Idem Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 196.
378Interestingly European States have differed with themselves and with the U.S. how to
address discrimination left over from a racial past. For instance, Britain and France have
taken quite different approaches to the integration of migrant populations. Great Britain
moved during the post-WWII period toward using civil law to penalize access racism—the
type of racism which prevents minorities from accessing services similarly accessed by non-
minorities. France, on the other hand, used criminal law. See Geddes, Andrew/Guiraudon,
Virginie Britain, France, and EU Anti-discrimination Policy: The Emergence of an EU
Policy Paradigm. West European Politics, 27 2004. Work by Bleich illustrates quite well
the very different approached taken by two large EU countries in combating racism, and
concludes that neither is unambiguously more successful than the other. Bleich Race Politics
in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s, p. 203.
379Martinez-Alier, Joan The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Con-
flicts and Valuation. Edward Elgar, 2002, p. 172-73.
380As an example of this difference, see Article 16 ECHR, which allows for derogation
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tion and aliens but are the only places however where we find even minimally
extra protection or rules for minority groups within Europe. Otherwise, the
Convention is a one-stop document protecting all persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the High Contracting Parties.381 The different historical backgrounds
of minorities in Europe translates into a different discursive focus than the
U.S., and leaves Article 14 little mentioned in discussions of EHRs in Europe.
The lacking should not be interpreted as a vote against its eventual usability,
especially toward environmental justice ends.
4.3 Conclusions for EHR and the ECHR
The preceding sections covered a lot of ground in relatively large leaps. That
may feel doubly so for a reader new to the European Court or formal human
rights instruments. As the goal is to paint as complete a picture of the pro-
tection the European Convention already offers in the way of environmental
benefits, and, by inference, what EHRs in general could accomplish, a sum-
mary exercise is in order bringing that protection in to focus. What ultimately
must be answered is to what degree this protection affects the concerns of en-
vironmental justice. It should be clear though that some degree of protection
indeed exists. The goals of the UDHR and the ECHR have been brought to
some degree of fruition in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. This section aims
to bring all the jurisprudence of the ECHR discussed above into such focus
as to, first, clearly and concisely delimitate what derived or extracted envi-
ronmental protections exist,382 and second, to what extent those protections
address, or could be reasonably expected to address, the environmental justice
issues developed in Chapters 2-3.383
There are two lines of thought here that one must be careful to not entangle.
This chapter addresses how well the derived rights to environmental protec-
tion illustrated above succeed in addressing environmental justice concerns.
of the rights of aliens to engage in political activities. “Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14
shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on
the political activity of aliens.” (Article 16). Notably, this Article’s statements have no
counterpart in other prominent human rights conventions. Gomien/Harris/Zwaak, p. 357
Other amendments to the Convention mention aliens in their capacity to be, or not to be,
expelled from a territory. Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Protocol 4 and Article 1 of Protocol 7.
381Also note Council Directive 2000/43/EC which is based on Article 13 of the Amsterdam
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That is, given the demonstrated but extracted (un-codified) protections of the
ECHR on environmental issues, does the protection address the agglomeration
of pollution among a minority of the population or their relative powerlessness
to affect choices which turn that cycle towards them? If the reader agrees with
the preceding chapters deriving the problem, and acknowledges the interpre-
tation of ECtHR cases proffered, the conclusion emerges that environmental
justice protection does exist via derived EHR protections. It is, however, in-
complete protection, just as the derived EHR protection is incomplete relative
to what proponents of adopting a formal EHR might want.384 The outcome
is unsurprising as it was never tuned toward such ends.
Parallel to this inquiry and conclusion, however, there is the related question
of how well a recognition of the role justice, or equality, concerns which play in
environmental matters could feed back to clarifying environmental protections
via human rights. Given the successful expansion of the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR toward environmental ends, but overall reluctance to solidify those
traced and foggy boundaries, does the comparative (positional) nature of en-
vironmental justice inquiry add towards firming up those boundaries? After
all, it is the unclear boundaries of EHR which creates much of the concern
towards adopting them. Part of this question is touched upon in a later chap-
ter, in illustrating how the ECHR’s approach informs the less successful U.S.
approach to melding rights and environmental concerns. But this question
should be addressed more directly in later research. In the meantime, there is
plenty to address as to the overlap between derived environmental rights and
environmental justice concerns.
4.3.1 The Existing Coverage of EHR in Europe
Cases in the European Court which connect environmental conditions to hu-
man rights protections show, first and foremost, a recognition that environ-
mental concerns can indeed affect human rights obligations already entered
in to by signatory states. This in itself might be shocking for lawyers from
different backgrounds, as might be the absolute breadth of rights across which
protections are derived. This is an important reminder of the “living doc-
ument” philosophy of the European Convention, as it is unlikely given the
384See discussions in Shelton, Dinah Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right
to Environment. Stanford Journal of International Law , 28 1991; Also Hayward.
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antebellum milieu surrounding its early days, that many duty-holders saw the
importance this nexus would become in just fifty short years.385 The evolu-
tion and expansion of the protections embody the momentum given by the
framers, pushing fundamental rights ever farther up the moral ladder, protec-
tions unnecessary when earlier framers bound the hands of the State in classic
libertarian rights.
Perhaps given the devastation to civilian areas during the War, someone
might have made the prescient connection between humans and their imme-
diate environs, seeing devastation or damage to sustaining areas as impacting
a human’s right to life. What practical substance does a right to life have if
the life-supporting environment does not exist? And while this is the heart
and soul of the argument for a fundamental human right to the environment,
the European Court and its forward momentum has moved more slowly and
cautiously in that uncharted direction, recognizing rather than defining.
The caution though has nevertheless outlined significant territory. The fail-
ure of the state to protect that connection in times when it was in their power
to foresee calamity came to a modern head in Öneryilidiz v. Turkey.386 While
neither modern legal writers or scientists may not yet be able to define what a
“safe” environment is, the European Court can tell what a “dangerous” one is,
at least relative to the obligations states already have. This black-letter case
also shows the human rights community that administrative failures toward
remedy are not small bureaucratic problems but carry human rights implica-
tions. The take-away message seems to be that signatory states have been
put on clear notice that human rights are more than goals; fundamental rights
are not only clearly definable with respect to connections tangential to factors
of life—such as the environment— but the factors that do carry fundamental
protections must engender real, and demonstrably practicable, answers.
Of course, not all cases with environmental overtones carry the weight of
Öneryildiz. Recognizing that human rights can reach into areas of life when
dangers are clear and present is another weapon in Davey’s aresenal—to para-
phrase Luke Cole387—against the Goliath sovereign, but there is much room
385Ovey/White, p. 40, noting the utilization of preparatory work in Convention interpre-
tation by the European Court. A comparison here between the “originalist” philosophy
of Constitutional interpretation in the U.S., especially at the Supreme Court level, is in-
evitable and merits closer scrutiny in later research linking European human rights and the
traditional U.S. environmental justice discourse.
386Section 4.2.2.1.
387Cole, Luke W. Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling. Ford-
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between the danger of death by industrial explosion and the nearly omnipresent
lurking dangers of modern living. But here too the European Court has set
plodded forward and given tools to help evaluate whether a State has satis-
factorily met their commitments to human rights.
Using Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom as a visual, one sees a com-
mitment to allowing State’s flexibility how to use their national environments.
That flexibility extends to both how to use the environment and how the State
goes about deciding how to use it. Thus there are no substantive nor proce-
dural prescriptions. Öneryilidiz and the ECHR does not keep modern states
from any engaging in dangerous activities, or even activities that pose little
traceable danger to life. It does, however, force a State to make sure to actively
consider the dangers they are placing on citizens. It does not tell how to go
about actively considering dangers though. Hatton and its predecessors brings
the concept of the margins of appreciation, a flexible approach to analyzing
the state’s burden as a duty holder. The environment might not currently
endanger one’s life, but it can impact deeply the enjoyment of that life, deeply
enough to trigger protection. States can still decide to encroachment into pri-
vate life. They have to go about such activities with deliberative and careful
purpose, however, minimizing what they can and providing opportunities to
put a check on those choices, recognizing that their incentives may not be
aligned with those of the impacted citizen.
There is a sense of emphasis on proactivity here, and that the Court will not
accept ignorance of the connections between environmental issues and funda-
mental rights, even in situations, like Hatton, where physical dangers are low
and environmental inquiry borders on defining substantive levels of allowable
environmental burdens. Although the margins of appreciation move power to-
ward the State, allowing them much leeway in justifying modern environmental
burdens, the ruling not only positively accepts that a degree of environmental
protection extends from Article 8—a broader area of obligations than Arti-
cle 2—but also that the state must devise substantive methods for protecting
the familial and home connections when modern life encroaches, and must
also have procedural methods in place to handle questions that come up from
that encroachment. As Boyle summarizes, using the recent Taskin case as a
clarifying example388
ham Urban Law Journal , 21 1994.
388application no. 46117/99, judgment of 10 November 2004.
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“[i]f Hatton shows a reluctance on the part of the Court to grapple
with the merits of a decision interfering with individual rights,
Taskin convincingly demonstrates an unequivocal willingness to
address the proper procedures for taking decisions relating to the
environment in human rights terms.”389
The rulings make sure that the singular voices do not get lost in the din of
modern industrial life, while only stopping short of prescribing methods to the
domestic authority.
And although Turkey is one of the few states to have some substantive ac-
knowledgement of a quality environment in their constitution,390 the problems
which pushed this situation into the European Court’s purview stem from the
actions of the government after the administrative courts had struck down
permits. That is, it was not the potential question of an acknowledged civil
right to environmental quality that moved the proceedings. Although the
administrative courts had effectively ordered the shut down of the industrial
mining the Prime Minister directly intervened and helped bring a new report
of environmental safety from a scientific advisory board showing a “clean bill
of health” for the mine.391 With the report in hand, the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment who originally held back the permit proceeded to issue a permit and
allowed mining to recommence. The government’s prodding came not only
from the new impact survey but also in the form of political opinion that the
mine was important for economic reasons.392
Executive influence such as this and fundamental rights do not mesh well,
and circumvention of procedure amounted to a detour around a final judicial
decision, an outcome incompatible with the rule of law.393 The administrative
court agreed, holding that the earlier decision was an enforceable decision,
as well as noting the accumulation of these specific chemicals in the ground
could endanger future generation’s rights to a healthy environment. The latter
point touched on the domestic civil rights dimension.394 But again, the Prime
Minister directly intervened and prompted the Supreme Administrative Court
389Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 499.
390Ibid., p. 479-481; noting other Constitutions.
391paras 43-44.
392para 47, and 75.
393para. 48. Note also questions of independence raised in Bryan v. the United Kingdom,
application no. 44/1994/491/573, judgment of 25 October 1995.
394para 48
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to decide that the report allowing the operation to commence was not open
to appeal.395
Further appeals to domestic courts were pending and awaiting decisions as
the case was brought to the European Court alleging violations of Article 2,
Article 6 §1 (right to fair trial), Article 8, and Article 13. The allegations of
a breach of Articles 2 and 8 stem from the permitting of the mine, while the
allegations against Art. 6 §1 and 13 stem from the convoluted pathway and
appeals dynamic which ensued between applicants, the Administrative Courts,
and the National and Local authorities. The Taskin case therefore hits all of
the major pathways of moving from human rights guarantees to addressing en-
vironmental degradation. The approach of the Court to the Taskin case then
cemented its own progress in linking modern environmental regulation respon-
sibilities with existing human rights, focusing on proper domestic procedures
and safeguards while allowing for domestic choices. The decision continues
the momentum for procedural fitness to ensure the margins still afforded to
signatory states is properly checked.
Backing this up is the decision illustrated in López Ostra,396 which goes
above recognizing home/environment connections and signals a willingness to
weigh, on a case-by-case basis, the margins of appreciation due to the state.
Given the particulars of the situation, how much leeway does the State enjoy
before touching on a human rights violation? Danger clearly shrinks that al-
lowance, but that is only one dimension along which human rights obligations
reside. Others include what could be broadly grouped as “annoyances” to
home and happiness. Also, in general “the showing of a consistent policy of
regulation or abstention from regulation in other European states will influence
the Court’s determination of the breadth of the margin of appreciation.”397
But between Fadeyeva and Öneryildiz, the Court has shown the most will-
ingness to discuss danger directly. Fadeyeva398 shows even more clearly what
lengths the Court will go through to analyze margins of appreciation.
It also tangibly extended the reach of derived protections by pushing down
any requirements to causally link burdens with health outcomes; it is the con-
nection of civil rights with environmental problems that is key. Whether that
civil right is to procedural transparence or an environment in line with a na-
395para 49.
396application no. 16798/90, judgment of 9 December 1994.
397Janis/Kay/Bradley, p. 243.
398application no. 55723/00, judgment of 9 June 2005.
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tional regulator’s own code, the civil right has protection from the ECHR’s
provisions. While a positive sign as to the existence of derived environmental
protection, the rulings show, by extension, that there is an un-willingeness to
draw bright lines or protocols as to where obligations are met under different
circumstances. Case-by-case analysis is the rule of the land for now. Like a
flashlight in the dark, an exploration of jurisprudence on margins of appreci-
ation illuminates many examples of existing rights carrying ramifications for
environmental protections, but only shows pieces of the whole picture.399
Lest the reader take that metaphor too far, and begin thinking that derived
environmental rights are bringing more judicial heat than light (perhaps phys-
ically via the friction of a growing acceptance of such cases) Fadeyeva also
reminds advocates that tenuous and remote consequences are not acceptable
links to existing civil rights. Here then is the reason why situations where
danger plays a tacit role find their way into the literature more often. Backing
up one’s claim of problems fomented by failings of the State with science and
data is implored,400 especially where there is not a deviation from existing
regulation. Dangerous environs must breach a certain threshold; what that
threshold is, though, is not exactly defined. Modern city living does not con-
stitute a de facto problem, but neither is the bar set so high as to require
direct links between pollution and a negative health outcome like cancer or
death.
It remains to be seen in what circumstance the Court will wade into human
rights cases where substantive environmental quality has not already been suffi-
ciently assessed by domestic courts. While the doctrine of domestic exhaustion
usually applies the fact that environmental protections are being derived from
existing rights means there might not be a domestic environmental judgment
before the extant rights’ breach moves to the ECtHR. Tenuous connections
we know are not tolerated but there is little guidance on what differentiates
cases in grey ares. Once a domestic “quality” has been breached though fun-
damental rights concerns begin weighing on the situation. They weigh even
more heavily when no domestic remedies exist to rectify the problem. Guerra
allows concerns to elevate above national courts without domestic exhaustion
when existing remedies would not be effective, putting domestic legislatures in
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a proactive stance to watch the ECtHR and its jurisprudence. Guerra though
at the same time alleviates some burden of information collection relative to
environmental problems, an obligation read into Article 10. The State need
not be assessing every usage of the environment. True, States are beholden to
disseminate necessary information which they hold but that necessary compo-
nent adjusts with the margins of appreciation. Further, dissemination is not
the same as collection. An element of impending danger shrinks the margins
within which the State can shirk in their information collection role, and the
Aarhus Convention401 sets some degree of backstop, but there is a definite
limiting of paths toward substantive EHR.
Jurisprudence surrounding Articles 6 and 13—rights to utilize the courts
and receive remedy from them—goes some way around Article 10’s substan-
tive limitations with open procedural pathways. Again, remedies need to be
effectual, but only insofar as a civil right already exists which requires effective
remedies when broken. Support at the fundamental rights level for such basic
tools as public participation in processes though is almost certainly some de-
sirable facet of EHR power. To what extent those powers are currently derived
is less clear. The picture will continue to evolve, however, and rather rapidly,
with the recent adherence to the Aarhus Convention and as complaints and
questions are settled.
These collected rights to forward protection of life, home and familial con-
nections, surrounded by procedural safeguards of information dissemination
and access to courts and public proceedings are then bookended by Article
14’s prohibitions on discrimination. Although it has no independent exis-
tence, it does offer the EHR-discourse an open-ended list of potential groups
across which one can compare the application of laws. The State can still
stand to justify differential treatment between accepted comparator groups,
but the margins they are afforded shrink based on the subject matter; gender
and national identity play the larger groupings of concern compared to the
U.S.’s focus on race.402 Differential impact triggers the scrutiny. In any sit-
uation though, the European Court views no difference in the obligations of
equal application for positive or negative rights provision. These protections,
however, have yet to be tested relative to the preceding Articles’ rights, unlike
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rights in the U.S.
But unlike the roadblocks seen in the U.S., the derivations in the ECHR
are being reinforced by the most recent cases, thus supporting not only the
view that derived EHRs exist in ECtHR jurisprudence, but momentum is tak-
ing the Court forward, distinguishing case law even if not expanding scope.
Given that the Council of Europe itself publishes a manual on how the human
rights system protects people’s environment, this is not a contentious con-
clusion.403 The Taskin case finds the European Court reinforcing their own
precedents, especially of relying heavily on the decisions and discussions in the
domestic systems.404 The Turkish government found no recourse in appealing
to intrinsic safety. It failed to to convince the Court that, despite perhaps
failing in their duties to shut the mine down, the risk derived was low and
could only manifest itself over coming decades. The Government saw this as
a lack of imminent risk and therefore not possible to conflict with articles of
the Convention. Turkish domestic law though does guarantee protection from
environmental damage. Hence, in the eyes of the Convention, the applicants’
contention did touch on a serious and genuine dispute: were the procedures
in place enough to give effect to this civil right? These facts led to a unani-
mous decision of a violation of Art. 6 §1 and Article 8;405 the decision by the
domestic Supreme Administrative Court was final, and should have been effec-
tive and binding. Without the procedural protections of law and remedy, the
State’s failure to regulate an environmentally-damaging industry had intruded
into established, though non-environmental, human rights areas.
The view from Taskin summarizes as well as informs the future use of the
403See Council of Europe Manual on human rights and the environment .
404In particular, the Government made an arguable case that the mine had not operated in
a risky manner and the tests resulting from the provisional operation of the in showed healthy
environmental statistics. (para 108, 109). The domestic courts had, however, already found
to their judgement that the particular aspects of this undertaking were not consistent with
the right to a healthy environment (para. 112). See also Moreno Gómez v. Spain (para 59);
finding noise bylaws had already been broken, bylaws established by the municipality, and
therefore there could be no “reversal of the burden of proof” to have applicant prove levels
of (noise) pollution inside their own home.
405But compare Gorriaz Lizarraga and Others v. Spain, application no. 62543/00, judg-
ment of 10 November 2004. With regard to the complaints against Articles 2 and 13, the
Court saw no need to examine the merits independently of the unanimous decisions against
the State on failure to secure Articles 8 and 6 §1 rights. That the Court did not discuss these
provisions directly, however, is not to say that the Court’s decision did not have much to do
with the two. Indeed, the process which the Court took through Articles 8 and 6§1 highlights
the overlapping of protections of the Convention, especially when used as an instrument for
environmental rights.
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European Court as an instrument for environmental protection. And although
there is a reluctance of the Court to engage itself in active weighing of merits
seen in cases like Hatton, Taskin and the general consensus finds a willingness
to question sufficient procedure, and even some vague notions of substance,
in environmental decisions impacting on human rights.406 Boyle summarizes
that
“ [o]n this evidence the European Convention on Human Rights is
note merely a living instrument but an exceptionally vibrant one,
with a very extensive evolutionary character.”407
Whether or not the protections illustrated constitute an EHR is a separate
question taken up by other authors;408 that the European Court has accepted
a nexus of protection between existing rights and the way that State’s use
their environments in modern society is unquestionable.
And so there is agreement in an ability to protect the environment—indirectly
or par ricochet—with the European Court.409 And it comes at the conjunction
of substantive and procedural protections to freedom writ large. One might
expect as much, given the tradition within which this research finds itself. As
Sen notes,
“[i]f our concern is with equality of freedom, it is no more adequate
to ask for equality of its means than it is to seek equality of results.
Freedom relates to both, but does not coincide with either.”410
The future of that protection depends on just where the Court will draw
its boundaries for considering Convention rights predicated on environmental
problems. The future direction though is not the research question at hand.411
406Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] .
407Ibid.
408Inter alia DeMerieux
409San José, p. 66.
410Sen, Amartya Inequality Reexamined. Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 87 (emphasis
in original)
411For some ideas, however, San José calls for development in two dimensions of the
Court’s jurisprudence:
. . . horizontally, by considering other rights in the Convention as susceptible
to being associated with an environmental harm (e.g., the right to physical
integrity (Article 3) or the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions
(Article 1 of Protocol No. 1); and also vertically, that is, assuming that those
rights which the European Court has confirmed could be the object of inter-
ference as a consequence of environmental pollution, and that there may be a
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The excursion into EHR was to see what kind of power it currently wields
and if that power is enough to deal with the problems identified as falling
under a heading of environmental justice. The success and positive overall
tone of the jurisprudence connecting individual freedoms and the environment
under the European Court stands in stark contrast to the dead-end seen in
the US’s connection of civil rights and environmental burdens. While the
two situations are not directly comparable, there are similarities worthy of
further discussion as we move toward policy considerations. This discussion is
taken up in Chapter 5. And with the map provided by the preceding sections
analysis can proceed to point out the successes and failures of human rights
approaches to environmental justice. Naturally there is much more detail to
be had in the legal discussion on environmental protections in the European
Court’s jurisprudence, but this work must continue on with this short-but-
sufficient summary to examine how the uncontentious derived protections fare
in protecting against environmental injustice.
4.3.2 Existing Coverage as Applied to Environmental Justice
Problems
The rather laudatory phrases and pictures painted above stem from either the
literature advocating continued pushes toward environmental protection via
high placed rights or from general theorists who have an interest in human
rights and their evolution. How though does this impact environmental jus-
tice as it was introduced in Chapters 2-3? Environmental justice admittedly
remains an amorphous concept itself but can broadly be broken up into cate-
gories of concern drawn from examples lent by the literature. This concluding
section compares what has been learned about derived environmental rights to
those categories to see at what level environmental justice protections would
also exist in the current landscape.
The first and most prominent concern raised by environmental justice is that
of democratic disenfranchisement.412 If the perceptions of the environmental
justice movement are indeed prevalent, and Chapter 3 shows that one cannot
rule out that conclusion a priori, then environmental burdens stand a good
violation not only when the core of the right is affected but also in its normal
and broader context.San José, p. 68-69
412Section 2.1
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chance of impacting a numerical minority of the population disproportionately
more than the majority. This conclusion proceeds from a combination of
established economic theory with the arguably uncontentious proposition that
environmental burdens which were to impact (negatively) the entire majority
would not—or at least would rarely—come to fruition in a democratic society.
With the environmental load tilted toward a predicted numerical minority
there is a risk that they will not be able to change their lot without special
protections or attention and hence suffer at the hands of the majority in the
same fashion against which fundamental rights were meant to protect. Human
rights certainly provide that protection and deserve discussion as to their role
in protecting the minority from bearing environmental burdens chosen by the
majority.413
Secondly, Chapter 2 addressed the limited extent to which concerns about
environmental impacts on health could initiate motion toward addressing those
environmental problems. That is, as the environment is not a completely ab-
stract entity and does have direct bearing on human existence, could appealing
to that connection with established protections for humans and human health
be enough to overcome, among other weaknesses, the democratic failing? The
devastating effects environmental pollution has on an individual’s health have
often been used as motivation for court cases and changing public perceptions
of the industrial usages to which they acquiesce. Moral indignity and out-
rage were, after all, catalysts of the environmental movement which has done
much to change the legal and regulatory landscape in the past half-century.414
Utilizing the health and danger nexus is another proven way to extract en-
vironmental protection from existing legal pathways, but without necessarily
venturing into fundamental rights territory. The problem though utilizing the
human health/environmental pollution connection is the double-edged sword
of limited scientific information and intervening temporal aspects.415 The
connection between the environmental pollution and harm—negative health
outcomes—has to be quite strong to get the legal ball rolling here. Science is
not developed to a level yet to always allow for tight derivations. And while
science will progress on many fronts, harms continue to be perpetrated and
413Section 4.3.2.1
414See Lazarus, Richard J. The Greening of American and the Greying of United States
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United
States. Va. Envtl. L.J. 20 2001
415Section 2.2.
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justice remains delayed. Furthermore, even as science evolves, the nature of
the most pressing spectre utilized to motivate environmental clean up, cancer,
means that our bodies’ own ability to heal will work against establishing con-
nections.416 Using derived environmental rights from human rights sources
does not run in to this problem.417 Does it, however, affect environmental
justice outcomes?
Thirdly, the majority of literature on environmental justice centers on the
problem of siting and permitting programs.418 The reason that this strand is
so prominent in the U.S. literature is because of the momentum lent by the
earliest incarnation of environmental justice discourse–environmental racism.
Regardless of the name,419 this problem for justice is the concentrated sit-
ing of environmental burdens in and around well-defined demographic groups,
be that racial or broader socio-economic criteria. Whether it is intentional
and targeted (racism) or a more complex outcome (aggregation) is not critical
to answer. Chapter 3 brings the assertion under the economic umbrella of
early valuation studies and current agglomeration studies in geographical eco-
nomics while using the established environmental justice literature to support
allegations of prevalence. How do the protections derived above deal with the
siting and agglomerations problem, bounded by the mechanics of spatial eco-
nomics?420 That is, is there enough protection to stop the ratchet of economic
decisions from continually impacting certain areas over others?
Following closely on the heels of assertions of racially-motivated pollution
siting and its less-intentional cousins is the lackluster cleanup record in and
around the neighbourhoods from which environmental justice complaints arose.
Such was especially clearly illustrated in the U.S. by Lavelle and Coyle421 and
picked up by the administrative problems in European cases like Taskin. The
EHR protections though clearly have some bearing on unequal procedural ap-
plication, just as they have something to say about the bar put on public
participation in environmental matters. While grassroots organization plays
a central and lauded role in the U.S. literature, Chapter 2 questions briefly






421Lavelle, M./Coyle, M. Unequal Protection: The racial divide in environmental law. The
National Law Journal , 21 1992, and Section 3.5.3
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whether shouldering disadvantaged groups with the start-up costs of organiz-
ing for environmental clean-up is a true success.422 Certainly grants toward
informational exchange are necessary for proper debate, but procedural guar-
antees in environmental decisions must be backed up by actual power in the
public. The threat of the minority becoming the majority must be a credi-
ble threat lest the guarantees of public participation serve only to exhaust the
minority of society through constantly coming together to utilize public partic-
ipation. The goal in guaranteeing public participation is a backstop, granting
actual political power to the minority is a forward check on environmental uses
that may not be in their best interest.423 To what extent then can the derived
protections enable empowered public participation and information flows of
the sort desired by environmental justice advocates?
The section concludes with mention of what derived EHR-protection does
not cover relative to the environmental justice problem. This is as useful as
an illustration of what is protected. It draws a picture of what is left to do,
what cracks are left to be filled, should one hope to move toward environmen-
tally just outcomes. This is especially helpful to the U.S., where one would
have to engage the EHR mechanisms so open in the ECtHR through the less
straightforward constitutional and civil rights pathways, the topic explored in
the final chapter.424 As the two areas—Europe and the U.S.—continue on
their paths of environmental choices, this is the comparison that will become
telling and the metric of success versus failure.
4.3.2.1 Problem 1: Democratic Disenfranchisement
The environmental cases detailed above leave one notion very clear: the people
must have access. This is access to information, through both the Aarhus
Convention and Article 10 ECHR, as well as access to courts via Article 6 and
full, effective remedies to breaches of guaranteed rights via Article 13. Does
this level of access suffice to solve environmental justice problems? This is not
an entirely clear question to answer in abstracto. As the next chapter shows,
however, the remedy and access provided by the EHR protections are far more
developed and open to environmental ends than the analogous routes in the
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difficulty, and most recently, a roadblock.425
Knowing that outcome it is easy and appropriate here to remark on the
multitude of pathways to provide access toward justice in the human rights
system in Europe. While there is no substantive right to have one’s voice
heard in cases of environmental despoliation, or even a definite assurance that
a particular environmental problem will be able to engage the human rights
protections—there connections to underlying civil rights can, after all, be ruled
too tenuous given the particulars—the fact that there are multiple paths is very
positive for the ability to redress environmental justice problems when and
where they arise. That is a general comment but holds particularly strongly for
environmental justice-related disenfranchisement. The government is bound
by at least an analysis of margins of appreciation. To take a decision they must
consider the impact on the individuals and their safety and peaceful enjoyment
of rights within that impacted area. This is an individual weighing, and not
a group analysis. Therefore, it need not be the case that the group impacted
is indeed finding it difficult to access political routes toward change, or even
political routes toward recognition. Further, in the European case, there is
no indication of judicial effort to restrict these pathways; the gates are open.
While there hopefully will take place a clarifying and solidifying discussion, as
would be beneficial for each individual route as well as for creating a unified
outward appearance, there is no roadblock on the horizon for citizens who
believe their rights have been stepped on by the State in their decisions over
the environment.
With regard to access to information, secured through either Aarhus com-
pliance or the Guerra standards, information for the individual is only some-
what secured. It may not be enough information or the level of information
the individual hoped to receive for purposes of decision making, but it does
render the fact that they belong to a numerical minority affected by environ-
mental pollution moot. The government cannot pick and choose when and
where to dispense the information they have and must be wary of informa-
tion they choose not to pursue as the activities which they regulate increase
in foreseeable danger. In a sense then, the individual aspect of human rights
short-circuits the problem of minority-imposed environmental burdens.
The same can be said for access to the Courts. Through the derived EHR
425See Section 5.3.2.5, discussing specifically the Alexander v. Sandoval, decision, along
with South Camden Citizens in Action (Section 5.3.3.1)
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protections, States are put on notice that complaints must be able to find their
way in to the Court systems, and that valid remedies must also exist and be
properly carried out once awarded. Thus, the environmental justice advocate
tunes their argument of disproportionate environmental burdens to a failure of
domestic systems to protect and remedy their civil rights complaint. Should
the environmental problem indeed have a nexus to that civil right, the individ-
ual’s minority status does not matter and the environmental justice outcome
is achieved with existing protection. Should there not be an adequate un-
derlying right on which to argue the State’s failure, however, then there is
another problem. But this problem is not due to the numerical minority prob-
lem of environmental justice; the clustering and agglomeration of industries
and, by probable extension, pollution around any definable group—that is,
the environmental justice problem—is not in fact the issue. The issue instead
is that society has yet to issue protection deemed or perceived adequate for
this individual. As such, any grassroots campaign for political change should
focus on increasing the substantive level of environmental protection so that
a claim that the state has failed to provide that protection can move forward.
This does not necessarily have to be a substantive right to a certain quality,
or an environmental justice protection for a certain grouping or class of peo-
ple but could be, for instance, a substantive level of oversight or regulatory
presence near more dangerous facilities. This is not though an environmental
justice problem but the more omnipresent environmental questions of modern
industrial impact.
The more general problem can itself have democratic issues though. They
are different from the complaint that pollution impacts certain definable groups
more heavily. It can still be a complaint by a spatially definable neighbourhood
group that there is an environmental failing, but they are no longer implying
that this is a general phenomenon. It is an individual case of concentrated
pollution aggregated across an area of inhabitants. The claim is then a class
action, but not an environmental justice complaint based on minority status
or socio-economic classification. The area may still have to rely on grassroots
campaigning to convince a majority to notice the problem as the problem
may not affect the majority directly. A palpably different debate than envi-
ronmental justice would ensure because the traditional environmental justice
complaint requires an implicit argument that such conditions happen often or
predictably to this definable grouping. The latter carries an implication that
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it is somehow more morally reprehensible than the former.
One can also see that the right to remedy plays out differently in these
two scenarios. The remedy to protect the underlying civil right is different
than a remedy for an environmental justice right. They may effect the same
outcome but there is a subtle difference.426 Elaboration of that difference takes
place in the following chapter, but in brief, in the individual case there must
be a weighing of the problem relative to the individual’s rights while in the
mainstream environmental justice framing of the problem, there must first be
a definably weaker or minority group. That minority then garners attention
via potential discrimination. The ECtHR jurisprudence, while admittedly
being more open to the question of a nexus between environmental conditions
and fundamental protections, also has a shorter distance to travel between
environment and right. Even here though access to courts indeed not provide
the kind of protection to entirely solve environmental justice problems. It is
a step, though. A step in the right direction, perhaps, and a step away from
the specific environmental justice claims and toward a more general and direct
connection between humans and environment. Furthermore, it is a step backed
up by several harder backstops.
4.3.2.2 Problem 2: The Insufficiency of Health Problems
The problems of consistently linking health outcomes and environmental trig-
gers discussed in Chapter 2 is no problem for derived EHR-protections. In
fact, there need not even be an inquiry into the health consequences of envi-
ronmental damages in the European Court.427 The hard connection is between
fundamental guarantees in the Convention and their application in practice. If
there is a fundamental right to a certain quality of environment, then the pro-
cess guarantees of Articles 10 and 13 certainly give strong procedural claims
to anyone alleging an inadequate domestic environment by way of pointing
to health outcomes; does the state live up to its own guarantees? But even
outside of this still-rare situation,428 Articles 10 and 13 lock down the ability
for an individual placed in a dangerous environmental situation to question
their State’s performance with established Convention obligations. The State
426A subtle difference ripe for future papers and especially inquiry as to which would be
more effective and practicable.
427See Fadeyeva
428See Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] ; Hayward
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may live up to their procedural requirements, but substantively fail to protect
life and home under Articles 2 and 8. The various combinations here have
broad protection for health via environmental impact, implying also coverage
for environmental justice.
The process here is to link problems with established obligations. While
the EHR literature continues to grow in its own theoretical right, the ECtHR
jurisprudence expands on more tractable grounds, grounds which avoid the
problems of causality illustrated in Section 2.2.1. Briefly, in all but the most
egregious of cases, statistics can fail to support a causal connection between
chemicals or environmental insults and eventual health defects. The causes
of such failure are legion, but can stem from problems of small numbers of
victims relative to the “well” population at any given time, and large devia-
tions in the onset of symptoms or problems. The marvelous healing machine
that is the human body works against establishing causality for legal purposes
as well, at least in current construction. This is not to denigrate the health
outcomes; environmental damage is real and costs human lives and livelihood.
Showing that damage though and then utilizing it to propel change in envi-
ronmental regulation has met with less success than one would hope given
the background levels of concern with modern society’s growing impact on the
natural environment.
A derived environmental right is, in essence, protection for the natural en-
vironment that comes as a byproduct of protecting humans. There are those
who would like to protect the environment in its own right, and feel that it has
strong moral connections with the existing human rights discourse.429 Both
factions have used health concerns to motivate legal discussion. But neither
the individual nor the Court must weigh in to epidemiological debates when
utilizing human rights in the manner illustrated in the European Court. Here
it is not even bending an old protection to a new usage, a tactic used heavily
in the U.S. that will be discussed in the following chapter.430 The ECHR
generates protection of existing rights, pure and simple. Any protection to the
environment is incidental. States guarantee a right to life and a right to home
and family life. As activities which the State permits threaten those rights, vi-
olations occur. The fact that the violations are in the form of creeping smells,
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noises, creeping pools of waste or unsafe industrial practices do not need to be
linked to health outcomes, other than to illustrate a magnitude of intrusion
commensurate with non-environmental violations.
The simplicity of the EHR approach brings with it power. There is no
new judicial ground to break or competences to test. And it is not weak
protection either. The protection takes a stern view of protecting human life
in the face of industrial danger. Currently, the Court’s view of danger limits
to foreseeable events, but as science evolves and becomes more consistent in
linking environmental insults on the body to health outcomes, tenuous linkages
suddenly become firm legal precedent. So there is protection today, without
full knowledge of the environmental connections to human security and familial
connection, and that protection is presumably only going to increase as tenuous
assertions receive more empirical support.
Should scholars or policy advocates move to bump up the current support
then? Moving quickly toward establishing firmer substantive environmental
quality criteria is likely to meet with political and judicial resistance, lying as
it does in the realm of new rights and new competences along with forcing
greater obligations on the regulatory State. More favorable and suggested
by the momentum in the Court itself would be to simply continue testing
and pressing the European Court with cases which, though environmental
in outcome, firmly connect a State’s existing duties under Articles 2, 8, 10,
and 13, to the impact on the individual. Environmental degradation will
continue to encroach on protected spheres the more damage humans do to
the environment. This is far from perfect protection and also suffers greatly
from criticism that it will be chiefly ex post adaptive protection, enacted only
after tragedy and human suffering. But the point is that the EHR protection
overlaps completely here with the protection needed for environmental justice
outcomes. Both have appealed to the health/environment nexus in the same
fashion and so share the same umbrella here.
Also germane to the problems of environmental justice especially in dis-
cussion of agglomeration, is that degradation will be expected to impact cer-
tain individuals and areas faster than other groups. Firmly establishing both
substantive criteria where impacts impinge on existing rights, and procedu-
ral safeguards that States must have in place to prevent those situations from
arising puts increasing and established weight on the State to watch out. That
watching out shifts some of the criticism off of ex post heavy analysis. Knowing
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that there is a gravity to the agglomeration leaves less time to dawdle and less
recourse for the State to claim they met their obligations when environmental
calamity does occur. That is, strengthening the known ties does as much as
possible to put pressure on States to prevent environmental injustices, with-
out moving into health outcomes or attempting to define substantive “safe”
aspects of quality environments.
Öneryildiz shows the environmental justice advocate that truly horrendous
outcomes are actionable on human rights grounds. Hatton, López Ostra and
Guerra expand the duties of the State into protecting the home, family life,
and information flows which enable those rights to come to fruition. All of
these situations could easily fit under the heading of environmental justice,
though in some cases without the strong minority overtones. This is already a
wide net of responsibility. The more cases which explore such situations, the
tighter the existing weave becomes. Adding to the edges means playing with
the emerging science though; trying to connect environmental degradation and
lapses in Convention duties at the edge is working with the weaker data of a
learning society. Strengthening the data will allow us to build on to the net,
but for now there is much protection to be had on the inside.
The motion implied by derived EHR protection suggests advocates would
be well advised in bringing dangerous situations to the attention of the State,
laying a paper trail of warning should anything occur. As science works to
ground connections between environmental insults and dangers to life and
well-being, advocates of EHR-approaches to human protection should work
to point out as many cases as possible where States are headed down paths
which have led to infractions of the ECHR before. The two prong approach
expands the derived protection in a fashion harmonious with the expanding
jurisprudence without leapfrogging into unknown territory.
Still there remains a weakness of leaving explicit protection for human health
outside of human rights documents, as well as environmental health, in that as
this two prong approach operates there will remain a lack of ex ante power for
citizens. Ex post actions are much more powerful in the established framework.
But as the number and severity of warnings increases, the nexus moves beyond
Article 2 protections and in to Article 8 protections, and the more cases which
are tested by the Court, the clearer it becomes what States have to provide
their citizens in the way of access to information, court oversight, and remedy
for potential problems with EHR protecting the same area as environmental
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justice would have protected. For example, Hatton and López Ostra raise the
duties on the State to validate the margins of appreciation awarded to them
by the Convention. This is the right direction for anyone hoping to utilize
extracted EHR protections toward environmental justice ends.
The State knows now that the European Court will wade deeply into each
case, weighing the merits of each individually, to assess whether the State did
indeed protect home and family life. One can hope that this will create a
more vigilant state apparatus, and all by utilizing what protection exists and
allowing the science to come into its own. The protection leaves something to
be desired in the sense of foresight, however, relinquishing some of the power of
the people just where the U.S.’s experience with environmental justice would
want it to be strongest: pollution and hazard siting decisions.
4.3.2.3 Problem 3: Siting and Agglomeration
How do the protections derived from the European Convention deal with the
siting and agglomerations problem, bounded by the mechanics of spatial eco-
nomics? That is, is there enough protection to stop our environmental playing
field from tilting? There are certainly individual checks for when one finds
themselves in a “tilted” position. But this is only part of the environmental
justice problem. The central environmental justice issue, at least as defined by
the U.S. literature, is the consistent and arguably predictable tilting toward
certain groups. Identifying the groups within pollution agglomerations and
cataloging their racial and socio-economic makeup is what made the case for
widespread injustice and pointed toward incorporating increased protections
for such situations. It was only the lackluster performance in identifying mag-
nitudes which stopped the momentum of the effort. Does derived EHR though
put a check on the tilting process, or throw a monkey-wrench in the mechanics
of Chapter 3?
The first and most prominent piece in the U.S. environmental justice litera-
ture remains this claim of environmental racism, or the concentrated siting of
environmental burdens in what in many cases is areas of racial minorities. As
much as the title has changed to environmental justice and expanded into so-
cial justice, and public health, policy management, and general jurisprudence
have diluted that flavour, there is a still an aftertaste running through much
of the literature. Chapter 3 though goes on to illustrate how the research in
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the U.S. specifically has failed to solidify this perception in statistical studies,
at least as far as the racial component.431 The studies though do not rule out
agglomerative dynamics which impact groupings who presumably find it both
difficult to change the situation and facing continued influxes of environmen-
tal burdens. That conclusion flows simply from the agglomerative dynamics
of modern industries and an assumption that if the impact encroached on a
majority of the population, there would be no political problem in stopping
it. There is no need to discern the makeup of the impacted group.
Although the statistical work has yet to incorporate the existing research
on spatial agglomeration into models of the clustering of environmental dis-
amenities,432 there is nothing in the theoretical or empirical literature to sug-
gest that the problems identified by environmental justice will not continue
to be real problems for a subset of society, especially relative to the major-
ity of the population. The updated models of geographical economics433 only
back up what the earliest valuation studies in environmental economics ac-
complished at the dawn of the environmental movement,434 at least relative
to environmental justice issues. While they are certainly more sophisticated
and their insights incorporated immediately into empirical environmental jus-
tice inquiries, we are still simply showing that different locales in space have
different economic values. And when decisions on environmental usage are
taken inside political and bureaucratic pathways, if that clustering happens
to impact a racial or socioeconomic minority, there is no reason to think that
they will be well positioned to impact the outcome.
The reasons that the ECHR and its derived-EHR protections could stop
this dynamic have, for the most part, already been mentioned. In the first
degree, as both economics and epidemiological work becomes more sophisti-
cated, states cannot hide behind a claim of ignorance. States must provide
a modicum of environmental protection via established rights. As they be-
come more aware of what impacts environmental damages have on humans,
the tilting becomes much more of a problem; putting another polluting facil-
431As do more intensive appraisals, notably Bowen, William An Analytical Review of
Environmental Justice Research: What Do We Really Know? Environmental Management ,
29 January 2002, Nr. 1; Bowen/Wells; Bowen, William/Haynes, Kingsley E. The Debate
Over Environmental Justice. Social Science Quarterly, 81 September 2000, Nr. 3
432Bowen, William M/Atlas, Mark/Lee, Sugie Industrial Agglomeration and the Regional
Scientific Explanation of Perceived Environmental Injustice. Annals of Regional Science, 43




4 Europe and Rights
ity, or failing to clean up an old facility, in an area with clustered burdens is
now more likely to breach a state’s margins of appreciation on how to utilize
their environmental resources while staying within their Convention obliga-
tions. There is a mechanism by which choices which otherwise enable tilting
become more and more difficult to justify.
Whether or not this is sufficient for the eradication of enough environmen-
tal insults is unlikely, and one need only reference the continued discussion
on EHR for evidence. Derived protection exists but does not reach a level
hoped for by advocates or satisfactory for those concerned about health and
human development within industrial modernity. If it does not provide suffi-
cient coverage for pure environmental concerns, it is likely to have strictly less
protection when seen addressing environmental justice claims. Without a for-
mal claim to “no tilting” there will still be room for downward motion imposed
by the State. The protection as illustrated here pushes back against that but
the margins of appreciation allowed leave room still for relative differences.
These differences might indeed remain problems of environmental injustice.
Their magnitude though finds a backstop on EHR protection and pushes back
harder the more work emerges on environmental insults and human health
and happiness. Even without progress in science the known linkages can be
brought to bear on the State to provide procedural protections commensurate
with the dangers, agglomerated as they may become.
In the Court’s establishment of derived protection lies the seeds for greater
protection. Greater substantive protections were predicted above in Section
4.3.2.2 in that advocates and the judiciary should be focused on elucidating
and tightening the established links between environment, human impact, and
the protections already guaranteed. When one considers the evidence—theory
and empirical—pointing toward agglomerative tendencies it becomes hard to
argue that failures to watch out for that gravity will continue to pass muster.
For the environmental justice focused within the EHR, then, the goal becomes
to point out to State and Court that there must evolve a relevant consideration
of the agglomeration of environmental problems in assessing the State’s duties
to protect life and livelihood. Procedural guarantees follow along the same
logic. As the danger of environmental encroachment increases, as it will with
the agglomeration of polluting activities, the state’s margin of appreciation for
deciding that it is a relevant use of their resources shrinks, and duties to allow
access to information and legal proceedings similarly grow. Without specu-
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lating too far, the Court has enunciated that duties to protect increase with
danger and burden. Thus, adding information on the clustering of pollution
only increases the power of the individual and the protection their existing
rights already grant relative to the ECHR.
Therefore, this is also the first point where we must mention Article 14,
the guarantee of equal protection under the law. The hypothetical question
exists here, as it has been initiated by the environmental justice literature,
do existing laws grant the same protection across all similar situations? In
the situation of industrial agglomeration, and assuming concomitant pollution
agglomeration, can the State meet both their substantive duties to protect
and their Article 14 duties to protect equally? At a minimum, Article 14
coupled with derived-EHR protection places its own pressure on the State
to take a stance on keeping local environments in regulatory check, above
the flat duty implied by Öneryildiz, Hatton and others where the assumption
is that each person is being protected at a minimum standard. Given the
limited resources of any state agency though—a motivating factor for staying
away from entangling themselves in too many positive rights—applying the law
evenly over an agglomerated industrial landscape will arguably not protect all
inhabitants equally. Those already burdened by more forms of pollution will
find themselves in a hole, so to speak, one which the evenly-spread positive
obligations does not help them out of, at least relative to its ability to raise
citizens not already placed in a pollution hole.
The counter argument would be that the Court evaluates situations on a case
by case basis; if there is an individual complaint arising from a certain area, it
does not matter if they have more pollution than an area removed from them.
It only matters whether the State has fulfilled their substantive and procedural
obligations under the Convention relative to whatever level of insult to which
the individual is exposed. The worse the environment insults, the more the
State must do to assure compliance. Öneryildiz and especially Hatton speak
to the ability of the State to allow insults so long as they monitor safety or
take measures to minimize both personal and pecuniary damages. This is in
an individual right, and thus weighed on the nexus of individual impact.
While this is certainly true for the substantive measures of life and living
space protections, there is a greater question as to whether the procedural
guarantees of Articles 6, 10, and 13 would not be implicated if shown that
the individual were subjected to agglomerative environmental insults. Is one’s
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access to the Court’s processes and remedies reduced by the number or mag-
nitude of simultaneous burdens which they fight? Article 14 clearly provides
protection against having different doors to the Courts for different people.
But for the case of environmental problems, problems lying in to the area
shown above as derived protections for the environment, does the Convention
protections for access to process and remedy have to rise when there is agglom-
eration potential? If the agglomeration cycle continues, and a particular area,
group, or even minority is found to be constantly fighting to prevent pollution
from slipping into their depressed topology, is the law truly protecting them?
Is it the effective remedy and protection envisioned by the Convention to have
industries routinely breach a threshold and then be pulled back by regulatory
apparatuses initiated by the human rights obligations? Or is it rather to pro-
vide a safe sphere where society need not be constantly vigilant to point out
encroachment? Does protection have to remedy the gravity of the tendency to
cluster, or provide greater protections from it? Given the individual focus in
human rights and the Convention itself, the answer is in itself likely negative.
In conjunction with Article 14, however, there is room for consideration.
Although there is not room to consider all ramifications here, hopefully with
these roads now paved inquiry can spend less time in transit from “traditional”
environmental justice to this point of departure. For the meantime, however,
suffice it to say that the addition of Article 14 to the derived EHR picture, com-
bined with the environmental justice situation, continues the forward pressure
for States to protect against environmental encroachment. The substantive
and procedural guarantees in the Convention do offer a level of protection
against the agglomerative concerns of environmental justice, putting at least
a progressive brake on the tilting if not a firm prohibition. The protection
against tilting is, however, mostly derived from the individual protection and
does not directly address the unequal propensities. The immediate focus of
research in this direction should then be to first answer whether the coupling
of Article 14 with what we know about agglomeration does impose duties on
the State, and to what extent those conditions are currently met. In the mean-
time, there are more immediate routes for advocates to explore for protection
against unequal environs.
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4.3.2.4 Problem 4: The Lack of Public Empowerment
Given the current milieu, the most used weapon for those looking to push back
against the tilting of environmental problems is simply public participation.
While the above all rely on, for the most part, backwards-looking strategies,
public participation advocates getting people in the door while regulatory de-
cisions are made. Whether or not the Court must take in to consideration the
increased forces agglomeration puts on individuals in certain situations, their
ability to participate in decision making must reach a proscribed level. How
well does the derived EHR protection do in securing a place for concerned
voices? And how well does that protection address environmental justice con-
cerns?
Like the protections against health encroachment, there is full overlap here
between derived EHR protections and environmental justice problems. The
goal under both is to empower the individual in their relations with the State.
The ability for voices to be heard in planning processes is to be measured as
a function of meeting procedural duties. But the State is given wide margins
as to how it sets up its machinery to regulate the environment. Thus, there
is plenty of room for structures where public participation on the front end
of decision making is not the norm. To some extent, there is protection from
being completely shut out of the discourse by the European Court’s acknowl-
edgment that a citizen need not exhaust domestic remedies if remedies do not
realistically exist.435 Even when an individual then cannot affect aspects of
the State’s environmental decision making machinery, but the outcome of that
machinery can foreseeably impact their fundamental rights, the individual has
standing at European Court. Their chances of reaching the Court itself may
be small but their ability alone places duties on the State to prevent the need.
This may be relatively weak preventative power, given the time, energy, and
uncertainty involved with bringing a claim, either against the domestic appa-
ratus or the Convention. Nevertheless, it does provide a toehold for public
participation relative to environmental decision making, grounded in estab-
lished human rights precedent. Given that EHR mechanisms are derived a
toehold is not a bad start.
An equally important safeguard is provided through the Court’s recognition
of effectual remedies. The foot dragging in Taskin and interference provided
435Guerra, para 49.
243
4 Europe and Rights
by the Government was seen by the European Court in their role as an impar-
tial observer of domestic processes as a circumvention of judicial and binding
decisions. Decisions by the lower courts clearly established that the issue was
a question of a civil right under the definitions in the Court’s jurisprudence,436
and one which was directly in question given the situation.437 That is, the
foot-dragging led to a circumvention of civil rights, as defined by the Court,
and hence deprived the applicants from their right to fair trial.438 The people
had access to a trail but the outcome was ineffectual. Importantly here, there
was no regard to the probable and long-term outlook of the harm alleged.439
The people must not only have access but the legally binding outcomes must
come to fruition. Thus, public participation, while not guaranteeing an out-
come to the benefit of the public, does guarantee that the outcome decided
happens.
There is then a significant backstop to make sure any gains made by public
participation—or frankly any other methods towards environmental preservation—
do not go unfulfilled. Nevertheless, it bears repeating there is no requirement
for a particular remedy,440 and the Taskin case reaffirms that domestic legisla-
tures are given wide margins to decide what remedy is adequate and sufficient.
Here the Court noted that the rights of Article 6 only require that the possibil-
ity of remedy exists. That is, the aims of public participation, should the truly
be affected by human rights, must have a remedy available, but it need not be
the remedy most preferred by the group alleging the problem. Addressing the
problem, though bounded by the requirements and duties of the Convention,
has some latitude. In fact, a particular outcome might be beaten back by an
initial claim of violation but reemerge successful, albeit delayed, by following
proper procedures under rectified government oversight. Of course, if the ap-
436para 130
437para 133. Note process for interpretation laid out in Zander v. Sweden Application no.
14282/88, judgment of 25 November 1993.
438This reflects Bryan v. the United Kingdom, application no. 44/1994/491/573, judg-
ment of 25 October 1995 judgement where the Court found that the High Court’s ability
to strike down an unfair or impartial ruling, if one occurred, was enough to secure the
possibility of effective remedy under Article 6. That is, the decision making body must be
sufficiently independent. See, inter alia, Langborger v. Sweden application no. 11179/84,
judgment of 22 June 1989; Leander v. Sweden, application no. 9248/81, judgment of 26
March 1987.
439Also see Okyay and others v. Turkey, application no. 36220/97, judgment of 10 De-
cember 2005.
440For instance, there is no positive obligation to allow an applicant to prosecute or convict
those responsible for harms.
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plicants still do not believe their interests were protected adequately by the
State, there should be avenues for appeal.441 There is a lot of room for back
and forth, a positive for public participation in general but not allowing much
certainty toward outcomes preferred by environmental rights advocates.
The goal in guaranteeing public participation is a backstop, and granting
actual political power to a numerical minority is a forward check on envi-
ronmental uses that may not be in their best interest. Best interests though
might be far above the lower bar for adequate protection of interests. Given
that the environmental protections here are all derived rights, it is more than
likely that the best environmental outcomes and those secured by the Court
diverge significantly. This is of course the complaint of mainline EHR propo-
nents, that derived protections cannot be relied upon to do “enough.” But
the ultimate goal of human rights, and by extension, of environmental human
rights, is to provide an environment worthy of human dignity to all. Dignity
does not always arrive by getting one’s way. Nevertheless, the goal of securing
dignity is naturally forward looking. It may not be forward looking enough,
but one hastens to note that although one would not want despoiling to neces-
sarily occur before engaging the right, a truly negative EHR would not engage
positive duties but rather disallow government actions. The absence of gov-
ernment (the duty-bound object of the right) would not necessarily prevent
degradation. With that in mind, comparing the limited forward protections
of assuring participation but not substantive outcomes does not necessarily
compare so poorly.
Even in failures of participation to prevent problems the government would
later be forced to take remedial action.442 It is clearly better to have agreement
from both sides as to the use of the environment, the distribution of the benefits
of that use, and the acknowledgement, monitoring, and containment of the
burdens. Ensuring some degree of public voice is a step toward this. Work
however needs to be done on the correct way to structure this. Procedural
rights and obligations are a step in the right direction but certainly do not
solve all problems nor does it tackle all dynamics of the back and forth.443 Too
much blocking power on either side (eminent domain) sees unilateral outcomes
441Council of Europe Manual on human rights and the environment , p. 18.
442cf. Hayward, p. 150
443See discussions in Hartley, Nicola/Wood, Christopher Public Participation in envi-
ronmental impact assessment-implementing the Aarhus Convention. Environmental Impact
Assessment Review , 25 2005; Spyke. Also grassroots work done in the U.S. by Fraser.
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more than would be efficient, economically speaking.
But even an in depth study of the justiciability and outcomes of derived-
rights enabling public participation would miss an important level of the dis-
course: the social impacts. Courts are only one way to enforce a law. The
strongest way, perhaps, but not necessarily the only way. With environmental
justice, which so clearly arises from distributed decisions and responsibilities
on how the environment will be used, duties and the pressure they exert can
arise outside of courts. It is the duty of all to actively decide how to use the
environment without, of course, impinging on the uses aspired to by others,
especially not to deprive those “others” of uses which you yourself enjoy. But
this pressure need not always act through courts. By putting a strong stamp
on public participation and the rights of individuals to voice their opinions
in environmental matters is a strong social statement in and of itself of the
respect due to environmental opinions.
Some have called this as a form of political enforcement. Branco, for in-
stance, states that
“[i]f society, with regard to the enforcement of economic, social and
cultural rights, cannot be accountable before a court of law, it must
still be accountable before individuals in the shape of voters. In
other words, as far as economic, social and cultural rights are con-
cerned, legal justiciability could, and perhaps should, be replaced
by political responsibility.”444
Environmental justice concerns have as mentioned concerns about political
representation. But even though the political enforcement might be lessened
in environmental justice cases, it still plays a definable role in EHR-type pro-
tection. And, to the extent that environmental justice concerns flow from a
lack of voting power among those effective, EHR-like protection via Branco’s
extra-judicial channels would have to take note of environmental justice con-
cerns to provide coverage.445 They need, however, to be explored in future
research.
The conclusion in examining the coverage of derived EHRs, and by exten-
sion the protection against environmental injustices, the lack of public partic-
ipation guarantees is the largest gap in environmental protection that could
444Branco, p. 13.
445See discussions in Chapter 2.
246
4.3 Conclusions for EHR and the ECHR
realistically and presently be addressed. How far procedural guarantees, and
how far the impact of individual-tuned policies such as those indicated by the
Aarhus Convention go to cover that gap, is open for debate. Like the above
discussions, there is certainly a level of support here though.
4.3.3 Conclusions on Derived Protection
A great deal of derived environmental protection exists in the European Con-
vention, that much is clear. That derived protection goes a long way towards
addressing the concerns raised in the EHR literature. It also goes some way to
addressing environmental justice concerns, such as disenfranchisement, limited
evidence linking damage to health outcomes, the tendency for economic activ-
ity to cluster, and the lack of public empowerment to address manifestations
of any or all of these. Protection of environmental justice concerns however are
notably derived just as the environmental protections. Thus, the extant pro-
tections do not solve the problems entirely. That admittedly would be a high
fence to clear given the way that problems keep emerging as our knowledge of
our impact on humans via our environmental choices grows. Nevertheless, the
positive attitude and expanding scope of the European Court lends much hope
to continued utilization of this pathway toward environmentally just outcomes,
especially relative to the picture in the U.S. discussed in the next chapter.
To foreshadow, much of the success in the ECHR framework comes from its
focus on individuals, a hallmark of fundamental rights. Groups of people—a
numerical minority—-exposed to an environmental burden are protected as in-
dividuals. Individuals are protected from intrusions in to the life, their home,
and their possessions as well as provided procedural pathways to check State
maneuvers in and around their infrangible spheres. The kind of legal analysis
necessary to examine human rights instruments are more developed and di-
verge less from strict interpretations of the guarantees granted by the ECHR
and therefore allows for easy overlap extending into environmental realms.
Extending existing rights into environmental realms has not been successful
in the civil rights approach taken by the U.S. Hence, this chapter suggests a
significant positive development in the desire to address the growth of dispro-
portionate burdens. Again, the approach does not solve environmental justice
issues. It does, however, address many.
In the individual approach via human rights, there is no mention of com-
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paring their status as a member of a larger group to the members of another
comparator group. This is quite beneficial in terms of avoiding legal problems
of constructing comparator groups. In fact, there is already a general litera-
ture critical of what is known as this “comparator problem”446 within legal
thought on discrimination emanating from the U.S. Naturally then it trick-
led into thoughts on environmental justice and racial motives. Briefly stated,
from the point of view of a plaintiff concerned that an outcome stemmed from
discriminatory origins—that the outcome is unnatural and steered by biased
hand—the overarching question is whether alike things were treated alike.
While this sentence is vague, it quickly reveals the problem; how do we define
what makes things “alike?”447
McColgon448 uses the example of Powell v. Pennsylvania449 to quickly il-
lustrate the problem. The US Supreme Court (US Court) confronted a statute
which placed restrictions on producers of margarine but not on producers of
the arguably analogous product, butter. Given that butter and margarine are
at least partial substitutes in the economic sense, did these regulations deny
equal protection of the laws as per the 14th Amendment, guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws for all citizens of the U.S? The US Court rather brusquely
dismissed the claim, drawing a tight line around margarine producers and a
separate one around butter’s manufacturers. As long as the law applied to all
margarine producers equally, the law was granting equal protection.
This sort of logic though, as U.S. lawyers now know, does not make for
conclusive analysis. The landmark Loving v. Virginia450 saw that analysis
must go further, at least in certain cases. There, a ban on a white person
marrying a “non-white” tried to hide inside this same margarine-logic, claiming
that what is applied equally among all whites could not be unequal for the
purpose of the 14th Amendment. The judges’ ruling went to the logic of the
446The term comparator first appeared in U.S. jurisprudence in Spaulding v. University
of Washington, No. C74091M, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17951 at *18 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17,
1981), aff’d, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Atonio
v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) cf. Sullivan, Charles A. The
Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators. Alabama Law Review , 60
2009, n. 193.
447The handy idea of treating “like alike” is meaningless without simultaneously proposing
criteria to determine “likeness.” See discussions in, inter alia, Westen, Paul The Empty Idea
of Equality. Harvard Law Review , 95 1982
448McColgon, Aileen Cracking the Comparator Problem: Discrimination, “Equal” treat-
ment and the role of comparisons. European Human Rights Law Review , 6 2006.
449127 U.S. 678 (1888).
450388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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law over the letter.
The comparator problem points to these differences and begs us to answer
why we draw comparator group boundaries where we do. Perhaps it was easy
to overlook such a question when confronted with an argument between butter
and margarine, easy because there is not much on the line. It is just as easy to
overlook the boundary problem in 1967’s Civil Rights milieu when confronted
with Loving where so much is on the line as to push the judicial question so far
away from the boundary concern. That is, the situation was so egregious, so
literally black and white, that judicial competences were not called into a grey
fog. So the fact that neither of these cases arguably sat near the boundary
and that many similar cases followed in their footsteps has kept legal scholars
from examining comparator issues as central in any case of discrimination,451
be it racial, gender, or disproportionate public good provision.
In situations like we find in environmental justice cases, however, it is much
more likely, as illustrated in the U.S. literature to which the next chapter
turns,452 that we are going to run into the necessary and difficult task of
defining boundaries. It is equally likely that opposing sides will be able to
choose arbitrary comparator groups conducive to their argument. The goal of
the defendant becomes not either to show that they did not treat the plaintiffs
differently or to show that the plaintiff belongs to a group dissimilar from the
group to which they are comparing themselves. Naturally the dissimilarity has
to be justifiable but leaves much room when one moves away from egregious
cases of racism; the environment has proved a fair deal removed from cases of
clear racism.
The ability to be arbitrary is a weakness to any law which enables it and
choosing comparator groupings retains a degree of that arbitrariness. But
this is not a new problem. The existing judicial logic, in both the U.S.453
and the ECtHR,454 place much weight on first establishing one’s similarity
to an external group before alleging discrimination took place. Work then
proceeds to inform how best to choose and rigorously define the boundaries of
the comparators.455




455Sullivan has recently expounded the rationale for comparator group usage in the more
charged employment discrimination situation and found that introducing expert testimony
regarding comparators is helpful and necessary in drawing boundaries in that context.
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From an environmental justice perspective, the use of expert testimony in
defining comparator groups should be both easier and already enabled by the
approaches of the empirical science. This has not, however, proved to be the
case. Not only is a spatial metric hard to identify, but the U.S.’s distinct civil
rights evolution puts more weight on the decisions which led to discriminatory
outcomes, rather than simply the difference in treatment that emerges.
In U.S. discrimination cases, around which much of the work on comparator
groups in environmental justice situations revolves, the case rests on the ques-
tion of inferring intent to discriminate, a topic touched on in Chapter 3.456
The drawing of the comparator group around a suspect classification—a metric
of distinction having little or no rationale except to enable discrimination—
enables this inference, often by bringing in evidence that the decision-maker
has in other situations a proclivity towards a preferred group over the claimants
group. Offering evidence to the contrary helps support the defendant’s deci-
sion.
As the environmental justice literature in the U.S. showed, the intent-hurdle
is virtually impossible to show in environmental justice-situations, and the lack
of legal support to questions of discriminatory impact nearly perfectly hinders
any forward progress for advocates. The focus broadly speaking has been
how (re) enable such pathways, or barring that, how to move the discussion
above or around the dead ends. Evidence of wider gates and lower bars in the
ECHR stands in contrast to this problem and a big difference is the utilization
of individuals versus the intrinsic group dynamic of discrimination inquiry.457
The next chapter turns to examine the U.S. situation in more detail in order
to ground this comparison. This chapter should have clarified both how and to
what extent the ECHR has been successfully expanded to include protection
from environmental issues. It would be very beneficial if somewhere in the
literature there existed a grading criteria for the level of protection offered by
EHRs. Alas, the topic is too new, and the jurisprudence still too spartan,
to develop such a measure. As such, the discussion remains, for the time
being, in the area of rhetoric. The take away is nevertheless a feeling that
derived EHRs have a useful—and potentially powerful—role in environmental
justice’s future. That does not imply that the ECHR needs an EHR tuned
to environmental justice nor is this more evidence for fundamental right to
456Specifically Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
457Regarding lower bars to the ECHR see San José.
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environmental rights. States are still wary to be put on the hook for positive
duties, and rationally so when it comes to the environment. Environmental
issues encroach in on modern life in so many ways, and yet the problems stem
from the industries and technologies from which we derive “modern life” itself.
Perhaps the ultimate irony is that the War which brought us the UDHR and
the instruments of human rights we know today also brought us the synthetic
chemicals and a reliance on science which created much of the pollution with
which we are now dealing.458 Perhaps it is then fitting that we close the circle
by pitting the beneficial offspring of the world’s most terrifying war against
its detrimental progeny. And the problems experienced in the U.S. make a
good bookend for the benefits of the ECHR’s individual approach, allowing a
personal weighing of rights and the environment in which they enjoy rights.
458Rachel Carson, whose epigraph opened this chapter, notes the connection between
WWII science, chemical warfare, and the pesticide (biocide) catastrophe as early as 1964.
Carson, p. 16
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5 Back to the Future: The U.S.,
Environmental Justice, and
Rights
If the Bill of Rights contains no
guarantee that a citizen shall be
secure against lethal poisons
. . . it is surely only because our
forefathers, despite their
considerable wisdom and
foresight, could conceive of no
such problem.
Rachel Carson
Although the U.S. literature played the main role in the last chapters of
this work, giving birth to the issues which took hold and became the move-
ment of environmental justice, the preceding discussion on human rights was
able to cover much ground environmental justice ground without a mention
of the U.S. Although civil rights play a central role in the U.S. environmen-
tal justice discussion there is not the same positive feeling as to its auxiliary
ability to protect the environment. The pessimism is rather encompassing
because the U.S. turned nearly exclusively to civil rights protections against
discrimination in their attempt to safeguard against environmental damages
via fundamental rights. Those pathways, while once holding some promise
analogous to that illustrated in the preceding chapter, now have serious le-
gal roadblocks. Furthermore, should those roadblocks be bypassed there still
remain the hurdles, largely due to viewing the issues entirely through the
lens of discrimination, that lent lackluster protection in the first place. These
high hurdles toward applying solitary civil rights to environmental protection
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are quite a bit more problematic than a similar roadblock would be at the
European Court, given that the environmental justice approach in Europe is
multi-axial, rotating through more rights-protected areas than the U.S.’s focus
on anti-discrimination. This chapter brings the positive outcomes of derived-
EHR protection in Europe back to discuss the shortcomings in the land where
environmental justice got its start, comparing and contrasting processes and
outcomes.
A direct comparison must be a careful run thing though. Relative to the
experience in Europe the human rights discussion in the U.S. resides on a
different level; there is no top-down expansion of individual rights nor any
international pressure. Again, there is some mixing in the discussion of levels
of law at this point. Notably here there is a discussion of Constitutional
Law—mainly focused on the Fourteenth Amendment—but also a significant
discussion on the Civil Rights Acts—here centered on Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Here however the fact that the major anti-discrimination
provisions have achieved quasi-constitutional status in the U.S. means that
overlap is less problematic. The rather tight focus on anti-discrimination as
protection in the U.S. remains the relevant comparison.1
Though one must mention the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
passing, its influence on U.S. legal discourse is so minimal relative to the
influence exerted by the ECtHR that no direct comparison is (yet) warranted.2
The U.S. has, however, taken explicit notice of the human rights focus and
logic in some of their recent high-profile cases.3 The global move—cautious
to be sure—toward economic and social rights, both in the explicit yet goal-
orientation form of the ICESCR and the indirect but tangible forms in the
1Though one hastens to note that there are other potential sources of derived rights,
including procedural rights in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. These are more rarely
employed because of elaborate requirements in statutory law. This is especially true in the
law governing federal agencies and their decisions, which come in the form of promulgating
regulations: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The cumulative
effect of the bits of protection available within the U.S. regulations may indeed be substan-
tive. This however needs to be considered in rather intricate detail and is left for later
research once the broader comparisons here have been firmly established.
2Recent influence of the Inter-American Court on U.S. policies toward accused terrorist
detainees in Guantanamo Bay however deserve note. See Koh, Harold Hongju; Ignatieff,
Michael, editor Chap. America’s Jeckyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism In American Exception-
alism and Human Rights. Princeton University Press, 2005. The general milieu around
such a weighty topic however bars simple inferences like the U.S. becoming more open to
international human rights oversight.
3Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-8 (2002)
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ECtHR,4 requires measures often involving market intervention by coercive
elements, something to which the U.S. has not been particularly warm. This
has been a relatively new development, however, and this chapter begins by
quickly clearing the air and showing that there is no specific barrier to the U.S.
adopting more economic and social protections.5 It is rather the culmination of
subjective elements of U.S. legal evolution which steered toward the landscape
we see today, a rights-landscape focused tightly on anti-discrimination.
That discussion lends naturally to an illustration of the ways in which the
civil rights of the United States have not extended to protect new areas as have
the protections of the ECHR.6 There is much detail here, given the long and
contentious legal history surrounding efforts to eradicate racial discrimination.
To ground the discussion the section focuses on illustrating the ways in which
environmental justice literature itself has documented the failings of applying
existing rights toward protecting new areas, a cue taken from the approach
in Chapter 3 of illustration by example. The discussion on growth of ECtHR
jurisprudence in Chapter 4 highlights the utility of the multiple existent rights
in deriving environmental protections relative to the confined focus in the U.S.
on rights protecting from discrimination. The conclusion is that either the U.S.
must open up their civil rights protections to new areas or begins to apply other
areas of existing rights protection to the environmental problems highlighted
by their own environmental justice discussion should they desire to address
the general statement of the problem of environmental justice expounded in
Chapter 2 and mirror the success on that pursuit shown by the European
approach.
5.1 A Fine Place for Rights
An explanation as to why the U.S. did not enjoy the expansion of rights-
protected areas as the ECHR, especially in environmental realms, could start
with the current overarching antipathy toward economic rights. The cold
reception though is a relatively recent phenomenon and therefore forces re-
4Note however recently: Osiatyński, Wiktor Human Rights and Their Limits. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009, p. 36-37, discussing the move away broad definitions and
goal-orientation of the late 1940s rhetoric on human rights, toward using justiciability as a
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search to dig deeper. This section touches quickly on how the current situ-
ation evolved noting most importantly that there are no structural barriers
to increasing the scope of rights while building toward the discussion on the
particulars which hindered the extraction of newer rights.
Aversion or antipathy to positive or second-generation rights was not al-
ways the case in America. Perhaps the best and most powerful illustration of
this is Franklin Roosevelts proposed Second Bill of Rights in his State of the
Union speech in 1944.7 The proposal, which would have guaranteed rights to
a home, job, living wages, medical care, education, and economic protection
from detrimental but largely unavoidable circumstance bears many similarities
to the goals embodied in the European Convention. The temporal connection
to the UDHR is obvious8 but notable that it was popular enough to be brought
into the political discussion at that level. Coming at the end of the successful
New Deal the Second Bill of Rights could have continued a very drastic trans-
formation of the role of government in the U.S. Basing their current opinion
on a more recent and literal interpretation of the wording in their national
constitution, however, U.S. courts now, over a half-century later, view rights
guaranteed to citizens to be negative in nature. The idea is to limit state
power to act instead of positive requirements to guarantee standards.
The focus today is thus negative in nature; the forward-looking Second Bill
of Rights is all but forgotten.9 Nevertheless the anecdote illustrates that the
shift in focus has a cultural and subjective component and is not structural
and legal; there is no direct institutional barrier against social and economic
rights in the U.S. In fact, the U.S. Congress has heard several proposals for
an environmental right, both on the heels of the civil rights years and more
recently.10 Though there is measured resistance to reading the Constitution as
7Fleischacker, Samuel A Short History of Distrubive Justice. Harvard University Press,
2004, p. 82-83.
8As is the involvement of his wife, Eleanor, in the United Nations and the writing of the
UDHR after FDR’s death.
9DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, (1989).
cf. Steiner, Henry J./Alston, Philip International Human Rights In Context. 2nd edition.
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 252; noting in contrast Brennen J.s dissent that inaction
can be just as much of an abuse of power as action on the part of the State.
10See H.R. J. Res 1321 90th Congress (1968); HR J. Res. 1205, 91st Congress (1970);
HR.J Res 33, 108th Congress. (2003). cf. Hill, Barry E/Wolfson, Steve/Targ, Nicholas
Human Rights and the Environment: A synopsis and some predictions. Geo. Int’l. Envtl.
L. Rev. 16 2003-2004, n 132 The American Public Health Association recommended a con-
stitutional amendment to guarantee that citizens would be free from the harm of pollutants.
Schrader-Frechette, Kristin Human Rights and Duties to Alleviate Environmental Injustice:
The Domestic Case. Journal of Human Rights, 6 2007
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living document in the sense that the ECHR is read,11 the echoes of proposals
for positive-type rights allow for a discussion of why such rights did not appear,
either in later legislation or via derivation.
The failure to expand rights in general, and the failure to derive environmen-
tal protections in particular, was also not for a lack of noticing the possibility.
Anderson and Miller noted explicitly the possibility as far back as 1977.12 Prior
to the emergence of a strong environmental movement and government regu-
lations in environmental directions, environmental scholars noted the possible
constitutional recognition of an environmental right. The idea follows from
analysis of the U.S. Constitution’s Ninth Amendment—rights are reserved to
the people which are not specifically given to the states. That interpretation
emerged under Griswold v. Connecticut.13 There the U.S. Court14 expressed
an opinion that certain private liberties were protected by the “penumbra” of
expressed guarantees in the Constitution. That is, the right in question is
“necessary to make the express guarantees of other provisions fully
meaningful. . . ”15
Above the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of unspecified rights there were
also penumbra aspects read from the Third Amendment’s prohibition of quar-
tering troops in private residences, the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the
11There is extensive U.S. constitutional literature on the subject. For environmental
justice-relevant discussions and introductions, see though Mank, Bradford C. Can Adminis-
trative Regulations Interpret Rights Enforceable under Section 1983: Why Chevron Defer-
ence Survives Sandoval and Gonzaga. Fla. St. U. L. 32 2005, p. 860-864, and footnote 116,
as well as Idem Suing under 1983: The Future after Gonzaga University v. Doe. Hous. L.
Rev , 39 2003, p. 1463-64. Also note that the federal structure of the U.S. may itself poses
a barrier to an environmental right’s inclusion in the constitution, though this is not the
same as a structural bar to economic and social rights. Hill/Wolfson/Targ, p. 390. The U.S.
Court of Appeals , in Flores v Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2002)
at 161 took a limited view of other second generation rights such as health, and even noted
that the right to life itself can be
“boundless and indeterminate. They express virtuous goals understandably
expressed at a level of abstraction needed to secure the adherence of States
that disagree on many of the particulars regarding how actually to achieve
them.”
Nevertheless, a dim view is not an impossible view.
12Anderson, Frederick R./Miller, Alan S.; Husimi, Kodi, editor Chap. Fundamental
Rights and Environmental Quality In Science for Better Environment Fundamental Rights
and Environmental Quality: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Human En-
vironmental. Pergamon Press, 1977, p. 828.
13381 U.S. 479 (1965). . cf. Ibid.
14The term U.S. Court is used here to refer to the Supreme Court in order to emphasize
the comparison with the European Court: the ECtHR.
15Ibid.
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security of the person and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against personal
incrimination. Without the level of privacy at issue in the case several consti-
tutional protections would not be effective.
The need for certain levels of privacy to meet the needs of citizens to enjoy
their Constitutional rights quite naturally links to the discussion of effective
enjoyment of rights in the ECtHR; there is shared logic in that rights must
be effective to be rights. Similar penumbra derivations though did not take
off in the intervening decades in U.S. jurisprudence, especially not relative to
the environment nor the movement in Europe. This is not without some good
reason, including the rise of environmental regulation and the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) which, among other things, deemphasized other
paths toward environmental control.16 Suffice it to say at this level of abstrac-
tion that there are pathways in U.S. legal history which, generally speaking,
could have led down a road parallel to that followed by the ECHR. For a few
reasons, none of which being a change in the foundational or bounding laws,
the rights discourse did not evolve however.
The simple illustration here tells that the U.S. is not structurally hostile to
the idea of economic and social rights. As further support, Sunstein17 explored
this question and came to the conclusion that the present chill picture is also
not attributable to some degree of American exceptionalism. He concludes
instead that it is a directional change in the interpretation of the Constitution
relative to government-provided benefits after the election of Richard Nixon
in 1968.18 A change in the majority view of interpreting the Constitution is
a much different situation though than a definitive structural judgment on
the boundaries of the Constitution. The changes in the makeup of the Court
16Another problems could be a concern regarding the potential for political capture as
well. The use of a constitutional right for political ends via the environment and policy
setting is not what the Constitution was designed to guide. A U.S. constitutional right
is properly restricted to protecting the safety and well-being of individuals. Given what
was said about the tenuous links between environmental and health—a link still as legally
problematic now—this problem remains substantive in addition to any legal rationale. See
Anderson/Miller, p. 842. Also note discussions of alternatives to regulation promulgated
by Yandle, Bruce Common Sense and Common Law for the Environment. Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997; also Morriss, Andrew P./Yandle, Bruce/Dorchak, Andrew
Choosing How to Regulate. Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 29 2005
17Sunstein, Cass R.; Ignatieff, Michael, editor Chap. Why Does the American Consti-
tution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees? In American Exceptionalism and Human
Rights. Princeton University Press, 2005.
18Nixon appointed Warren Burger, Harry Blackmum, Lewis Powell and William Rehn-
quist, three conservative justices whose weight potentially changed the then-expanding
recognition of economic and social rights.
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created the gravity of today.
More specifically, the 1960s saw the U.S. Court extending requirements on
the State to provide for the poor in certain situations. In Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections19 the Supreme Court interpreted the 14th Amendment to
proscribe the poll tax.20 The Court “effectively ruled that states must provide
the vote free of charge–even though it is expensive to run an election.”21 Thus,
the state must actively provide an entitlement—an example of a U.S. duty to
secure a right through active motion on the part of the State.22 It was this
motion that slowed with the change in mentality.
The intervening years and change in makeup changed both the cultural and
judicial momentum in the U.S. It has never been easy to change (amend)
the U.S. Constitution,23 but interpretation of its proscriptions has swayed
through the Court’s history. Had the change in direction not occurred, how-
ever, Sunstein confirms that there is indeed enough latitude in at least the
14th Amendment to accommodate economic and social rights.
“An interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that called for
social and economic rights would not, in fact, be much more of a
stretch of the document than many interpretations that are now
taken for granted in American constitutional law.”24
Cases, such as Harper and other entitlement-expanding decisions25 speak also
to this conclusion. And although they came to the Court because of situations
where poverty is reducing a citizen’s ability to exercise their citizenship and
thereby creating an entitlement,there remains room to argue that sufficient
environmental damage could reach this level of citizenship reduction.26 This
19Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
20This was above the proscription by the 24th Amendment which applied to federal
(national-level) elections.
21Sunstein American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, p. 106.
22We avoid talk of positive and negative rights here as, given both the present tendency
away from such speak in the literature and following also Cass Sunstein with Christine
Jolls, who remind readers that all rights presume some expenditure or existence of costly
infrastructure. Jolls, Christine/Sunstein, Cass R. Debiasing through Law. National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc, November 2005 (11738). – NBER Working Papers ff
23See, for instance, the Equal Rights Amendment of 1972 and discussion in, inter alia,
Berry, Mary Frances Why ERA Failed: Politics, Women’s Rights, and the Amending Pro-
cess of the Constitution. Indiana University Press, 1988
24Sunstein American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, p. 106.
25Such as Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
26See Chapter 2, also Holland, Breena Justice and the Environment in Nussbaum’s “ca-
pabilities approach”: Why sustainable ecological capacity is a meta-capability. Political
Research Quarterly, 61 2008
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sits generally well with other interpretations of the foundational rights guar-
anteed by the United States, in that they are “counteracting the disparity of
power between the state and the individual.”27
At the very least though there is no blocking derived-rights in the U.S. In
fact, the cooling of sentiment towards positive duties might simply keep—or
have kept—the discussion to a lower level than Constitutional protections as
well. Sunstein suggests that political guarantees of minimum security would
find their way into U.S. laws with less resistance than constitutional rights and,
again by extension, more easily than the interpretation existing rights toward
new ends.28 The point though is that the individual liberties preserved in
the Constitution are seen as analogous to the human rights provisions in the
ECHR and are not explicitly barred from similar evolution. On the former
point, consider the telling story from Osiatyński’s recent book:
In 1990 I was invited by the University of Chicago to teach human
rights. The dean of the law school was a recognized constitutional
scholar. One day, after he and I had become friends, he asked me
to tell him what exactly I was teaching in my human rights course.
[. . . ] When I progressed from general theory to the details of the
freedoms of speech, expression, and association, he exclaimed what
I was teaching was, in essence, the very same thing he was teaching
in Constitutional Law I and II. I then realized that, for American,
human rights was an export product.29
The general lacking of positive rights relative to the ECHR then is at least
arguably a temporal factor with room remaining to bring in a discussion of
expanding rights, whether they enter at the Constitutional or legislative levels.
The protections aimed at by the framers of each system appear analogous.
27Sinden, Amy Climate Change and Human Rights. Journal of Land Resources and
Environmental Law , 27 2007, p. 6, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), esp. 656:
“Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause
in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry
from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.”; United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938); and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),
esp. 558: “The touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual against arbitrary
action of the government.”
28Increasing the power of judges seems to be problematic in garnering support or mo-
mentum for constitutional rights. Keeping the guarantees under the purview of Congress
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The remainder of the chapter tackles the issues within existing law that
truly constrain the possibilities of evolution as one wonders why some sort
of emergent protection never emerged. For the topic at hand, why did the
environment find almost no extracted protection? Naturally there are many
potential answers of varying breadth and depth. The discussion here in the
remaining bulk of the chapter parallels the structure of the preceding chapter,
detailing here first the lack of environmental justice protections extending from
established rights and moving to clarify the details why. Many of the reasons
are bound up in the cases themselves and so are presented simultaneously.
While that may prove a dense exposition the parallels with the preceding
chapter should guide the reader. Evidence from the environmental justice
movement in the U.S. shows a very limited protection in an area where the
ECHR shows broad protection even though in both cases no explicit claims to
protection are warranted. That power in the ECHR is incomplete protection
to be sure but just as certainly a more promising pathway for environmental
justice advocates than the path left open now in the U.S.
The evidence presented here focuses on the strong protections against dis-
crimination in the U.S. both because it is central to the environmental jus-
tice discourse there. Moreover though the focus is justified because of anti-
discrimination’s powerful position in U.S. law, culture, and politics. Their
centrality overshadows any talk of rights to home and familial connections
which played a central role in the European discussion, at least as far as en-
vironmental justice is concerned. Despite the inability to compare directly
rights-to-rights between documents and legal traditions, the fact that the U.S.
failed to extend protections out of some of their most powerful laws for social
change makes it hard to argue that protections could be forthcoming out of
weaker protections. That conversation should certainly be had—a hard posi-
tion to argue still may end up leading to a beneficial outcome—but the focus
of this work is on initiating the comparison with European successes and so
moves onward from this arguably stable assumption.
The conclusion here is clear: rights-based protection in the U.S. did not lend
to derived-EHR protection and by extension fall short of overlapping with en-
vironmental justice protection. The experience also shows that existing rights
discourse in the U.S. is unwelcoming to the environmental justice incorpora-
tion seen in the smooth meshing of environmental justice and human rights in
Europe. All of this occurs despite the U.S. being structurally open to such in-
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corporation. As such, a substantial overhaul of civil rights machinery would be
necessary to push the current U.S. trajectory toward environmental justice-
protecting outcomes available through the ECtHR’s network of influence—
judicial and legislative, international and domestic—in Europe. Barring that,
protections weaker in American law relative to the ECHR protections could
be initiated into the environmental justice fold and then expanded in the envi-
ronmental direction.30 The chapter concludes with a discussion of what might
be necessary to bring the U.S. rights in line with the ECHR protections.
5.2 Discrimination and the U.S.’s Rights Culture
The aim of the body of this chapter is to illustrate the level of success in deriv-
ing environmental protections and hedges against environmental injustice in
the U.S. experience. That level is relatively lower than the European experi-
ence. Similar to Chapter 3 this section utilizes the mainstream environmental
justice literature to illustrate the claimed tendency. The discussion attempts
to remain at the highest levels of U.S. jurisprudence though some forays in to
lower court cases are necessary.31 The U.S.’s environmental justice literature
shows quite clearly that the tendency is away from what directions adopted
by the ECHR.
The U.S. environmental justice canon focuses on two legal categories: rights-
based approaches to rectifying environmental injustices and regulation-based
approaches.32 The former includes primarily analyses of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the US Constitution and the Civil Rights Acts, while the latter
includes the myriad regulations implemented by the EPA. The focus of this
30Sections 5.4.2, 5.4.1, 5.4.3.
31Staying at the highest levels allows for connection to the closer parallels between the
European Court of Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court. According to Gomien,
Harris, and Zwaak
it could be said that in many respects, the theory and practice of the European
Convention on Human Rights parallel the theory and practice of the United
States Supreme Court more closely than any domestic system operating in
Europe. Gomien, Donna/Harris, David/Zwaak, Leo Law and practice of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter.
Council of Europe Publishing, 1996, p. 19
32Luke Cole breaks down environmental justice approaches into more categories. That
well-cited paper was classifying along the lines of promise for advocates though. See Cole,
Luke W. Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling. Fordham Urban
Law Journal , 21 1994
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research though is on the former. While the second naturally does lend pro-
tections to the environmentally burdened, as it assuredly does in Europe as
well, the concern here is addressing the democratic failings which lock certain
groups in problematic environmental states. That is the broadest concern il-
lustrated by the many points of environmental justice concern and that which
elevated the inquiry to questioning at the level of fundamental rights. The
supplementary or parallel protection that regulation grants against the tilt-
ing of environmental burdens should certainly occur. That does not however
detract from the need to address the rights aspects of the American story.
Addressing the unique American history requires a shift in terminology at
the outset. The conversation here differs from the preceding as the term “mi-
norities” refers to racial status. The term is a subset though of the broader
concern with simple numerical minorities and hence can be retained with no
loss of generality. Starting then with the broadest and most powerful of envi-
ronmental justice-applicable rights’ protections then leads to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause’s (EPC) bar against discrimination under the law, a protection
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Akin to Ar-
ticle 14 of the ECHR the EPC guarantees that no state can deny to any person
equal protection of the laws. It was enacted in the wake of the United States
Civil War to guarantee the rights of former slaves in all states. Its power,
resting as it does in the highest law of the land, is formidable, but makes
it often impractical to wield in environmental—and therefore environmental
justice—-situations. Discussion herein remains short but remains nonetheless
to give background to the reader for understanding the Civil Rights Acts which
followed.33
The Civil Rights Acts provide broader protection against discrimination.
They are more tailored to the cultural history of the U.S. When referring to The
Civil Rights Act, most are referring to the sweeping 1964 Act. This occupies
the foremost position in environmental justice comments as it contains the
important Title VI. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—its formal title—
was not however the only legislative work extending protection to minorities
below the constitutional level. It was however the most sweeping and arguably
effective. There were also the Civil Rights Acts passed in the wake of the
Civil War and Reconstruction though, including Acts of 1866, 1871,341875,
33Section 5.2.1
34which contains §1983, discussed infra at Section 5.3.3
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followed by more in 1957, 1968,35 and 1991. They are all connected in broadly
addressing shortcomings or loopholes exploited in the protections of the EPC.
With an eye to the discussion on the ECHR one might question how loop-
holes exist in discrimination protection. The problem with the EPC was the
Supreme Court’s holding in The Civil Rights Cases36 that Congress lacked au-
thority to outlaw racial discrimination by private individuals or organizations
via the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The holding
thus found the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional. The problem with
outlawing discrimination outright remains to this day.37 The Civil Rights Act
of 1964, however, legislatively bridged this gulf by appealing to the powers
granted to Congress by Commerce Clause.38 The landmark Civil Rights Act
of 1964 attacked segregation by prohibiting discrimination by agencies receiv-
ing federal funding, a power extending from the Congressional allowance to
regulate interstate commerce. A multitude of state and local functions draw
funding from the federal government and would have difficulty existing with-
out it. The Act therefore compels their compliance with congressional anti-
discrimination directives not via direct legislation—outlawing discrimination—
but through their budgets.39 The teeth of the Act in lie with the “power of
the purse.” The picture immediately emerges though of a piecemeal approach
to securing equal rights, functional but residing on a different plane than the
human rights discussion.
The powers of the purse though push deeply into environmental protections
as the U.S. federal government disperses most of the funds to regulate the
environment via the EPA and their subsidiaries. There is then an immediate
connection from environmental agencies to this powerful non-discrimination
statute. Such a connection is exactly the type of area where one might claim
a violation of existing rights via environmental problems. Drawing funds from
the government in pursuit of environmental regulations at state and local lev-
els must adhere to non-discrimination standards. If the dispersal of funds
35which contains the Fair Housing Act, FHA, discussed infra at Section 5.4.2
36109 U.S. 3 (1883)
37United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
38Specifically, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 draws its authority from Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution
39This fact, some would argue, sets the boundaries of the Act’s power, enabling regula-
tions to make monetary allocative decisions. See especially Lambert, Thomas A. The Case
Against Private Disparate Impact Suits. Ga. L. Rev. 34 2000, p. 1221-5
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results in a discriminatory environment then there is a derived-right to some
degree of environmental protection. The wide net cast here makes Title VI the
most important catch for environmental justice hopes in the U.S.40 Operating
through the lens of discrimination however ends up limiting its reach and re-
cent judicial decisions make it almost impossible to utilize in a derived-EHR
manner.41
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, sweeping as it was in its attempts to blot
racism out of American public culture was not the first such attempt. In a pre-
vious response to compelling private compliance with the anti-discrimination
goals of the United States, the Congress enacted the Civil Rights Rights Act of
1871 which contains the important §1983. §1983 provided a path for civil ac-
tion against anyone accused of depriving others of their rights. In the general
course of U.S. law, violations of constitutional rights such as the EPC result
in an injunction against future insults. It does not however reach backward
for rectification. Without §1983, one could make the claim that there is pro-
tection without remedy. With it however citizens have a method to enforce
the rights granted to them in the Constitution.42 In its early life it enforced
and redressed private violations of the First Amendment and the EPC, two
frequent targets of openly racist movements.
The situation is quite stark within cases of majority parties acting to with-
hold voting rights, civil protection, or education opportunities from minorities,
prominent problems meant to be addressed in the U.S. with the adoption of
anti-discrimination laws. The applicability of §1983 however blurs when one
moves into environmental cases. Repositioning §1983 as a tool to derive en-
vironmental protection for minorities currently occupies an unsteady position
in the environmental justice arsenal because of recent court rulings disputing
whether agency regulations—specifically EPA regulations requiring agencies
to take no actions having discriminatory effects43—confer rights in the direct
sense as do the First Amendment and the EPC. If the agency’s actions do not
create a right there is nothing for the section to operate on and to enforce.
The nuances of this section of the discourse do much to limit any expanded
protection from §1983.
Briefly discussed in addition to the most powerful anti-discrimination statutes
40Section 5.3.2
41Sections 5.3.2.5,5.3.3.1
42Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
43Discussed infra at 287
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so far utilized toward environmental ends is the Fair Housing Act (FHA),44
a component of the Civil Rights Act of 196845, which similarly ties actions
which harm minorities’ equal access to housing markets to anti-discriminatory
goals. In this fashion, the FHA can dovetail with the economic logic behind
environmental justice dynamics, as outlined in previous sections46. Because
environmental concerns directly impact housing markets, this becomes a valid
pathway for addressing environmental justice concerns. It is though less tried
in practice than either Title VI or §1983. It is more useful here to illustrate
that in the wake of the debates on impact versus intent standards for infer-
ence of discrimination47 settling on an impact standard may still carry too
little power. Though standing and an discriminatory impact standard exist in
FHA action it still does not appear as ripe for expansion into environmental
directions.
These three prongs, all stemming from different Civil Rights Acts form
the majority of U.S. environmental justice cases. Compelling citizens to be
color-blind on their own was, and unfortunately remains, a sizable challenge
given the unique history of the U.S. The combined power of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts still cannot reach into some corners of
discriminatory behavior.48 As such, they all remain imperfect armour against
discrimination. The specific ways in which they have evolved to handle dis-
crimination without pushing into other areas of life though limit not only their
effectiveness against discrimination but now limit their applicability toward
deriving environmental protections. Thus, they remain insufficient genera-
tors of derived environmental protections relative to the ECHR. The following
sections detail these shortcomings in more detail, starting with the broadest
protections of the Constitution.
5.2.1 The 14th Amendment and Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides for
equal treatment of all under the law. Specifically, coming into existence after
the Civil War, it makes sure that states cannot “deny to any person within
44Infra at Section 5.4.2
4542 U.S.C. §§3601-3631 (1998), sometimes referred to as Title VIII
46See infra Section 3.2
47Discussed in Section 5.2.2
48Such fundamental problems are discussed infra at 273
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[their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”.49 Hence, it is known as
the Equal Protection Clause (EPC). Despite the Declaration of Independence’s
1776 claims that “all men are created equal” it took over a century and a
civil war before the U.S. government began to define the legal structures to
enforce the philosophical background. This fact, albeit stated in a deliberately
strong form, embodies the U.S’s long struggle to rudder the often opposing
and turbulent currents of moral philosophy, prevailing culture, and capitalism
through the rule of law.
Just as the UDHR and ECHR picked up the pieces after the destruction
of the Second World War, the EPC aimed to stitch the U.S. back together
after their most devastating conflict. In this sense the US Constitution takes
on more character than simply the supreme law of the land; it is interpreted
as the moral compass of the nation. The introduction already mentioned
the ways that compass can shift, but the language of the document cannot.
Largely a function of the period in which the Constitution was written, the
document declares its rights in absolute terms; the EPC is no different. Here
is a difference to the tuned definitions of rights, complete with details on
abrogation, in the ECHR.50 Perhaps because of this tendency the U.S. courts
have been pushed to interpret small pockets of flexibility around absolute
protections.
The EPC pushes against racism while staying in line with other constitu-
tional provisions, especially the Establishment Clause, which “rules out valu-
ations that assume certain conceptions of what is sacred, at least those that
invoke religious commitments.”51 Even though religious norms may pene-
trate deeply into American private life, they are viewed as too contentious
to find use in public life. This is an interesting point that has bearing on
the lack of derived protections from the EPC as the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause bear on the interpretation of discrimination in legisla-
tion. These two religious freedom guarantees allow for government intervention
into the religious sphere although religious practice is guaranteed in the First
Amendment.52 The interference is allowed through the passage of neutral laws
which incidentally impact greater on some religions than others. Rather bold
49U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1
50Janis, Mark W./Kay, Richard S./Bradley, Anthony W. European Human Rights Law.
3rd edition. Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 253.
51Sunstein, Cass R. Free Markets and Social Justice. Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 95.
52Compare to Article 9, ECHR.
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examples include prohibitions of polygamy and of sacrifices which could oth-
erwise lay inside religious spheres. Such prohibitions incidentally impact some
religions which hold them as beliefs. The intention however is not to proscribe
their freedoms but to protect the freedoms of society at large. Naturally the
invocation of words such as intent should harken back to earlier discussion on
Yick Wo and Gomillion.53 Interference without intent does not do damage
to the underlying personal liberty; the fact that the interference is incidental
though is important here in religious examples as in the specifics of Yick Wo
and Gomillion. Discriminatory intent—here on the part of the government—
is necessary and sufficient for invalidating an attempt to legislate; otherwise,
the discriminatory effect—here on one religion over another—is incidental and
allowable.54
As it was implied in discussing the early Yick Wo and Gomillion cases55
it can be difficult to always draw bright lines around when statutes neces-
sarily must discriminate in order to accomplish their purpose and when they
discriminate due to intentional bias, be that racial, religious or otherwise.56
Extreme cases of impacts may reveal racist intent—by precluding all expla-
nations save for racisms—but walking back from the extreme enters foggy
areas quickly.57 One would hope that in situations questioning intentional
and incidental damage, like Justice Stewart’s famous quote about obscenity,
the judiciary would “know it when they see it.”58 This is unfortunately not
always the case. The individual sphere of protected liberty to act in their
own way is a well guarded locus, whether one is discussing religious freedom
or the dark-side of liberty of conscious, the freedom to discriminate. When
those freedoms move from private spheres to public spheres, the government
can step in to protect competing interests. But the desire to guard that inner
sphere holds the government to a high standard, allowing them in only when
the influence coming out is intentional and cuts against rights guaranteed to
53Section 3.3.2.
54Sunstein Free Markets and Social Justice, p. 95.
55Section 3.3.2
56Weinberg, Philip; Gerrard, Michael B., editor Chap. Equal Protection In The Law of
Environmental Justice. American Bar Association, 1999, p. 4.
57Empirical works exists, however, on the prevalence of biases. See current empirical
research showing vitality of cognitive bias discrimination in the U.S. in Blumrosen, Al-
fred W./Blumrosen, Ruth G. Intentional Job Discrimination–New Tools for Our Oldest
Problem. U. Mich. J. L. Reform, 37 2004; Also notes and discussion in Sullivan, Charles A.
The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators. Alabama Law Review ,
60 2009, p. 226
58in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964)
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the objects of influence. Viewing the issue always from within the desire to
guarantee individual freedom necessarily makes it hard to “see it” in a legal
sense, where those on the outside may well see the issue much more clearly in
the shape of discrimination.
In the desire to balance these opposing rights lies some flexibility in full
and complete equal protection, but flexibility that needs to be grounded in
some structure. The U.S. Court has had, partially due to the particular racial
history of the country, many instances with which to visit the vicissitudes of
how government treats differently situated individuals. That is the essence
of protecting against discrimination, deciding when and where differences are
allowable and when they are not. To summarize though the US Court allows
a classification for differential treatment by law invalid only if “the varying
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of
any combination of legitimate purposes that [it] can only conclude that the
legislature’s actions were irrational.”59 That leaves significant personal room
for decisions. But if that classification further has “suspect” qualities due to
its historical or political position, then the level of legitimate purpose must
be even higher or more precise to justify the use of classification.60 Subject
classifications, such as race, always trigger the highest level of scrutiny on the
situation, while gender takes up an intermediate standard61, and the open
rational basis test for every other classification.
By breaking down analysis to the group level the U.S. Courts add both
flexibility and structure into their analysis of when the private sphere extends
into areas necessarily protected by other government rights, allowing for max-
imum personal choice when the situation is not pressurized by historical or
current concern for the personal freedoms of a particular group. How strict is
strict though? The degree of strictness associated with suspect classifications
was illustrated in Fullilove v. Klutznick62 where it was described as “strict in
theory, but fatal in fact.”63 Here it was clearly delineated that classifications
which trigger strict scrutiny are highly unlikely to prevail ever if they legally
sanction categorizations for the purpose of differential treatment.64 Strict is
59Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,97 (1979).
60Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); establishing necessary and compelling gov-
ernment interest as twin tests for allowing classifications.
61Illustrated in Craig v. Boren, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
62448 U.S. 448 (1980)
63at 519.
64The only exception is affirmative action. See Grutter v. Bollinger 59 U.S. 306 (2003).
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thus very strict, at least when the law is intentional and applied with emphasis
on certain categories of people.
Precedent states that when laws touch on suspect classifications, like mi-
nority races, or on fundamental human rights they trigger increased judicial
scrutiny.65 Scrutiny refers to the level of discretion that a court allows to liti-
gants in their interpretation of laws and therefore is the inverse of discretion.
In the case of suspect classifications the court must apply strict scrutiny. This
is the highest level of scrutiny and therefore the lowest level of discretion which
a court allows in interpretation of laws. Should a state enact a law affecting
suspect classifications, the precedent of applying strict scrutiny then shifts the
burden to the state to justify a “compelling state interest” for that law.66
The requirements of strict scrutiny thus mirror the shrinking of margins of
appreciation in the ECHR.
The essence of the amendment remains equal application though. It is sus-
pect classifications and its requisite scrutiny which serve as the framework for
utilizing the protection to actively root out discrimination; they tell judges
when to raise their eyebrows that bit extra. The protection remains triggered
by acts of discrimination as perpetrated through state actions which deny equal
application, and thereby protection, of the law, heightened then by situations
where equal application might be hard to assume. Through this it hoped to
serve as a tool of discrimination eradication. Illustrating the commitment of
the EPC to redressing racial problems is the blackletter case of Loving v. Vir-
ginia.67 In Loving, a ban on interracial marriage did not find justification in
the fact that it was a ban equally applied to blacks and to whites; it was after
all just as illegal for white to marry black as black to marry white. By finding
that the Equal Protection Clause meant more in context than just equally
applying inherently racist laws, the US moved past a simplistic view of com-
parisons between groups and toward equalizing the footing of races before the
law.68 There are shadows of intention here too, covering as it did the desire
to maintain a racist status quo,69 melding with the earlier ideas of personal
But compare Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
65“Footnote 4”, Carolene Products 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938)
66cf. Weinberg The Law of Environmental Justice, p. 6
67Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967). This case is a prominent early example of strict
scrutiny in the U.S. jurisprudence. Karlan, Pamela S. Loving Lawrence. Mich. L. Rev. 102
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liberty.
This outcome turns on what it is to be part of a suspect classification. Sus-
pect classifications, being groups (classifications) which are likely to be the the
subject of discrimination, must be identifiable as such. In the U.S. that means
primarily that the group’s characteristics are unchangeable, a categorization
which clearly encompasses race. Secondly, the group must have a history of dis-
crimination. Third, the group must find political avenues impossible to utilize
due to their status as a discrete and insular minority.70 Notably, these three
characteristics of suspect classifications do not necessarily include the poor or
all groupings of disenfranchised people. Therefore, as anti-discrimination laws
in the U.S. specifically focus on minorities—and thus, suspect classifications—
they already have trouble reaching into protecting the environment should
that environment involve a non-minority, such as a poor community.71 The
choice to frame the the environmental justice problem then as one of effecting a
numerical minority stems from this lacuna. Framing the problem as a numer-
ical minority still manages to encompass the same minority-based situations
however. The choice was made at the outset to explicitly avoiding the murky
and loaded questions of racial composition remaining in the U.S. framing as
well as to avoid having to import those definitions into the European story.72
Suffice it to say, forming the environmental justice problem under the umbrella
of anti-discrimination protections in the U.S. very quickly places boundaries
on available protection.
Application of strict scrutiny and subject classifications within the Equal
Protection Clause’s mandate did much to weed out overt and even cunning
discrimination in U.S. laws. But the fact that one can justify the application
under a compelling state interest is the first weakness in the equal protection
70As discussed in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
71Discrimination based on income does not trigger suspect classification scrutiny in the
U.S. See San Antonia Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). With re-
gard to the U.S. EPA, the agency will not use race as a criteria when reaching environmental
decisions. Hill, Barry E. Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice. Environmental
Law Institute Press, 2009, p. 197 . Once the decision is made, however, the agency can
analyze the impact on race and income categories. This approach keeps the EPA in line
with U.S. Court decisions such as Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995);
and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). cf. ibid..
72A task that would be more difficult given some countries, like France, who do not
collect or define racial data. See Bleich, Erik Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas
and Policymaking since the 1960s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; idem
Antiracism without Races. Politics and Policy in a “Color-Blind” State. French Politics,
Culture and Society, 18 2000, Nr. 3
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armor. The crack runs strongly in directions away from the original purpose
of the law, such as the topic at hand—environmental protection. As was il-
lustrated by the discussion of economic motion in Chapter 3 there are many
situations in which the “cause” of a disproportionate impact is not human
action. Animus is naturally complicated through decision making processes—
processes inherent to both law-making and employment decisions, two areas
where discrimination cases are prevalent.73 Laws can then argue for their own
compelling interest and augment that with a claim of no suspect animus. The
filtering of cause and outcome is enough to make a direct legal connection
to the EPC’s jurisprudence questionable in theory in all but the most overt
cases. The “obscured intent” is precisely what we saw earlier in early environ-
mental justicecases’ difficulty in tying statistical evidence of disproportionate
environmental outcomes to racial motives.74 Absent “smoking guns” linking
a decision to an intent to discriminate, plaintiffs have a difficult task apply-
ing the EPC. In practice, this was indeed the case when it came to deriving
environmental application.
Further complicating the picture is the concept of legal standing. Standing
is whether the court sees the litigant as entitled to bring judicial action against
another party and have the court decide the case on its merits.75 Standing
can be seen as the ability of a party to connect themselves to a harm caused to
them via existing laws. The ECHR explicitly recognizes the rights of citizens to
bring complaints to the European Court when they feel they have an actionable
complaint. That issue is the addressed by a committee there and decided
whether meritorious (admissible) or not. There is therefore more discussion
of what constitutes meritorious complaints and virtually no conversation of
whether an individual in a given case has a right to bring the complaint. That
is not the case in the U.S. with regard to the Civil Rights protections.
Indeed, much of this section revolves around the problems of intent and
standing, motivated by the tight banding of constitutional protections, and
their critical function in the lackluster protections of civil rights when applied
73White, Rebecca Hanner/Krieger, Linda Hamilton Whose Motive Matters?: Discrim-
ination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making. La. L. Rev. 61 2001, discussing
complications to discrimination theory when decisions are the result of horizontal or vertical
decision making processes.
74The mere existence of a non-discriminatory explanation for an outcome should not
bar a finding of discrimination, although it often does, especially in U.S. jury-based trials.
Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2007).
75In the U.S. defined by Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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to environmental situations in the U.S. Quick illustrations of the problem were
already mentioned in the famous environmental justice cases like Bean76 and
R.I.S.E. v. Kay77. In all but the starkest cases of discrimination the blurred
connection between the differences between races and the actions start to play
a mitigating role, pushing toward a reading of unintentional outcomes and
therefore placing the concerns outside the purview of government protections.
The logic behind Yick Wo and Gomillion does not run strongly, let alone
when environmental matters replace legislative concerns. Furthermore, when
problems do not come directly from legislation and application of laws but
rather from lower-level regulations and agency-based decisions there are legal
questions of whether protections were designed to be utilized by citizens at
that level. All of this turns what could be a straight path toward auxiliary
environmental protection into a convoluted detour.
5.2.2 The Use of Intent and the EPC
This discussion on the general protections of the Equal Protection Clause
brings us to central point in the U.S. literature around which much discussion—
in environmental justice circles as well as civil rights law in general—revolves.
This hub is the legal distinction between the intent standard and the im-
pact standard in measuring discrimination–or equally discriminatory intent
versus discriminatory effects. It is central not only to discrimination litiga-
tion but also to blocking attempts to derive environmental human rights. The
reader should note that the literature uses the terms “impact” or “effects”
interchangeably to refer to the standard of reading discrimination as any dis-
proportionate situation or outcome irrespective of the animus.
Interpretation the EPC leads the discussion because of its placement in
the Constitution. The U.S. Court since Washington v. Davis78 has read the
EPC as preventing only invidious—intentional—discrimination. That is, the
amendment aimed to eradicate intentional discrimination and any continua-
tion of intentional discrimination through state law. It does not reach through
intervening filters to root out incidental discriminatory effects. In Davis, four
times as many black candidates failed the District of Columbia’s Police Depart-
76Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corporation, 482 F. Supp. 673; 1979.
Section 3.3.1.
77Residents Involved in Saving the Environment (R.I.S.E) v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144.
(1991). Section 3.3.3.
78426 U.S. 229 1977.
273
5 The U.S. and Rights
ment’s written test as did white candidates. The U.S. Court found however
that the test was not intentionally racist and that the plaintiffs were therefore
not discriminated against.79 There was no smoking gun of an racist plot to
keep minorities out of the police force. In fact, the discriminatory effect was
filtered through the contravening facts that the department actively sought
minority applicants.80 Such facts contravened the intent interpretation of the
logical chain connecting the Amendment to the outcome; the discriminatory
outcome could not be in violation of the Constitution because the intent of
those generating the outcome was not the same as the intents the Amend-
ment was written to thwart. That decision changed the anti-discrimination
landscape where the rest of the civil rights laws now live.
In many respects, the intent standard is a strong reading of the Constitution,
pulling as noted above from many angles of the U.S.’s history. Without going
in to all of those details though one can already see a problem for derived EHR
type rights. Consider how quickly the Hatton case would have been decided if
the European Court only had to weigh whether the UK government intended
to harm the people around Heathrow Airport. Even if it could be shown
that those residents were members of some suspect classification the analysis
would have been much different and the outcome far less protective of rights.
It was because the people had a right directly connected to enjoyment of their
home and familial connections that brought protections over environmental
damages. Displacing that right into a question of discrimination makes for a
very different analysis.
If one takes issue with the intent reading, there are two options: first, argue
that a discriminatory outcome, whether intentional or not, is exactly what
the Equal Protection Clause aimed to eradicate, and hence is per se illegal.
There is much merit to this statement and also significant legal scholarship.81
Secondly, a lawyer can move their focus back from the filter and discuss the
economic, political, and even personal intervening processes which dilute or
filter the flow of racism—whether intentional or latent—from action to out-
79But note the success of other cases, such as Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (DDC,
Feb. 9, 1967), which successfully challenged the outcomes of tests which had disproportional
racial effects. Hobson, in contrast to Davis, focused on the tests’ implications for innate
ability and learning achievements.
80Weinberg The Law of Environmental Justice, p. 7.
81Notably we discuss one pioneering paper, Lawrence III, Charles R. The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism. Stanford Law Review , 39 1987 here,
infra, at 5.2.2. Note also the sentiment of the Supreme Court Case Swann v. Charlotte-
Mechlenburg Board of Education 402 U.S.1 (1971).
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come.82 That is, the lawyer must find and sum all the strands of latent and
diluted discrimination to recreate the tapestry the Court needs to see to find
intentional discrimination. Such a work of legal art seems nearly impossible
to accomplish in the landscape of U.S. environmental injustices.83
The Court’s focus was then on “whether a law or policy was an action
directed towards a minority group,”84 and not on whether an intent reading
or effects reading is more proper. The wording of the judgement is often
read, however, and indeed advances concerns that the EPC under an impact
standard could open a judicial can-of-worms. If one were to see all cases where
groups were unequally impacted as discrimination it would not only open the
floor to many cases but could invade many protected spheres of individual
liberty. One might arguably contend that the intent standard is too high and
that it leaves too much wiggle room for the discrimination it was created to
eradicate. Granting more power to investigations of racism however runs the
risk of creating sharper racial dividing lines. The goal of the EPC, and later,
the Civil Rights Acts, was above all to erase those lines. It is the French
experience with immigration and racism that reminds us of this fact. Alain
Terrenoire, who drafted the French 1972 antiracism legislation intentionally
without reference to “race,” explained that
“[s]peaking of races is always a delicate matter, for we run the risk
of giving credibility to the idea that there are different distinctions
within the human species. That is why we must separate out the
justified and necessary struggle against racism and its misdeeds
82One could also argue for a new viewing of intent in environmental discrimination cases.
See Lewis, Browne C. Changing the Bathwater and Keeping the Baby: Exploring New Ways
of Evaluating Intent in Environmental Discrimination Cases. St. Louis U. L.J. 50 2006
83The Baldus Study, an integral part of the Supreme Court case of McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987) highlights dramatically the issue of intent versus impact. The case dealt
with the variable imposition of the death penalty in capital murder cases. The Baldus study
showed that there were links between the race of the murder victim and imposition of the
death penalty, as well as between the race of the murderer; Black defendants and cases with
white victims had a higher incidence of death penalty sentences than white defendants and
black victims. The Court found that, although the incidence was illustrated, the results
showed “at most, . . . a discrepancy that appeared to correlate with race, not a constitu-
tionally significant risk of racial bias affecting . . . [the] capital-sentencing process. . . ” Hill
Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice, p. 241. This case affirmed the distinc-
tion between intent and impact as involving volition “because of, not merely ‘in spite of’,
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
et al. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279.
84Guill, Terenia Urban Environmental Justice Suits Under the Fair Housing Act. Tul.
Envtl. L.J. 12 1999, p. 216.
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from the factual recognition of differences between people accord-
ing to their origins, their religions, and the color of their skin.”85
Bleich similarly reminds researchers from countries that do operate within
a milieu of racial data collection that more and more powerful laws are not
unambiguously better for combating racism and discrimination,86 even if the
availability of large amounts of racial data did empower the policies aimed at
combating racism through the political process in the U.S.87
There is in addition to concerns of etching racial lines deeper into the cultural
conscious a worry of how the broader impact reading could reach perverted
legal outcomes. From Davis,
“[a] rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid. . . if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than
another would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions
about...a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory,
and licensing statutes that may be burdensome to the poor and to
the average black than to the more affluent white.”88
Above all of the side effects is the general problem that failing to eradicate or
otherwise diminish perceived racism in step with the adoption of new tough
law erodes confidence in the law as a way to bring about change and meet
goals.
While this is necessarily a cursory treatment, these facts coupled with the
above constitutional arguments make an arguable case for holding onto the
intent standard at the constitutional level. At the very least it allows for a
treatment at the theoretical level that reveals the logic as self-consistent rather
than an interpretation that needs explaining. More detail is provided below
with regard to the intent- and impact-standards under the Civil Rights Acts.89
85In Bleich French Politics, Culture and Society 18 [2000] , p. 58.
86Ibid.
87Bowen, William M Environmental Justice through research-based decision making. Gar-
land Publishing Taylor & Francis Group, 2001, p. 67.
88at 248. Perverse effects on public expenditure legality of utilizing disparate impact
standards in reading anti-discrimination statutes is well know. The classic inverted example
is public transportation. Taxes which support public transportation in the United States
predominantly flow to minorities and low income workers without automobiles. Under a
disparate impact regime, such taxes would have a discriminatory impact against the wealthy;
a “reverse” disparate impact. Inter alia Lambert, p. 1186. Also note for more extensive
discussion on problems with impact standards, Lawrence III, p. 32, footnote 11,319-20,364-
65
89The courts also find some defense here, as the do in the Civil Rights Acts’ usage of
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Here though it is also important to remember throughout the discussion that
the U.S. Congress has legislated disparate impact wording and thus statutes
have not merely been interpreted as implying an intent or impact reading
by the Courts; the absence of instructive wording has meaning.90 A blanket
proclamation then of strengthening racial inquiry in the U.S. might indeed
end up being counter to the intent—both Congressional and cultural—of the
anti-discrimination effort and movement in that direction would be judicial
activism. The U.S. Court walked a very fine line then in their laying down
of precedent in civil rights law, in a milieu that was anything but receptive
to judicial contemplation or wavering on the application (or disapproval) of
anti-discrimination measures.
As Professor Sheila Foster summarizes the situation as it stands today,
“[b]y definition, all discrimination claims require plaintiffs to demon-
strate a causal connection between the challenged decision or out-
come and a protected status characteristic. That is, when a plain-
tiff alleges that she has been discriminated against by a partic-
ular decision or action, she is essentially making a causal claim
about the relationship between her status and that decision or ac-
tion. Indeed, this causal link defines the very essence of prohibited
discrimination under both constitutional and statutory civil rights
law. Not all differential treatment of, or disparate impact on, an in-
dividual or group is prohibited by the law. The prohibition against
discrimination is a prohibition against making decision or taking
actions on account of, or because of, a status characteristic singled
out for protection by our civil rights laws or constitutional tradi-
tions (which generally include race, gender, nationality, religion,
disability, and age).”91
intent standards—specifically Title VI, §601—in the fact that states and agencies are free to
adopt stronger downstream statements holding disparate effects themselves as illegal. This
allows also for legal flexibility in applying the effects standard to more specific cases while
leaving the can of worms unopened. See Weinberg, Philip Environmental Law. Syracuse
Law Review , 55 2005, noting that other important statutes exist which do not require the
intent standard, such as Title VII of the 1964 Civil Right Act (42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.).
See Section 5.4.3
90Sullivan, Charles A. Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage. Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 47 2006, p. 917, noting that the Congress at the time of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964’s passing knew discrimination could rise up in many smaller forms—especially
in employment decisions—and yet chose to focus on the more notorious form of direct
discrimination.
91Foster, Sheila R. Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact.
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The essential points of all discrimination cases and the seminal ideas for all
anti-discrimination protection—from the Fourteenth Amendment, to the Civil
Rights Acts, Fair Housing Act, and Equal Employment Act—can be seen here.
From the foundation, the courts have built their three-step process of searching
for discrimination, encompassing 1) status inference, 2) neutral explanation
and 3) causal attribution.92
Could there have been a significant underlying body of racist intent, how-
ever? Certainly this is possible. The presence of unconscious racism has been
discussed at length in literature surrounding anti-discrimination protections in
the U.S.93 Acceptance of unconscious racism can even be inferred in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s enactment of the landmark Brown v. Board of Education94,
another definitive anti-discrimination case which ruled that the thereto legal
divisions under the separate but equal95 doctrine was unconstitutional. Instead
of ordering immediate compliance, however, the U.S. Court ruled that there
were complexities which could not be overcome immediately.96 The complexi-
ties however were mainly the resistance of whites. Ruling in this way reserved
certain racist privileges for whites, at least for a time. Chiefly, whites would be
spared the presumed travesty of suddenly being sent to black schools, which
were likely stereotyped as being in deplorable conditions.97
The holding in Brown recognized that stigmatizing via separate but equal
is itself unequal, and hence unjust. The stigmatization though could continue
somewhat more surreptitiously through delay and later through resentment
from the majority. What later scholars have added to the conversation is
Hous. L. Rev. 41 2005, p. 1472, emphasis in original, footnotes omitted
92Foster, p. 1474.
93Notably, many authors have also constructed a definition for racial environmental out-
comes within the this debate surrounding intention. These definitions incorporate both the
Supreme Court legal tradition and the economic and social foundations which drive actions
toward discriminatory outcomes—regardless of intent. See Evans, Jill E. Challenging the
Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent. Arizona Law Review ,
40 1998, p. 1276-77; Foster, Sheila Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities,
Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Move-
ment. California Law Review , 86 1998, p.731-35; Gelobter, Michael; Bryant, Bunyan I./
Mohai, Paul, editors Chap. Toward a Model of “Environmental Discrimination” In Race
and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A Time for Discourse. Westview, 1992, p. 64-
74; and Torres, Gerald Race, Class, and Environmental Regulation. University of Colorado
Law Review , 63 1992, Nr. 4. For a recent discussion on the continued need to fundamentally
reform how the courts view discrimination, see Foster
94347 U.S. 483 (1954).
95Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
96349 U.S. 294 (1955), also known as Brown II cf. Lawrence III, p. 342
97Wasserstrom Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics.
UCLA L. Rev. 24 1977.
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the fact that these stigmas are also self-perpetuating.98 Further, stigma’s
impose harm whether there exists an animus behind them or not, as they
travel on the wings of culture.99 Naturally, the emergence of environmental
justice themes could be seen as another line in the self-perpetuating problems
of discrimination. The point though is the continual balancing of a desire to
root out discrimination while remaining at a distance from personal liberties,
even liberties as difficult to justify as bigotry.
Despite the larger issues at stake, there remains the precedent, set by Yick
Wo and Gomillion100 that there are some discriminatory outcomes which,
even lacking proof of racial animus—intent—become inexplicable without it.
In those cases, the outcome was nearly exclusively centered on minorities; a
law which impacts only a minority negatively, with no majority members being
implicated, wears a strong discriminatory odour. There is then a door through
which victims holding negative outcomes can pass to find the protections under
intent standards. How much can courts though relax the exclusive requirement
illustrated in Yick Wo? Would one or two white-operated laundry facilities
case have proved there was no animus? The focus of much discussion has
been how much evidence must surround a discriminatory outcome before it is
sufficient to show that the action falls within the reach of anti-discrimination
statutes. The blackletter cases show that a rather large amount of circum-
stantial proof is necessary to connect a discriminatory outcome to a facially
neutral law via an intent reading. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Co.101 there is evidence that a racist history can
also matter in deducing a violation from effects, although again the amount of
previous racist action must be rather large and overt. If the magnitude remains
high in pure discrimination cases there is a lower probability of repositioning
that to protect against environmental degradation.
The point here is explain but not to justify the intent standard.102 Should
98Lawrence III, p. 351
99Ibid., p. 359, footnote 190 “In the same way that a text is detached from its author,
an action is detached from the actor and develops consequences of its own. This autonomy
of human action constitutes the social dimension of action.”
100118 U.S. 356 (1886) and 364 U.S. 339 (1960), respectively.
101429 U.S. 252 (1977); Here the Court set out a standard of what direct or circumstantial
evidence will surmount the intent standard. 1) the effect or impact of the official action
2) the historical background of the particular case 3) the chronology of events leading to
the decision 4) any departures from normal procedures in decision making 5) any departure
from normal substantive criteria used in such decisions 6) the legislative or administrative
history of the decision. cf. Hill Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice, p. 245
102Others have worked very hard on this issue. Of note to environmental justice specifi-
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one be so inclined, there is much work done, both within the context of the
U.S. as well as opportunities for comparative law. British law, for instance,
protects against both direct and indirect racism, including the these situa-
tions which concerned advocates so fiercely in the U.S. where facially neutral
action disadvantages a minority group.103 In this research, however, the in-
tent/impact background is necessary for the reader to understand more fully
the outcomes when looking at how the civil rights path failed to generate
derived environmental protections.
Humanity has never efficiently solved problems when the needs of the one are
in contrast to the good of the many. It seems ubiquitous that the satisfaction
of the One and the Many, the individual and society, while joined in the coarse
motions as seen from a distance, are extremely turbulent and in opposition at
micro levels. As such, it stands to reason that, absent complex rules and
legal structures, it is simpler to leave control of the situation in the hands of
an agency; simply because the agency can go either way—choosing for the
good of the One or the Many. The open question is then to make sure the
agency both truly can and truly does, a far easier task than spelling out, ex
cally, Lambert makes the case that decisions under intent standards were not only correct
legally, but also made in the right direction for environmental justice. In moving the focus of
lawyers away from courtroom tactics for bringing private suits, one can move backwards into
the realm of theory and address the more root causes of environmental justice. That is, in the
advocacy-focus of the U.S. intent standards are not only defensible but beneficial to steering
advocates away from this path. Private action suits address merely the symptoms. Instead
of empowering citizens to fight disparate impacts, allow instead federal agencies to become
“screeners” of decisions, allowing them to determine which disparity causing impacts are
dysfunctional. See Lambert, p. 1161. For a practical example too, note that The National
Black Chamber of Commerce filed amicus briefs during the Chester Residents proceedings
(Section 5.3.2.3) asking the courts not to allow disparate impact suits against environmental
disparity due to their concerns on the negative effects such suits would have on brownfield
re-development which would be beneficial to urban environments. An example of just such
an asymmetry exists in the environmental justice case of New York City Environmental
Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d 250, (S.D.N.Y. 1999). In this case, the city
of New York had plans to build low-income housing on city-owned property. The property,
however, was currently in use by minority individuals as community gardens. Those wishing
to protect the gardens sought a preliminary injunction to stop the defendant from selling
their property to the developers of the new low-income housing. They sued on the grounds
that the action would create a disparate impact on the minority area. The court not only
denied plaintiffs’ motion, but also denied that a private right of action existed for such an
action. Outside of the issue of standing, the case would have precluded the much-needed
low-income housing in favor of minority gardens. Clearly to the plaintiffs, the availability
of gardens and outdoor space in New York City is extremely important. To society as a
whole, however, the low-income housing would have more wide-spread effects. There is no
unambiguously correct answer here.
103Geddes, Andrew/Guiraudon, Virginie Britain, France, and EU Anti-discrimination Pol-
icy: The Emergence of an EU Policy Paradigm. West European Politics, 27 2004, p. 338.
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ante, what is and is not justifiable disparate impact.104 In that way, the EPC
and the Constitution play a framing role in anti-discrimination protections in
the U.S., and by extension play the framing role in the potential for derived
environmental protections. The inability to be too flexible at this high level
though pushes more tuned measures downward into legislation and regulation,
matters to which the following sections turn.
5.3 Protections Derived from the Civil Rights Acts
For a multitude of reasons, The Equal Protection Clause then does not provide
much, if any, derived environmental protections. Its place in the Constitution
virtually assures a tight interpretation, and in practice this has been the case.
Even when there is an opportunity to utilize the protections against discrimi-
nation in an environmental manner, the clause’s power is otherwise obscured
by the hurdle or proving intent. Problems with intent continue down the line
of civil rights protection too, placing barriers on access to other statutes meant
to prevent discrimination in situations where the EPC proved less than fully
effective. The first are the broad protections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
especially §601 and §602. These two sections have figured prominently in the
environmental justice discussion in the U.S., especially recently. The second is
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (§1983).105 The preceding discus-
sion on the EPC and its reliance on the doctrine of intent is heavily utilized
here and the conclusions for derived-EHR protections is the same.
5.3.1 The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a landmark addition to the U.S. legal land-
scape.106 Although there is much to discusstThe next few paragraphs focus
tightly on the aspects of the Act which have proven critical to cases of environ-
mental justice. Much of the discussion revolves around the doctrine of intent.
104Lambert, p. 1194, illustrating that the attempt was made with Title VII employment
cases. See discussion below, and, e.g., Lye, Linda Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion
and Confusion of Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense. Berkeley J. Empl.
& Lab. L. 19 1998.
10542 U.S.C. §1983 : US Code - Section 1983: Civil action for deprivation of rights. Also
known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” due to its role in protecting southern blacks from racial
abuses propagated by the Klan.
106An Act of Congress in the U.S. is a statute which legislates how powers of the Consti-
tution are used.
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Again, the standard by which to measure discrimination is not written explic-
itly in the legislation of the United States. That is not to say that Congress
was or is unaware of the difference between a discriminatory intent standard
and discriminatory effects when crafting the Act. In fact, and specific to the
Civil Rights Acts, the House of Representatives turned down an amendment
in 1966 to explicitly word Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to require
proof of intentional discrimination.107 In the absence of guiding legislation
the courts have collectively determined that the Acts, similar and lying in the
shadow of the EPC, are meant to proscribe only intentional discrimination.
The story continues here, however, as there is still the possibility of states
and agencies extending protection farther, to discriminatory effects, on their
own. The extension of protections above and beyond the framing mandate is
generally permissible, but there are problems with this legal construction, and
its application to derived EHR.
In this vein, this section lays out the broad outlines of the applicability of
sections of the Civil Rights Acts—predominantly §601 and §602 of the 1964
Act, §1983 of the 1871 Act, and Title VIII (The Fair Housing Act) of the 1968
Act. The section then delves rather deeply into what may appear esoteric
relative to the larger outlined structure of the preceding chapter. One cannot
glaze over details here because of a recent Supreme Court case—Alexander
v. Sandoval—which severely curtails the usability of civil rights pathways
for environmental justice advocates and forms the basis of all that blocks
using civil rights pathways for environmental protection. Although the case
in question was not about pollution, it removed the private right of action
on the major pathways which environmental justice advocates had employed
since the 1979 Bean case brought the idea of tying civil rights protection
to environmental issues. Although the discussion here merely presents the
information and does not make a judgement on it the removal of something
as basic as legal standing reveals how limited existing civil rights law is at
addressing environmental justice and also how prone the derived-EHR pathway
is to barriers in the U.S. The extent to which broad concepts of equal protection
and civil rights can trickle down to protecting the environments is thus limited
by these subtleties of U.S. jurisprudence. Therefore, the topics that case brings
107112 Cong. Rec. H18,715 (1966). cf. Hoffer, Melissa A. Closing the Door on Private
Enforcement of Title VI and EPA’s Discriminatory Effects Regulations: Strategies for En-




together show clearly why the hope of deriving environmental protections via
existing fundamental protections is rather small.
5.3.2 Title VI
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, more commonly referred to simply as
Title VI, prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin
in programs receiving federal funding.108 This construction of Title VI has it
operating through the funding agencies of the government receive. Operating
in this fashion means that the Act itself does not bind the federal structure; the
federal government is not able to be named in a dispute on Title VI. Rather,
the states and recipients of the federal funds will be responsible for failing to
secure anti-discriminatory duties. Due to the federalist nature of the United
States, the tying of civil rights into the pockets of states and agencies whose
largest funding source is the federal government is a strong incentive toward
pushing, albeit slowly, all forms of discrimination out of U.S. society.
Up until the 2001 decision inAlexander v. Sandoval,109 this was the strongest
possibility for deriving environmental justice protections in the U.S. rights-
based discussions. If an agency made an environmental usage decision which
could be argued to discriminate, the agency’s decisions were technically in
question. This included any agency, from educational facilities receiving fed-
eral funding, municipal planning obtaining government matching funds, and of
course the EPA. There is much more subtlety however given the two workhorse
sections of Title VI, §601 and §602. §601 first sets large boundaries of pro-
tection, preventing any person from being “excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination” by the cornucopia
of state and local agencies which draw any sort of federal funding.110 It is the
equal protection clause writ small, around the well of federal funding. §602
directs federal agencies to promulgate regulations to effectuate §601.111 Agen-
10842 U.S.C. §2000d (1988).
109532 U.S. 275 (2001).
110“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
111“Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract
of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section
2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives
of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is
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cies thus receive some grant of power via congressional mandate to make sure
that the funding they receive from the government does not end up benefit-
ing discriminatory ends. The following sections explore each section in more
detail.
5.3.2.1 Section 601
Naming §601 the EPC writ small carriers more than a title; §601’s coverage
over the non-discriminatory application of funding across agencies receiving
federal funds has the same shortcomings as the EPC. Despite never being de-
cided strictly on its own merits, the U.S. Court held that §601 proscribes only
intentional discrimination112 deciding that it is coextensive with the constitu-
tional protection. There is clear evidence though for standing on §601.113
Recall that standing is whether the court sees the litigant as entitled to
bring judicial action against another party and have the court decide the case
on its merits.114 Standing can be seen as the ability of a party to connect
themselves to a harm caused to them via existing laws. In this sense, §601
allows for private standing—that is, to ordinary persons—to bring a legal case
against an agency, who receives federal funding, and who discriminates when
one is directly connected to the harm being done. The Courts recognize that
the harm caused by the agency is born by the private citizen and therefore
is actionable by them. Therefore §601 provides a lower-level equal protection
clause to assure federal funds are distributed equitably, a protection that is
enforceable by citizens.
Despite having to prove discriminatory intent, as plaintiffs would under EPC
litigation, and therefore having the same drawbacks for all forms of protection,
having standing is quite important. §601’s sibling, §602 no longer admits to
standing. The Supreme Court recently held that litigants cannot enter court
taken.”
112Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). . See
also Mank, Bradford C.; Gerrard, Michael B., editor Chap. Executive Order 12,989 In The
Law of Environmental Justice. American Bar Association, 1999, p. 23, 31. Also Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (Bakke) viewing Title VI
as coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause and hence requires proof of intent.
113Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), holding that there is a private right
of action under Section 901(a) of Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments Act, which
is modeled on Title VI §601. The text of §601 as well as the legislative history was used in
deciding the case. cf. Idem Chap. Title VI In The Law of Environmental Justice. American
Bar Association, 1999, p. 32
114Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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proceedings claiming private harm from violations of regulations promulgated
under §602. Recall that §602 is the congressional mandate to agencies receiv-
ing its funds to make rules assuring that §601’s goals are met. Hence, there
is now no standing for private litigants on §602.115 Like the discussion on
intent versus impact, the discussion on standing carries much of the substance
of the strengths and weaknesses of Civil Rights laws in extending protection
to environments. Johnson116 notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has tight-
ened standing requirements for direct environmental litigation as well.117 The
tightening has not been as severe though as with the standing for suits on civil
rights issues.118
§602 was once a great hope for environmental justice advocates in the U.S.
who saw an opportunity to strike at the many federal agencies for making de-
cisions which continued to effectuate environmental injustice. Several agencies
had promulgated rules to put §601 goals into effect that carried their own dis-
criminatory impact standard, a higher requirement than the framing mandate
required. If an agency, like the EPA, had promulgated §602 rules saying that
no decisions could have discriminatory impacts, then citizens could bring a
complaint that the agency had violated their own §602 promises. From the
discussion of the Bean case,119 which jump started the environmental jus-
tice movement’s motion into legal forums, this legal construction makes much
sense.
5.3.2.2 Section 602
Section 602 directs federal agencies to promulgate regulations to ensure that
organizations receiving federal funds indeed enact their spending equitably.120.
The EPA, as a notable example, adopted language pursuant to §602 which
prohibits program criteria and from locating facilities where there will be a
discriminatory effect.121 Specifically, §7.35b states that recipients
115Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), hereafter Sandoval
116Johnson, Stephen M. Economics v. Equity II: The European Experience. Washington
& Lee Law Review , 58 2001, p. 465, n. 287
117E.g. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (denying
standing to an environmental group).
118E.g. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 180-88 (2000); FEC v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 26 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
178-79 (1997); all showing examples of affirmation of standing in environmental suits.
119482 F. Supp. 673; 1979.
120Hill, Barry E. Lemons Into Lemonade. Envtl. F. 5 2002, p. 33.
12140 C.F.R §7.35(b,c) (emphasis added).
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“shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program
which have the effect of excluding individuals from, denying them
the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination under any
program to which this part applies on the grounds of race, color, or
national origin or sex; or with the purpose of effecting or defeating
or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of
this subpart.”122
As another example, the Department of Justice, in clarifying how agencies
should view their responsibility under §602, says that they may not “utilize
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting in-
dividuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin.123
The key word in all of these directions is effect. The agencies themselves, in
their dedicated power from Congress, make stronger regulations relying on an
effect standard rather than an intention standard in order to give effect to the
anti-discrimination provision.
Note however that there is no federal requirement for an agency to go above
and beyond their §601 mandate. Therefore the need to give effective meaning
to §601 is the lower bound, a bound which we know is augmented by an ability
to infer from a pattern of effects discriminatory intent. Despite the lack of a
requirement to protect against disparate impacts, since §602’s enactment all
federal agencies have codified the discriminatory effects language into their
laws. Hence, all agencies have bound themselves to make more stringent judg-
ments on the outcome of their regulations than required by the intent-based
terminology in §601.124
Despite the willingness to promulgate regulations above the lower bound of
intent, §602 was not a panacea for environmental justice litigants. There are
two legal pitfalls surrounding §602 which we will address here. The first is
the as-yet theoretical question of whether agencies have the power to prop-
agate disparate impact regulations over §601’s mandate of preventing only
intentional discrimination. That is, while agencies can go above the standards
needed to make §601 effective, do they have the mandate to change the stan-
12240 C.F.R. §7.35(b)
123cf. La Londe, Kyle W. Who Wants to Be an Environmental Justice Advocate: Options
for Bringing an Environmental Justice Complaint in the Wake of Alexander v. Sandoval.
B.C. Envtl. L. Rev. 31 2004, p. 32
124Hill Envtl. F. 5 [2002] , p. 39 The agencies are not however controlled by §602; they
are making a judgment to promulgate rules in accordance with that part of Title VI.
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dard of measurement of discrimination from intent to effects? Congress can
delegate some power to agencies, but agencies can not exceed their congres-
sional mandate in making rules and regulations. This would naturally be a
relevant place for discussion were the research here aiming to propose an ex-
pansion toward effects-standards. The next section discusses this question as
a lead in question to Sandoval but does not pass its own judgment. After all,
if the question was answered in the affirmative, the use of Title VI for derived-
EHR would still hit upon all the hurdles discussed below; if it was answered in
the negative it would be yet another potential roadblock that only strengthens
the hypothesis here. Therefore, the discussion focuses here on the problem of
standing in Title VI; is §602 an avenue for private plaintiffs or was it intended
for agencies only?
5.3.2.3 Agency Power and §602
It is still legally unclear as to whether agencies indeed have a right to extend
their own regulations to cover disparate impacts, in light of the fact that §601
covers only intentional discrimination. Such a claim came to forward as part
of the case Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif (Chester
Residents).125.
Chester Residents challenged the Pennsylvania Department of Environmen-
tal Protection (PADEP) for their issuance of new permits for a waste facility in
the pollution-heavy, and minority populated, county of Chester. The permit
would be the fifth sited hazardous waste site126 Although a lower court agreed
that the permitting process had a discriminatory effect they saw no private
standing to bring the case under §602 and requested that the citizens amend
their complaint to draw only upon §601 of Title VI. This would, however, leave
them to prove discriminatory intent in issuing the permits rather than simply
showing the discrimintory effect and linking it to the agencies own regulations.
As the case climbed the U.S. court ladder it was posed to be the first test of
the right to standing question.127 The progression of denial, appeal, and re-
125132 F.2d 925, vacated 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998)
126Lambert, p. 1155; the litigation was also notably playing in the same physical areal
and the legal milieu as the Khian Sea waste-trafficking incident. See Pellow, David Naguib
Resisting Global Toxics. The MIT Press, 2007, p. 116
127For a full chronology, see Worsham, Julia B. Latham Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under
Title VI, Section 602: Can A Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice? B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.
Rev , 27 2000, p. 666-679
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versal involved is revealing of the level of ambiguity and ongoing difficulty in
operationalizing the complete desegregation of all circumstances under the law
in the United States. It is also another indication of the difficult road toward
derived-EHR there.
The situation was anything but clear. Two previous cases had intoned in
dicta that agencies could promulgate regulations with greater anti-discriminatory
bars than the original mandate.128 An amicus brief filed by the Washington
Legal Foundation though pointed out that the were indeed purely dicta.129
Three justices in the Guardians court stated that §602 extensions toward dis-
parate impact metrics fall under proper agency discretion while two other
justices were of the opinion that §601 itself covered disparate impacts, and
not merely intentional discrimination. Hence, the commentary indeed showed
that a majority of the court believed §602 extensions to be valid.130 The logic
was not part of the holding of either case, however. Nevertheless, and as a
counterpoint, the Sandoval decision pointed to Justice O’Conner’s language
in Guardians that disparate impact regimes “go well beyond” the purpose of
Title VI.131 The amicus brief though points out the undecided legal nature of
the EPA’s effects wording
Above problems with clearly interpreting judgments, there are underlying
administrative law problems as well. If an agency can overstep their §601 com-
mitments and enact disparate impact regulations, and assuming inarguendo
that they can, the question emerges as to whether an agency’s regulation is
itself a law. Specifically, does their regulation carry the force of law? The
Chrysler test132 established a three point test for whether a regulation indeed
carries the force of law.133 Should a regulation pass the test, it is then con-
sidered to carry the force of law. Indeed, the question of whether rule-making
128Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582 (1983);
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
129Mank The Law of Environmental Justice, p. 34.
130Ursic, Joseph Finding a Remedy for Environmental Justice: Using 42 U.S.C. 1983 to
Fill in a Title VI Gap. Case W. Res. L. Rev. 53 2003
131Guardians at 613. Discussion in Laufer, John Arthur Alexander v. Sandoval and Its
Implications for Disparate Impact Regimes. Colum. L. Rev. 102 2002, p. 1657
132See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)
133Namely
1. Do the regulation function as rules which affect individual rights and obligations as
laws do?
2. Had Congress granted authority for the agency to make regulations doing so? and
3. Did the creating of the regulations follow correct procedural requirements?
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can, in effect, be legislative was answered in the affirmative.134 The point is
simply that regulations do not automatically carry the force of laws in U.S.
administrative law.
As laws can only be created by Congress, the regulation-as-law originating
from the agency must fit within the original law as passed by Congress. Hence,
the power an agency wields stems only from the Congressional statutes au-
thorizing their actions. Debates are inevitable over what an agency does and
what Congress “meant” for them to do. If an agency creates a regulation,
a mechanism which can carry the force of a law, the Courts may step in to
clarify the grey area between Congressional intent and agency effectuation.
This brings us back to one of the questions of this section: do agencies—in
general, or the EPA, specifically—have the authority to promulgate disparate
impact regulations? If one views agencies as a sort of limited-power legisla-
tive body located much closer to problems than the Congress proper, then
one finds much traction in allowing the agency leeway to regulate as they
see fit. Otherwise, it would seem prudent for the courts to keep an eye on
the balance of power between congressional statutes and agency regulations;
agencies creating laws where they have no democratically-granted ability to do
so is counter to the rule of law. The prime arguments for and against judicial
management of agency regulations are enunciated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron).135
Chevron is one of two precedents the Supreme Court established which help
courts decide whether there is, in fact, a grey area needing clarification around
an agency regulation. Courts can afford what is termed as Chevron Deference
to agency interpretation when a statute does carry the force of law.136 The
courts defer to the reasonable agency interpretation of congressional mandate
when such deference is warranted. Under Chevron deference, courts acknowl-
edge the quasi-legislative nature of the power often delegated to agencies and
allow them to promulgate laws—regulations having the force of law—of their
own accord.137 The court’s job is only to determine whether the statute in
question is ambiguous and if Congress meant for that ambiguity to be ad-
134See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) and Davant IV, Charles Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s
Apprentice: Federal Agencies and the Creation of Individual Rights. Wis. L. Rev , 2003
2003, p. 641
135467 U.S. 837 (1984)
136For a similar idea in the UK, see Wednesbury unreasonableness, Associated Provincial
Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 ff
137Mank Fla. St. U. L. 32 [2005] , p. 872.
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dressed by the agency.138
To be clear, Chevron deference is often viewed as strong deference as the
courts step out of the way of the agency.139 There is a lower bound for deferring
to agencies’ will in constructing congressional mandates. Skidmore deference
occurs where, in light of a regulation not having the force of law140 but rather
and merely the power to persuade, the court analyzes the regulation with less
deference, a level predicated on the persuasive power.141 Naturally, agencies
will argue for Chevron deference when faced with a lawsuit while plaintiff’s will
petition for Skidmore deference, hoping for the judicial oversight it brings.142
Despite multiple chances, the Supreme Court remains quite timid in drawing
brighter lines than Chevron and Skidmore as to when and where agencies
approach the borders of their congressionally-granted powers.
There are those who would argue that Chevron was overlooked or down-
played in recent proceedings over §602 regulation, and that Chevron deference
should be applied or called for in such situations,143. Other have however
noted that statutory silence should not be inferred to reflect congressional in-
tent to delegate authority.144 Still others make the point that agencies are
constrained, both by Congress and by judicial precedent, to effect only regula-
tions co-extensive with the Fourteenth Amendment.145 In light of the unsettled
issue, the safe way to view Chevron deference is to limit it “to regulations that
merely interpret a statutory right and do not apply to regulations that cre-
138Lambert, p. 1217.
139Although recent cases have narrowed its strong interpretation. See United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Also Alaska Department of Environmental Protection v.
EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004)
140For instance, in a case of a regulation not passing the Blessing test
141The court looks at “factors which give [the regulation] the power to persuade, if lacking
the power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)
142Johnston, Craig N./Funk, William F./Flatt, Victor B. Legal Protection of the Envi-
ronment. Thomson West, 2005, p. 80.
143Galalis, David J. Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake of Alexander v. San-
doval: Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron. B.C. Envt. Aff. L. R. 31
2004 stating that as the enacting Congress did not explicitly address whether discrimination
is to be weighed as an intent or a effect, then the Sandoval Court is bound to defer to the
EPA by Chevron, echoing Justice Steven’s dissent, 502 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Also note Gorod, Brianne J. The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency
Power to Define Private Rights of Action. Yale L. J. 113 2004, and Hoffer, p. 997. Justice
Scalia refused to defer because the “the Court had construed Title VI to ban only intentional
discrimination.” cf. Mank Fla. St. U. L. 32 [2005] , p. 848
144Ibid., p. 873.
145Lambert, p. 1217, commenting that Bakke’s holding leaves no ambiguity on what types
of agency regulations are permissible.
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ate or ‘effectuate’ rights based on the general goals of a statute.”146 Notably,
the Supreme Court advises courts to be at their most deferential in situa-
tions where the agency must make difficult predictions—“at the frontiers of
science”—about future conditions stemming from current actions, interpreting
and effectuate their congressional statutes in the shadow of such uncertainty.147
This open question as to how much power regulatory agencies have and
what shape that power can take is a major gap the Title VI jurisprudence.148
As §601 does not explicitly state that it proscribes only intentional discrimina-
tion but has been inferred as such from its perceived standing as coextensive
with the EPC149 it would appear that there are grounds for “wiggle room”
for agencies to promulgate regulations under §602 to effectuate the goals put
forth in §601 goals which are not explicitly limited to preventing intentional
discrimination.150 That wiggle room though can foreseeably shrink depending
on the circumstances.
Despite the lack of both binding judicial precedent and adequate clarity on
when agency discretion is permissible, some precedent for the validity of an
agency’s ability to extend Congressional legislation—the wiggle room—in sit-
uations where Congress intended the agency to prevent certain behaviors can
be found in the regulations promulgated by another federal agency: the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder151
the Court held tightly to congressional wording in an empowering statute.
The clarification by the court was that “a private plaintiff may not main-
tain a. . . suit under. . . [a statute when] the statute authorizing the rule. . . does
not prohibit a class of behavior broad enough to encompass those acts.”152
Plainly stated, the lawsuit at hand was invalid because they were stretching a
146Mank Fla. St. U. L. 32 [2005] , p. 873-4. See also Gorod.
147Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); and NRDC,
Inc v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Circuit, 1990). cf. Johnston/Funk/Flatt, p. 334.
148see Note After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title
VI Enforcement. Harv. L. Rev. 116 2003, p. 1781 citing that the U.S. Court missed an-
other opportunity to address this matter directly in South Camden Residents v. NJDEP
(discussed at Section 5.3.3.1)
149“. . . when the charge is intentional discrimination in the nature of the government pref-
erence, Title VI incorporates the constitutional standard. . . ” NAACP v. Medical Center
Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1330 (3rd Cir. 1981).
150Compare Primus, Richard A. Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three.
Harvard Law Review , 117 2003, Nr. 2; discussing whether equal protection affirmatively
blocks the use of disparate impact standards within legislation.
15125 U.S. 185 (1976)
152Ursic, p. 510. Also Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164 (1994) See also Mank Fla. St. U. L. 32 [2005] , p. 870-71, Lambert, p. 1213.
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regulation to cover behavior they perceived to be illegal but was not deemed
problematic by the original authorizing statute. Extending the protection is
something only Congress can do, not the agency.
The holding established clearly that agencies were merely administrative,
and not legislative bodies.153 The Court believed that because the statute went
to lengths to explicitly enunciate what behaviors were wrong the intent was
to preclude only those behaviors. The reverse image of this logic is then that
a statute will be less specific in its definitions if it indeed authorizes a broader
agency mandate. One might go so far as to say that such logic would preclude
any stretching of civil rights toward new ends, but that would be too much.
First, the case here dealt with statutes with extensive congressional input as
to right and wrong; sections 601 and 602 are much more open in their text.
Also, there would not necessarily be a widening of discrimination statutes to
encompass environmental justice (and EHR) concerns. Furthermore, The U.S.
Court did touch on the question of when agencies may broaden their mandate
in United States v. O’Hagan.154 The Court found that the statute in question
did allow for greater agency discretion because it was worded in preventative
terms instead of proscribing certain actions. Congress authorized the agency to
prevent certain outcomes here, but did not tightly specify the illegal practices.
This was thus a legislative action deemed a clear (and apparently kosher)155)
delegation of authority to the agency. If Congress had merely stated which
practices were illegal that would not be viewed as carte blanche to promulgate
an agency’s own version preventative regulation.
Therefore, when a congressional authorizing statute is couched as a prophy-
lactic measure it necessarily circumscribes a larger area of activity than core
activity which Congress explicitly is controlling.156. The agency must care-
fully craft its wording to make sure the regulation is merely “gap-filling” what
is missing in the statute’s text.157 Agencies, even when they are allowed to
broaden within their mandate, must remain bounded in their pursuits. Further
there is little guidance other than the fact that the U.S. abhors overly broad
provisions. Tractability and ends-justifying-means seem to be good rules of
153Lambert, p. 1211.
154521 U.S. 642 (1997).
155Delegation of authority from Congress to agencies has its own extensive jurisprudence.
See, inter alia, Schwartz, Bernard/Corrada, Roberto/Brown Jr, J. Robert Administrative





thumb to keep in mind, especially relative to the ECHR.158 Suffice it to say
that even when agencies give broader effect to anti-discrimination statues, it
is far from clear that anyone concerned with environmental justice could use
that as a toehold toward enforcing a right.
5.3.2.4 Private Right of Action and §602
Whether or not it is a legitimate exercise of agency power to proscribe dis-
criminatory impacts, the problem still remains as to whether private citizens
were deputized by Congress to enforce §602 regulations. In theory, a viola-
tion of a federal statute is akin to negligence and Congress could be viewed
as allowing a private plaintiff to sue federal law violators for failure to take
reasonable care.159 As the above cases were not the first times such questions
were raised, the U.S. Court has a general test for examining questions of when
citizens are ready to serve as policers.
The Cort test160 determines whether there is an implied private right of
action from a statute. The question becomes one of whether the statute grants
a right to a citizen to ask for the codified duty to be performed. Forcing the
hand of an agency is in general a difficult proposition under US administrative
law, thanks in part to doctrines like prosecutorial discretion. The Cort test is
thus not a binding test of whether a private right of action exists. It addresses
where a private right might plausibly reside.161 Given such criteria, the courts
had previously upheld—at least implicitly—a private right of action under
§602.162
158Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996), where the Supreme Court struck down a provision
which would have barred special protection of people based on sexual orientation. In the
Court’s view, the ends aimed for were much narrower than this broad means employed.
159Lambert, p. 1227.
160From Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)
161The Cort test asks
1. Does the statute intend to provide special benefits to the plaintiff?
2. Is there implicit or explicit evidence that Congress intended to create or deny this
remedy?
3. Is such a remedy consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme?
4. Is the cause of action traditionally relegated to state law, and in an area where a
federal cause of action would intrude on important state concerns?
Mank The Law of Environmental Justice. See also, for relevant discussion Lambert, p. 1229-
31.
162esp. Guardians, holding a private right of action for minority police officers experiencing
discrimination through test-based hiring, seniority, and firing policies. Such was noted by
the Third Circuit in Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d
293
5 The U.S. and Rights
Most notably, the Third Circuit Court upheld a private right under §602
in their holding on Chester Residents before the Supreme Court vacated their
judgement as the situation went moot before their certiorari hearing.163 Nev-
ertheless, in Chester Residents, the Third Circuit found that the regulation
promulgated pursuant to §602 indeed warranted a private right of enforce-
ment. The lower court found that the regulations satisfied a three-prong test,
similar in structure to the broader Cort test.164
The result was tentatively beneficial for the goal of extending civil rights
protections to environmental problems as the Chester Residents case explicitly
involved environmental concerns of a minority group. A final decision on the
existence of a private right though was postponed in Chester Residents until
Sandoval.165 The outcome though fell more into line with §601 and the EPC
than toward deriving environmental justice protections.
5.3.2.5 Alexander v. Sandoval
The grey areas surrounding the interpretation of §602 came to a head in
Alexander v. Sandoval166 after missing a chance with Chester Residents. Al-
though §601 grants a private right of action, it rarely found application in
environmental justice contexts due to the high hurdle played by the intent
925, 927 (1997); also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, upholding a lower court granting
standing for the disproportionate impact case, but reversing the finding of discrimination
because there was no intention. Furthermore, see Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481 (1996),
and David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265 (1988) cf. Ursic
163524 U.S. 974. The act of vacating the opinion would appear warranted in the face of
pointed criticism that the validity of disparate impact claims stems from dicta improperly
becoming holding. See discussion in Lambert, p. 1204-1211; showing how stricter adherence
to the dictum that “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position by those
members who concurred in the judgements on the narrowest grounds”, which stems from
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), would have kept the Alexander v. Choate
court from creating a false holding out of the Guardians opinions.
164132 F.3d 925 The test here affirmatively answered the following similar questions
1. Is the agency rule properly within the scope of the enabling statute?
2. Is the statute under which the rule was promulgated properly permits the implication
of a private right of action?
3. Will implying a private right of action further the purpose of the enabling statute?
165There was concern at the activist level whether taking the Chester case to the Supreme
Court would be a good decision for the movement. The likelihood of failure, that is, over-
turning the Circuit Court’s opinion, is statistically high. A negative judgement would have
been crushing to environmental justice concerns. While the national attention from the case
itself might bring benefits, there were reasons for environmental justice organizers to hope
for more lower court cases similar to Chester before pressing the issue to the Supreme Court.
166532 U.S. 275 (2001) hereinafter, Sandoval
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standard. That left its sibling, §602, to provide the leverage for a citizen wish-
ing to bring a discriminatory suit based on agency-created regulations stained
with discriminatory effect. Assuming, in arguendo as Sandoval did, that im-
pact regulations are a valid exercise of a funded agencies’ power, the question
of whether a private citizen has standing to bring suit boils down to whether
there is to be private oversight of agency regulations or whether they are only
subject to internal oversight.
The Sandoval case came to the Supreme Court in the aftermath of Chester
Residents. Unfortunately for the environmental justice community, the Chester
case was ruled moot as the permitting authority eventually revoked their re-
quest for an extension of permitting process because the applicant was delin-
quent on associated bond payments.167 The Supreme Court, who had accepted
a petition for a writ of certiorari, then vacated the Third Circuit Court’s ear-
lier decision that standing was implied under §602, and remanded the case for
dismissal. The unfortunate side of this turn of events was not only that the
question was left undecided after it had reached all the way to the Supreme
Court, but that the issue fell into another case, one not stemming from envi-
ronmental concerns, for a decision.
The Sandoval case involved a dispute over a decision by the state of Al-
abama’s Department of Public Safety to give drivers license tests only in En-
glish.168 The non-English speaking citizens in that state brought a class ac-
tion suit using §602 alleging that the Department of Justice’s regulations—an
english-only test— would have a discriminatory effect which would violate the
agency’s—the Department of Justice—own anti-discrimination creed.169 The
outcome of Sandoval, in addition to answering the question of private standing
on §602 in the negative, abruptly changed the road map with which environ-
mental justice advocates used to navigate. Suddenly, private citizens had no
standing to directly compel compliance with §602 of Title VI despite nearly
thirty years of precedent to the contrary and the finding of the Third Circuit
167Worsham, p. 676.
168Although the focus here is the outcome’s effect on standing of U.S. citizens to utilize
§602, the linguistic aspects of the case call to mind both the earlier U.S. case Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and the ECtHR Belgian Linguistic Case, 23 July 1968, 1
E.H.R.R. 252.
169It is unfortunate for environmental justice advocates that the issue was decided on
a canvas much different than the environmental one of Chester. One is left to wonder
whether the public safety undertones of an environmental action would have made the
private enforcement issue under §602 a more volatile issue.
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Court’s earlier, but vacated, Chester Residents test.170 In fact, it overturned
the previously implied logic holding that the wording of §602 passes their log-
ical tests for implying private cause of action.
Specifically, Justice Scalia, writing for the slim majority, found that the
explicit wording of §602 focused entirely on what agencies should do and no
where did Congress mention individuals at all, let alone what their part should
be.
“Section 602 focuses on federal agencies’ obligations, rather than
on individual rights. Moreover, [it] establishes a fairly elaborate
scheme for enforcement, which ‘suggests that Congress intended to
preclude other means of enforcement’...”171
The very tight reading of the authorizing statute gave the judges cause to
consider, and ultimately rule against, whether §602 implied private rights of
action through the Cort criteria.172 Harkening back to principles, the basics of
statute construction imply that when a statute specifies a certain method for
carrying out a legislative mandate it simultaneously implies that it should not
be accomplished in any other sense.173 The focus then on federal agencies’
obligations implies, if not confirms, that Congress excluded obligations on
citizens.
Nevertheless the U.S. Court’s ruling was only 5-4, a slim majority, with a
stinging dissent written by Justice Stevens.174 The Court found that Congress
had not explicitly written or intended for private citizens to bring discrimi-
natory cases via this route, and rather only other government agencies had
170La Londe, p. 34.
171Hill Envtl. F. 5 [2002] , p. 40. Also Lambert, p. 1250; claiming Congress must have
known they would be foreclosing a private remedy by creating the remedies for violations of
§602 in 1964.
172The circuit court had originally inferred that the amendments applied to Title VI
through the Rehabilitation Act of 1986, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§2000d-7; “In a suit against
a State for a violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1) [inc. title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], remedies (including remedies both at law and
in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available
for such a violation in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State.”
The Supreme Court viewed that the amendments only clarified §601 obligations, and hence
could not be applied to answering the Cort criteria. Ursic. Note also that comments toward
implying private rights of action contained in and around the Restoration Act of 1987 also
do conclusively grant private rights of standing for disparate impact suites. See Lambert,
p. 1239-1242
173expressio unius est exlusio alterius (the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another). Ibid., p. 1238-9 and notes therein
174The dissent by Stevens goes so far as to call the majority’s line of reason “something
of a sport.” 532 U.S. 275 at 300.
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congressionally–created standing. Plaintiffs might still lodge an administra-
tive complaint for non-compliance with regulations but there is no standing
for them to sue directly.175 The dissent added that although the Court’s odd
ruling foreclosed §602 routes for private suits, a plaintiff could still quite sim-
ply claim that this and other discriminatory effect issues were in violation of
§1983—an idea to which we turn now. The plaintiff might not be able to sue
directly about a §602 violation, and may not have evidence of discriminatory
intent in agency funding decisions necessary to succeed on a §601 claim, but
they could stand on §1983 and contend that agency failure to comply with
their §602 regulations violates a right guaranteed to them. Rights guaranteed
but not received are actionable under §1983 but brings the plaintiffs back in
to the question of when regulations promulgated under delegated authority
become rights under the law.
Although Sandoval closed private standing to enforce §602 regulations it left
open the question of whether discriminatory effect standards promulgated by
agencies were a proper use of their power under Title VI. In light of the closing
of the §602 pathway to private litigants, however, the debate as to whether dis-
parate impact regulations are valid is nearly moot from the perspective of de-
riving environmental protections from rights already granted. While the EPA
and other agencies should find the most effective internal procedure for han-
dling administrative complaints of non-compliance—a remaining albeit rather
passive approach to private oversight of §602—the big picture of environmen-
tal justice and derived environmental protections in the U.S. moves quickly
away from anti-discrimination applications. But while the closing of private
standing on disparate impact grounds came as a blow to the environmental
justice movement, history shows that the path was not particularly effective
at any rate.176 Stronger provisions against discrimination, however, might
175Administrative Complaints are discussed in Section 5.4.1
176Inter alia as a textbook summary see Hill Envtl. F. 5 [2002] , p. 37, noting the hurdle of
intent made it an inconsistent mechanism. History also reveals that suits involving disparate
provision of municipal services were more successful. See Hoidal, Sten-Erik Returning to
the Roots of Environmental Justice: Lessons from the Inequitable Distribution of Municipal
Services. Minn. L. Rev. 88 2004, p. 210. These situations provided a spatial boundary
defined by the non-provision of some service like sewers, sidewalks, or street-lighting. The
non-provision became hard to justify outside of intent readings. In environmental justice
usage, however, the “non-provision” would be the lack of an environmental benefit—a lower
environmental quality relative to that enjoyed by the majority. This is a reversal of logic that
even with more notable spatial boundaries—which depending on the environmental problem
are not as assured as, say, where street-lighting ends—is not necessarily amenable to the
denial of municipal services jurisprudence. Also see Moreau, Sophia Reibetanz Equality
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prove more effective, not only against discrimination but toward application
in environmental directions.
5.3.3 Section 1983
Section 1983177 (§1983) predates the civil rights act of 1964 and its §§601,602
by nearly a century, entering U.S. code in 1871.178 §1983 guarantees that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage of any State of Territory of the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for
redress.
It was created to provide a civil remedy to discrimination, direct action against
perpetrators of violations of federal law.
As with the EPC and the powers in Title VI the wording of §1983 sounds
powerful and reassuring in the face of the blatant racism present in Amer-
ica, especially at the end of the Civil War. Originally though the Act only
provided for redress of breaches of Constitutional rights.179 The term “and
laws” was only added to the Act in 1874. The “Laws Clause”, as it is known,
adds as much ambiguity to the protections here as the weakness above with
the EPC and the problems with the sections of the civil rights protections.
What Congress ultimately meant by “laws” determines how applicable this
civil rights protection is to environmental justice claims. There are relatively
few “rights” guaranteed by the Constitution and hence very little to enforce via
§1983 if the section is read narrowly. But there are many laws, and even more
regulations. If then Congress intended that laws and regulations—correctly
promulgated—are just as good as rights, then there is also the potential for
much broader application for §1983.180 The potential to hold private defen-
Rights and the Relevance of Comparator Groups. J.L. & Equality, 5 2006
17742 U.S.C.S. §1983
178Civil Rights Act of 1871 codified at 42 U.S. Code 21 1983 & 1988




dants criminally and civilly liable for violations of civil rights is decided by the
size of the legal foothold.181
In the dissent in Sandoval the idea was raised to press otherwise §602-bound
complaints toward §1983. The concept of moving §602 claims now blocked by
Sandoval to §1983 claims revolves around the thought that if the litigant can
prove a state agency deprived them of privileges granted to them (the litigant)
via regulations pursuant to §602 then they can bring a §1983 suit against the
agency. The question of private standing on §1983 itself is already sound.182
Furthermore, there is precedent that action’s brought under §1983 can enforce
other statutes,183 including §602 of Title VI.184 One should note, however,
that the presumption is against an implied right of action.185 The burden is
always on the plaintiff to show an intent existed to create a right of action.
Unfortunately simply detouring environmental justice claims previously slated
for §602 litigation to §1983 has problems. The problems come in the form of
the recent Third Circuit’s decision in South Camden v. New Jersey Dept.
of Environmental Protection, (Camden III )186 Although the case is discussed
often with an eye to Sandoval, §1983’s logic is truly independent of the pure
questions raised about §602. The main question on the §1983 pathway is
whether or not a regulation created a right, and then whether that right was
broken by an agency or person. The connection to Sandoval then comes in
because the rights under review in Camden III would stem from §602. The
§602 logic questioned whether an agency’s regulations are a law and it is not
all together obvious what regulations could create a right. The lack of obvious
connection truncating a plaintiff’s connection to §1983, at least in the eyes of
the Camden court.
In order to bring a §1983 suit, the plaintiff must assert violation of a federal
right187 In the context of environmental justice coverage, plaintiffs hoped to
181Ratner, Steven R. Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility.
Yale L. J. 111 2001, p. 499.
182Wright et al. v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418
(1987).
183Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992)
184Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (1999), notably reaffirming their Chester Residents
decision to uphold private standing even after the vacatur of Chester. See Lambert, p. 1160
185Suter v. Artist, at 363-364 and Ibid., p. 1237
186274 F.3d 771 (2001) Also Gonzaga University and Roberta S. Leauge v. John Doe
(Gonzaga), 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
187Golden State Transit Corp v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). Defen-
dants can, however, show that Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under §1983 with
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assert that a right to be free of disparate environmental impacts were created
from the EPA’s implementing regulations pursuant to Title VI, §602. But
when does an implementing statute create a federal right?
To answer this question courts apply yet another test; the Blessing Test.188.
In language that recalls the related Cort Test, the Blessing Test attempts to
get at the intention of the authorizing mandate handed down by Congress.189
Naturally, the regulations in question must carry the force of law, a force
checked by the Chrysler Test.190 The Supreme Court has held that the harm
caused by regulations—as laws—can stem from action on the part of a gov-
ernment entity or agency that “implemented or executed a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body’s officers, or the result of the entity’s custom.”191
In short then, the legal pathway to environmental justice via a §1983 claim
is essentially a claim that a person has been deprived of a right. Suing to
enforce a statute and suing to enforce a statute via §1983 are different things,
however. The first is what plaintiffs attempted in Sandoval.192 From both
Sandoval and now from the Gonzaga case, the bar for private standing to
a enforcement mechanism for protection of a federal right. See Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) and discussion in Mank Fla.
St. U. L. 32 [2005] , p. 858-9
188Blessing v. Freestone 520 U.S. 329 (1997)
189
1. Did Congress intend the provision in question to benefit the plaintiff?
2. Is the intended right clear enough, i.e. not be and amorphous, not to strain judicial
competence?
3. Does the enabling Statute unambiguously impose binding obligation to the state?
That is, it must be worded as mandatory over precatory terms.
Ursic
190See Section 132 In an environmental example then, on would look at EPA regulations
in Section 7.30, 7.35A,B. cf. Ibid. See also Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,
411 U.S. 356 (1973) and discussions in Hoffer, p. 995-6.
191Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691
(1978). Forsythe, Ian A guide to civil rights liability under 42 U.S.C §1983: An Overview
of Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Precedent. website. See also Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1, 4 (1979), reading §1983’s “Laws Clause”—“secured by the Constitution and
laws”—to encompass federal statutory regulations. cf. Hoffer, p. 992. The dissent in Maine
v. Thiboutot, however, noted that the amended “Laws Clause” in §1983 only refers to
enforcing equal rights statutes, and not all federal statutes. See also Mank Fla. St. U. L.
32 [2005] , p. 854.
192And after Sandoval’s direct comments on standing under §602, Gonzaga’s decision
seems to set the logic in stone. Gonzaga v. John Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) Also note
modifications of the Cort standard in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979), and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). These




sue to directly enforce a statute is much higher. Potential litigants have to
show both congressional intent to grant them a right based on that statute
and that they allow them to privately enforce it.193 There is then a higher
“congressional intent test” for implied rights of action. The word “intent”
has never been particularly welcoming to environmental justice ears, and it
continues its infamous role here.
As a private remedy exists explicitly under §1983, but no substantive rights
in an of itself, the pivotal hurdle is to show congressional intent to establish a
right in their favor.194 The use of civil rights mechanisms to enforce the well-
intentioned EPA regulations is stuck between Sandoval and Gonzaga without
much judicial wiggle room. Viewed in light of recent cases then, the connection
between §1983 and §602’s implementing regulations is significantly obscured
compared to what Justice Stevens implied in his optimistic Sandoval dissent.
Even if the direct connection between §1993 and §602 should exist195 environ-
mental justice advocates know that any dilution of the connection between
their case and the Civil Rights laws they utilize works terribly against them.
5.3.3.1 South Camden Citizens in Action
South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection196 struck the fatal blow to the loophole pointed out in the dissent
of Sandoval ; making Sandoval and Camden a 1-2 punch to anyone hoping to
utilize any of the most accessible civil rights protections in the U.S. toward
environmental ends. Here, the Third Circuit Court extended the Sandoval
decision to remove private right of actions under §1983 as a whole, essential
making Justice Stevens’ idea to open up §1983 irrelevant.
The Camden cases involved a serious of decisions by the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) which led to the disproportionate
polluting of an area in South Camden, New Jersey, which is predominately mi-
nority and poor.197 The case moved to block the construction of another pol-
luting facility by claiming the disparate environmental impacts violated §1983
193Mank Fla. St. U. L. 32 [2005] , p. 881.
194Forsythe.
195see Hoffer, p. 992-8
196274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), often Camden III. certiorari den. 536 U.S. 939 (2002).
197Note, p. 1787. For a short history of the area and the dynamics which led to the
situation from academics who worked on the case, see Bowen, William M/Atlas, Mark/
Lee, Sugie Industrial Agglomeration and the Regional Scientific Explanation of Perceived
Environmental Injustice. Annals of Regional Science, 43 December 2008, Nr. 4.
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of the Civil Rights Act. St. Lawrence Cement had applied for a permit to add
more nitrogen oxides and other airborne pollutants, in edition to a substantial
increase in truck traffic delivering material for processing,198 to a community
of more than 91% black and Hispanic residents, over half of whom live below
the poverty line.
In the cases leading up to Camden III, a lower state court had previously held
that the plaintiffs had good standing and a case sufficient to grant an injunction
against the NJDEP.199 After the decision however the court reconvened to
determine whether the judgment stood post-Sandoval, as the Sandoval decision
irreparably damaged Camden I ’s legal reasoning.200 Camden II, however, held
on to the reasoning from Camden I. The court interpreted Sandoval narrowly
and believed, as Justice Stevens did, that it only foreclosed a private cause of
action under §602. Therefore, the Camden case’s logic was still valid as long
as applied through §1983.201
The Camden II court utilized Wright v. City of Roanoke202 and Blessing v.
Freestone203 to show that precedent indeed existed under §1983. The higher
Third Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, and reversed the holding in Cam-
den III. Crucial to the reversal was the Circuit Court’s reading that the it
was the EPA’s administrative regulation enforcing Title VI through which the
plaintiffs accessed their standing under §1983. The Court appears to view the
leap from §1983 to EPA regulations as too far to award a remedy by stating
that the interest looking to be enforced must be implicit in the statute autho-
rizing the regulation. The administrative regulation, as an implementation of
a statute and not the statue itself, thus falls under the intentional discrim-
ination language intrinsic in Title VI (the authorizing statute), and cannot
therefore create a right to discriminatory impact remedy via §1983. Although
both §1983 and Title VI been held elsewhere to create enforceable rights the
statutes of Title VIs have more direct connection to §1983 than regulations
promulgated as a reaction to Title VI and hence the greater strength as a legal
198274 F.3d 771, and Hill Envtl. F. 5 [2002] , p. 39
199145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001), Camden I
200145 F. Supp. 2d. 505, Camden II. cf. Hoidal, p. 207
201Ibid., p. 208 Besides Justice Stevens’ dissent, there is precedent supporting the substi-
tution between §602 standing and §1983. In Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999)
where plaintiffs pursuing disparate impacts remedy were allowed to employ either §602 or
§1983.
202479 U.S. 418 (1987)
203520 U.S. 329, (1997), The source of the Blessing rights test, which sets out protocol to
decide whether Congress created a right.
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connection. It is the EPA’s administrative regulation—one step downstream
from the “authorizing statute” of Title VI—which governs disparate discrim-
inatory impacts and the congressionally-created statutes under Title VI only
apply to intentional discriminatory actions. The Camden court therefore saw
that plaintiffs cannot enforce disproportionate impact claims directly through
§1983.204
It is unclear however whether the Court thought that the agency regula-
tion defined a right already implicit in the empowering statute and therefore
stemming directly from Congress or whether the regulation itself created a
right, drawing on its power to do so by its congressional mandate. If the for-
mer is true, then the Court set precedent that the right must start itself with
Congress’ intent. Judicial scrutiny then should focus on the existence of rights-
creating language in the congressional statute. If the latter were the reasoning
then the precedent is to first assert whether the congressional statute granted
the power to make a right to the agency, followed closely by an analysis of
whether the enacted regulation constitutes a right within the power Congress
granted the agency.205 Again, Congress is the only body which can create
individual rights in U.S. lawmaking. The difference in the two scenarios then
turns on whether Congress created the right, or created a right (for an agency)
to create a right (for an individual) via their regulations.206
This latter scenario was viewed as “troubling” by Justice O’Conner in her
dissent in Wright because such broad reasoning, that any federal regulation
creates an enforceable right, potentially creates judicially-inferred rights where
Congress had no intention.207 Indeed, her dissent may be the source of some
overlap in the reasoning between cases questioning private standing and §1983
enforceable-rights cases—where standing is not an issue. She explicitly men-
tions the bridge of “Congressional Intent”, as the connection between finding
204The Third Circuit’s reasoning also rules out the use of Wright as support of Camden II.
In Wright, the regulations in question defined the term in question of generating a right—
in that case, what “reasonable rent” meant—and that right-granting regulation explicitly
and directly benefited the plaintiffs. The regulations therefore carried the force of law and
established a federal right.
205See discussions at Mank Fla. St. U. L. 32 [2005] , p. 860-864, and footnote 116, as well
as Idem Hous. L. Rev 39 [2003] , p. 1463-64
206Echoing the ambiguity from the Supreme Court decision is the split in interpretation
at the Federal Court levels. See Idem Fla. St. U. L. 32 [2005] , p. 864-67. Compare the
ECHR, which is expressly a “living document,” and therefore is interpreted not only on
the intent of the writers, but how the phrasing is contemporaneously viewed. The textual
criticism that comes in to play in the American discourse is absent.
207See Wright, 479 U.S. 438 (O’Conner, J., dissenting)
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an implied right of action, and an implied right.208
The Wright ambiguity did some damage to the Camden case. Although
EPA regulations promulgated under §602 prohibit discriminatory effects, the
authorizing statutes, §601 and §602 of Title VI, never define such a term.
Hence, the EPA’s discriminatory effect regulations are called into question
as to whether they carry the force of law, breaking the chain of logic before
reaching the question of whether they can grant an enforceable right. In
Camden, this fact served to disconnect the plaintiff’s logic from the precedent
in Wright.209 The court called into question the distance a plaintiff must
be to the empowering statute in order to truly be the intended beneficiary,
as required by the Blessing test for a statute creating a federal right. §602
focused on agencies, which is twice removed from plaintiffs over the direct
funding agencies. In the logic of the court, that is a significant legal distance
for a plaintiff to wield §1983 over.
Camden also shows how the older Blessing test has fallen under the newer
Gonzaga ruling.210 The logic in the Gonzaga case requires that congressional
intent to bestow a right enforceable by §1983.211. The Court cited §601—with
its explicit intent standard for discrimination—as an example of congressional
rights-creating language. The focus in rights-creating language also should lie
on the individual, and not the aggregate.212. These new, higher, requirements
hurt the potential which existed under the Blessing test for showing that
a statute creates a right, and have even led to new precedent saying that
administrative regulations can never create rights which could be enforced
through §1983.213
Above the contentions of the listed court decisions, there is also an open
question of whether allowing citizens remedy via §1983 action on regulations
via Title VI would even exceed Congress’s power to do such a thing based on
their mandate and in Article I of the U.S. Constitution.214 Mistretta v. United
208Mank Fla. St. U. L. 32 [2005] , p. 862-3.
209Ursic.
210Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)
211Hoffer, p. 998.
212Ibid.
213See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit Recent Cases: Federal Courts—Civil Rights
Litigation—Ninth Circuit Holds That An Administrative Regulation Can Never Create an
Individual Federal Right Enforceable Through §1983—Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit,
335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003). 117 Harv. L. Rev. 735, 2004; Campbell, Andrew L. Can
Federal Regulations Ever Create Federal Rights Privately Enforceable Under Section 1983?
Ind. L. Rev. 38 2005.
214Eastland, Keith E. Environmental Justice and the Spending Power: Limits on Using
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States215 clarifies some ambiguity as to how much power Congress, via its leg-
islative mandate, can delegate to agencies other branches of government over
the non-delegation clause in Article I, Section 7 and the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution.216 Expansive reading of §1983 could push federal laws
too deeply into state sovereignty terrain, as noted by Justice Powell in Maine
v. Thiboutot. With that in mind it one can couch the Sandoval and Gon-
zaga decisions as attempts to reign in potentially problematic issues.217 These
issues all present the legal can-of-worms in which we find the Sandoval and
the Camden judgments, and hence the predicament face by an environmental
justice advocate looking to argue the judgements away.
Above the more esoteric issues, the lower court’s reasoning and denial of
standing in Camden echoes their shyness to infer discriminatory intent from
outcomes. They continued their tendency to narrowly and castiously interpret
the intentions of legislative directives. The Supreme Court put their approval
on the cautiousness in denying certiorari.218
Between the Sandoval and Camden decisions, held together with the higher
standards of Gonzaga requiring a deeper reading of congressional intent, the
courts have created the precedent that “an administrative regulation cannot
create an interest enforceable under [the statute] unless the interest already
is implicit in the statute authorizing regulation.”219 But there is the chance,
as will all common law doctrine, that Camden could be overturned, however.
But as this section comes to a close, it should be remembered that even if
the decision were overturned, reopening the §1983 as a legal pathway toward
enforcing §602, the issue of whether regulations extending to disparate impacts,
and not only intentional discrimination, are valid would likely reappear.220
Recall too that these somewhat esoteric issues of law are one step removed
from the problems of identifying whether or not the outcome is discriminatory
Title VI and §1983. Notre Dame. L. Rev. 77 2002.
215488 U.S. 361 (1989)
216Mank Fla. St. U. L. 32 [2005] , p. 869.
217Ibid., p. 855 Further, there is the theoretical question that if an agency cannot pro-
mulgate disparate impact regulations pursuant to Title VI, than how are Congress’ powers
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment different? For discussion see Laufer; Mank
Fla. St. U. L. 32 [2005] ; Davant IV.
218South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-
tection, 536 U.S. 939 (2002).
219This quote, from S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dept of Envtl. Prot, 274 F.3d
771, 774 speaks directly to §1983, but the logic applies to the broader Sandoval decision
governing §601 and §602.
220Note, p. 1781.
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and then another step away from from expanding environmental protection in
a form not dependent on the makeup of the group—a suspect classification—
alleging the problem.
The Camden case is, after all, well researched as to its spatial implications.
Bowen, Atlas, and Lee added much to Chapter 3 by explaining how much
spatial economics can add to the environmental justice conversation. The
gravity of firms locating in a certain area contributed more to the explana-
tion of facility permitting than did the pattern of the distribution of minority
residents.221 In addition to changing the results from models which did not
include agglomeration as an explanatory variable, the new variable brought
with it significantly greater explanatory power and reduced other statistical
problems relative to the non-agglomerated model.222 Industrial and residen-
tial patterns have likely co-evolved to reveal the pattern we see today, so the
inclusion of a measure of that history in the form of agglomeration is relevant.
Here we come full circle, as that work was done to help answer whether there
was discrimination in the Camden situation.223 As that section illustrates,
the failure to take into consideration the economics of agglomeration leads
to inflated correlations between race and locations. Thus even allowing for
standing the eventual outcome may not have been toward protection of the
plaintiff’s environments.
Before leaving this convoluted topic, it needs to be noted that although pri-
vate rights of action do not exist where they once did, and that the force of
disparate impact regulations created to enforce §601 are questioned, does not
mean the statutes will not be enforced. The statutes themselves must still be
enforced, but now that enforcement must come from within the EPA or other
agency. Previously, the beneficiaries were able to aide the EPA in their over-
sight efforts by bringing issues to the attention of the courts. The situation
now leaves a particularly large burden that was previously aided by citizen
oversight. Citizens can still appeal for proper enforcement through adminis-
trative complaints.224 Ironically, §1983 may be used in an alternative sense
and see a revived usage in environmental justice if litigants can show that
agencies have engaged in “deliberate indifference”—a framing of discrimina-




224Hill Envtl. F. 5 [2002] , p. 40.
306
5.4 Associated Rights Protections
situations.225 Outside of civil rights litigation, the EPA also encourages al-
ternative measures for dispute resolution226. Such alternative abilities speak
toward an ability to protect the environment through public participation and
perhaps even access to information, similar to the abilities granted under the
ECHR and the Aarhus Convention, but here they reside relatively below the
level of importance of a “right” and rest on administrative remedies.
5.4 Associated Rights Protections
The recent removal of civil rights pathways toward environmental justice may
have been a legal blow to environmental justice advocates but the pathways
themselves have not been particularly successful in achieving the aims of envi-
ronmental justice thus far.227 Even as far back as 1994, just as the environmen-
tal justice movement was gaining significant traction, Luke Cole, in frequently
cited work, placed Civil Rights laws in third place in his list of four tools for
pursuing environmental justice behind utilizing environmental laws.228 These
problems, or at least the potential for convoluted problems, were foreseen. The
provisions in the U.S. code against discrimination are not, however, the only
civil rights protections that could inform the derived-EHR discussion. The
following sections detail information on the Fair Housing Act and protections
against employment discrimination. While these, like the above protections,
operate through the lens of discrimination, they add both information to the
U.S. legal picture as well as confirm that even outside of the main armaments
utilized thus far for environmental justice purposes there is little evidence or
hope for deriving environmental protections via rights.
5.4.1 Administrative Complaint
Because the problems arising between minority groups and agencies receiving
funding from the federal government are often administrative in nature, an
225see Faerstein, Brian Resurrecting Equal Protection Challenges to Environmental In-
equity: A Deliberately Indifferent Optimistic Approach. U. Pa. J. Const. L. 7 2005 and
Black, Derek Picking up the Pieces after Alexander v. Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private
Cause of Action for Disparate Impact. N.C. L. Rev , 81 2003
226Hoffer, p. 999 and see the EPA’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Law, Policy and Guid-
ance at http://www.epa.gov/adr/cprc policy guidance.html [last accessed Sept. 7, 2007]
227Worsham, p. 705.
228Cole Fordham Urban Law Journal 21 [1994] , p. 526.
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administrative complaint is a common and effective method for rectification.229
Although an administrative complaint, especially via the US EPA, involves
regulatory structures that left otherwise are untouched by the rights discourse,
it deserves mention here as part of the complete comparative picture between
U.S. and European extended environmental protections, especially in view
of its relation to access to information and procedural rights in Europe. As
regulations within agencies like the EPA are promulgated following Title VI
mandates there is also a direct connection to the previous discussion.
In brief, an administrative complaint allows a party to allege that the agency
is not following its own regulations. It does not need to then go the extra step
and allege that the failure of the agency to properly mange or regulate results in
discriminatory outcomes. After all, there there are many ways one can justify a
disproportionate impact. Apart from the movement of the inanimate economy
and the statistical problems discussed in Chapter 3, problems which viewed
from the other side of the argument are not always seen as problems, legal or
otherwise, there is the problem that most agencies are not the parties choosing
a site or and therefore they are not the people causing the discriminatory
impact.230 Administrative complaints, however, are not tied to the logic of
anti-discrimination. That automatically relaxes restraints on standing. A
community does not have actually be a member of a the protected class in
order to file a complaint alleging discrimination against a Title VI protected
group.231 It is certainly up to the complainants to establish a strong connection
between the eventual choosers (of environmental problems) and the agency
against which failure to comply with their regulations is alleged. Of course, if
the offending polluters do not receive federal funding, they are protected from
a discriminatory suit against the agency which regulates them. But at the
start there are lower hurdles relative to civil rights litigation.
Formally, and in the environmental context, an administrative complaint is
filed with the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR). The OCR came into being
partly through President Clinton’s urging and then explicitly because of the
enacted Executive Order 12898,232 the major, if non-binding, piece of law in
229For an extensive discussion, as well as a record of the first such cases lodged with
the U.S. EPA see Cole, Luke W. Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA: The
Brief History of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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the U.S. mentioning environmental justice.233 If there is merit to the com-
plaint, the OCR will notify the parties involved and elicit written statements
and attempt informal resolutions. While the specifics of the complaint path
are not pertinent to the current work, it is sufficient to note that the pathway
exists, and it is accessible for common citizens. They must only draft a letter
to the OCR. Of course, the more legally focused the letter is, the more likely
the OCR will find merit to the claim.234 Thus there is always an ability to
lodge a complaint with an environmental agency, divorced from discrimination
logic and even from suspect classifications.
The administrative complaint though is a far cry from access to courts,
remedy, and information as defined in Europe. Access to remedy remains en-
shrined at the constitutional level with the Due Process Claus, but that has
not been applied to environmental contexts in the way it has in Europe. Access
to remedy generally remains at a lower level in the U.S. through interaction
with agencies implementing congressional legislation. In fact, part of the more
open applicability stems from there being limited bite to an administrative
complaint. Within the EPA, accepted administrative complaints can be re-
solved informally. This is the most likely and prudent choice as well. However,
in the form environmental justice complaints usually take, an informal resolu-
tion is quite limited relative to granting an injunction to halt construction or
remove a siting decision. An informal resolution can be as light as getting the
potentially-discriminatorily effecting company to go back to the public partic-
ipation phase of permitting. The agency can also refer the case to the Justice
Department, or indeed choose to do nothing.235
Although the benefits to filing an administrative complaint over pursu-
ing formal litigation on civil rights grounds may favor—empower—the small
groups usually at the center of the U.S. environmental justice stage, the draw-
backs as far as public participation enablement are substantial. An informal
process, capable of being executed by a community without legal assistance
or expense strongly benefits small communities is quite helpful.236 However,
233Crossman, Brian Ressurrecting Environmental Justice: Enforcement of EPA’s
Disparate-Impact Regulations through Clean Air Act Citizens Suits. B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.
Rev. 32 2005, p. 604.
234For specifics on administrative complaints, see Ibid. and Mank The Law of Environ-
mental Justice, p.27-29
235Cole Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 9 [1994] , p. 318 Notably, the “do
nothing” choice is often a result of limited agency resources to process such complaints.
236Although the framing of the complaint in proper legal channels may bring benefits.
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once filed, the community is left completely out of the loop; there is no back-
and-forth discussion nor revelation of new information. The agency conducts
its own internal investigation, which also affects the available remedies, leaving
the full removal of agency funding as the only substantial penalty. No penalties
are available to the aggrieved and full removal of funding is commonly held to
be too harsh to serve as a credible deterrent to a potential offender. The EPA
would rationally only choose this method if the environmental benefits of the
program were minimal.237 Further, there is effectively no time limit within
the EPA to decide on a complaint.238 However, they are also not barred from
pursuing formal legal action during the interim.239 That is, the administrative
remedy must not be exhausted. However, it is unclear as to whether it must
first be at least attempted.240
Regardless, this is another convoluted set of instructions for a disadvantaged
group of people to navigate in hopes of getting even well-meaning regulations
to function as they view they should. Even if they have erred in their opinion
of the outcome there is significant time and energy costs to accessing even a
negative response for a solution. From even a brief discussion it is obvious
that an administrative complaint does little to shore up information exchange
or public access relative to the ECHR, at least as far as guaranteeing partic-
ipation and access to information in manners approaching Article 10 and the
now-attached Aarhus regulations in Europe.241 This may be an unfair direct
comparison given their very different sources and rationale. In the context of
a comparison between abilities to derive environmental protection, however, it
is another hole in the umbrella of protection in the U.S. relative to Europe.
Cole Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 9 [1994] , p. 319-21,398-90
237La Londe, p.38.
238Cole Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 9 [1994] , p. 321,387 Previously
held doctrine that individuals could not punish agency slowness in processing claims via
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA, 5 U.S.C. §704 (2000)) because individuals had
(perceived) standing to sue directly may now be open due to the loss of individual standing
through Sandoval. See La Londe, p.39
239See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)
240Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), cf. Cole Journal of
Environmental Law and Litigation 9 [1994] , p. 323
241Sections 4.2.4, 4.2.4.2
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5.4.2 Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act,242 like other provisions of the civil rights acts, came
to power to address a specific claim of lingering racism in the United States.
A part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII addressed the concerns
of the Kerner Commission Report. The report summarized the causes of the
major race riots of 1967 as an outpouring of minority frustration with the U.S.
“moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”
As such, the FHA moved to prohibit discrimination in the “terms, conditions,
privileges, services, or facilities connected with sale or rental housing” that
otherwise might come to pass between the two worlds.243 Its entire purpose
was to bring about “truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”244
The connection to the sale and rental of housing is perhaps overlooked by
U.S. lawyers investigating environmental injustices.245 The FHA is applicable
to a wide array of situations dealing with the habitability of dwellings and
hence touches on environmental conditions in ways that could, but as of yet
have not significantly, serve as an analogue for the protections to the home in
the ECHR. The connection is certainly not parallel and given the more strict
milieu illustrated in the civil rights pathways, this could be a stretch currently.
Nevertheless, it bears discussing not only because of its possibilities246 but
because the discussion shows the same difficult legal environment illustrated
24242 U.S.C. §§3601-3631, most importantly to the environmental justice situation are
§3604(b) and §3617
243Brown, Alice L./Lyskowski, Kevin Environmental Justice and Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (The Fair Housing Act). Va. Envtl. L. J. 14 1995, p. 743. Or as, stated
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the FHA “prohibits
discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of dwellings, and in other housing-related
transactions, based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status (including
children under the age of 18 living with parents of legal custodians, pregnant women, and
people securing custody of children under the age of 18), and handicap (disability).” [from
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/FHLaws/]
244Guill, p. 226, quoting Senator Walter Mondale. This quote, carrying as it does some
implication of equitable distributions, should not be inferred however as representative of
the legislative climate at the time of the Act’s passage. Much discussion focused on the
Act’s ability to enable motion on behalf of minorities, in response to job migration out of
city centers. See ibid., p. 227-8.
245For an example of the ideas that limit the use of the FHA, see Laramore v. Illinois
Sports Facilities Authority, 722 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Ill. 1989), which dismissed fair housing
claims because there was not an adequate connection to the sale or rental of property.
246Detailed in specific situations such as Hurricane Katrina in Rajotte, Benjamin A
Housing-centred approach to Justice. J. Envtl L. & Litig, 24 2009; idem Environmental
Justice in New Orleans: A New Lease on Life for Title VIII. Tulane Environmental Law
Journal , 21 2008 and in general in Crawford, Colin; Gerrard, Michael B., editor Chap.
Other Civil Rights Titles In The Law of Environmental Justice. American Bar Association,
1999
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above with protections against discrimination. The conclusion is therefore
that even if it could be beneficial, and if one could apply Title VIII toward
environmentally protective ends, it would not be as straightforward or as broad
as the protections derived from Article 8 of the ECHR.
In brief, §3604(b) of the FHA prohibits active discrimination associated
with housing transactions and in the provision of services surrounding housing
transactions. The duplication of the word “transactions” here is important and
the first indication that this protection might have an upper boundary. Indeed,
the discriminatory acts must have linkage to the transference of housing, be
that selling or renting.247 There must be a harm done to the ability to acquire
or hold property that has a segregating impact. According to Rajotte, §3604(a)
aims to prevent the removal of housing options from those who would be
discriminated against while §3604(b) covers conduct that affects the nature of
the housing, conduct that could make the housing undesirable and thus effect
discriminatory outcomes.248 Further, §3617 guards access to these provisions,
protecting against backlash and interference.249
Here there are protections against certain forms of discrimination in housing
as well as protections for fair enjoyment of that housing. The protection though
comes through the lens of discrimination. It is not expected to be able to widen
as much as familial connections protection in the ECHR then. However, it is
a broader discrimination protection in the U.S. because plaintiffs must not
meet Title VI’s nexus of federal funding requirement here. Hence, Title VIII
is actionable against fully private institutions providing housing and housing
services. More powerfully, it does not require the plaintiff to prove intentional
discrimination.250 Discriminatory effect or the higher evidence of intent find
protection in the FHA, anything that grants segregative effects to the housing
picture in the U.S.251 It is also well established that individuals have standing
on Title VIII complaints.252 There will not be a chance, like Sandoval, where
247Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734 (Fifth Cir. 2005).
248Rajotte J. Envtl L. & Litig 24 [2009] , p. 169.
249United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D. Neb. 2004); interpreting the statute
as preventing interference with enjoyment of the home.
250Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15 (1988), aff’d 844 F.2d 926
(1988), as early, if tacit, evidence of the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow FHA cases
with a showing of disparate impact instead of intent. Compare City of Cuyahoga Falls v.
Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 538 U.S. 188 (2003) vac’d in part 263 F.3d 627
(2001).
251Summerchase Ltd. P’ship I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522, 528 (M.D. La.
1997)
25242 U.S.C. §3613(a) (2000)
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this pathway will suddenly close down.
Suits alleging obvious discriminatory housing practices and practices affect-
ing the opportunity to acquire housing, which may including keeping existing
housing in the face of relocation, find protection here as well.253 As many deci-
sions by town and urban planners, environmental siting, among others, affect
the future of housing opportunities, the FHA can be viewed as casting a wide
net aimed at hauling in all forms of discrimination in the housing market.254
The actions the FHA though reach only the provisions of services and facilities
in connection with the sale or rental of housing.255 The statutory construction
forces a reading on what Congress intended by “in connection with” and with
“sale or rental.” Suffice it to say here that the courts have construed the inten-
tion narrowly and “sale or rental” applies reservedly to the process of selling
and renting.256 Provision of services to that housing is generally bounded by
services attributable to governmental bodies: police, fire, garbage.257 It is up
to the plaintiff to bring a lack of provision in line with segregative effects.
FHA claims are also strong connection between a defendant’s actions and
the future availability of housing for minorities. Here, it should be noted that
the FHA applies only to protected classes and would not apply to housing
moving to lower income classes, for instance. One trades some ability to extend
protection in the enjoyment of the home outside of specifically minority areas.
There is however the broader power of §3617 which extends to protection from
acts of intimidation meant to dissuade minorities away from housing areas
or persuade them to leave what they already have. This power, while still
applying to selected classifications, applies in situations not limited the buying
and selling of property.258 The wording is broader in that it extends to actions
which interfere with the enjoyment, relatively broadly defined, of housing, and
not merely the prevention of its attainment. As all of these legal pathways are
far less traveled than the above Title VI claims and their stand-alone utility
253Other protections are discussed in Rajotte Tulane Environmental Law Journal 21
[2008] , p. 61-63
254E.g. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1998).
25542 U.S.C. §3604(b)
256See Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Authority, 722 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
See also NAACP v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 978 F.2d 287 (1992).,
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2335 (1993), reiterating that the protection is associated with the
acquisition of housing.
257Southend Neighborhood Improvement Assoc. v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1210
(Seventh Cir 1984).
258Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661 (Fifth Cir. 1981)
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remains questionable, although they do provide detours when the other roads
have their own obstacles.
Given their verbal echoes of the “peaceful enjoyment” of one’s home sphere
in the ECHR, it is worth an attempt to expand environmental protections
outward from Title VIII, if only because Title VI has become such a dif-
ficult path.259 Combined with interpretations construing §3604 to prevent
redevelopment which would displace minorities from their current affordable
housing, it is easy to see how provisions under civil-minded Housing acts can
proscribe activities that would fall under an environmental justice heading,261
and also how that protection could follow the extracted protections of the
ECHR, though likely on a more limited scale. Rajotte has done the most
recent work on this pathway toward environmental protections in connection
with finding a right to a safe and healthy reconstruction after a hurricane in
Lousiana.262
Despite the untested nature and some limitations, the protections are there.263
Their ability to extend to environmental problems are possible too, especially
in areas of tense racial pressures. Once again one must work through the
connection of discrimination if one wishes to apply the housing protections to
environmental problems. Title VIII’s ability to rectify those problems remains
largely untested and so the degree of available protection remains in the realm
of conjecture.264 And because it operates through the lens of discrimination,
even broad discrimination readings such as impact over intent, it will neces-
sarily occupy a subset of the protection that the ECHR currently allows. The
FHA may well provide stronger and deeper protection where the housing, en-
vironmental, and racial components of a situation are tightly meshed, but the
ECHR allows for much broader movement away from racial and discrimina-
259In a similar vein, Section 109 of the Housing and Community Development Act
(HCDA)260 is a different connection for environmental justice to the civil rights literature.
Hoidal (2004) mentions this as a new route replacing that lost after the Revenue Sharing
Act (31 U.S.C. §1224(b), (1972-1976)) went out of power. This section was tested in Miller
v. City of Dallas, No.3 98-CV-2955-D, (US District Court, N.D. Texas 2002). Hill Envi-
ronmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice, p. 254-263; Hoidal, p. 216 Originating in the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, the provision prevents agents receiving
money under the HCDA from selecting or locating facilities where their benefits cannot be
utilized by minority communities.
261Brown/Lyskowski, p. 751.
262Rajotte J. Envtl L. & Litig 24 [2009] ; idem Tulane Environmental Law Journal 21
[2008]
263Protections labeled as “intriguing” by Luke Cole, Cole Fordham Urban Law Journal
21 [1994] , p. 534-35
264Rajotte Tulane Environmental Law Journal 21 [2008] , p. 53
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tion issues, thus removing one anchor of the analysis and allowing any derived
protection to drift farther out over the housing and environmental area. To
conclude, the FHA deserves a discussion as a place to look to extract envi-
ronmental protections of the sort desired by environmental justice advocates
but the fact that it remains bounded to the anti-discrimination perspective
necessarily means it will not expand to encompass the same derived-EHR pro-
tections of the ECHR. Nevertheless, with its secure private right of action,
it may remain the only rights-based approach realistically open to impacting
environmental protection.
5.4.3 Employment and Justifiable Discrimination
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act265 is not usually discussed in the context
of environmental justice.266 The reason is simple: Title VII prohibited em-
ployers from discriminating. As cases of environmental damage have little to
do with employment practices, there is no legal pathway here for remediation,
at least viewed from the traditional discrimination/environment connection of
environmental justice. Nevertheless, Title VII deserves a look as it is the only
civil rights protection which explicitly incorporates, as a matter of statute, an
discriminatory effects standard.
Specifically, under Title VIII, employment practices which are facially neu-
tral but still result in disparities in employment patterns can be found illegal.
Unfortunately, the disproportionate impact, devoid of any intent, can also be
found legal. The difference rests on whether they are justified as a business
necessity. That is, practices which are “job related for the position in ques-
tion and consistent with business necessity”267 are legitimate, albeit disparity
causing, practices. To cement the idea, this would be similar to amending §602
to encompass disparate impacts while not completely ruling them out in situ-
ations where a defendant could show that there was a compelling, non-racially
265See above Title VI
266Exceptions include the treatment of Lambert, p. 1188-1190, comparing Title VII’s bur-
den shifting procedure to possible improvements of agency-based disparate impact oversight
under Title VI.
26742 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); “An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this subchapter only if a complaining party demonstrates that
a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity;”
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motivated, reason.
There exists much jurisprudence weighing when distinctions between classes
is justifiable and when they are not268 In the U.S. employment discrimination
cases are often weighed on the three-stepMcDonnell Douglas test269 There the
plaintiff first establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then
shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
difference in treatment. If they succeed, the plaintiff then must show that the
proffered rationale is a pretext covering discrimination. In the abstract, the
balancing sounds analogous to the weighing of interests in margins of appreci-
ation with its back-and-forth dialogue. Though in practice such a case usually
starts by establishing comparators and to adduce evidence that the employer
has or routinely treats with difference protected classes. The defendant then
responds with an attack on the proffered grouping. The conversation can tend
to the minutia of a particular employment situation.
More relevant to the environmental discussion though is the fact that the
disparate impact was not originally contained in statute, but was interpreted
as such in Griggs v. Duke Power Company,270 and later amended into the
statute271 The Griggs decision stated that even neutral policies “cannot be
maintained if they operate to “freeze” the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices.”272 Given the unique circumstances of groups, policies
otherwise equally applied and neutral may in fact be “built-in headwinds” for
those groups.273 Freezing the status quo is also the concern behind the FHA
268In some branches of the literature, the term disparate treatment is used in place of
intentional discrimination. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); the facts of the case are also the likely reason as to why the
term “disparate treatment” is used more heavily in Title VII cases than Title VI. . Here at
the outset the reader can make a mental note of the broad test for discrimination which rests
on showing that “persons similarly situated are treated differently.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982) cf. Weinberg The Law of Environmental Justice, p. 4. We note here also
the tension this statement creates with respect to affirmative action laws, treating groups
differently for the benefit of minorities or those still under the shadow of discrimination.
269McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
270401 U.S. 424 (1971)
27142 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(2); “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”
272Griggs at 429-30. The Court employs the parable of the Fox and the Stork to illustrate
that a neutral policy. There, a neutral policy—the offering of food—works to freeze the
status quo when it is offered in a way which works for one group but not for the other—
asking the fox to eat its meal out of a dish which it cannot reach the food.
273Griggs, J. Burger majority opinion.
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and its prohibition of segregative practices.
There is a hefty amount of literature surrounding these issues within the
jurisprudence of Title VII. Some federal court decisions have followed its lead
when analyzing Title VI cases, lending another reason to mention it in this
chapter.274 Likewise, as the disparate impact regime is codified in Title VII the
same courts have looked there as guidance when considering disparate impact
cases under Title VI (§602).275 But although the statute explicitly reads a
larger view of discrimination, in the context of nationality and sex in the
workplace it still has not weeded out stopped discrimination.276 In particular,
the courts have a very difficult time with the expanded Title VII statute, a
fact which should give pause to proponents of a codified discriminatory impact
standard under Title VI.
In employment discrimination cases under Title VII, including sexual ha-
rassment, 277 there is standing for private aggrieved plaintiffs to bring suit.
Otherwise, information on sex discrimination might never be exposed. Once
the information is available, the suit shifts into oversight mode and answer-
ing the question of whether the alleged practice created a justified disparate
impact or not.278
The reason for not outlawing all disparate impact-causing business practices
is that some are genuinely good for society. For instance, safety regulations
keep the workplace safe. Rules meant to promote safety however can fall with
more weight on a particular group. Consider—among many other instances—
a weight-lifting requirement which precludes people who cannot lift a certain
274E.g. Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984); Georgia State Conference
of Branches of the NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985) and notes in
Mank The Law of Environmental Justice, p. 38
275Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (1999), and notes in Lambert, p. 1189, n.107
276See Sullivan Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 47 [2006] , who summarized the state of employ-
ment discrimination practices as of 2006 as “plaintiffs are losing almost all of the cases they
file, except for a few isolated ones, most notably sexual harassment claims (p. 912).” He
continues, noting that the state of employment discrimination scholarship shows that “dis-
crimination is more pervasive than ever, but only when ‘discrimination’ is defined in a way
that few outside the legal academy are willing to accept,” referring to the prevalent nature
of “trait” discrimination, which encompasses “behaviors commonly associated with, but not
inherent in, particular races.” ibid., p. 922
277Sexual harassment is not the same as discrimination because of sex, albeit obviously
related, and viewed as a subset of sex discrimination. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986). Nevertheless, the term “sexual harassment” does not appear in 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-(2)(a).
278There are, of course, problems here as well. Notably, whether one is justifying a business
practice or an employment practice. The requisite comparison group would be different
under the two categories. See Ibid., p. 977, discussing the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) v. Joe’s Stone Crab, 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000). ff
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heavy weight from the applicant pool. Such a requirement would likely exclude
more woman than men. An equity analysis then would focus on whether the
requirement fills a legitimate and pressing business purpose. The requirement
should reflect working conditions and not more; if no employee ever truly must
lift that much weight then there is no reason to set the bar so high. However,
even with the statute-granted power for courts to analyze whether rules are
justifiable or not under a disparate impact regime, they have often tangled the
idea together with disparate treatment/intentional discrimination.279
Disparate impact is a difficult concept for the courts to wield because its
usage depends critically on defining boundaries. Their reluctance were cogent
in Title VI interpretation but here they are forced to determine how boundaries
are to come to define a comparison group.280 Likely because of the difficulty,
courts dealing with employment discrimination have been willing to hear cases
of discrimination, but rarely act on them.281 The reluctance must find some
blame in the difficulties.
In order to control the access, the courts have been reluctant to extend
disparate impact theory, even in employment discrimination cases where there
is no question that disparate impacts are covered by congressional action.
Attempts have been made, in the interim, to avoid the bright line distinctions
between intent and impact by expanding the definition of intent or expanding
the definition of causation without firmly settling into either camp.282 The
279Seiner, Joseph A. Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting
the Canadian Approach. Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 25 2007, p. 113, who cites cases as EEOC v.
Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975); Hazen Paper v. Biggens, 507 U.S. 604 (1993); and Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003); as evidence of long lasting confusion and difficulty for courts
to separate disparate impact and treatment.
280Notably, the recent Ash v. Tyson Foods Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006) has placed a high bar
on plaintiffs looking to prove discrimination via comparators. Though the Supreme Court
overruled the Eleventh Circuits particularly brusque rational that that relative comparisons
prove discrimination only when “the disparity in qualifications is so apparent as virtually to
jump off the page and slap you in the face.” at 456-57, quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
129 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005), it did so only “grudgingly”. cf. Sullivan Alabama
Law Review 60 [2009] , p. 194
281Idem Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 47 [2006] , p. 927 for comments concerning establishing
prima facie employment discrimination cases, and Mank The Law of Environmental Jus-
tice, p. 38, n. 137, noting simple that statistical evidence likely suffices. See also Foster,
p. 1500, noting Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
Also Oppenheimer, David Benjamin Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California
Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates
for Women and Minorities. U.C. Davis. L. Rev. 37 2004 for evidence of low success rates
in employment discrimination, and our supra discussion of environmental justice cases for
evidence of very limited success despite many attempts.
282See Green, Tristin K. Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
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bridging solutions though overlook the fact that disparate impact is a different
theory for the reason that it does not require anyone to be able to “see”
anything; there does not have to be a bias at all to achieve discriminatory
impacts.283 The bridging solutions merely look for ways to for courts to “see”
more, but not too much.
And this is where an examination of Title VII leaves the environmental jus-
tice student, with a feeling that even allowing disparate impact standards in
the shadow of the high hurdles of intent standards would not necessarily em-
power the oppressed to knock out discrimination. With the research at hand,
it is a short laboratory experiment within the U.S. legal landscape which lends
evidence that adding a disparate impact reading to Title VI—and removing
the new roadblocks of standing—would not lead to more protection, especially
in the direction of widening the anti-discrimination statutes toward environ-
mental ends. It is by no means conclusive proof that the U.S. is not likely
to see environmental justice or derived-EHR protections from their analogous
civil rights. Furthermore, and perhaps obviously, it is doubtful that one could
position Title VII itself to extend in environmental directions directly. A plain-
tiff would have to carefully construct an argument connecting discrimination
in the workplace fomented by environmental problems. The European Court
has, on the other hand, accepted that one’s sphere of home life extends to
one’s ability to create relationships via employment.284
5.4.4 Executive Order 12898
The final piece of legislation discussed herein was, at one point, seen as the
official arrival of environmental justice concerns within the legal regime of the
U.S. Executive Order 12898 seemingly signaled the arrival of environmental
justice as a force in environmentalism. The goal of the non-binding execu-
tive statement was to place conscious into federal agencies. “The presidential
memorandum issued with the [Executive] Order emphasized that existing laws
provided federal agencies with the authority to address many environmental
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory. Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 38 2003, and Sullivan
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 47 [2006]
283Ibid., p. 969.
284Sidbaris & Džlautas v. Lithuania, applications nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00 judgment
of 27 July 2004. To the extent that environmental degradation retards one’s movements
and abilities to commingle with other social groups within society, or otherwise segments
the social space, we have an analogous problem with environmental justice.
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hazards in minority communities and low-income communities.”285 In this ca-
pacity, executive orders allow the President to direct federal officers—of which
agencies are a part—in the completion of their jobs, within the bounds set in
delegating legislative power.
The recognition of the term “environmental justice” in the Executive Order
is therefore quite important. No longer would advocates have to spend time
convincing agencies what the concept was in their attempts to prevent dispro-
portionate impacts. After all, the EPA distributes over 2 billion dollars286 of
federal funds via 44 programs to 1,500 end recipients. These figures include
nearly all environmental permitting agencies.287 The accepting of federal fund-
ing links any and all of these permits through their respective agencies to Title
VI compliance. The EPA, however, had a notably lackluster enforcement pol-
icy. And despite amendments to the original environmental regulatory Acts
in the 1980s and 90s aimed at making compliance more binding, the Title VI
enforcement remained lax.288 The Executive Order then should refocus ener-
gies toward meeting §602 goals with the recognition of environmental injustice
as a problem.
The signing of the Executive Order pushed to EPA to create its own Office
of Civil Rights and issued guidance to permitting agencies regarding Title VI
compliance.289 The recognition though boiled down to a gentle “reminder”
of existing responsibilities. Notably, there are many existing responsibilities
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).290 As the first wave of
the major regulatory changes in the 1970s, NEPA forced federal agencies for
the first time to explicitly consider the environmental impacts of the programs
they initiated. The lofty goals of NEPA are clear from its preamble.
The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which
285Mank The Law of Environmental Justice, p. 112.
286$2,298,188 projected 2008 EPA budget allocation to Environmental Programs and Man-
agement (EPM). available at http://www.epa.gov/budget/
287Idem The Law of Environmental Justice, p. 25 The notable exception being local water
supply and solid waste programs. See Colopy, James H. The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing
Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Stan. Envrtl. L.J.
13 1994, p. 173
288Mank The Law of Environmental Justice.
289See Idem The Law of Environmental Justice, p.26. The EPA has also issued general
guidance on using environmental laws to pursue environmental justice. See A Citizen’s Guide
to Using Federal Environmental Laws to Secure Environmental Justice (2002). available at
www.epa.gov. The EPA has also developed videos to assist communities in finding access
points toward environmental justice. cf. Hill/Wolfson/Targ, p. 373
29042 U.S.C. §§4321-4347 (2005).
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will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and
his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health
and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to
establish a Council on Environmental Quality.291
With its enactment, federal agencies now would have to, before engaging in
any major or significant action, investigate and document what would be the
environmental impact of their decision. The intent of Congress, which is crucial
in subsequent American jurisprudence, is clearly aimed at making the federal
government responsible for providing to its citizenry a safe environment.292
As the name suggest, NEPA was made to create a national environmental
policy, something which was missing from the national conscious before the
environmental push of the 1970s. Because its push was directed at changing
how U.S. agencies view the environment, it is conceptually quite different than
the direct environmental legislation which followed.293 As there is no explicit
mention in the Constitution of a congressional right to regulate the environ-
ment, Congress had to ground the new oversight in well trodden territory;
their power over federal spending.
In appealing—again—to the power of the purse NEPA connects federal agen-
cies to regulation through federal funding. It also creates a Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality (CEQ). The CEQ serves as support for the President and
his direction of executive agencies’ activity. In order to instill an environ-
mental focus in those agencies NEPA first requires agencies to identify and
prepare a detailed statement on the environmental impact of their proposal.
NEPA is the start of the now ubiquitous term “environmental impact study”
(EIS). The environmental impact statement includes what effects cannot be
avoided by an agency’s proposed action and which aspects are irreversible or
include irretrievable commitments of resources.294 Therein comes also the dis-
cussions of alternatives and the weighing of short term gains versus long term
gains. The agency should also include a discussion of taking no action. A full
discussion of all these points make up an official environmental impact study
29142 U.S.C. §4321
292Hill Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice, p. 141.
293Johnston/Funk/Flatt, p. 82.
294Tripp, James T.B./Alley, Nathan G. Streamlining NEPA’s Environemental Review
Process: Suggestions for Agency Reform. N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 12 2005, p. 79.
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under NEPA and serves as a constant reminder for agency’s to think of the
environment.295
NEPA though was never meant however to be a veto button for all environ-
mentally damaging activities. Neither the EIS or its sibling, the environmental
assessment (EA), state definitely what can and cannot be undertaken. They
are instead process requirements, requirements which the Executive Order re-
focused on through the lens of environmental justice.
“The [Executive Order] simply serves as an appropriate and timely
reminder to agencies to become aware of the various demographic
and economic circumstances of local communities as part of any
socioeconomic analysis that might be required by NEPA or their
authorizing statutes.”296
Even with the recalled focus and guidance, public reaction has remained crit-
ical of slow performance and the lack of substantive outcomes. Notably, “ex-
ecutive orders have no binding legal effect outside the executive branch unless
authorized by statute, and no statute specifically empowered President Clin-
ton to issue the Order.297 This means that, should an agency decide they
need to modify policies under their control, such as permitting processes, the
changes must be adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking or oth-
erwise Congress must directly put such legislation or authorization forward.
The line between an Agency interpreting their standing (and Congressionally
approved) rules in light of an executive order, and a modification of those
standing rules because of a new order, is not always clear. In light of all of
this, it is best to view the 1994 Executive Order as providing a stern reminder
to all executive agencies of their responsibilities under Title VI, NEPA, and
other environmental statutes, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. The Executive Order provided guidance on how to achieve those
goals, and commited the executive branch to future oversight of these respon-
sibilities, but stops short of admitting that the legislation already in place
grants any substantive rights to environmental justice advocates.
295See 42 USC §4332(C)
296Hill Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice, p. 96-100.
297The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) under which the EPA and all federal agen-
cies operate requires agencies to use notice-and-comment rule-making to issue new ‘legisla-
tive rules’ or modify existing substantive rules that are judicially binding. Mank The Law
of Environmental Justice, p. 131; Also note One Thousand Friends of Iowa v. Mineta, 250
F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Iowa 2002).
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The reminder though has been interpreted and used by environmental justice
advocates to assert that negative socio-economic points were not appropriately
considered in filing environmental assessments and impact reports during per-
mitting applications.298 The executive order can have such teeth through
persuasion, but not through enforceable entitlements. For instance, after its
enactment, the EPA Region 1’s administration pledged to triple the number
of environmental inspections at sites operating in low income areas, effectively
discouraging polluting in such areas through potential liability.299 The small
victory however adds little in remaining the sea of environmental justice com-
plaints.300
Other positive outcomes though included the creation of the Office of En-
vironmental Justice and then the National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council (NEJAC), a permanent recognition of the impact environmental tilt-
ing has on minorities. NEJAC consisted of around 25 members appointed from
community-based groups, from corporate and industrial interests, business,
and academic institutions. Their role is to oversee EPA’s implementation of
environmental justice ideals embodied in the Executive Order and monitor and
evaluate their projects’ compliance with the Order. Notably missing though
from the Executive Order and its wake of implementation were connections to
personal or corporate action, even through the dispersed but often powerful
purse-strings utilized in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.301 In the intervening
decade too there has been little forward motion and even less direct utilization.
What seemed at the time to be the crowning achievement of the environmen-
tal justice movement in the U.S. has not led to a shift in legal or regulatory
discourse nor to the empowerment of citizens. It would appear that this is
just last in a line of potentially powerful tools that unfortunately did not
prove powerful in practice. The wave of environmental justice advocacy rush-
298Such as in the matter of Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., before the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (US NRC) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board., regarding the siting
of a uranium enrichment facility in Claiborne, Louisiana. See Hill Environmental Justice:
Legal Theory and Practice, p. 91-101. This preliminary injunction on environmental justice
grounds was successful.
299Lambert, Thomas/Boerner, Christopher Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes,
Economic Solutions. Yale Journal on Regulation, 14 1997, p. 213.
300The EPA’s Office of Civil Rights, in 2002, have 121 claims to process and decided only
one on merits. cf. Crossman.
301Martinez-Alier, Joan The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Con-
flicts and Valuation. Edward Elgar, 2002, p. 172 For a discussion on individual U.S. States’
and environmental justice Executive Orders, see Hill Environmental Justice: Legal Theory
and Practice, p. 214-225
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ing through civil rights protections, environmental regulations, and their nexus
to protections against discrimination ran out its storm surge in the convoluted
channels of existing legal landscape. The end of the tour then of the American
protections against environmental justice shows a much less cohesive picture
of protection in environmental directions extending from fundamental rights.
5.5 Summary
This chapter ends on a much lower note than the previous. The land where
environmental justice got its start does not afford the same routes to protec-
tion as the similarly situated but legally very different European situation.
Despite sharing the same underlying concerns the local legal landscapes af-
forded different paths for addressing those concerns. This chapter focused on
a comparison of the fundamental rights pathways available in the U.S. that
might foreseeably lend themselves application as seen in Europe. Such a fun-
damental rights approach was not only indicated by the introduction to the
environmental justice problem given in this work but is indicated by the U.S.
literature itself. Virtually from its inception environmental justice has focused
on the civil rights pathways as avenues for rectification. Unfortunately, the
reception of derived-EHR via U.S. civil rights and associated legal paths was
not as pleasant as that of European human rights.
Civil rights and their role in anti-discrimination policy play a powerful and
central role in rights discourse in the U.S. Equal protection under the law
is enshrined at the constitutional level, preventing laws from varying over
different classes of people. Its logic trickles down into the funding decisions of
agencies of federal government through the Civil Rights Acts. The goal of the
policies was first to root out latent discrimination in the U.S. but was bounded
by their parallel rights to personal liberty. Therefore, the absolute wording of
the constitutional protections ended up being not as absolute as an advocate
might like. And the constitutional flexibility that the U.S. Court has read
into the evolving U.S. terrain ended up hurting not only anti-discrimination
goals but also placed a large road block in the path of expanding rights over
environmental directions. Those roadblocks have crept forward by forcing
the traffic once channeled down those roads to the other less tested and less
cohesive legal roads like housing discrimination protection and then down the
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small roads of individual regulation.
In order to fix ideas more concretely, this summary proceeds to nail down the
general feeling of disappointment with the U.S.’s utilization of rights-pathways
by a direct comparison with the four problems identified—and largely addressed—
in Europe’s discourse.302 How did the U.S. fair in particular in addressing the
fears of democratic disenfranchisement, health affects, siting concerns, and
limited public empowerment?
5.5.1 Democratic Disenfranchisement: Revisited
Compared to the detailed discussions of both Article 10 of the ECHR and the
Aarhus Convention, there is far less mention in the U.S. about guaranteeing
rights to information and process. In fact, there is significant concern world-
wide about how limitations on informations flows—both formal and informal—
can affect democratic participation.303 The European experience though puts
a backstop in in the form of forcing States to provide information where nec-
essary to allow citizens to make their own informed decisions. While, again,
this right does not place structured requirements on the State to collect in-
formation they are under notice that failure to provide adequate and timely
information will impact the European Court’s perspective on whether they
adequate met their margins of appreciation.
It is this backstop whose absence is most apparent in the U.S. literature.
Both Sandoval and Camden have succeeded in placing severe restrictions on an
individual’s ability to check state action against its own regulations. In the ab-
stract, it seems as though the U.S. system tells individuals not to worry about
this and that the regulatory state will take care of it. Should the regulations
fail there are bureaucratic methods for dealing with the shortcoming, such as
administrative complaints and, ostensibly, letters to your representative. But
these are precisely the democratic backstops predicted to groan weakly against
issues of disproportionate environmental burdens.304 The U.S. has sufficiently
truncated personal oversight of environmental problems, relegating the out-
comes to the oversight of the regulatory state and failed to notice that this is
the start for environmental injustice.
302Sections 4.3.2.1–4.3.2.4.
303Kravchecnko, Svitlana The Myth of Public Participation in a World of Poverty. Tulane
Environmental Law Journal , 33 2009
304Chapter 2.
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While one can write another whole research study on the efficacy of these
particular pathways, and whether the closing of the path inflicts in actuality
any harm, the point remains that Europe guarantees access to information and,
to a greater extent, deputizes individuals to police a range of environmental
issues through their existing human rights. Damage is done to relative levels of
protection in the U.S. simply by its single-axis attack on the problem. Not only
are there no concomitant requirements toward information ends, though much
talk has been had of granting public participation rights as environmental
justice solutions,305 but in the U.S. individuals are stripped currently of their
powers to access the court system on grounds that would be acceptable for
comment under Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.
These points all combine to give grave concerns for the minority’s ability to
influence decisions. It puts much weight on their ability to change majority
opinion while it removes their ability to press change more forcefully through
legal channels. This point perhaps explains the the continued discussions of
grassroots power and organization in the U.S. literature.306 Their successes
notwithstanding, the question remains whether burdening the burdened, even
when it can arguably wind up being a success, is justice. While a philosophical
question worth addressing in later works, the mechanics of Chapter 3 predict
such a victory will only be a static success anyway. Without the trickle-down
mechanics of the overarching rights-focused framework, there is far less hope
that a static victory could automatically translate across the many environ-
mental justice situations into future protection against injustices.
A counter-argument that the U.S. could easily implement a positive re-
quirement to provide for information exchange to bolster the positions of the
minority does little to change the relative momentum of the two systems un-
der comparison. In Europe, all paths are open and there is no discussion of
closing down the pathways so recently expanded.307 It is true, however, the
there are major concerns within the European Court of handling caseload;308
cases which fall through the cracks are as equally unjust as U.S. cases which
never make it through the front door. Justice concerns view this as a different
problem however than a lack of justice-fomenting pathways to explore.
305Kravchecnko2009,Fraser2005,Spyke1999,Guana1998,Foreman2000
306Importantly new textbooks like Hill Environmental Justice: Legal Theory and Practice
307Compare, however Alston, Philip Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal For




It is this difference in momentum which seems at this point the evolution of
environmental justice to be the most damaging. Protections there are clearly
defined toward the problems they exist to address. Adding supplementary pro-
tections then in an environmental direction do not necessarily mix well with
what is already on the table. Thus there is limited chance for deriving environ-
mental protections and methods pressing back against environmental injustice
in existing legal pathways. The landscape in Europe allows for addressing en-
vironmental justice problems without incurring the problems with sculpting a
new right or new regulations. Engaging the many axes of rights-based power
allows for flexibility relative to what is achievable in tuned regulations. That,
in turn, enables the momentum to continue developing forward while in the
U.S. it has sputtered to a stop, leaving individuals stuck either holding the
pollution or the proverbial bill in setting in motion a campaign to influence
the majority.
Relative to Europe then the U.S. is left with a decision to jump in an fully
regulate environmental justice, as the Executive Order was perhaps hoped to
do, or move in the difficult direction or re-interpreting or overturning much of
their civil rights jurisprudence. Access to information is fundamental to rights
themselves, as it would be to any successful grassroots campaign. Even where
that information may be accessible, through agency or EPA regulations, access
to the courts and successful remedy, so damaged by the new hurdles imposed on
individuals leaves the U.S. in an unprotected position. To fail to do something
in this direction leaves the democratic problems exposed by environmental
justice unaddressed and inflicting damage on the liberal principles upon which
all other foundational rights are based. Its weakness also puts more pressure
on the remaining problems which a rights-based approach does address.
5.5.2 The Insufficiency of Health Problems: Revisited
Is there enough protection of personal health in the U.S. with which to derive
some environmental justice protection? A derived right is, again, a protection
for the natural environment that comes as a byproduct of protecting humans.
Protecting the environment in its own right would be a step farther but the
former is often utilized in the justice context to locate a legal requirement to
protect.
This chapter focuses attention rather noticeably on the fact that legal re-
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quirements are hard to come by in the American discourse. There is a re-
quirement for polluting activities to adhere to regulatory agencies and the
rules which they promulgate but there is no formal way for individuals to
force compliance other than an administrative complaint. Those complaints
are necessarily ex post in nature thus granting no formal forward protection
even when health concerns could be proposed. Access to information is not
assured nor is procedure or remedy, two related routes which could give ex ante
protections via health to environmental oversight. There is no connection to
protections for the home and familial connections either. Threats to life are
equally going to fall under tort and possibly criminal law before they are seen
under and rights-based microscope.
The most powerful complaints in the U.S. could still be brought under a
discrimination heading instead of a failure-to-protect umbrella, but the for-
mer runs immediately into the problem of proving intent to discriminate. All
in all this means that even appealing to health concerns for environmental
ends, despite their inability to solve the democratic or spatial problems of
environmental inequity, will not always possible in the U.S. This is, in a nut-
shell, the problem with early environmental justice cases such as Bean. The
health/environmental nexus must sit tightly around a defined minority group-
ing and this has failed repeatedly to be sufficient for U.S. courts to act upon.
Here again, and above the continued problem of expanding given protec-
tions, there is the relative problem of momentum. In Europe the experience
points to a strategy for environmental advocates to continue pressing existing
duties under Articles 2, 8, 10, and 13 on the State. As environmental degra-
dation continues to encroach on protected spheres one expects more cases on
these levels to find fertile legal grounds before the Court. The fruits of those
seeds then becomes forward protection as States become aware of the holes in
their protection of fundamental rights. Thus there is a route here for forward
momentum.
Because there are no similar guarantees in the U.S., nor any realistic hope
for extracting protections from existing anti-discrimination paths, the insuf-
ficiency of health problems to trigger justice-type protections becomes even
more glaring. If they cannot trigger protection when the group suffering a
health risk is also a suspect classification then the protection that exists is
limited indeed. Even as the market-minded U.S. leads the economics research
in spatial agglomeration there will grow no concomitant duty to watch for
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the environmental impacts of those clusters, either from the environmental
quality itself or from any projected health impacts. Naturally, regulation will
continue to provide basic protection of toxic pollutions. That protection has
failed though to prevent the rise of the environmental justice movement and
should as such not be trusted to put the brakes on disproportionate environ-
mental burdens.
Again, none of this is to imply by negative examples that EHR or derived-
rights are sufficient to protect all human health situations. There may very
well remain large gaps and environmental problems. There may even be catas-
trophes like that in Öneryildiz lingering in the European lanscape. Leaving
health concerns outside of human rights documents exacerbates these concerns
though it limits problems with overreaching and state reluctance to add more
positive duties. Nevertheless, the absolute lack of backstopping power in the
U.S. to use health concerns through existing legal protections to motivate envi-
ronmental safety looks glaring in comparison with Europe. Hatton and López
Ostra put a duty on the State to validate their margins of appreciation as
health impacts emerge. And even when those health impacts do not breach
the thresholds, leaving individuals with continued exposure, there is no such
backstop requirement in the U.S.
Regulations may continue to address the most grievous or politically-flammable
situations in the U.S. but that does not address the environmental justice is-
sue. The closure of individual pathways to regulatory enforcement complete
the castration of the health pathways toward derived environmental protection,
even though such protections would not be sufficient to prevent environmental
injustice without further modifications. Combined with the lack of standing
and access to information, environmental justice advocacy falls behind leaving
even less pressure than before on forward momentum toward change. The
U.S. literature though is most focused on problems of siting, and hopefully
find more derived protections there, despite roadblocks and legal hurdles.
5.5.3 Siting and Agglomeration: Revisited
While Europe excels relative to U.S. protections in providing the backstop
when one finds themselves in a tilted position, the U.S. fairs relatively better in
providing protections against unfair siting. Identifying the groups within pol-
lution agglomerations and cataloging their racial and socio-economic makeup
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is what made the case for widespread injustice and pointed toward incorpo-
rating increased protections in the first place. This is therefore the area of
most concentrated environmental justice inquiry in the U.S. It was only the
lackluster performance in identifying magnitudes which stopped the momen-
tum of the effort, a problem later augmented by the legal hurdles of personal
standing.
The U.S. may not actively address the agglomeration issues presented at
the end of Chapter 2 but they do have an assortment of protections against
almost any processes which focus attention on a minority. That is, they are
protections against siting and agglomerating environmental problems when
that minority is actively identified as a suspect classification and that discrim-
ination is arguably intentional. This is arguably powerful protection although
in practice it has not translated to the kind of justice nor the widespread
conception of equity desired by environmental justice.309 Moving away from
looking at these issues through the lens of discrimination did much to open
up standing for aggrieved individuals outside of the U.S., but it is precisely
the focused attention to minority issues there which make spatial siting and
agglomeration more likely to find derived protections in the U.S.
But this is, at best, only the backstop which the U.S. was missing in ad-
dressing the previous two problems. And it only operates when racial minority
issues are in play. The fact that this is often the case in the U.S. does not
remove the fact that an entire socio-economic minority is removed from con-
sideration even though they face arguably the same limited power to affect
majority decisions as a racial minority.310 Therefore, the remaining powers to
protect minorities under §601, §1983, and associated checks placed on majority
decisions by the FHA and administrative procedure reminders of the Executive
Order do not protect similarly across all environmental justice situations.
That is another benefit of the derived-EHR approach that reveals itself most
strongly when contrasted with the discrimination-focus in the U.S. The derived
EHR approach works evenly across all citizens, focusing as it does on the in-
dividual and their rights rather than through a lens (or legal pathway) first
created to rectify existing injustices between groups. Repositioning this latter
rectification toward environmental ends may carry more power because of re-
maining moral or political repercussions where the racial problems obtain, but
309Even if it were to be resurrected from behind the Sandoval pale. See Black
310Where they are indeed two separate groups.
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its power is more limited in scope. Therefore, while the U.S. makes up ground
relative to Europe in allowing for possible environmental justice protections
against (racial) minority siting and agglomeration it loses significant credit
because it localizes that protection on a reduced number of people.
Also reducing the positives in U.S. based protection is the lower pressure
applied from successful environmental justice cases to future instances. Be-
cause the power here works through the channel of anti-discrimination—where
standing and intent issues do not come into play—there is less chance of a suc-
cessful case’s precedent spreading waves of change through a legal system. The
same logic applies to forced changes in regulation. The State’s duty here is not
to prevent damage to life and livelihood but to prevent discrimination. The
protection to life and livelihood in the U.S. derives from the fact that the State
may be preventing damage better for the majority than for the racial minor-
ity. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protection under the law
though there is not, however, a weighing of whether the State has successfully
equalized in a positive sense the provision of resources.311 If the law in and
of itself is applied equally and remaining segregative effects appear afterward
then protection is not assured. It is not individualized protection in the same
sense as in Europe.
Therefore, the democratic underpinnings of injustice are left untouched for
a group of people even when and where anti-discrimination protections do find
application in environmental issues. Although they might be a group less in
need of augmented protection they still are a numerical minority faced with
power imbalances to push against the tilting of environmental problems caused
by majority desires. In Europe, the worse the insults, the greater the obligation
on the State to assure compliance with underlying rights. In the U.S. the
dynamic is different. There is to be compliance across suspect classification
and the majority but questions regarding the content and outcome of the
situation are outside the question of protection. That leaves questions of
adequate protection to be tackled in regulatory and administrative fashion,
placing the public in the difficult position of raising their own voice.
311Except in cases of municipal service provision, an area of U.S. anti-discrimination law
not touched on here. But see Hoidal; Rogers, Richard J. New York City’s Fair Share Criteria
and the Courts: An Attempt to Equitably Redistribute the Benefits and Burdens Associated
with Municipal Facilities. N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 12 1995.
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5.5.4 The Lack of Public Empowerment: Revisited
Unfortunately, the U.S. sensitivity to a history of discrimination does not
translate more power for public participation. Paradoxically, now that the
§602 pathways are left unchecked by the public at large, the lack of attention
to requirements of public participation leaves people even more exposed to the
problems to which §601 and §602 were meant to bring attention. Again there
is a hole in the blanket of protection relative to Europe’s derived rights. Here
it is is most glaring as it appears it is not only a hole in derived-protections
but is arguably a hole in its intended protection.
What exists then to patch the hole? If there is no private right of standing
to address grievances after the fact is there a way to check agency power prior
to enactment? Though anti-discrimination pathways have proved less than
adequate from which to derive environmental protection perhaps the U.S. can
find related protections by directly allowing for individual participation. There
is, however, no formal locus of empowerment for the public in environmental
matters. Recall from the analogous discussion in Chapter 4 that there is full
overlap between environmental justice problems and environmental human
rights problems and the degree to which public empowerment serves as an im-
provement for one it is unambiguously beneficial for the other. In Europe, the
state is given wide margins for setting up their regulatory apparatus. That
apparatus must however recognize rights to receive and impart information
and provide for effectual remedy within the context of other substantive rights
and auxiliary commitments like those of the Aarhus Convention. There is an
interconnected backstop there. Although there is a relatively wide margin for
State’s choice in regulating the environment and to what degree public par-
ticipation is allowed or required therein, there is an overarching goal which
must be maintained. Part of that maintenance is keeping a population able
to check the choices. It may not necessarily be able to prevent changes in
environs due to domestic exhaustion clauses but it will provide a check later
and furthermore for future cases. In the U.S. however there is no such unifying
principle. Individual regulations and procedures innate to administrative law
do exist but to the extent that European results adequately provide environ-
mental human rights one can expect relative protection in the U.S. to be more
limited.
On the point of innate procedures there is much written on congressional
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delegation of power to agencies, what power that actually moves from the
democratically-bounded Congress to the unelected agencies, and what pro-
cesses the agencies must take when exercising that power. Of particular note
here is notice-and-comment rule making. Often an agency must look for com-
ments on a proposed rule or regulation before that proposal can be incorpo-
rated as law. The intricacies of when and where this must occur and further
how much action an individual can take to force the issue are far beyond the
scope of the research.312 Suffice it to say that when agencies are involved pub-
lic participation may well be a part of the legal landscape. How much and how
powerful though is a factor of many things. All of those issues need not line up
behind the overarching goal of protecting fundamental rights, either. Never-
theless, the focus in the U.S. on administrative and regulatory law surrounding
environmental protection does have some built-in public participation and it
was necessary to mention here.313
There is therefore a limited amount of stopping power given to the people
in any specific instance of environmental siting, usage, or pollution. Getting
one’s voice heard though is a struggle democratic processes necessarily must
avoid. The fact that the ECHR framework makes it an a priori requirement
to take into account a broad spectrum of impacted spheres of citizens puts
this issue already in the foreground. While it might not solicit input it cannot
expressly disregard the issues that might exist there and still expect to pass
muster. The US approach is fundamentally different. The actions available
to the people come through existing protocols which were put in place for
312For a textbook approach, see Schwartz/Corrada/Brown Jr
313Similar public participation regulations exist in, for example, Superfund cleanup pro-
cesses. Cleanup is organized under national contingency plans and proceed through steps of
site assessment, decisions on removal actions, whether or not to place the contaminated site
on the national priorities list (NPL), remedial investigation and feasibility studies, and the
public issuance of a plan, invites for public comment and participation, and to issue a deci-
sion. The public has a chance to speak their mind and comment as to whether the actions
are suited to the circumstances.The public can also speak their mind directly through their
private right to bring trial against polluters via CERCLA. Details are not discussed fully
herein as they are ad hoc in nature and do not usually have binding effect. Huitema, Dave
Hazardous Decisions: Hazardous Waste Siting in the UK, The Netherlands, and Canada.
Institutions and Discussions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 But compare
actions by Mr. Cole as one of the only success stories in environmental justice litigation. In
El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpia v. Co. of Kings (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1991), he successfully
convinced the state court that an environmental impact study had not satisfied its public
participation requirement for permit siting because they neglected to translate the proceed-
ings into Spanish, the dominant language of the affected community. Lavelle, M./Coyle, M.
Unequal Protection: The racial divide in environmental law. The National Law Journal , 21
1992, p. S8
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reasons other than allowing for personal environmental protection. The U.S.
Courts have expressly been reserved about opening up new pathways with old
laws. Both take a short view of administrative-foot dragging, though the U.S.
remains notable resistant of enabling positive claims on the State where there
are not explicit claims authorized by Congress. This, like the ECHR, does not
guarantee a specific remedy, however, only that claims when and where they
do exist are properly respected via due processes. It is therefore the desire
to limit judicial readings of obligations into the constitution or congressional
legislation that makes the analogous U.S. processes inherently more bounded
than those afforded via the ECHR.
Again, this is the difference between guaranteeing participation and grant-
ing actual political veto power. Granting full veto power has the downside
of potentially allowing too much protection and stopping environmental us-
age when it is actually net positive. Organizing power can grow too powerful
though with the propensities illustrated herein it is within reason to think the
scales of power are still significantly underweighting the desires of the masses.
Discourse and dialogue should be the rule rather than political lobbying for
ultimate veto power. Democratic participation after all does not dictate the
best outcome but rather a more fair fight for opposing outcomes. Crafting
rights and responsibilities therein are a necessary next-step in the environ-
mental justice conversation. In the U.S. though that conversation will have to
take nearly all of the pressure of the environmental justice conversation while
the European experience has less equity pressure to offload on this single check
on government power.
5.5.5 Summary and Thoughts on The Limited Results
This chapter aimed to illustrate exactly how ostensibly powerful canon of civil
rights protections already touched on by decades of environmental justice advo-
cates is either legally truncated or displays a rather spotty record in protection
in the U.S. The record further illustrates how convoluted the pathways will
be for any future attempts to link fundamental protections to environmental
protection. §601 of Title VI remains open to private litigants but only those
with the smoking gun of intent will be able to strike back against a discrim-
inatory outcome. §602 is now closed to private parties, leaving the disparate
impacts standards promulgated by agencies above and beyond their §601 anti-
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discrimination mandate out of reach. §1983 also remains underpowered as a
toehold toward remedy. Public participation is not yet guaranteed but Europe
has notably taken several steps, like the Aarhus Convention, toward leveling
the information playing field relative to the U.S. Neither side though has a
model on which to base formal public participation procedures. In sum, how-
ever, the ability to derive protections from several axis of fundamental rights
puts Europe ahead in the case for providing protection against environmental
injustice, carving farther with the more flexible albeit weaker rights than the
U.S. moves with the anti-discrimination blade.
The roads well traveled in the home of environmental justice literature are
thus rather in need of repair, where they remain passable at all. Backroads
such as administrative complaints, fair housing complaints, and petitioning for
public participation remain available but auxiliary. Administrative complaints
do carry some force when coupled with Executive Order 12898’s reminder to
federal agencies to comply with their environmental promises and mandates
but only before comparing their power to the umbrella protection provided
by access to remedies, courts, and information in the ECHR. It is indeed less
clear how much enforcement one can pull out of the U.S. analogue pathway.
Tackling problems via connections between the housing market and discrim-
ination is another detour but bounded in scope to minorities involved with
active housing transactions; there is little forward pressure here to protect
against environmental justice. That, in the end, is the most critical aspect of
the illustrations here. While one might plausibly argue that the multitudes
of pathways available in the U.S., though convoluted and tricky, can lead to
the same positive outcomes of environmental protection for minorities as the
more unified picture of fundamental protections in Europe. The minutia of
such an argument would be key to winning that debate and would likely take
a team of very skilled and experienced legal authorities to craft. This chap-
ter should therefore not be viewed as a critique that the U.S. leaves citizens
completely exposed to environmental justice problems. There are solutions
and they can be pieced together to form protections. That they have not re-
sulted in positive-sounding judgements thus far can be construed as a lack of
adequate attempts and cases rather than a failure, generally speaking, of the
law.
But even granting that such a possibility exists leaves the highest criticism
unanswered; there is little to no forward pressure to change the picture. Chap-
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ter 3 went to lengths to show how little evidence there is against the proposition
that a freely-adjusting marketplace will aggregate environmental problems and
a numerical minority—when not a racial or socio-economic minority—will be
on average the recipients of such problems. The pathways available in the
U.S., weak as they are, do nothing to address the future tilting of environmen-
tal problems even when they can be cobbled together in a particular situation
to form some semblance of derived environmental protection.
Individual success stories are possible. The grosser the negligence or disre-
gard for a suspect classification’s situation, the more likely that becomes with
the legal tools discussed above. But it will continue to be an ad hoc prob-
lem/solution dynamic. Because the connection to fundamental rights in the
U.S. is not direct, and the derived protections, when they exist, necessarily flow
through a lens of discrimination, there will not be the trickle-down effect that
will change laws, regulations, and procedures at the levels where it matters.
The decision makers will never be forced to consider the effects their actions
have on the fundamental rights of those being impacted by their decisions and
will only be called to check their actions when the outcomes are sufficiently out
of line with certain narrowly proscribed rights. Paying lip service to environ-
mental justice in regulations and the acknowledging the problems which result
from environmental tilting without simultaneously recognizing the continued
insults to basic freedoms will never move the U.S.’s legal regime forward in the
direction Europe’s approach moves. These situations will continue to emerge,
will continue to find limited success in the courts and in the established pro-
cedural pathways available to them, and will continue to generate negative
assessments of the rule of law in this area.
The following chapter concludes on this point by highlighting some of the
downsides to the European approach itself. Deriving environmental protec-
tions with which to address environmental justice is, after all, not a panacea.
It carries its own concomitant risks as well as covering some of the problems
falling under the heading of environmental justice as approached in Chapter
2. Compared though to the approach in the U.S. though it shows far more im-
mediate promise and completeness. At the very least, should the U.S. decide
not to address environmental justice in an expanded rights manner but rather
focus on optimal regulation and oversight so that the absolute levels of environ-
mental insults result in a level of protection commensurate with fundamental
dignity they should discuss this choice openly in light of the comparison con-
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ducted here. That is, they will have to justify how and why those regulations
are not simply the static fixes but work toward preventing the environmen-
tal justice problem in a fashion that provides the flexible safety net that the
European approach has both pioneered and set in motion.
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6 Environmental Justice through
Derived Rights: Protection,
Holes, and the Future
By means of a global approach to
these phenomena...it has become




This thesis tested the hypothesis that a class of environmental problems, for
some time now fomenting themselves in a broad literature as “environmental
injustices,” can be more completely addressed by operationalizing existing
rights toward environmental ends. Operationalizing existing rights toward
new ends has itself an existing literature known as derived rights or derived
protections. While a testable question in and of itself, the research first took
one step backward and derived the need for a fundamental rights solution
from the problems concentrated environmental burdens have on underlying
democratic principles. That is, before examining the utility of fundamental
rights protections over the environment it was necessary to check the validity
of using rights in this way. There is indeed a concern regarding the realization
of the choices for the use of the environment by of a minority of the population.
The proclivity of environmental burdens to cluster is supported by both
economic theory and the evidence accumulated by the environmental justice
movement itself. That damage established and connected to the need for
certain spheres of protection around a democratic minority, the thesis finds its
primary support in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
While they have not ventured into the creation of new environmental human
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rights, the European Court has found and defined areas of derived-rights by
recognizing the role which environmental quality impacts the established canon
of rights. These derived rights provide significant protections for environmental
injustice. Thus, the European Court has found a ready solution that addresses
both instances and underlying causes of environmental injustice.
The hypothesis is further supported by the opposing reality in the United
States. Though the field of environmental justice emerged inside their le-
gal and cultural milieu which could arguably also allow for such derivations
of rights, advocates there attempted instead to derive protection narrowly
around anti-discrimination goals. The legal evolution was natural and un-
derstandable, given the power and history of the anti-racism struggle in the
U.S. It proved however a less successful approach relative to the multi-axial
dynamic overseen by the ECtHR. This lackluster response via civil rights sits
on top equally disheartening regulatory outcomes and formal recognition of
environmental justice problems. The comparison reveals that derived environ-
mental rights are a more successful and more complete method—in terms of
aiding the democratic foundations of society— of addressing the problems of
environmental justice, but also illuminates how the underlying rights on which
the derivation occurs critically impacts the protection outcomes.
In a break from the main line of environmental justice literature, this the-
sis located the international environmental justice literature within the wider
social justice discussion to encompass different legal cultures and unmoor en-
vironmental justice from historical tethers, especially the tightly pulled line
of discrimination in the U.S. Seen from this comparative perspective the en-
vironmental justice dilemma ceases to be primarily about defining metrics
for measuring toxic exposure, statistical techniques for defining spatial areas,
or legacies of discrimination.1 It rather reaches the level of a human right
as the struggles to deal with the problem form a democratic issue for a mi-
nority of society (Chapter 2). The propensity toward such minority impact
emerges from the evidence the field of environmental justice itself has collected.
Though viewing the issues as a problem for a numerical minority is different
than the racially-defined minorities of early literature it nevertheless retains
the picture of a globalized, industrialized economy, tuned toward distributing
1Though those metrics are critically important. See, for proper discussions and starting
places moving forward, Liu, Feng Environmental Justice Analysis: Theories, Methods, and
Practice. Lewis Publishers, 2001
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dis-amenities in a concentrated manner (Chapter 3), placing environmental
burdens among the few while spreading benefits farther and wider. To the
extent that the burdened are also burdened by other social ills, such as the
latent racism which so motivated the U.S. discussion, their lack of protection
in environmental matters becomes quite detrimental to the exercise of their
liberal rights.
This reality is implicitly recognized by the jurisprudence of the European
Court on Human Rights. It also sits tightly with the social justice discussion
in engaging the dialogue of the environment as a member of protected classes
of goods necessary to enable capabilities.2 Thankfully there was this existing
commentary on the use of human rights to secure such environmental quality,
so-called environmental human rights (Chapter 4.) which aides the exposition
of what the ECtHR has accomplished. Above the theoretical discussion on the
need for or the implicit existence of substantive or procedural environmental
rights lies the practical application of existing human rights toward environ-
mental ends, called derived or extracted environmental rights (derived-EHR).
In this discussion the ECtHR figures prominently, interpreting their “living”
document, the European Convention on Human Rights, to cover an environ-
mental nexus when attributes of that environment diminish the protection of
existing human rights. In this way the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has both led
and grounded the conversation on environmental protections as fundamental
and inextricable from extant rights.
A study of the jurisprudence in Europe necessarily hits the U.S. student of
environmental justice hard though. Armed with auxiliary protections spread
over life, home, remedy, access to information and legal process the ECHR
has stepped in to defend many situations which fall under the heading of envi-
ronmental justice. Armed with fewer but arguably stronger weapons, focusing
on the sharp edge of anti-discrimination law, the U.S. has failed in a similar
attempt to expand existing protections to environmental attributes impacting
the enjoyment of civil rights. Though no systematic barriers to positive rights
exist the stricter “textual” interpretation of the U.S. Constitution join with
the operation of anti-discrimination policy to make a rather tight fabric of pro-
2a la Nussbaum’s expansions of Sen, among others. Nussbaum, Martha Frontiers of
Justice: disability, nationality, species membership. Belknap Press, 2006; also recently ex-
panded by Holland: Holland, Breena Justice and the Environment in Nussbaum’s “capabil-




tection with less inherent stretch than the ECHR. Because of the difference
Europe has come closer to addressing the underlying worries of environmental
justice and moreover revealed ways in which the underlying rights colour the
emergent protections.
The thesis thus supported, the relative conclusion emerges that the U.S.
needs to allow for the expansion of existing rights in a fashion similar to the
ECtHR should it hope to fully address environmental justice. Moreover, their
system has not kept pace with protecting the rights of minorities—numerical
or otherwise—as evidence mounts about the clustering of the environmental
problems from which modern society at large benefits. It is not a question
of the makeup of that minority but rather the simple observation that it ag-
glomerates, distributing benefits and burdens in different fashions. Clustered
burdens, falling on a minority of the population, leaves the majority voting
in favour of the dispersed benefits while the minority must organize to fight
against the concentrated burdens, precisely the type of situation which merits
fundamental protections.
This conclusion is walked backwards slightly with the adjective “relative”
because it does not reach whether a protective outcome could not be secured
in other fashions. There remains much minutia on regulation and policy to
discuss before that stronger conclusion is supported as well as a discussion on
how the different levels of law invoked here contribute to the end protection.
The existing dialogue in the U.S. does not give much hope to a belief that
regulation or policy is on a direct path toward protection, however. There is
also little reason to believe that an expansion of civil rights protections in the
U.S. will be forthcoming, although there do remain auxiliary protections that
could be widened to protect against environmental problems. Such protec-
tions, such as against housing segregation and workplace discrimination, op-
erate also through the lens of discrimination and are therefore remain equally
unlikely to come to have the same scope as the individual-based protections
of the ECHR.3
All of this takes place on top of an existing and well-established environ-
mental regulatory canvas, a fact which further emphasizes the weakness of
3The inability of environmental justice to address non-discriminatory harm has indeed
been a criticism inside its own literature. Lewis, Browne C. Changing the Bathwater and
Keeping the Baby: Exploring New Ways of Evaluating Intent in Environmental Discrimina-
tion Cases. St. Louis U. L.J. 50 2006; Coleman, Leslie Ann It’s the Thought that Counts:
The Intent Requirement in Environmental Racism Claims. St. Mary’s L.J. 25 1994.
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existing lower-level approaches. The discussion here also speaks up for the
idea that only an explicit environmental right will end up fully protecting the
environment in the way deemed necessary by the environmental rights litera-
ture. Perhaps this way of looking at the problem opens up new methods for
comparing the two methods, especially a new way to measure success.
It is after all the broad protective umbrella which makes the human rights
approach so successful at encompassing the entirety of the environmental jus-
tice problem. A legislative solution does not fully come to terms with the
underlying social and economic issues which continually cause problematic en-
vironmental distributions. If one accepts the economic and political premises
which conspire to cause environmental injustice then a fundamental rights
approach to addressing the issue becomes the only complete solution. Thus,
by discussing at length the shortcomings of the established routes towards
greater environmental justice expounded by traditional advocates and by cou-
pling those shortcomings with discussions of the hard science that will be
needed to shore up their weak points, the research exposes that a rights-based
approach is both a more powerful and a more coherent tact for environmental
justice realization.
6.1 Limits and Problems
The mission of the work was to first identify and then to defend to the reader
the application of fundamental rights—human, constitutional and civil—in
an environmental direction as a practical, established, and cohesive approach
to protecting against environmental injustice. While the ECHR literature
establishes both its practical side and introduces its cohesive nature, later
revealed in relief against the U.S.’s ad hoc approaches, something remains to
be said here at the end about concerns with continued expansion of the rights
dialogue.
The picture in Europe is only emerging from a relatively recent and rapid
expansion which cautions of problems in the future. Problems may be as
simple as a reluctance of the court to continue tying their jurisprudence on
environmental issues together and thereby running the risk of generating over-
laps or unclarity. There is always the spectre of a wholesale inability to address
the growing number of court cases. If justice is delayed or denied because of
congestion, caused in whole or in part by the recent willingness to hear cases
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touching on new areas of protection, then individual success in improving eq-
uity will be balanced by individual failures. This is no success at all. An
argument against adding rights to the ECHR need only point to the problems
in case-load already plaguing Strasbourg.4 The willingness however of the
European Court to such ideas like Pilot Cases gives at least a sense that the
Court is not trying to close its doors and indeed actively working on ways to
keep up with expanding numbers of claims.5 Those experiments however are
in very early stages.
Will a greater number of cases even when handled judiciously generate prob-
lems of over-reaching, overlap, or unclarity? This was a greater concern for the
question of adding an explicit, substantive right.6 If an environmental right
over-reaches and falls short of its promises, it weakens the whole Convention;
if the environmental overlaps with other existing rights and creates unclarity
then it changes the protection landscape.7 New rights necessitate a discussion
as to overlap and, in the case of positive-minded EHRs, how to achieve broad
positive obligations.8 There is a fear that explicit broad rights may weaken
the entire character of what it means to be a human right.9
In the context of the ECHR though this is not a new critique. Research has
noted the same danger with the expansive but amorphous wording of Article
8’s respect for private and family life.
“The transformation of Article 8 into a general charter of indi-
vidual autonomy is clearly fraught with difficulties. Any restraint
on individual choice may be assailed as raising a possible viola-
tion of this right. Such an omnibus right is in marked contrast
4For a discussion, see Janis, Mark W./Kay, Richard S./Bradley, Anthony W. European
Human Rights Law. 3rd edition. Oxford University Press, 2008, Chap. 15
5Ibid., p. 883-84.
6See discussion and notes in Section 4.1.
7In the limit, a case cannot be brought to Strasbourg using a Convention right with
the goal or result of extinguishing a separate right. Witzsch v. Germany, application no.
7485/03, admissibility decision of 13 Dec. 2005 (inadmissible)
8Alston, Philip Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal For Quality Control.
American Journal of International Law , 78 1984.
9This is a general criticism of second generation rights, such as environmental rights
and labor rights. The inevitable “holes” left by positive rights devalues to some extent
the absolute moral position held by the original first generation rights. The general but
fundamental problem in human rights theory is called the Inferior-Urgency objection. See
Risse, Mattias A Right to Work? A Right to Leisure? Labor Rights as Human Rights. Law
& Ethics of Human Rights, 3 2009, Nr. 1. AlsoMcCarthy2004; There are also criticisms that
moving toward rights is a devolution of the purpose of the environmental justice movement.
See Sze, J/London, J K Environmental Justice at the Crossroads. Sociology Compass, 2
2008
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to the apparently modest ambitions for this provision implied by
the drafting process. The Convention, itself, may be seen as an
enumeration of particular ways in which free choice and action are
protected, and the supplementing of that specification with such
a broad presumption of liberty threatens to make the other rights
redundant.”10
Overreach is thus a recognized problem when discussing either the addition
of a new right or with the expansion of a single right. Perhaps though this
will be less of a front-and-center concern with the enactment of the changes
with Protocol 14. Streamlining and focusing the caseload of the European
Court leaves less room for a multitude of cases to push and pull in different
directions. Coordination will likely increase as fewer cases reach to the level
of needing Chamber interpretation. Whether or not this will truncate access
to the courts though and thereby restrict the otherwise positive treatment of
individual access remains to be seen.
Because the court is deriving environmental protections between existing
rights, many of the more focused concerns of overreaching are mitigated. It
is arguably more pressing to address expansion of explicit rights than the
expansion of implicit rights. From the jurisprudence discussed here though
it is at least arguable that derived-EHRs are more of a way to smooth and
connect existing rights, as well as provide full enjoyment of them, and not a
manner of stretching the fabric of the rights, contributing to holes and folds.
The court is completing the protection. What is being accomplished then is a
derivation between, not a derivation on the edges. This might be an arguable
point, however.
Surrounding this micro argument is the more macro thought that new rights
territory can be celebrated by some while simultaneously contributing to the
detriment of others. It begs notice that changing the fundamental rights land-
scape in any sense concretely restricts democratic options. Substantial sets of
restrictions, which are as much a part of constitutional rights or human rights
as their aspects of enablement, are not unambiguously democratic.11 Human
rights are meant in part to foreclose upon choices by the majority deemed rep-
10Janis, Mark W./Kay, Richard S./Bradley, Anthony W. European Human Rights Law.
3rd edition. Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 375
11Waldron, Jeremy A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights. Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies, 13 1993.
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rehensible and oppressive to the minority but the elevation of a principle to a
“right” cannot be amended or changed by majority rule.12 It seems that the
moral question of foreclosing on a pathway to explicitly oppress a minority is
quite settled and uncontroversial; foreclosing on pathways to utilize sovereign
environs however is not as clear. It is implicit and imperative within the con-
versation on derived-EHRs then to have a narrative illustrating that their use
in complementing and completing the existing canon enables democracy. After
all, this was the the starting point with which this research began.
To enable the discussion but limit the democratic impact, commentators, of
whom Boyle is a notable example,13 point out that procedural rights to partic-
ipation in environmental decision—procedural EHRs—are the values worthy
of protection. Procedural rights are indeed already encapsulated at the high-
est levels of human rights organs and were touched upon herein.14 Their
flexibility seem to create less concern about overlap or unclarity than more
pointed discussions in the EHR literature on adding substantive rights. Recall
that the substantive rights embody many questions on qualifying thresholds
and what it means to be a “good” or “livable” environment. While these
are discussions that must occur if the courts continue to move forward with
enunciating derived protections, it is sufficient here to say now that the ECHR
jurisprudence reflecting the derived-EHRs runs parallel to the discussions on
procedural right to environmental protections thus avoiding the more pointed
critiques of substantive EHRs.
There is however a downside to flexibility. The less-guided expansion of
multiple areas of rights and obligations under national and international law
might well turn into a thicket of overlapping requirements. Such is a natural
consequence of a lack of a unified approach to protecting the environment.
There a substantive right would serves as an explicit goal toward which all
subsequent moves, international and national, must navigate. With the courts
12Arneson, Richard J.; Dowding, Keith/Goodin, Robert E/Pateman, Carole, editors
Chap. Democracy is not intrinsically just In Justice & Democracy. Cambridge, 2004, p. 45
Amending is possible but unlikely without great difficulty.
13Boyle, Alan; Idem/Anderson, Michael, editors Chap. The Role of International Hu-
man Rights Law in the Protection of the Environment In Human Rights Approaches to
Environmental Protection. Clarendon, 1996; Boyle, Alan Human Rights or Environmental
Rights—A Reassessment. Fordham Envtl. L. Rev , 18 2007.
14Section 4.2.4; discussing Article 10 of the ECHR and the principles enunciated inGuerra
v. Italy, application no. 116/1996/735/932, judgement of the Grand Chamber, 19 February
1998; as well as Article 6 and Article 13. Also the Aarhus Convention on Access to Infor-
mation, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters. UN Doc. ECE/CEP/43, 38 I.L.M. 717.
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left plugging holes between existing rights and their environmental compo-
nents there is a risk that the correct coverage may be there but it may emerge
as far less efficient or even effective as a unified protection. That is, “[s]o long
as environmental rights cases are brought individually, the ability to develop a
systematic jurisprudence will be limited.”15 Given larger environmental con-
cerns, including climate change and sustainability, this is indeed a significant
concern to which a full-scale substantive right to environmental quality would
be a more complete solution. And it is this rationale which motivates the green
movement’s hope to bring all entities—in the US, in Europe, and worldwide—
under a codified environmental umbrella, so that they speak with one green
voice. Speaking from this worldly perspective and an eye toward unification
but also concern as to the potential for a continued U.S. dominance in the
movement and literature, Joan Alier-Martinez notes
[t]he environmental justice movement is potentially of great impor-
tance, provided it learns to speak not only for the minorities inside
the USA but also for the majorities outside the USA (which locally
are not always defined racially) and provided it gets involved in is-
sues such as biopiracy and biosafety, or climate change, beyond
local instances of pollution.16
And while the rest of the world could learn from the U.S.’s focus on urban
environmental problems17 the global sustainability perspective generates an
overarching concern in which environmental justice plays a smaller part. Af-
ter all, if the world succeeds in lowering the absolute level of pollution globally
there will necessarily be fewer situations where environmental burdens breach
a threshold of concern for the liberal values which generated the worry in the
first place, even taking into account the ability for such burdens to accumulate
within the lower absolute pollution levels. Nevertheless, with deriving protec-
tion between rights there exist already the boundaries of the existing rights to
provide some guide for expansion. The full weight of the critique applies more
to the difference between substantive and procedural environmental rights.
Regardless, commentators have noted how human rights courts themselves
15Osofsky, Hari M. Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International
Environmental Rights. Stan. Envtl. L. J. 24 2005, p. 131.
16Martinez-Alier, Joan The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Con-




work consciously already to coordinate their approaches to evaluating human
rights cases,18 and thus generate another sort of unification pressure. Thus,
the more limited discussion of derived rights avoids larger existing criticisms.
The flexibility of derived environmental protection though remains practi-
cally important to the immediate future. As a practical concern, one can easily
imagine a stringent environmental treaty being too binding for ratification by
enough parties, yet the existence of a right would remain empowered to some
degree within derived rights.19 Generating a green shift is not something that
will come lightly in the globalized economy. The soft approach of the derived
rights, despite being much less organized or powerful than substantive or pro-
cedural EHRs, remains relevant in light of short-term needs versus long-term
goals even as other green advocates move toward deeper results.
And even if the derived rights might be subsumed into a larger environ-
mental policy the rights approach retains further current relevance as both
international law and the discourses of sustainability and climate change move
into the international regulatory realm. The human rights focus here kept
the discussion between two actors—State and individual—but the flexibility
in human rights also engages non-state actors and their decisions.20 It is these
entities who are proving most difficult to regulate globally and a strong criti-
cism of an EHR is that multinational corporations (MNC) and transnational
corporations (TNC) as non-state actors could affect the environment while op-
erating outside of human rights treaties.21 Human rights law at this juncture
must be careful then not to imply that a human right is a law that automat-
ically governs all players and participants in the global economy but it does
retain its influence on third parties in practice. This has not proved to be
all too effective but may be expanding as they are recognized as the same
18Higgins, Rosalyn A. Babel of Judicial Voices. Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 55 2006.
19A similar view was expressed in Flores v Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140
(2d Cir. 2002) at 161.
20Section 4.1.4.
21“. . . corporations are no duty-bearers under international human rights law. . . ”
Wouters, Jan/Chanet, Leen Corporate human rights responsibility: a european perspective.
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights, 6 2008, p. 16. Also “[I]t
does not seem that the international human rights instruments. . . currently impose direct
legal responsibilities on corporations.” Report to the Human Rights Council of the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises, “Business and Human Rights: Mapping In-
ternational Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts,” UN Doc
A/HRC/4/035 (2007), p. 14. para 44
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problems as individual governments’ failures to effectuate existing rights.22
A flexible but recognizable degree of environmental protection through hu-
man rights can level the playing field in the short run for countries to interact
with other countries’ environmental decisions. That in itself can enable a
shifting toward unified green norms. At the very least it is neutral to the di-
rection of motion of larger green movements. This operates by influencing the
creation of initiatives at national levels. Importantly, the existence of human
right instruments has already influenced the creation of soft law and national
initiatives toward bringing business conduct in line with internationally ac-
ceptable standards in areas other than environmental concerns.23 The derived
protections can now tune this toward environmental ends. For instance, if
protection means simply a deterrence of the harmful activity then a finding of
ineffective deterrence can heavily influence domestic law to plug holes in their
legal system.24
This all simply says that the problems identified in the general literature
on expanding rights does not apply with complete force to the continued use
of derived environmental rights. This smaller discussion is already mitigated
by countervailing factors such as the fact that the derivation exists between
and, in some sense, underneath, existing rights. The purpose here is always to
fully enable existing rights. Moreover, the approach remains relevant among
other environmental goals currently in motion thus retaining value to con-
tinued discussion here. Granted, derived rights also do not give the kind of
protection that those pushing for substantive rights would desire, and may
fail to guarantee some of the access that an explicit procedural environmental
right would lend. With the framework here, however, there are ways for future
research to define more completely the necessary protections and to reduce, if
not eliminate, their own deficiencies in protection.
22Verschuuren, Jonathan/Kuchta, Steve; Letschert, Rianne/van Dijk, Jan, editors Chap.
Victims of Environmental Pollution in the Slipstream of Globalization In The New Faces of
Victimhood: Globalization, Global Justice and Victim Empowerment. Springer, 2010.
23See Report to the Human Rights Council of the Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises, “Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts,” UN Doc A/HRC/4/035 (2007).
24As in X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, para. 27; discussing
specifically a hole in Dutch law which necessitated additional criminal law provisions as the
surrounding area is covered and deterred by criminal law.
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6.2 Directions for Future Research
First and foremost among directions for future work is the full incorporation
of aggregative dynamics and geographical economics into the environmental
justice canon. Despite the many critiques of early empirical techniques25 these
constructive criticisms have yet to make their way into the mainstream con-
sciousness. This is first on the environmental justice-wishlist as it is entirely
necessary for whatever path the discussion moves, be it continued human rights
expansion, a focus on regulation, a re-empowerment of anti-discrimination leg-
islation, or a fusion with the greater sustainability literature. Environmental
justice cannot have a conversation on the spatial patterns of environmental
burdens without a formal language of spatial dynamics.
This work stayed only on the very top of that dialogue, moving quickly
to identify fundamental rights protections that would address the underlying
democratic critique as well as the environmental problems. Even at that level
though it is apparent how much impact there is to be had. With only the basic
and least contentious conclusions of that literature this work was able to move
solidly towards the fundamental rights discussion and away from regulation
and policy. As touched on briefly in Chapter 4, understanding the ebb and
flow of both business and burdens will have impacts on what it means for a
State to adequately meet their positive burdens of protection. Currently it is
rather easy to claim ignorance. Empowered by correct empirical techniques
though will allow advocates to make more inroads with the established paths.
Moreover, it is beneficial for the legal discussion as it grants sharper edges to
the picture of when and where rights have been met and where questions will
emerge. Naturally too, should one take issue with the conclusions of this work
and desire to more into formal policy regulation the empirical work takes on
a central roll both in making one’s point of departure and drafting corrective
policy.
Parallel to this should run a path for epidemiology and exposure research.
Knowing when and where thresholds of danger are going to be important in
utilizing the information economics and statistics delivers. Currently there
is a dearth of information connecting exposure and risk, with approximations
25Most notably Bowen, William An Analytical Review of Environmental Justice Re-
search: What Do We Really Know? Environmental Management , 29 January 2002, Nr. 1,
Liu, Davy, Benjamin Essential Justice: When Legal Institutions Cannot Resolve Environ-
mental and Land Use Disputes. Springer, 1997
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forming the fulcrum of decisions. Approximations can lead to mistrust on both
sides of the issue, with business interests naturally pointing to overestimates of
safety and the population pointing to overestimates of risk. The problems are
currently magnified by the silence of science on interactions and combinations
of exposures. The vast majority of research not only is forced to approximate
single toxin exposures but their interactions with other insults. Then again,
some pollution is apparently benign or easily mitigated by secondary means,
allowing society to enjoy benefits without localized burdens. Thankfully some
of this information gather is enabled by the advent of advanced GPS and GIS
systems, research that must continue at a rapid pace.26 Such work could also
help quantify what the impact of health problems is on the participation of
those burdened in democratic pursuits. That is, how does pollution affect the
development of liberal capabilities in a substantive sense?
With a firm foundation (re)established on the movements of people and
pollution research can then add information to the Courts’ decisions. This is
where the bulk of research directly descending from the human rights approach
must focus. As successfully admitted cases continue through the European
Court the field receives more raw data as to where that particular Court finds
boundaries to deriving protection. The elucidation behind those decisions will
prove ample fodder for legal commentary, both within Europe but also in
connection to the U.S. through the comparative approach taken here.
It is also here where legal researchers can work on showing whether the
derivation process is more of a way to smooth and link existing rights or
whether it is stretching the fabric of the rights and contributing to holes. What
advocates of this approach would want is to show that derivation happens
between and not at the edges of the convention’s articles. To quote again
Boyle,
“The virtue of looking at environmental protection through other
rights, such as life, private life or property, is that it focuses atten-
tion on what matters most: the detriment to important, interna-
tionally protected values from uncontrolled environmental harm.
This is an approach which does not need to define such notions as
a satisfactory or decent environment, falls well within the compe-
tence of human rights courts, and involves little or no potential for
26Starting places include Cutter, Susan Hazards, Vulnerability, and Environmental Jus-
tice. Earthscan, 2006, Liu
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conflict with international environmental institutions. . . ”27
That praise helped earlier to motivate the discussion on keeping EHR in a soft
law or goal-oriented role, a role which allows courts to slowly expand existing
rights as cultural and legal conditions permit. It’s the logic that sits in the
background of derived-EHR.
At some point though the growth of jurisprudence outlining where values
are indeed protected will be clearly enunciated in practice. As noted, there
is some mixing here of discussions on levels of law. As one of the conclusions
which emerges from the comparison between the U.S. and Europe is how the
underlying law dictates the derived protection, the level from which the derived
protection emanates must be clarified. This is especially true if advocates
start pushing the derivation process at one or another level at any time. Such
progress must keep in mind too that commentators have noted already that if
existing regulatory structures were strictly adhered to then there would already
be this defined area of environmental rights.28 As this is not the case, legal
theory should get out ahead of the jurisprudence and find where this expansion
does hit definite boundaries and where expansion of rights is an unnecessary
or unwarranted overlay to the regulatory picture. That effort works to prevent
overlap and unclarity, the two biggest problems with expanding rights.
Concomitant and parallel power structures must also be clarified if any court
moves forward in recognizing environmental rights. There are extra-judicial
channels which convey power to advocates,29 as does the court of public opin-
ion.30 If one’s goal is to simply protect the environment until there are no
toxics then there is not need to worry about over-powering derived or sub-
stantive environmental rights. If one is concerned about environmental jus-
tice, properly bounded, or an efficient use of the environment economically
described then these extra-powers need to be accounted for in a court’s calcu-
lations, especially on margins of appreciation afforded. Given the prevalence
of environmental justice concerns and the relative weakness of the individual
against the state and, increasingly, the multi-national corporation, such tuning
might be low on the practical priority list. Calling to mind though Coasian
bargaining and traditional law and economics theory, optimal empowerment
27Boyle Fordham Envtl. L. Rev 18 [2007] , p. 507.
28Hancock, Jan Environmental Human Rights: Power, ethics and law. Ashgate, 2003.
29Branco, Manuel Couret Economics Versus Human Rights. New York: Routledge, 2009.
30Hayward, Tim Constitutional Environmental Rights. Oxford University Press, 2005.
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may be fruitful for mainstream economics research, including economic rights
work.31 Offloading some heavy lifting from legal rhetoric while keeping the
common language of this dialogue should prove fruitful for both sides.
These are all puzzle pieces which fit together to create a picture of a more
environmentally just world, brought about through protecting the classical
liberal sphere of individual liberty, liberty that finds itself under pressure by the
modern usage of the environment. Given time, perhaps environmental justice
research can illuminate exactly the necessary distributions for an equitable,
habitable, and livable society. In the meantime, though, law must play the
lead roll in pressing back the injustices brought down on so many by the rapid
advance of globalization. Recall that it has always been the universality of the
evil which necessitates the rights-based legal mechanisms. This is not a work
extolling a universal characteristic of any environmental right. To quote Gray,
There can be no definitive list of human rights. Rights are no
theorems that fall of theories of law or ethics. They are judgments
about human interests whose content shifts over time as threats to
human interests change. When we ask what rights are universal, we
are not inquiring after a truth that exists already. We are asking a
question that demands a practical decision: Which human interests
warrant universal protection?32
This work found a thread that leads to an acknowledgement that human’s
are already granting universal protection to parts of the environment. The
parts protected overlap considerably, if not fully, with the pieces which envi-
ronmental justice literature would traditionally like to protect. It is the Eu-
ropean Court who has already taken the first step by acknowledging in more
than words the interactions of environment and rights. The U.S. is farther
behind but could quickly re-open their civil rights pathways, allowing for a
more detailed discussion on the relative benefits of multi-axial and single axis
derived protections. That is just another dimension of the work to come. With
any luck, this work has correctly identified the tendencies and located them
within the operating dynamics with which they interact, allowing for some
unifying gravity. With a bit more luck, these paths for future research will
31I.e. Hertel, Shareen/Minkler, Lanse; Hertel, Shareen/Minkler, Lanse, editors Chap.
Economic Rights: The Terrain In Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement and Policy
Issues. Cambridge, 2007.
32Gray, John Two Faces of Liberalism. The New Press, 2000, p. 113.
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elucidate those dynamics more precisely. For environmental justice research
then the academic milieu remains promising. Successful continuation of work
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Mensenrechten (NJCM), 24 Dec 1999, Nr. 8, 1038–1057
Varga, Csaba/Kiss, István/Ember, István: The Lack of Environmental
Justice in Central and Eastern Europe. Environmental Health Perspec-
tives , 110 November 2002, Nr. 11, A662–A663
Veblen, Thorstein: The Theory of the Leisure Class. Modern Library Pa-
perback Edition edition. Random House, 1899 (2001)
Vera, Esther Pozo/Masson, Nathy-Rass/Krämer, Ludwig:
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